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ABSTRACT 
This study attempts to trace how religion could have originated in prehistory 
and antiquity, out of natural human and prehuman behaviour, without requiring the 
reality of the supernatural. 
Religion is here defined as beliefs, conceptions, practices and roles concerned 
with the putative supernatural. A variety of manifestations or elements of religious 
belief and practice can be identified. It is proposed that they have separate origins. 
Examples of religious elements are: life after death, ghosts, sacrifice, priests, 
shamans, gods, demons, .... It is argued that to try to reduce religion to one original 
element is a mistake. There may be no single origin. But the individual elements have 
origins, and plausible theories can account for each. 
Using theories and insights of previous workers, elaborated as necessary with 
information from a range of sciences, arguments are presented to account for five 
major foundational religious elements, thereby illustrating and partly fulfilling what is 
potentially a much wider programme. The elements covered are: 
(1) Animatism: numina, daemons; (2) Animism: ghosts, souls; 
(3) Another world: life after death; (4) Another world: heaven; 
(5) Religious specialists: shamans. 
Chapter 1 introduces the programme. Chapter 2 sets out definitions, 
philosophical principles and methodology. 
Chapter 3 explores the specifically numinous quality which characterizes the 
supernatural in subjective experience. Chapter 4 describes brain structures and the 
neural substrate of experience. Chapter 5 proposes specific neurological hypotheses to 
account for certain types of numinous or `supernatural' experience. 
Chapter 6 deals with ape mentality, which may be presumed to characterize 
that of our remote ancestors, and identifies precursors of religious elements. 
Chapters 7 - 11 deal with the possibly separate origin of five major religious 
elements, as listed above. 
Chapter 12 summarizes the investigation, attempts to place the elements 
covered in sequence of their development in prehistory and antiquity, and expresses 
the limitations of the theory constructed. 
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NOTES ON ORGANIZATION AND TERMINOLOGY 
The appendices are not essential to the argument but provide supporting or 
excursus material. 
The appendices are extensions of specific chapters, and are identified 
accordingly. For example, Appendices 5A, 513 and 5C are appendices to Chapter 5. 
In accordance with recent practice in palaeoanthropology, I have used the term 
` hominin' to refer to creatures on the lineage which separated from chimpanzees and 
includes living human beings. Until recently, the commonly used term was `hominid'. 
Reasons for the change in nomenclature are discussed in Appendix 6A. 
I sometimes use the terms `primal' and `primitive' - of course without 
derogatory connotation - when referring to the people and cultures of tribal, pre - 
agricultural societies of recent centuries. I use the word `primordial' to refer to 






The argument of my thesis is that a plausible case can be made for the origin 
of religious behaviours by natural means in the course of human evolution. To this 
end, my programme in what follows is to attempt to show how beliefs and practices 
of a religious or quasi- religious character may be explained as natural developments 
in prehistory, without recourse to divine intervention or other supernatural agency. 
My argument does not require that the supernatural not exist or that a deity 
not exist, or that no divine intervention should have taken place in human history or 
prehistory. It is neutral on the truth of any given religion. When a Christian states 
that God `sustains in being all that is', he or she does not imply that the laws of 
physics have no relevance in explaining the universe. Acceptance of the laws of 
physics and belief in the sustaining power of the deity are not mutually exclusive. 
Conversely, to seek a naturalistic explanation for the origins of religion is not to 
exclude the possibility that a given religious doctrine may correctly describe some 
aspects of reality, or to abrogate, if one possesses it, one's own religious faith. One 
can, of course, be a physicist and a priest (Polkinghorne 2000) or an evolutionary 
geneticist and a Christian (Finlay 2003). 
Justification of the inquiry 
Apes and humans 
Apes do not have religion; we do. All recent human populations have had a 
form of religion (Lowie 1948: xvi; Malinowski 1948: 1). This means that, unless our 
common ancestor had religion and apes have since lost it, religion first appeared at 
some point during the evolution of human beings from the common ancestor of 
hominins and apes. My question is: how did the hominins get from a condition of no 
religion to a condition of having religion? 
It is possible to imagine a world in which groups of people or of other 
sentient social creatures do not practise religion of any kind or hold any beliefs 
recognizable as religious. Such a world may have been that of our remote ancestors. 
Chapter 1 1 
Other religions 
Even if one accepts the truth of a given religion, for example Islam, and 
ascribes its origin to divine intervention in human history, there is still a need to 
account for the origin of other religions. If one accepts that, say, the Judeo -Christian 
tradition owes its origin to divine revelation, the need remains to explain the origin of 
other, incompatible religions in naturalistic terms. That is so unless they too are to be 
attributed to divine revelation, either the revelation of their own gods or a partial 
revelation by the deity of the Judeo -Christian tradition (cf Parrinder 1954: 18). 
Unless all religion is to be attributed to revelation, then there is scope to seek 
origins in naturalistic terms. In later chapters I seek to put forward at least the 
foundation of a naturalistic explanation of religion. A naturalistic explanation is one 
which is comprehensible in terms of physiology and psychology without requiring 
the reality of the supernatural. 
A revelatory theory 
If religion is never to be explained in naturalistic terms, then the origin of all 
religions must be attributed to divine agency. One might call this view a revelatory 
theory. Divine agency can be seen as additional to psychological and physiological 
agency. The principle of parsimony, that a more parsimonious explanation is to be 
preferred where possible, is widely accepted in science. It is known to philosophers 
as Occam's razor. In accordance with that principle, the onus of proof would appear 
to rest upon those who would espouse a revelatory theory. It would be up to them to 
show that divine agency in prehistory brought about the earliest religions. 
On the revelatory view, how would religion originate? Would there be a 
theophany, followed by an astonished obeisance? At what stage in human evolution 
did it occur? What kind of human or prehuman was the first to receive such a 
theophany? The revelatory view is not by any means to be dismissed out of hand, but 
those questions indicate that it would be hard to research. It is not within my present 
objectives to pursue it further. 
It seems to me legitimate to seek an origin of religion which does not involve 
divine intervention, if only to see how satisfactorily naturalistic explanations can 
account for the phenomena of religious behaviour. 
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Feasibility 
According to Evans -Pritchard (1965: 104, 111), it is unscientific to search for 
the origins of religion, `especially when they cannot be found'. He says, for example, 
`The ideas of soul and spirit could have arisen in the way Tylor supposed, but there is 
no evidence that they did' (1965: 25). It is not clear what would count as evidence in 
such a case. My point is that it is worthwhile to have a theory. 
If there is to be no theory of the origins of religion, then there is a vacuity in 
this area of anthropology and theology of a kind not tolerated elsewhere in human 
inquiry, even in the case of unique, unrepeatable and experimentally unobservable 
events. For example, there is no lack of theories about the origin of the universe. In 
history, there is no lack of theories about Prince Charles Edward Stuart, his military 
expertise, personal courage or lack of these. 
In my view, evidence can be found. Information and insights from a number 
of disciplines, such as archaeology, anthropology, primatology and psychology, can 
be used to search for it. 
Evans -Pritchard (1965: 16, 108, 112) criticizes early theorists such as Tylor, 
Frazer, Lang and Marett, who attempted to investigate primitive religions and inquire 
into the origins of religion without leaving their armchairs. A given primal religion 
cannot be understood without the context of the social structures within which it is 
practised. But the early theorists did not attempt to describe given primitive or primal 
religions without reading the reports of field researchers. Even a field ethnographer, 
if he or she wishes to extend an interpretation beyond an immediate target society, 
has to depend upon other researchers, because in a single lifetime no one can study at 
first hand every primal society, even the few remaining in the modern world. And 
even Evans -Pritchard (1965: 114) seems to acknowledge that merely accumulating 
descriptive studies of the religions of particular preliterate peoples is a little tedious. 
What I believe Marett, Tylor and others were ultimately interested in, and 
what I am interested in, is not to know the part which religion plays in the life of any 
given people today, but how religion came about in the first place. 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, study of current and recent 
stone -age peoples brought to light primal religions with different and apparently 
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defining characteristics, such as totemism, ancestor worship and the like. As these 
characteristics were to be found differentially among peoples with more or less 
developed levels of material culture, it was possible to believe that the identified 
characteristics were indicators of historical stages of religious development 
proceeding in parallel with material development. It seemed that the stages could be 
put in order chronologically from less evolved to more evolved. In this way, some 
believed, it would be possible to determine the form of the least developed and 
therefore earliest religion (e.g., Schmidt 1931). Nowadays, the correlation of 
religious characteristics to levels of material culture and the assessment of 
evolutionary stages is treated as discredited, and the enterprise has been abandoned. 
No amount of field research among primitives is going to deliver the answer to the 
question of the origin of religion (Evans -Pritchard 1965: 104). 
The above conclusion should not be surprising. No recent stone -age society 
exhibits the earliest stage of human development. Every human society today, 
whether in the `developed' or `developing' world, stands equally at the end of a long 
line of cultural development from a more primitive condition, in the end stemming 
from the presumably simian culture of the common ancestor of hominins and African 
apes, maybe six million years ago. 
We cannot study the origins of religion first hand. We cannot even study the 
religion of past historical people first hand, although we may have their written 
documents. With only archaeological evidence, the religion of prehistoric people is 
even more problematical to estimate. We cannot know the mentality or mental 
capacities of early humans or prehumans, who may have been the first to conceive 
religion, and our speculations are constrained by this ignorance (Lang 1898: 62, 64). 
Even so, the study of religious concepts among recent tribal people has 
relevance to the search for religious origins: for the following obvious and almost 
traditional reason, which I make explicit. Recent stone -age societies evidently have 
not changed so much as present literate or industrialized nations in the course of the 
last thirty thousand years. They remain in a hunter - gatherer state of subsistence 
similar to that which archaeological evidence indicates was once the way of life of 
prehistoric peoples around the globe. Their geographical and cultural environments 
are limited and therefore the scope of their thought limited - or liberated - in the 
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same sort of way as we may presume for prehistoric societies. It seems, therefore, a 
reasonable assumption that their religions may be more similar than those of 
complex literate western or oriental cultures to the religions which mankind may 
have practised five, ten, twenty or thirty thousand years ago. 
Customs and beliefs in stone -age societies do not necessarily remain static for 
long periods. The extinct Tasmanian people had a history, and their final culture is 
not to be equated with that of the original Palaeolithic immigrants (Lowie 1948: 
125). Among aboriginal tribes of central Australia, the initiatory practice of 
subincision was not established from remote antiquity but apparently spread from the 
south east of the continent within recent centuries (Berndt 1951: 16). The world 
views of African traditional cultures are not static and timeless. Religious innovation 
within continuing traditional world views has been documented by field workers in 
Africa over a period of decades, and no doubt went on in past centuries, although in 
oral tradition innovators and their new ideas tend to be relegated to the `time of the 
beginnings' (Horton 1993: 313). 
Provided that one does not treat any given recent tribal religion as if it can 
stand for study as an unchanged relic of the past, one may hope to derive some 
insight into the form which religion might have taken in tribal societies of prehistory. 
If there appear to be similarities in the religious ideas and practices of 
geographically separated tribal peoples, these especially are noteworthy. If they are 
really similarities, then they are significant as indicating something about the past: 
conceivably communication between prehistoric peoples, and either a common 
origin of the religious behaviour with adoption of it by those peoples who did not 
invent it, or separate origins of similar ideas. The latter especially, but also the 
former, would suggest that the ideas and motives behind the religious behaviour are 
of a very fundamental nature. 
Religion, magic and the supernatural 
What I call `religion and magic' is essentially the same as that which Frazer 
covered by the same phrase in The Golden Bough (Frazer 1922). I mean ideas, 
beliefs and practices, and roles undertaken by persons, concerning what is thought to 
be supernatural. Putative supernatural forces and beings include gods and spirits and 
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occult powers such as blessings and curses. While the supernatural excludes social 
practices such as visiting the sick and promoting a faith by preaching, it includes 
matters which are central to religion and often the focus of preaching, such as prayer 
and life after death. 
To generalize, the supernatural seems to be a matter of agencies, usually 
invisible, intermittently acting, personal and sentient, which can exert invisible forces 
quite distinct from any other, commonly experienced, invisible force such as gravity. 
For example, the sentient agents may be living human beings in the role of priests or 
witches, or may themselves be invisible, in the form of ghosts or gods. 
Religion and magic form a compendium of ideas, beliefs, activities and roles 
concerned with these forces. Table 1.1 lists various religious and magical elements: 
those ideas, beliefs, activities and roles. 
Spirit Ghosts Mediumship 
Gods Angels Demons 
Visions Prophecy Divination 
Ritual Hymns Blessing 
Witchcraft Spells Curses 
Life after death Reincarnation Resurrection 
Ecstatic journey Underworld Heaven 
Prayer Sacrifice Communion 
Myth Tradition Theology 
Priest Shaman Theologian 
Table 1.1 
As will become clearer, I do not make much distinction between religion and 
magic, as both have to do with the supernatural. I use the word `religion' to cover 
both. 
The supernatural and rationality 
It can be seen from Table 1.1 that the supernatural is practically definable as 
the collection of alleged phenomena which are generally regarded as not amenable to 
explanation in the terms of normal physics, chemistry, biology or psychology. 
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Theology, while it may be the queen of sciences, generally does not seek to explain 
the objects of its study in terms of natural science, but rather is a discipline which 
accepts a world view including supernatural elements as a starting point and operates 
with conventions of its own. 
Religion, magic and the supernatural are generally seen as in some way 
outside of science and the scientific or even common -sense approach to 
understanding the world. That observation alone might provoke the question as to 
how religion came about. It may be puzzling enough that people today believe things 
which seem to run counter to a common -sense or rational outlook on the world (cf. 
Bergson 1935: 103). In the case of early humans or prehumans, however, one would 
presume on a prima facie basis that for daily survival they would have been obliged 
to be practical in their approach to activities such as food -gathering and self -defence, 
and careful to conserve resources, including their own time and energy. A fortiori, 
why did they begin to have beliefs, say about spirits, which, from a rationalist 
standpoint, would get in the way of a realistic view of their surroundings? Why did 
they begin to carry out practices, such as perhaps hunting magic, which would appear 
to most of us inefficacious and therefore a waste of time and energy? 
In so far as it is not amenable to scientific investigation, religion may be seen 
as irrational or non -rational. In the religious sphere of their life, people hold beliefs 
and act upon those beliefs, apparently without requiring the usual kind of evidence, 
from their senses and from demonstration, regarding the existence of the alleged 
agencies which are the object of those beliefs and actions. 
When people pray, they believe that there is a sentient being to which they 
pray. Normally we do not attempt to address a person unless we can see the 
interlocutor, or we believe him or her to be behind an obstruction, or we are using a 
telecommunication device. When someone dies, we expect the cause to be old age, 
illness or injury. If there is any doubt about the cause, we expect a physician to 
investigate the possibility of infection, poison, a cancer or some other biological 
condition. If someone said that witchcraft could be responsible for the death of a very 
old person, most of us today (pace Evans -Pritchard 1965: 110) would not think that 
suggestion helpful for understanding or worth following up. 
Chapter 1 7 
A world view which includes an existent supernatural realm allows for more 
beings and forces than one which is limited to the objects of western scientific 
explanation. For example, a world view which includes witchcraft as a possible 
explanation for various phenomena requires the existence of personal or impersonal 
unseen forces, not measurable by scientific instruments, or at least so far 
unmeasured, and possibly of invisible, more or less intelligent and wilful personal 
beings such as demons. One imagines that a person who espouses such a world view 
would not reject the reality of electromagnetic forces and gravity, oxidation of 
metals, the carriage of malaria in infected blood by mosquitoes or any of the other 
discoveries and theories about the world produced by science. So witchcraft is an 
addition to everything science has to offer. 
The problem with a world view which includes witchcraft is that, if scientific 
explanations can account for all the phenomena, there is no need to posit this extra 
realm of forces and beings. The principle of parsimony can be applied with a view to 
pruning all world views including elements of the supernatural, unless the 
supernatural elements provide explanations where science does not. If there occur 
phenomena which are not accounted for by science but are accounted for by a 
supernatural explanation, then it makes sense - that is, it is rational - to accept, at 
least provisionally, the supernatural explanation. Here of course one excludes 
fraudulent phenomena, such as some cases from the annals of spiritualism. 
There is much that science has not explained: for example, how 
electromagnetic radiation manifests in some observations as particles and in others as 
waves. But such unknowns in science have not been addressed, to my knowledge, by 
hypotheses involving the supernatural. Astrologers do not attempt to bring insights 
from their body of theory to bear on calculating the mass of Jupiter. New -age druids 
do not offer to elucidate the chemical composition of the standing stones at Avebury. 
Theories of the supernatural tend to have their own allegedly supernatural 
phenomena to deal with, such as second sight or answered prayer, rather than seek to 
deal with questions from the everyday world, such as how to recognise fatty foods, 
or questions from science, such as what conditions within a cell prompt mitosis or 
meiosis. World views admitting the existence of the supernatural, therefore, tend 
always to include it as an addition. 
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If a phenomenon generally accounted for by hypotheses of the supernatural 
can be explained in terms which do not involve the supernatural, then it is rational, in 
accordance with Occam's razor, to eliminate the supernatural from our repertoire of 
hypotheses in respect of that phenomenon. For example, if a subject's hearing 
disembodied voices can be explained in terms of hallucination, then it is rational to 
discard the hypothesis that a demon is addressing the subject. In other words, unless 
one rejects the concept of hallucination, the demonic hypothesis becomes additional 
to an adequate explanation and therefore superfluous. 
I do not claim that all allegedly supernatural phenomena have been explained 
by science or necessarily can be explained by science, even in principle. Moreover, 
even if a phenomenon is explicable equally by supernatural agency or by natural 
agency, its explicability by natural means is not a guarantee that natural agency is the 
correct explanation. It would be rational, on the basis of Occam's razor, to believe 
that it is and proceed as if it is, but a supernatural agency could not be finally ruled 
out purely on the ground of explicability by natural means. 
Interesting though the above considerations are in their own right, for my 
present purposes, the trend of those considerations is to lead back to the following 
question. If belief in the supernatural is essentially irrational, if it requires the 
assumption of an extra realm of being besides the physical or natural, if to us today it 
seems that most, if not all, phenomena in the world are explicable without requiring 
supernatural causes, then what prompted our prehistoric ancestors to begin practising 
religion and magic? 
The function of religion 
Even the religions of classical antiquity, let alone those of the present, 
represent late and complex stages of religious development. Study of them would not 
cast much light on their origins, or, rather, on the origin of the religious forms which 
preceded them. 
For my purpose it would not be fruitful to look at the function of religion in 
modern society or at the forms which religion takes in modern society. The function 
of a Christian church in the perception of members of its community may be, among 
other things, to provide social gatherings, offer shared worship and encourage 
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personal experience of Jesus Christ. There will be a diversity of functions appealing 
to different people. 
The function of a religion in its society at a given period of history and in a 
given locality may not be the same as the function which it had in an earlier period or 
in a different place. Politically, the function of the Church of England today is 
different from its function at the time of the English Reformation. In West Central 
Scotland, being a Roman Catholic or a Protestant defines one's allegiances within the 
local community more markedly than would be the case in South Africa. 
Frazer, before him Tylor, and after him Durkheim, Freud and others 
attempted to expose the common features of religious and magical practices and 
beliefs, to explain the function of religion and magic for individuals and societies, 
and in some cases to elucidate how religion and magic might have come about. My 
concern here is not the interesting features or even the function which religion or 
magic may serve in any given society, current, historical or prehistoric. I am 
concerned only to try to show how religion and magic might have come about. 
Features, even common features, of religions, and functions which religion or magic 
serve are of interest only in showing how religion and magic might have originated. 
What is included in religion 
A variety of definitions of religion have been proposed. Some classical 
examples follow. For Tylor, a belief in spiritual beings counts as a minimal definition 
of religion (1871, I: 424). According to Marett (1914: 1), an attitude of 
supernaturalism among primitive peoples provides religion with its raw material. 
Frazer regards religion, in contrast to magic, as a theory which assumes that the 
course of nature is determined by conscious agents (1922: 54). Durkheim defines 
religion as `a unified set of beliefs and practices related to sacred things, that is to 
say, things set apart and forbidden - beliefs and practices which united into one 
single moral community ... all those who adhere to them' (1915: 47), and at the 
same time, by a tour de force of continental metaphysics, `a system of ideas by 
means of which people represent to themselves the society of which they are 
members and the opaque but intimate relations they have in it' (1915: 323). Geertz 
says (1973: 90) that a religion is a system of symbols which establishes moods and 
motivations in people by offering theories of a general order of existence and giving 
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those theories such an aura of truth that the moods and motivations seem uniquely 
realistic. More recently, Stone (2001: 177) has defined religion as 'a system of 
practices rationalized by beliefs according to which the practices place the 
practitioner in a relation -of -value to a supramundane reality so grand that it can 
figure centrally in the satisfaction of human needs'. In Chapter 3, I shall show that 
the grandeur implicated in this last definition, while applicable to some religions, is 
inapplicable to others. 
My own approach reverts to Tylor and Marett. Such an approach has of 
course been criticized, for example, by Durkheim (1915: 24 -29). Durkheim's 
theories in turn have been severely criticized: for example, by Richard (1923: 228- 
276) and Lowie (1948: 153 -163). 
A given religion can perhaps be defined in terms of its own content - on my 
terminology (see below), which elements it contains and how they are manifested. I 
take religion in general to be the body of those ideas, beliefs, practices and roles that 
are concerned with the supernatural. I then seek a non - supernatural - that is, 
naturalistic - origin for some of those ideas, beliefs, practices and roles. I propose 
that a non - supernatural origin can probably also be found for those which I do not 
have the resource to cover in the present work. 
Because I define religion as having to do with the supernatural, it is open to a 
critic to say (1) that really there are elements of religion other than those concerned 
with the supernatural, or even (2) that religion is primarily concerned with matters 
other than the supernatural. I would certainly disagree with (2) and would consider, 
regarding (1), that the non - supernatural components of religion, if there are such, are 
less critical or fundamental to religion than the supernatural ones. I would argue, had 
I the resource to expend on it here, that matters which I would expect to be alleged to 
be non - supernatural aspects of religion are not essentially religious but social or 
traditional matters (cf Malinowski 1948: 41). For example, marriage, circumcision, 
and a communal meal attended by a church's alpha group are cultural traditions or 
social events. Such things are not essentially components of religion, just as the 
Biblical prohibitions against yoking together a horse and an ass or against wearing a 
garment of hemp mixed with flax are social rather than essentially religious matters 
(Durkheim 1915: 34). When the football crowd sing in communal harmony, that is 
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not religion. When a Celtic player crosses himself before running out onto the pitch, 
that is religion. 
If the reader is unable to accept that the body of ideas, beliefs, practices and 
roles concerned with the supernatural is coterminous with all or most of religion. 
then I ask him or her to bear with me and mentally substitute such phrases as `ideas, 
beliefs, practices and roles concerned with the supernatural' and `the supernatural', 
appropriately as occasion demands, for my term `religion' in most of what follows. 
At worst, I arbitrarily define religion as above. If, according to a different judgement, 
there are components of religion other than those concerned with the supernatural, 
then, as I do not seek to account for the origin of those, I shall have failed to offer an 
account of the origins of religion by naturalistic means: my account will have been 
insufficiently comprehensive. I have to accept that this may be so. I therefore ask the 
reader to accept the parameters, clearly stated above, of what I seek to do, and judge 
what follows within those parameters. 
Religious elements and their separate origins 
Religion has the appearance of a `complex and multifarious growth -a forest 
rather than a tree' (Marett 1914: 36). I propose that religious behaviour and religious 
concepts are not homogeneous, but that there are a variety of distinct manifestations 
or elements of religious belief and practice, and that these have separate origins. 
A given religion may manifest, for example, perhaps along with many others, 
these three elements or components: inspiration and prophecy, sacrifice, and a belief 
in personal survival after death. Those three elements of religious phenomena are 
not, I believe, necessarily concomitant. They may be found together at a given 
period, say, at the present day or in the ancient classical world, and form part of a 
given coherent religious complex at that time, for example early classical Greek 
religion or classical Judaism. However, I contend that they could have arisen 
separately. If this were not so, then we would have to suppose that at a certain 
moment the religious complex of which these three form part sprang into practice all 
at once, as it were ready made. 
Consider again Table 1.1. It may be that as religions develop, they include or 
omit elements from preexisting religions or supernatural practices. For example, 
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Islam includes such elements as sacrifice and life after death, and omits 
reincarnation, all of which elements were extant in other religions prior to the time of 
the Prophet. In effect, the selection of elements to be included within Islam was 
defined historically by the Prophet and his immediate followers. In the case of older 
religions such as Judaism, whose origin is not so clearly documented or so clearly 
assignable to a limited historical period, components may have accreted to or have 
been dropped from the complex over the centuries of its development. For example, 
as a case of historically evident change, sacrificial burnt offerings were central to the 
Jewish religion in the centuries before the Diaspora, yet have remained discontinued 
since the destruction of the Temple. 
My proposition is that religious elements such as belief in life after death, 
sacrificial offerings, mediumship, prophecy and the like each could have appeared at 
different times in prehistory and could each have been prompted by different causes. 
The religious elements - the ideas and beliefs, the practices, the roles taken 
on by practitioners - are, I contend, human inventions which occurred in the course 
of prehistory and antiquity. They are responses to common experiences and 
predicaments in human or even prehuman hominin life. They did not all come into 
being at once, forming any sort of complex, but rather at different times as humans or 
prehumans made their responses to certain experiences when those experiences were 
new. One suspects that only at a late stage of prehistory - but prehistory rather than 
history - did human beings at any locality attempt to codify or turn into a coherent 
complex the mixed bag of those religious elements which a given community carried 
with them out of their savage past. 
I do not say that the elements are always discrete. Some shade into others: 
souls, daemons and gods are all spiritual beings. Some elements influence the 
development of others: experience of what seems to be another world influences how 
the soul and personal survival after death are envisaged. 
In seeking the origins of religion, it is not necessary to account for its later 
developments. Later developments of a given religion may have very little in 
common with the original forms of belief and practice in the same religious tradition, 
let alone with what prevailed in prehistory. For example, modern Christianity exists 
in many forms, from Irish Catholicism and Armenian monasticism to the 
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fundamentalism of the American Bible Belt. The development of these diverse forms 
can be traced and explained historically by those equipped to do so. The origin of an 
entire religion can in some cases be clearly traced. For example, the origins of Islam 
in Arabia in the seventh century CE are fairly well understood, as are the origins of 
Mormonism in the nineteenth century. 
Only the origins of certain basic elements are within the scope of my 
investigation. Once certain elements came into being - that is, once people started to 
believe certain things or carry out certain actions which we can count to be of a 
religious nature - then the material was present for future development by 
modifying, expanding and combining those elements. It may be that throughout the 
later millennia of prehistory people adapted and augmented the initial elements and 
added others, so that the religious dimension of life passed through a number of 
phases and developments. Some developments probably were dead ends, the 
practices abandoned or the adherents exterminated; others became the main streams 
and ultimately produced the historical world religions (cf Tylor 1871, I: 426). 
According to Frazer (1922), mankind has passed through three broad phases 
of thought: the magical, the religious and the scientific. Evidence to distinguish these 
phases or place them in temporal succession seems to be slight or nonexistent (Lang 
1901: 46 -75), and no one would try to justify them now (Evans -Pritchard 1965: 28). 
They are not material to my thesis and I do not try to defend them. In Chapter 12, 
however, I do try to assign a temporal order to what, on prima facie grounds, seem to 
be the earliest religious elements. 
Plan of the rest of the thesis 
Background 
There have been many theorists on the origin of religion. I have not chosen to 
make a critique of one theory and then another, which would be a largely historical 
enterprise. This is not an historical inquiry about what Tylor, Durkheim or any other 
writer may have said or intended to say. It is an attempt to put forward a plausible 
theory of the origins of religion. 
In learning a science, one is not taught the succession of theories in the field 
from the ancient Greeks onward, but rather is taught the conclusions accepted at the 
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present day, usually without much historical reference to the discoverers of the 
phenomena or theories presented. This way one becomes proficient in doing that 
science. It may be that those who are familiar with the historical dimension of 
science are better able to contribute new ideas (Feyerabend 1975). However, to be an 
effective practitioner one must deal with current theories in their own right as 
principally modes of understanding the world rather than with a range of alternative 
theories as primarily the creations of historical, criticizable individuals. Practitioners 
of physics do not worry about what Einstein or Heisenberg actually said or what they 
may have intended by some of their pronouncements. Physicists use those 
authorities' theories as they have been taught, without feeling a need to go back to 
original sources (Polkinghorne 1998: 87). 
I make use of my authorities in the same spirit, to put together my own case, 
although I do cite original sources closely. This I conceive as an approach most 
likely to produce interesting results. I take what I can from those writers who have 
had valuable insights. 
So far I have not found any writer whose theory accounts satisfactorily for the 
origins of religion as such, the whole of primitive religious belief and practice. Some 
writers have appeared to believe that their theories were more or less satisfactory 
theories of the origin of religion (Tylor 1871, I: 426 -428; Marett 1914: iii, ix, xi; 
Guthrie 1993: 3, 7, 201). The problem is not that the theories are unconvincing, or 
that the criticism levelled by other authorities really in all cases stands up. The 
problem for each theory, in claiming to be a theory of the origin of religion, is one of 
scope, because religion is not one thing. 
Religion in the abstract is a collection of elements, as described above. It is a 
collection of ideas and practices which have been selected and combined by 
individuals or groups of individuals at divers times to produce different actual 
religions and their offshoot sects, heresies and new religions. Some historical 
religions have manifested some elements at one time and not at another time. Some 
groups adhering to a given religion include elements in their belief or practice which 
another denomination or sect would exclude. For example, gods are included in 
popular as opposed to philosophical Buddhism; deceased saints who can intercede 
are included in Roman Catholic as opposed to Protestant Christianity. 
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I do indeed think some of the theories of religious origins are convincing. 
They are convincing theories of the origin of one or more elements. That is enough 
to be an impressive achievement. For, once a few major elements are seen to be 
explicable in naturalistic terms, it becomes credible that the rest may turn out on 
further investigation to be either independently explicable in naturalistic terms, or 
even derivable from those elements already explained. 
Approach to the subject 
My approach to the subject is straightforward and perhaps old -fashioned, 
because I think that approach is correct. It is different from the approaches of most 
recent well known scholars, with the exception of Guthrie. What I believe I am doing 
is, in a wide sense, philosophy of religion, and I start from a philosophical 
standpoint. 
Although much of what follows is concerned with and makes use of 
anthropology, I do not follow its customary methods. Throughout I have avoided the 
use of such words as `cognitive' and `symbolic', which are de rigueur in recent 
literature. In fact, I have avoided abstractions so far as possible. What characterizes 
my approach is the practice, or at least intention, of limiting description and analysis 
to what individual people do or could do, and to what happens or could happen to 
individual people. As a result, my approach will seem concrete to the point of crudity 
to those accustomed to read, for example, Lévi- Strauss, Boyer or Rappaport. My 
sense is that abstract theories become removed from what really happens in 
individual lives, because abstract language has a tendency to take on a life of its 
own. ' At their worst, they are examples of the triumph of system over facts and 
explanation. The criticisms by the down -to -earth Radin (1938, 1953) of his 
predecessors and contemporaries Levy- Bruhl, Durkheim, Róheim and others can be 
applied mutatis mutandis to their symbolically minded successors. 
The interpretation of religion as an enterprise more akin to art and aesthetics 
than to science is unconvincing. On this view, religious discourse is often seen as not 
meaning what on the surface it would appear to mean but as symbolizing attitudes to 
My last sentence is itself an example of this tendency. It is people who allow themselves to spin 
abstract language; language is nothing without individual people to use it. 
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society. Symbolist theories have been, in my view, successfully criticized by Horton 
(1993: 53 -160) and Guthrie (1993: 26 -34). 
My study has to start from a standpoint which I believe in. Essentially, I take 
a literalist view of religion. When people say there are ghosts and spirits, they mean 
that there are ghosts and spirits, which are usually invisible, more or less intelligent, 
more or less autonomous agents in the world, agents of a supernatural character. In 
the interest of making progress with the real positive task as I conceive it, I shall 
devote very little space to negative criticism of theories with which I disagree. 
Frequently I cite old authors, mostly from the half century prior to the Second 
World War, whom most workers now would regard as passé. This is because, firstly, 
the subject of religious origins was largely neglected from that time up to the 1990s. 
Secondly, I make use of previous insights whatever their era, and try to credit their 
originators. Thirdly, the writing of the pioneers is clear, succinct and rich with ideas. 
The principles of my approach are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
Plan 
It would be a lifetime's work to set out such a theory as I propose and to 
make the case in full. My programme therefore is more limited. I cannot expect to 
produce a huge opus giving every detail and anticipating every counterargument. I 
can, however, make a case about the origin of religion which will be intelligible and 
perhaps convincing in its own right, and which could be used as a basis for further 
research. 
Guthrie (1993) traces the origin of religion to anthropomorphism, Freud 
(1933) to the Oedipus complex and a primordial totem feast, Tylor (1871) to the 
dream -image of dead or absent persons. Others have identified what they believe to 
be primordial practices associated with menstruation and deception of males by 
coalitions of females, which were of selective value (Knight and Powers 1998). The 
nature of the origin ascribed is related to the defining nature of religion as the writer 
in question conceives religion to be. 
However, I think the idea of a single defining factor is a chimera. In my view 
it is a mistake to try to reduce religion to one element or to seek the origin of all 
religious phenomena or elements in the origin of one. There is no single system and 
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there are many elements. There may be no single origin. But the individual elements 
will have origins, and those separate origins can profitably be sought and probably 
can be found; or at least plausible theories can be developed to account for the 
presence in history of those religious elements. 
To account for each religious element by natural means, I use as a basis a 
theory already promulgated by one or more authorities which comes close to 
fulfilling the requirement. I elaborate the theory as I see the need. There is of course 
overlap between elements, for example, between spirit beings and souls; and the 
possible developments of one element in relation to others, particularly proximal 
ones like spirit beings and souls, will be discussed. 
Owing to limitations of time and resource, I shall attempt to cover only five 
of the elements from the list which I presented in an earlier section. However, those 
which I propose to deal with are precisely those I believe to be central to religion, as 
it were core or foundational elements. I see these as actually defining what religion is 
about and including or possibly giving rise to some of the others. 
I deal with the elements listed below. 
Animatism: personifications, daemons (Chapter 7) 
Animism: souls, ghosts (Chapter 8) 
Another world: life after death (Chapter 9) 
Another world: heaven (Chapter 10) 
Religious innovators: shamans, priests (Chapter 11) 
Among the notable elements missing from my plan are those pertaining to 
gods, myth and sacrifice. These three are absent not because they are unimportant but 
because one has to stop somewhere, and the chapters on the five which I do cover 
will sufficiently illustrate the programme. 
Chapter 2 sets out definitions and principles, expanding on the methodology 
described in this introduction. 
Chapter 3 describes the specifically religious or numinous quality which 
defines the supernatural in subjective experience. Chapter 4 describes the neural 
substrate underlying experience and Chapter 5 proposes neuropsychological 
hypotheses to account for certain types of religious, supernatural and paranormal 
experience. 
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Religion originated in prehistory, at some time between the separation of the 
population which would give rise to humans from the stock of the apes, and the time 
of the earliest literate civilizations. Chapter 6 therefore deals with the nature of ape 
mentality, which may be presumed to characterize that of our remote ancestors. This 
is to clarify what basis there was at a remote period for the development of religious 
conceptions. 
Chapters 7 - 11 deal with the possibly separate origin of five core religious 
elements, as listed above. 
Chapter 12 summarizes the investigation, attempts to draw conclusions, and 
expresses the limitations of the theory thus constructed. 
Exclusions 
As might be expected given my title, at the outset I intended to cover in some 
detail what appears to be the earliest clear evidence of religious behaviour: the 
Palaeolithic burials of Eurasia and the parietal and mobiliary art of the European 
Upper Palaeolithic. However, in dealing with the generation of specific religious 
elements out of a milieu of their absence, I have expended all available space. With 
the exception of heaven, all the religious elements dealt with could have come into 
being during or before the Upper Palaeolithic. Some discussion of the bearing of the 
Upper Palaeolithic evidence is given in Chapters 9, 10 and 11. 
No claim can be made of comprehensive treatment. A huge swathe of 
religious and quasi -religious ideas, not obviously connected with the elements which 
are treated, is omitted. These include the `spiritual' quality of striking events in 
nature such as the migration of birds, and the esteem accorded in tribal and ancient 
societies to game animals and even to nourishing plants. 
An unfinished research programme 
My purpose is to show that a naturalistic account can be given of the origin of 
religious elements. I demonstrate that a theory is possible by constructing one. Given 
the main plank of the theory, that religious elements are separate, the rest is less a 
theory than a large research programme of which I have covered some strands, 
dealing with certain religious elements, but have not the time or space to cover 
others. There is also a lack of specificity in some areas. One of these is neurology, 
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where there are deficiencies both in my lay understanding and in the degree to which 
neurology itself is able at present to account for phenomena in detail. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRINCIPLES AND PARAMETERS 
A rationalist approach 
Sympathetic description of beliefs 
Shiels (1978: 714), regarding a belief of the Andamanese about souls, baldly 
tells us, `The ot-jumulo leaves the body commonly during sleep'. In contrast, I would 
have to say, `Well, no, it doesn't. The ot-jumulo does not leave the body during 
sleep, because there is no ot-jumulo!' 
I do not know whether Shiels thought there was an ot-jumulo, and this 
discussion is not a criticism of him. It is a convention in cultural anthropology to 
write baldly and sympathetically as if one accepts the beliefs of the people studied as 
true. This is the emic, as opposed to etic, approach (cf. Carlsen and Prechtel 1994: 
78 -79). The sympathies of some writers on shamanism are positively romantic (e.g., 
Wasson 1968, Furst 1994 and contributors to Furst 1997). A striking exception is 
presented by certain Russian scholars trained in the Soviet era. For example, Alexeev 
(1990) repeatedly uses quotation marks round phrases which indicate the supposed 
activities of shamans: `Curiously, the shaman "descended" into the ocean ...'; 
`Yakut shamans displayed "miracles" ...'; `Shamans, "fighting" with the spirit that 
was "possessing" the patient ...'. This author was producing an explicit atheist 
Marxist -Leninist analysis (Alexeev 1990: 108). 
While a sympathy with a target culture is usual, and perhaps necessary if the 
fullest understanding of that culture is to be attained, it would be extraordinary if 
ethnographers seriously assented to the beliefs of a people under study. If they did, 
they would be taking on board a whole raft of ideas foreign to those of their native 
society, such as beliefs in shamanic flight, a multiplicity of deities or a variety of 
disembodied spirits, all of which would surprise their friends and colleagues. There 
are enormous ontological ramifications to acceptance of the supernatural, as 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
An intellectual demand would have to be made that the researcher square his 
or her nativist beliefs with the western scientific knowledge (or alleged knowledge), 
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and perhaps religious dogma, which he or she espouses when back home. Evans - 
Pritchard (1937: 11 -12, 226) tells us that, among the Azande, witchcraft is regarded 
as a substance which, when it moves at night, can be seen as fire passing along a 
path. Such a belief invites questions about what exactly is emitting the fire -like light; 
and, if the source of the light is a process of combustion, what substance is being 
combined with oxygen. As for the belief in spirits among the Azande, that invites 
questions regarding the place in nature of the spirits, and in what manner they, as 
non -material objects, interact with material substances which at other times appear to 
act in accordance with the laws of physics. If one is a Christian, the further question 
arises: how do the spirits figure in an ontology consistent with scripture or with 
redemptive theology? 
To be sure, tribal people who profess traditional beliefs may assent to them, 
but they are still not true. We do not subscribe to the Arunta legend, reported by 
Spencer and Gillen (1899), that `the two brothers' created a lake in central Australia, 
but believe that it was created by geological processes. Does the ball game of the 
Hopi Indians help the corn to grow? (Lowie 1948). In those connections the 
hypotheses involving the brothers and the ball game are mistaken or superfluous. 
Some beliefs make sense in the world outlook of a given tribal society. Yet 
tribal people readily give up traditional beliefs when western commerce comes to 
their country (Herdt 1994: xv). In the middle of the twentieth century, the aboriginals 
of Australia largely gave up the beliefs transmitted from their own culture, as did the 
American Indians. More recently, there has been a resurgence of traditional beliefs in 
Australia and North America. I suspect this resurgence owes more to western new- 
age influences - despised by Soviet workers (Basilov 1990: 46; Furst 1994: 3 -4) - 
than to continuity of transmission from tribal elders. 
Statements of the bald form regarding the beliefs of other cultures have to be 
taken as shorthand for the same phrasing prefixed by some proviso such as `They 
believe that ...'. In the instance with which I opened this chapter, it would be correct 
to say, `The Andamanese traditionally believed that the of jumulo leaves the body 
...', or, more accurately, `An informant among a particular tribe of Andamanese 
once told an ethnographer that the of jumulo leaves the body ...'. To be more 
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accurate still, one has to know what role the informant played in society (Chapter 11; 
Radin 1938). 
The reason I emphasize this point is that I suspect there is a danger of 
becoming too sympathetic and too bound up with the `internal logic' of beliefs in a 
target culture. The ethnographer can become possessive about his or her `pet' people 
and defensive about their culture (La Barre 1972: 48, 52). 
Recent literature about shamanism is replete with sympathetic treatments and 
generalizations, and grades easily from scholarship to new -age romanticism. For 
example, Sullivan's (1994) paper on shamanism is a highly interpretative and 
sometimes lyrical generalization from ethnographic accounts and previous 
generalizations. It is not itself an objective, observational ethnographic account of 
publicly visible shamanic activities. Nor is it a first -person interpretative account of 
shamanic activities by a shaman who believes in what he or she does. For the most 
part, it is written from a point of view in which the supernatural character of the 
shamanic activity is taken for granted. It even opens with the provocative sentence 
`During ecstasy, the human soul leaves the body'. I am not criticizing Sullivan, 
because his is of course far from the only account of shamanism written in this mode. 
Eliade (1964) and Ripinsky -Naxon (1993) do the same. 
The point I am making is as follows. Writings in this mode are neither 
authentic interpretations of their shamanism by shamans nor objective accounts of 
what specific shamans have done. They are generalizations from accounts of many 
different, though admittedly similar, manifestations. And they are laden with western 
interpretation at a level of transcultural generalization inaccessible to a tribal shaman. 
This would not be problematical, except that, even in the hands of scholars, western 
interpretation often does not confine itself to what is objectively observable. Instead, 
to combine metaphors of Radin (1938: 92, 197), we are wafted off on ethereal wings 
to sublime romanticism. It was, I think, Eliade's (1964: 223, 400 -401, 477) romantic 
view of shamanism that induced him to believe that the shamanic use of 
hallucinogens reported from Siberia represented degeneration from a presumed pure, 
drug -free, archaic practice of ecstasy. In this he appears to have been mistaken, as he 
later acknowledged (Chapter 10 below). 
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If one is exploring and documenting a foreign culture, then no doubt one has 
to suspend disbelief and try to get inside the culture so that one can understand the 
functions and relations of its practices and ideas. The same is true of understanding 
an ancient culture. However, through accumulated scholarship in a variety of fields, 
we have access to external information not available to people inside a given ancient 
or local culture. We are therefore in a position to uncover the relations between a 
target culture and its surrounding and preceding cultures, for example between the 
culture of early Israel and that of the Canaanites. For full understanding we cannot 
ignore that external information (Wyatt 1996: 7 -8). Throughout, therefore, I adopt an 
etic perspective. 
An even worse scenario than an excess of sympathy is one in which 
metaphors and imageries used in interpretation of a cultural phenomenon, such as 
totemism, get out of hand in the investigator's determination to find system. Stanner 
(1960: 122) complains: `We start with "structure" and before long are dealing with 
"tensions" and "stress" and "centrifugal and centripetal forces ". ... a useful idea 
leads to the growth of an interpretative system of metaphors... .' Thus interpretative 
structures grow into a kind of speculative metaphysics. One thinks of Durkheim and 
Levi - Strauss (cf the critique of functionalism and structuralism by Munz 1993). 
Interpretative anthropological accounts, in proportion as they are generalized 
from many instances and subjective, importing concepts from a preconceived 
system, seem to become detached from the reality on the ground. Such accounts have 
been criticized by Sperber (1996). In particular, he draws attention to speculative 
interpretations of beliefs which `the believers themselves [in the target culture] are 
incapable of articulating', interpretations of `collective mentalities', and the 
attribution to a whole social group of ̀ collective representations which need never be 
entertained, let alone expressed, by any one individual member of the group'. He 
regards these as deficient scientifically because there is no way of evaluating the 
faithfulness of such interpretations (Sperber 1996: 35, 41). 
The customary interpretative methods of anthropology have also been 
criticized by Greenfield (2000), who contrasts anthropology with experimental 
psychology. In the latter discipline, the identity and relations of the investigator and 
subjects and the location, circumstances and procedures of data collection are 
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explicitly detailed as part of any report. This has rarely been done in anthropology, 
but, when this component of the methodology of psychological investigation is 
imported into ethnography, it leads to a realistic modesty about one's interpretative 
conclusions (Greenfield 2000: 565 -567). 
There is a tendency to import one's own personal and cultural predispositions 
into study of a foreign or ancient culture. A case in point is the interpretation of 
Biblical texts from a modern Christian or Jewish perspective, so that exegesis 
becomes eisegesis (Wyatt 1996: 8, 22). On a prima facie basis I suspect that a form 
of eisegesis takes place even in the most respectable works of ethnography. For 
example, Evans -Pritchard (1956: ix) notes his and other investigators' observation of 
similarities between the conceptual worlds of the Nuer and the Old Testament. Of 
course I am in no position to say, and do not say, that similarities do not exist. I only 
wonder whether the observation of genuine similarities may induce an interested 
party to find more similarities than are actually there. And even Evans -Pritchard did 
not refrain from putting system before evidence (Kuper 1988: 196 -201). 
Naïve rationalism 
I do not approach my subject from the point of view of ethnology. I approach 
it from a rationalist point of view. Stanner (1960: 58) says: `It is plainly a mistake to 
allow inquiry to be ruled by the philosophical notion that religious or metaphysical 
objects do not exist. They do exist for many peoples under study....' My position is 
completely the reverse: the alleged metaphysical objects do not exist at all. The 
worth of Stanner's position is that it facilitates empathy with target cultures, as 
acknowledged above. The worth of my position is that one straightforwardly tries to 
find out what is going on without becoming sidetracked by pretending to subscribe to 
beliefs to which most of us cannot possibly subscribe. In regard to the `religious or 
metaphysical objects', the phrase `they do exist for many peoples', with the 
implication that they do not exist for us outside the target culture, is in my view a 
misuse of language. What Stanner means is that we do not, but the target peoples do, 
believe that these objects exist, not that those objects simultaneously exist and do not 
exist. This common type of language misuse is discussed further below in connection 
with `truth'. 
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The philosophical foundation of my approach is the skeptical empiricism of 
Hume and Russell, combined with the realism of Popper (see below). Among many 
relevant passages from Hume, this one states the rationalist attitude to the 
supernatural most strikingly: `When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man 
restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, 
that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he 
relates, should really have happened' (Hume 1777: 116). 
Here I do not seek to set out all the principles of rationalism. On an analogy 
with naïve set theory in mathematics, an informal but formalizable treatment of the 
subject (Halmos 1960: v), my position could be characterized as naïve rationalism'. 
In much of physical science it is possible to formulate hypotheses and then 
conduct and repeat experiments to test them, because one is investigating how matter 
and energy behave in general. In history we deal with unique events; we investigate 
sources rather than test more or less timelessly applicable hypotheses. The prehistory 
of ideas of the supernatural may seem to fall into neither the category of 
experimental science nor even that of history, because its sources are so meagre. 
However, my position views cultural ideas and practices as being capable of 
explanation, just as geological formations are explicable. It is not possible to observe 
from beginning to end the unique formation of a mountain range, but we do not say 
that the process by which mountain ranges come into being must therefore be 
uninvestigable: we have a theory of plate tectonics. In the same way, although we 
cannot observe how religious elements came into being in prehistory, it should still 
be possible to formulate credible hypotheses regarding the processes whereby they 
may have originated. Moreover, with religions, unlike mountain ranges, it is possible 
to observe the process of cults coming into being in our lifetimes and in recent 
history (La Barre 1970a). 
If one is looking for religious origins, then I think one has to be objective as 
far as possible, to stand outside given cultures, avoid eisegesis of our own religious 
faith or of elaborate structures or systems, and try to see from which non -religious or 
pre- religious phenomena religious practices and ideas may have developed. 
This term may conceivably have been appropriated by some philosophical school, but I intend no 
connotation except that of the individual words. And of course I do not claim that a philosophical 
position is formalizable mathematically. 
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Truth, veridicality, reality 
It is of the essence for the present study to distinguish between truth and 
falsehood and between veridical and non -veridical (false) perception.' 
Truth 
I state briefly an adherence to realism and the correspondence theory of truth 
as expounded by Popper (1979: 32 -47). According to realism there is a world out 
there which we experience, live in and are part of According to idealist (subjectivist) 
philosophies the world of experience is created by our minds or mediated in such a 
way that ultimate reality cannot be known (e.g., the Kantian position). Neither 
realism nor idealism are refutable or provable - they are metaphysical positions - but 
Popper has shown that the arguments in favour of realism outweigh those for 
idealism. Realism is in accordance with common sense and allows comprehensive, 
coherent interpretation of our experience. Truth is a property of propositions, namely 
that they correspond to the facts. The idea of truth is therefore absolutist, but no 
claim can be made for absolute certainty. We can seek truth - that is, seek for true 
propositions to describe the world - but can never be certain that we have attained it. 
The adjective `true' is primary, not the noun `truth'. The adjective `true' 
describes propositions which correctly describe or correspond to facts or states of 
affairs. Facts or states of affairs are aspects of the world at large. Propositions are 
linguistic and quasi- linguistic entities such as declarative utterances, writings or 
thoughts. A declarative utterance, writing or thought proposes that something is the 
case. The abstract noun `truth' allows us to talk at a second -order level about the 
relation of correspondence between a proposition and the state of affairs which it 
purports to represent. Truth is merely this correspondence. It is not something else in 
its own right. Difficulties arise when we allow our tendency to hypostatize or reify 
abstractions to get out of hand, and when we uncritically believe that all common 
uses of words must genuinely be coherent. The tendency in modern languages, as 
compared with, say, classical Latin, to use nouns plus the verb `to be' rather than 
free -standing verbs encourages misleading reification of abstractions. For example, 
rather than say `I am a seeker after truth', I would express myself more clearly if I 
I only state this position positively, and do not take up space in criticizing cultural relativist or 
postmodernist views incompatible with it. 
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avoided using the abstract noun `truth'. I could say, `I seek to understand how the 
world is and my place in it' or `I seek to understand a body of true propositions about 
the world and my place in it, to which I can consent and adhere'. 
Besides propositions (or statements), language includes other types of 
utterance, such as exclamations and expressions of wishes. Only propositions, 
however, have the property of being true or false. We can therefore answer Pilate's 
question (John 18: 38). Truth is predicable only of propositions, and a proposition is 
true if and only if it corresponds to a real state of affairs which it purports to 
describe. Use of the abstract noun `truth' with reference to anything other than 
propositions is either metaphor, abbreviation or incorrect usage. When Jesus said `I 
am the way, the truth and the life' (John 14: 6), he was speaking metaphorically. 
When a Christian says to an unbeliever, `I wish you would be more open to the 
truth', he or she is uttering a verbal shorthand for `I wish you would be more willing 
to consider that certain salient propositions in the Gospels may correspond to reality'. 
On most occasions when the phrase `religious truth' is uttered, I should think it is a 
straightforward misnomer for `a body of religious belief'. 
The proposition `the cat is on the mat' is true if and only if the cat in question 
actually is on the mat in question. If there is no cat or if it is not on the mat, then the 
proposition is false. Some philosophers would maintain that if there is no cat the 
proposition is not false but meaningless. This is to get round the problem that, 
according to the law of excluded middle, the proposition's negation, `the cat is not 
sitting on the mat' becomes true if the original proposition is false, so that now there 
seems to be a true proposition about a non -existent cat. However, it appears to me 
that, in the absence of a cat, the original proposition is still meaningful but false. 
Veridicality 
In a similar way, I maintain that our perceptions are either veridical (true) or 
non -veridical (false). If I see a cat on the mat, then this perception is veridical if and 
only if there is a cat on the mat in question. If there is no cat or no mat, or there is a 
cat but not on the mat, then the perception is non -veridical, because it does not 
represent to me what is actually the case. 
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Veridicality is entirely a philosophical matter, just as truth is an absolute 
concept. It has nothing to do with psychology or neurology or with how human 
brains construct perceptions. We know that perceptions are not simple 
representations of sound waves entering the ear or of photons impinging on the 
retina. They are complex constructs which include material assumed or filled in to 
complete our image of what may be there, along with associations from past 
perceptions (Ramachandran 1999). Further, it does not matter whether I have any 
means of determining what is the case other than my perception. If my perceiving the 
cat is in doubt, I could ask someone else whether they too perceive the cat and 
whether it is sitting on the mat, and I could train a camera and a microphone on the 
place where I believe the cat to be. But then, if the cat is illusory, the other person I 
ask and the instruments I deploy could be illusory also, because I depend on 
perceiving the other people and instruments. 
In practice, both in science and in everyday life, to determine what is the case 
we depend on the concurrence of our own senses among themselves, with the 
testimony (which we receive via our senses) of other people based on their senses, 
with readings of instruments apprehended by our senses, and on the coherence of 
new perceptions with past experience. This is the best we can do, although we can 
never be completely certain. But, because it is the best we can do, it is the rational 
way to proceed. Conversely, to rely on our own perceptions if they conflict with past 
experience, with those of others and with readings of instruments is a more dubious 
proceeding. 
The philosophical complexity of the issue of truth and the psychological and 
neurological complexities of perception should not blind one to the fact that human 
beings manage very successfully on the basis of concurrence and coherence. 
Whatever philosophers may say, we know perfectly well in practice what we mean 
by `truth'. In a criminal court, a principal objective is to determine what actually 
happened in the case. To that end, witnesses affirm that they will tell the truth. When 
doubts are expressed about evidence, they have to do with the possibility that 
witnesses may deliberately lie or that their recall may be mistaken. The doubts are 
not Cartesian, nor are neurologists generally called in to perform scans to check 
whether witnesses' brain processes are aberrant. 
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I leave some philosophical issues hanging, but am concerned here to clarify 
the concept of veridicality of perceptions. A perception or experience of something is 
veridical if and only if what we think is there is actually there. If I think I see a ghost, 
the perception is veridical if there is a ghost there, an external object of my 
perception. If the perception of a ghost is only a construct of my mind, say an 
hallucination, and there is not a ghost there in the outside world, then the perception 
is false. Even if what I perceive as a ghost is an hallucination caused by an external 
agent projecting an image telepathically - as some investigators have suggested 
(Chapter 3) - then it is still not a ghost; it is just a projected hallucination. My 
perception is still false, because what I think is there (a ghost) is not actually there. 
The fact that the apparent perception has a cause, internal or external to me, has no 
bearing on its veridicality or otherwise. Unless there is a corresponding external 
object of the perception, the perception is non -veridical. 
Confusion of veridicality with value 
Some may say that the circumstances or mechanism whereby a subjective 
experience, in particular a religious experience, is mediated has no bearing on its 
truth, but that the consequences of the experience make for its truth or falsity. For 
example, if I have a vision of a saint, it may be that she actually appeared to me and 
was present externally, or it may be that I hallucinated the appearance. In either case, 
if the experience changes my life and I become a better person, then they would say 
it was a true vision. 
However, this is to confuse the truth of the vision with its value or 
significance. I agree that the value of the experience is determined by its 
consequences and not by how it comes about. But its truth - or, better (in respect of 
perceptions), veridicality - is determined by the circumstances whereby it comes 
about. If the saint is actually there, then the experience is a veridical perception. It 
may or may not have value or significance, depending on whether I change my 
conduct for the better as a result. If the saint is not there, then the experience is a 
non -veridical perception, but may still have value if it jolts me out of my unbelief, 
causes me to change my life and become a better person. But it does not become true 
or veridical by having value. It is veridical or not only according as its purported 
object is actually there or not. 
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The use of the word `true' to mean `having value or significance' is strictly a 
misuse of the word which causes confusion. It allows the speaker to claim the dignity 
of truth for something which is valuable or personally significant but strictly false or 
just dubious. Equally mistaken is the phrase, which one sometimes hears in respect 
of religious belief, `it's true for me', as if something can be true for one person and 
false for another. A correct phrasing would be `it has value or meaning for me'. In 
my view, the phrase `true for me' should have no place in an honest person's 
vocabulary. Even famous politicians do not use it when tried for perjury. 
In a similar vein, James (1903: 8 -17) discusses eccentric and apparently 
pathological behaviour in the lives of some religious leaders and among religious 
people generally, but argues against what he calls `medical materialism', the view 
that to explain the origins of behaviours and beliefs is to undermine their 
significance. Parrinder (1976: 167 -168) notes that some scholars reject visions and 
similar paranormal experiences as having nothing to do with valid mystical 
experience. He himself acknowledges that visions and voices are abnormal on the 
grounds that most people do not have them and that they are sometimes produced 
when the subject is disturbed or diseased. Even so, he is prepared to accept such 
phenomena, however caused, as meaningful concomitants of valid religious or 
mystical experience. For my part, so long as we do not confuse truth with value, 
veridicality with significance, I do not take issue with those authorities. 
Reality 
Another often casually used word is `reality'. The real is generally 
understood to be contrasted with the unreal, fake, false, deceptive, illusory or 
imaginary. In such a strong sense the adjective `real' belongs with the philosophical 
position of realism discussed earlier. `Reality' is taken to refer to a state of being real 
or to something which is real. 
With reference to a shamanic world -view, a phrase such as `other -worldly 
reality' (Ripinsky -Naxon 1993: 69) is therefore a gross misnomer for `imaginary 
other -world'. As I have stated earlier, for the most part, anthropologists do not 
seriously accept the ontology of target tribal cultures. Even shamans of different 
tribes in the same country often do not accept each other's world -view (Devereux 
1980: 32), let alone shamans from different continents. Like the believer's defence `it 
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is true for me' (see above), the defensive claim, with reference to a culture under 
study, `it is real for them' is a misleading paraphrase of the more accurate `they think 
it is real (but it is not real)'. Even in this phrasing, who are designated by `they'? Not 
all the people even in a small -scale society share the same world -view. As Radin 
(1938) points out (Chapter 11), the world view of the religious specialist is generally 
much more complex than that of ordinary people. 
I do not seek to impugn primal cultures or those who study them. I only wish 
all workers would keep a tighter grasp of their language. 
Psychoanalysis 
Freudian hypotheses have been put forward to account for various 
supernatural beliefs and practices, and it may seem strange that I make little use of 
them. They fall foul of the general criticism of psychoanalytic theory that no instance 
could ever be put forward which would count as showing the theory was false. On 
Popper's prescriptive defmition, therefore, psychoanalytic theory does not count as 
science (Popper 1972: 34 -38; 1979: 38; Schatzman and Fenwick 1994: 230). In my 
view, postulated entities and processes such as ego, superego, id, complex, primary 
process, catharsis are problematical unless or until they can be correlated with 
observable and measurable neural processes. Of course there is dynamic psychology 
other than the Freudian (Frude 1998; Malan 1995). In Appendices 3C and 11A, I 
discuss specific psychoanalytic hypotheses. 
Paranormal versus supernatural 
I have occasion, particularly in the next chapter, to refer to the paranormal 
and the supernatural. I use `supernatural' to refer to those alleged phenomena which 
require the existence of non -physical beings such as spirits, ghosts, demons and 
gods; non -physical locations or states of being such as heaven and the astral plane; 
and non -physical processes such as magic. I use `paranormal' to refer to alleged 
phenomena which are unexplained on the basis of natural laws as understood at 
present. These phenomena are thought by some of their protagonists to be in 
principle amenable to scientific investigation, so that in the future they may become 
explicable and predictable by a more comprehensive understanding of the forces at 
work in nature. They may be supposed to represent the action of impersonal natural 
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forces or mechanisms not yet understood - such as fields in spacetime which might 
mediate telepathy - or of natural personal agencies not yet clearly identified - such 
as extraterrestrial aliens. 
Paranormal phenomena may be expected to include telepathy, clairvoyance, 
prescient dreams, UFO encounters and perhaps the movement of objects in 
poltergeist episodes. Supernatural phenomena, on the other hand, are in principle 
beyond scientific investigation: they involve personal agents which defy present or 
possible laws of physics. There is a major ontological dimension to the supernatural: 
it requires a realm of being additional to the natural. Supernatural belief entails this 
ontological burden. 
My definition above would demand mutual exclusion, but in practice, the 
boundaries are fluid and there is overlap or inclusion of supernatural within 
paranormal, depending on one's point of view. Alleged paranormal phenomena such 
as clairaudience may be attributed by some practitioners to supernatural agency, for 
example, the imparting of information by spirits of the dead. Some might suggest 
that magic is attributable to the agency of demons, and is therefore supernatural. 
Others might allege that it is a form of impersonal action at a distance by a living 
human subject and potentially explicable in scientific terms, even if not explained by 
science so far, and therefore merely paranormal. If poltergeist phenomena are 
attributable to demons, then the phenomena are supernatural; if they are attributable 
to voluntary or involuntary psychokinetic action by a living human agent, then they 
are paranormal. 
Harris (1997: 7), drawing attention to the similarity between mana, a putative 
magical indwelling power in objects and people, and such unseen forces as gravity 
and electricity, points out that mana is not strictly a `religious' concept. In other 
words, mana (likewise wakan, orenda, etc) belongs to the category of the 
paranormal, not supernatural. 
Strictly speaking, encounters with extraterrestrial aliens ought to be entirely 
comprehensible in scientific and natural terms, even if the technology at the disposal 
of the aliens exceeds our understanding. However, alien encounters tend to be treated 
as paranormal because they generally manifest certain strange features shared with 
religious visions and ghostly appearances, as will be illustrated in Chapter 3. 
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The role of individuals 
An essential part of my thesis is that religious ideas are thought and religious 
practices carried out by individual human beings. 
Former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once dismissively said that there 
was no such thing as society. In at least one sense she was right. Biologically, it is 
populations that evolve, but it is individuals that embody the effects of genetic 
mutations and natural selection. The reason why groups exist is that it is in the 
interest of individuals to cooperate and compromise rather than live alone (Quiatt 
and Reynolds 1993: 2 -3). Furthermore and essentially, society does not think things 
and society does not carry out actions: individuals do. 
In the development of human culture, individuals, not society, had to have 
ideas, had to innovate. An individual was the first to do something, to haft a blade 
onto a shaft to make a spear, to light a fire deliberately, to have an idea of spirit. For 
each development, a person did something for the first time. 
On first encountering the idea of the tribal parricide posited as the origin of 
the incest taboo in Totem and Taboo (Freud 1913), one may think it, in comparison 
with mainstream anthropological literature with its technical terms and abstractions, 
to be crude, a just -so story, so existential and immediate as to be crazy. But, on 
reflection, it is not so crazy, in that for any religious or social practice or concept 
there had to be a first event, a first occasion of the practice, a first idea. And, 
whatever it was, whenever it happened, it was an individual who enacted it. 
Devereux (1980: 70) complains that `culturologists sometimes seem to study 
Culture as though Man did not exist'. In fact, all we actually know of are individuals, 
even if they do similar things together. Malinowski (1948: 40 -41) dismisses the 
concept of a `group mind'. Neurology and genetics do not provide any hint of a 
mechanism whereby memories or images can be biologically transmitted from an 
organism to its offspring. Similarly, dismissing the Jungian `racial unconscious', 
Devereux (1980: 6) delineates an ethnic unconscious, which is the putative 
unconscious material that a subject happens to possess in common with other 
members of his or her cultural community. Whether or not one agrees with Devereux 
that there is an ethnic unconscious, nothing is postulated by him except what is in the 
mind of each individual and acquired during his or her lifetime. 
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Suppose one wished to consider sacrifice in ancient religions. One might be 
tempted to use an expression such as `the practice of sacrifice arose ... . 
Consideration of another religious element might encourage one to write by the 
Upper Palaeolithic a sense of the numinous had arisen among the inhabitants of 
Europe'. Expressions like these are too vague. They miss the reality of what could 
have happened. They are misleading, because practices and senses do not `arise' of 
themselves. People do things. Any such expression, therefore, must be viewed at best 
as shorthand for a longer and more detailed account containing propositions such as 
`an individual did x, then an individual did y, ...' or `an individual could have done x, 
then an individual could have done y, ...'. Accounts of such detail, as read, may 
seem simplistic, because, in describing mere actions and thoughts, they may of 
necessity leave out the abstractions and technical terms which one is accustomed to 
find in technical literature. Yet such accounts would be the reverse of simplistic. 
Only such accounts will suffice in getting to grips with religious origins, in 
attempting to describe the moments when experiences occurred to human beings or 
their predecessors, and the immediacy of what they may have felt and done. 
In the introductory chapter, I wrote about phases, dead ends and streams of 
religious development through the ages. But such terminology can only be taken as 
abbreviation: in fact, only real individual people can have been the instigators, the 
abandoners or the perpetuators of any form of religion. 
The consequence of this principle is that any theory which I may offer of the 
origin of a religious behaviour or concept has to describe things which an individual 
human or prehuman could have done. 
The survival value of religion 
Natural selection works as follows. A young organism which does not 
survive to reproduce does not pass on its genes to the next generation. Some of its 
characteristics may therefore not be present in the next generation, unless there are 
other carriers of the genes for those characteristics and those carriers do survive to 
reproduce. Some organisms will lack or possess in smaller than usual measure some 
characteristic that enables organisms of their kind to live successfully: for example, 
size, strength, agility, cunning, intellect, the abilities to reach food or catch prey or to 
avoid, deter or defeat predators. Because of a deficiency in some advantageous 
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characteristic, those organisms may not survive long enough to reproduce, and 
therefore may not pass on the genes for that deficiency. Those which possess the 
required characteristics in good measure are more likely to survive and reproduce, 
and therefore pass on their advantageous characteristics to the next generation. 
We say some characteristics have survival value or are selectively 
advantageous. Genes for those characteristics are passed on because their possessors 
live long enough to reproduce. Genes for their absence or for their presence in a 
minimal or defective form are not passed on because their possessors do not live long 
enough to reproduce. Other characteristics may be present which are selectively 
neutral: that is, their possession does not affect the survival of their possessor. Such 
characteristics may therefore be passed on from one generation to the next but, as 
there is nothing to promote their retention, may disappear after some generations 
(Brace and Montagu 1977: 59 -64). 
Organisms are in competition with their siblings: for example, among 
mammals, the runt of a litter may not survive infancy because the others out -compete 
it for food and for the attention of the mother. Organisms in a community compete 
against each other: bull walrus fight during the mating season. Groups of organisms 
of different species compete, as do lions, leopards and hyenas for kills and carcasses 
on the African savannah. 
Competition need not involve actual violence between competing species. 
When lions, leopards and hyenas compete, they do not generally attack each other, 
but rather seek their opportunity to feed within the restrictions imposed by the threat 
from other animals. When lions are about, leopards and hyenas wait to take their turn 
to feed off a carcass, but wait reluctantly. They each have their place in the ecology 
of the area, but they are still competing, not cooperating. 
In a sense, all populations of different species are in competition with each 
other for territory and the available food within that territory. In Britain, the grey 
squirrel introduced from North America has out -competed the native red squirrel in 
most areas of the country. This does not mean that the grey squirrels have killed off 
the red squirrels, but that the grey squirrels have been more successful at exploiting 
the environment for food and have reproduced at a greater rate, so that they now 
outnumber the red squirrels. 
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It may be that in the course of human evolution our ancestors competed in a 
similar way, probably but not necessarily involving violence, with other hominin 
populations: Homo ergaster with Australopithecus robustus in East Africa a million 
and a half years ago; Homo sapiens with Homo erectus in the Far East and with the 
Neanderthals in Europe within the last hundred thousand years (Stringer and McKie 
1993). Within the species Homo sapiens, in historical times the Europeans can be 
said to have out -competed the native Americans and native Australians, in the sense 
that most of the population of their former territories, and the dominant culture there, 
is of European origin. 
The characteristics which allowed the Europeans to colonize other parts of 
the world were not superior physical attributes but the possession of superior 
technology and a culture which favoured exploration. In large measure, the same 
may have been true of inter -species competition between hominid populations in 
prehistory, as the robust australopithecines were physically almost as large as Homo 
of their time and Homo erectus were physically at least as robust as Homo sapiens. 
Clearly, the possession of technology is not passed on from one generation to 
the next genetically. It is, however, a characteristic passed on by one generation of a 
population to the successor generation. The same applies to other elements of human 
culture. Certain cultural characteristics give the edge: possession of superior 
technology, particularly weaponry, is one such characteristic. The population which 
has inferior technology is likely to be dominated, displaced or replaced by the 
population which has better technology. There operates here a kind of natural 
selection. It is selectively advantageous to have more advanced technology: that is, 
advanced technology has survival value. One would expect the same principle to 
have applied throughout prehistory. 
Possession of a given religion can be viewed as a characteristic analogous to 
possession of technology. Historically, it has been passed on from one generation of 
a population to the next, along with other elements of culture. It may be that 
possession of one kind of religion is advantageous to a population: for example, a 
religion which claims universal applicability and encourages exploration and 
proselytizing, such as Christianity and Islam, versus local tribal religions. Here, I do 
not wish to discuss whether a given religion might have better survival value for the 
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population which espouses it, as against another population with a different religion. 
Nor do I wish to discuss whether a given religion might have survival value for itself 
as against another religion, treating the religions as memes (Dawkins 1976), so that 
one religion is more likely to survive in the world, to retain adherents, than another. 
For my purpose the important question is whether the possession of religion 
of any kind might be selectively advantageous over the non -possession of any 
religion at all. I reiterate: apes do not have religion; we do. And we are vastly more 
successful as a species than apes. In prehistory, I think we can assume, human or 
prehuman populations with religion would not have survived if it had been 
selectively disadvantageous to have religion. The fact that all recent human 
populations have religion would indicate that possession of religion has not been 
selectively disadvantageous in prehistory. This rather sweeping statement needs 
analysis. 
As proposed in Chapter 1, religion can be viewed as made up of identifiable 
components or elements. It is the elements that should be seen as the cultural 
characteristics relevant to survival. I believe we should expect that the religious 
elements present in the cultures of human or prehuman populations which survived 
were not selectively disadvantageous to those populations. This means that either 
they were selectively neutral or they conferred a competitive advantage. If they were 
only selectively neutral, we might perhaps expect them to have died out after some 
time, and not to have continued for millennia. 
There is a further possibility, which is that the religious elements need not 
themselves be the subject of a selection process which has ensured that populations 
possessing them have survived. Some of them could be the selectively neutral 
consequences, perhaps by- products, of other characteristics which have been 
positively subject to selection. Such latter characteristics might not be cultural 
phenomena but psychological dispositions or physiological features of individual 
humans or prehumans. They would therefore be transmissible genetically. On this 
proposal, certain religious elements may be the by- product of genetically transmitted 
characteristics of our human or prehuman ancestors, subject to natural selection in 
the same way as acuteness of eyesight or body proportions. These genetically 
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transmitted characteristics in turn must have been at least selectively neutral or, more 
likely, selectively advantageous. 
In later chapters I intend to argue in favour of the view that some religious 
elements are indeed selectively advantageous, and that some are the by- product of 
selectively advantageous, genetically transmitted characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE NUMINOUS: SUBJECTIVE SUPERNATURAL EXPERIENCE 
Otto 
The numen 
An extensive examination of the nature of specifically religious feeling has 
been carried out by Rudolf Otto. He shows how, besides the rational dimension of 
theology and religious thought, there is an emotional dimension, which he says is the 
innermost core of any religion, whether primitive or sophisticated. This dimension is 
characterized by a numinous state of mind, which is qualitatively different from and 
not reducible to any other feeling. This numinous state of mind is an awareness of 
the uncanny, that which is in itself numinous, a numen, the holy. 
In its developed form, this sense is manifested in the contexts of mysticism, 
profound worship, contemplation of nature and occasions when one is faced by the 
wholly other, when one feels one is in the presence of the holy. The numinous sense 
has various moments or components, including self -abasement, dependence, awe, 
fear, wonder, rapture, the awareness of creaturehood, of being a created thing. Otto 
(1925: passim) finds examples of the sense of the numinous throughout the Old and 
New Testaments, and in the writings of other sophisticated religions. 
However, he also draws attention to the numinous sense in a less exalted 
form, the fear of ghosts. This is `a degraded offshoot and travesty' and `a caricature' 
of the genuine numinous or daemonic dread (1925: 28 -29). It is treated by Otto as a 
genuine form of the numinous sense and not something altogether different. 
The fear of ghosts would appear to be a survival into modern life of daemonic 
dread as it could first have been experienced by primitive peoples. According to 
Otto, daemonic dread is the starting point for all religious development. It takes the 
form of a sense of the uncanny, weird or eerie. Daemons and gods are the products of 
objectifying this dread. Natural occurrences and events in everyday life which leave 
one baffled are liable to become endued with the daemonic dread or numinous 
feeling, so that they become miracles or portents. Otto classifies this daemonic dread 
as a genuine form of the numinous sense because it is not just a more intense form of 
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fear in general but qualitatively different from any other kind of fear. It includes a 
shuddering which is absent from `natural' fear, with a creeping of the flesh and the 
blood running cold. He points out that one can be terrified without experiencing 
daemonic dread. One could adduce examples of natural fear: stage fright, 
agoraphobia, fear of flying, fear when bungee jumping or parachuting, fear when a 
car crash seems about to happen. None of these is likely to contain the thrill, the 
horror or the element of shuddering, which we associate with fear of ghosts and dark 
places. Natural fear is not transformed into daemonic dread merely by being 
intensified. Even gods in higher religions retain an element of the ghost in them, the 
quality of the uncanny or awful. As well as being an object of fear, ghosts are an 
object of attraction. One is drawn to ghost stories, and people wish to visit allegedly 
haunted places, because the idea of supernatural beings exercises a strong curiosity, 
even fascination. The reason why ghosts so much capture the imagination is that they 
belong to another realm, they are `wholly other'. Spirits and souls are conceptual 
objects produced by the rationalization of daemonic dread. The experience is prior to 
the concept (Otto 1925: 15 -16, 27 -29, 66). 
In much of this, I think Otto is essentially correct, but criticism can be 
levelled on at least three grounds. 
Firstly, it is not clear whether Otto claims that the experience of the numinous 
is in all cases a veridical apprehension of something external or objective. In certain 
places, he seems to make this claim, as when he says that the feeling `has immediate 
and primary reference to an object outside the self , and the numinous is `felt as 
objective and outside the self, an `immediate datum of consciousness'. He asserts 
that we have an inborn capacity to perceive and understand the numinous in the 
world (1925: 10 -11, 63). In the development of the religious consciousness, as 
indicated, for example, in some of the stories in Genesis, the daemon, conceived as 
the object of the numinous sense, is a god or pre -god, the numen at a lower stage. 
However, demons, in the sense of devils, are, like ghosts and spectres, `spurious 
fabrications' of the imagination (1925: 75). So Otto seems to admit that the sense 
which apprehends the numinous can be activated in the absence of a real numen. 
Altogether, it would appear that the genuine object of the numinous sense is 
claimed by Otto as an objective reality, and in the end it is God, as apprehended in 
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Christianity, Hinduism and other religions, but certainly the God of Christianity 
(1925: 74 -96). A more developed awareness of the deity may be manifested in 
mystical and religious experiences, while initial inklings are given in the form of 
minor numinous experiences; and for prehistoric people those experiences may have 
been no more than an inchoate stirring of the feelings' (Otto 1925: 10 -11, 26, 63, 
75). 
Secondly, the fear of ghosts, demons and other supernatural beings contains 
some of the moments of Otto's sense of the numinous: the uncanniness, the 
shuddering, the chill, the creeping flesh, and the attraction of curiosity. But the ideas 
of ghosts and spirits do not give rise to awe and reverence, or to the sense of 
creaturehood and self -abasement, the sense of being in the presence of the 
overpowering, the sublime, the beyond, all of which are emphasized by Otto from 
the beginning (1925: 8 -11), and they certainly do not give rise to love. The latter 
sensations seem to me to be limited to worship and the mystical sense of 
apprehension of the deity, and are confined, I should think, to the historical 
developed religions. In particular, they are characteristic of Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Sikhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam in certain developments. 
There are religions which accept the existence of gods but where awe is an 
alien sentiment (cf Kraemer 1956: 76). Awe and reverence are said to be absent 
from the tribal religions of West Africa and elsewhere (Horton 1960: 26). The 
Japanese and Balinese do not experience awe in connection with the objects of their 
worship (Guthrie 1993: 23). The Tungus regard supernatural beings as `stupid, 
cowardly, vain and greedy' (Baldick 2000: 135). Parrinder (1976) studied African 
religions for twenty years, but, attempting to find mysticism in world religions, is 
singularly unconvincing on African religion and Asiatic shamanism; he leaves 
Australasia and Oceania out of account altogether. Ecstasy is not necessarily 
mystical. An ecstatic ritual at the conclusion of which the protagonist falls down 
unconscious may have more in common with the hysterical excitement of a rock 
concert enhanced by Ecstasy tablets than with mysticism. It would seem to have little 
to do with either monistic or theistic categories of mysticism as Parrinder (1976: 11- 
12) describes them in Hinduism and under which he is able to subsume forms of 
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mysticism from elsewhere in the world, or with the definition and characteristic 
cross -cultural themes of mysticism which he lists. 
Thirdly, if the object of the numinous sense is real, and is God, then it is clear 
why it should be experienced in contexts of presumed encounter with God such as 
Abraham's intercession for Sodom (Otto 1925: 9 -10; Genesis 18: 22 -33) or the 
theophany of the burning bush (Otto 1925: 77; Exodus 3: 2-6)1. It is not clear why it 
should be experienced in connection with natural phenomena such as thunderstorms, 
dark caves, strange animals and the like. Otto attempts to deal with this question 
(1925: 27, 66), but, while fear of the supernatural may be present in the latter 
contexts, I do not accept that awe is present. 
Two kinds of numinous experience 
It seems to me that two kinds of experience are conflated. Otto distinguishes 
the two varieties but does not draw the conclusion that they are separate. One is the 
mystical sense of what Otto calls the wholly other, which induces awe, reverence and 
abasement (1925: 25 -29), and sometimes fear, but a fear tempered with adoration 
and often with love and yearning for union with its object. This is the mysterium 
tremendum et fascinans. In some degree or other it becomes accessible to people 
during acts of worship and prayer, and to experience this mystery more fully is the 
objective of theistic mystics (Parrinder 1976). The other experience is the rather 
differently mysterious and fearful sense of a presence of what I shall venture to call 
the merely other, the unknown and usually invisible. The fear of ghosts is 
represented among the varieties of this kind of numinous experience. While it may 
be mysterious and frightening, its object is not the same as the awful, awe -inspiring 
mysterium tremendum et fascinans. 
I suggest that ghosts, spirits, demons, local gods and the like are not wholly 
other (pace Otto 1925: 29), but merely other; they are other and uncanny. The 
second experience is not, I think, a debased variety of the former, but is a separate 
phenomenon. It never contains reverence or love. One does not feel abased in the 
presence of its presumed object. One does not normally wish to approach its object, 
These are highly literary examples, and not related first -hand by the experients, who are legendary 
figures. The burning bush may be a symbol of the menorah, the lights of which which burned 
continuously without consuming it. 
Chapter 3 43 
but rather to get rid of it. It is, much more often than not, characterized by fear, and 
fear of a particular type, which Otto describes well. It is not just fear, but 
supernatural fear. 
Supernatural fear 
Numinous fear is, I think, exclusively associated with what we call the 
supernatural, the unknown which yet knows us, the sentient but unpredictable, the 
unexplained and usually invisible. It arises from the allowed, anticipated, sensed or 
even witnessed presence of something unknown. We allow the possibility that 
something may be there; more than that, we may suspect it; sometimes we seem to 
sense that something is there; some of us even witness an apparition. All these, and I 
think only these, are the circumstances in which the fear occurs. 
Supernatural fear is well exemplified by the following stanza from The Rime 
of the Ancient Mariner. 
Like one that on a lonesome road 
Doth walk in fear and dread, 
And having once turn'd round, walks on, 
And turns no more his head; 
Because he knows a frightful fiend 
Doth close behind him tread. 
It is clear from the numerous references to spirits in this poem that Coleridge intends 
a supernatural fiend and not a human assailant. 
Some people may experience the supernatural fear when lying in bed in the 
dark at night or when sitting alone by a campfire in a forest clearing. It is most 
strikingly felt by a powerless subject during nightmares and waking experiences in 
which the presence of a threatening sentient entity is sensed or even witnessed, for 
example in the waking state when in an allegedly haunted house. Such a house is a 
location where, in principle, one might be prepared to believe there could be an 
object of the fear, an object of the sense of presence, an external agent. 
When an unexpected sound or shadow leads one to believe that something 
might be there, but it turns out that the sound was caused by a breeze outside or the 
strange shadow by a flicker of the light, or both were caused by a neighbour's cat, 
then there is relief. The fear is relieved by identification of a natural source for 
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unexpected phenomena. When the source remains unresolved and the possibility of 
an unnatural source remains open, the fear continues and tends to intensify. 
Moreover, it is no impersonal force that gives rise to the numinous fear. The 
fear is always of something sentient and personal. We fear that in our vicinity there 
may be an unknown person, with attitudes and designs, with the unpredictability and 
deviousness, and often the malice, which we know from human beings. But the 
unknown entity seems not to share the limitations and dependencies of a human 
being: it may not have to be in a particular place, it may not have to breathe or eat, it 
may be able to reach us through walls and locked doors, it may be invisible or appear 
and disappear at will. 
So the putative object of supernatural fear is an unknown personal being, 
whose mentality is humanlike but whose behaviour is unnatural, not limited by the 
physical laws to which human beings and other animals are subject. Even if we have 
not personally witnessed a supernatural apparition, the context in which many of us 
have witnessed the sort of behaviour which we associate with apparitions and 
presences is, I think significantly, that of dreams. 
Fear of the supernatural does not need to have a genuine object. The fear is 
provoked not necessarily by a supernatural object as such but by situations in which 
we suspect a supernatural object because there is no obvious natural object. If the 
fear did have to be provoked by a genuine object, then, since the fear certainly exists, 
the supernatural would have to exist. That the fear comes about without a genuine 
object can be illustrated from everyday life. 
Frequently one discovers that an event, which one might at first assign to a 
supernatural cause, and which provokes the supernatural fear, turns out to have been 
caused by natural phenomena. Such would be the opening of a door by itself at night 
or the thump of a locked door against the jamb as if something is trying to enter, 
which are explained by a gust of wind. The supernatural fear has occurred, but it has 
no genuine, that is, supernatural, object. 
The supernatural fear comes over people when they merely read books or 
watch movies or television programmes about ghosts. There may be a creeping sense 
of something there, even that there is something behind one or over one's shoulder. 
There is no comparable fear when one watches other frightening material, such as a 
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sequence in a film about an explorer falling off a precipice or encountering a wild 
animal. Especially in an IMAX cinema, watching a sequence from the point of view 
of someone on a rollercoaster or in the cockpit of a light aircraft may induce a 
sensation of dizziness and fear. Similarly, people may be revolted by the gore and 
deformity in some horror films, although they know that what they are seeing is just 
makeup and special effects. But there is nothing to compare with the creeping panic 
associated with the subject of ghosts and other supernatural phenomena. 
In such cases the fear arises, presumably, in the absence of an external agent, 
unless one is prepared to believe that supernatural entities are all around us, waiting 
to be called up to be objects of our numinous intuition whenever we are induced to 
think about their possibility, even in a context of entertainment. The experience 
therefore, however valid as an experience, need not be veridical. 
Even when we fear it, the supernatural has throughout history held a certain 
fascination. We want to know what it is that so frightens us and what the strange 
apparitions, sounds and paranormal phenomena represent. In this respect, the merely 
other shares another feature of the tremendous and fascinating mystery which Otto 
ascribes to the wholly other. 
Numinous experiences 
Throughout his master work Otto in effect makes a case for a continuum of 
the numinous sense from the `debased' form to the higher, mystical forms. Whether 
or not there is a continuum, I regard the extreme lower and higher forms of the 
numinous experience as so different in practice - that is, when experienced by a 
subject - that I shall treat them separately. 
The higher mystical experience of awe I am going to leave aside, for the most 
part. It may have occurred in prehistory. But, without archaeological traces in the 
form of inscriptions or art of a sort which would give serious reason to believe in its 
occurrence, there is no reason to believe that it did occur. I am not aware of any 
prehistoric evidence of this sort of mystical experience. There is evidence that 
prehistoric people may have had visions and that they may have believed in another 
world, and I shall try to treat of those in Chapter 10. However, evidence of mystical 
experience such as that of St Bernard or of the self -abasement recorded in the book 
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of Job (Otto 1925: 34 -35, 80 -83) is probably undetectable by archaeology. Those are 
reflective, contemplative experiences. In the forms in which we know them, they 
occur only in the context of a cultural tradition. In the absence of such tradition, it is 
conceivable that sensations of numinous awe could occur to an individual creature, 
but it is unclear what trace might be left which would show that they had occurred. 
I concur with Otto that the earliest numinous experiences most likely were, as 
mentioned above, no more than `an inchoate stirring of the feelings' (Otto: 1925: 26). 
The primal, inchoate feelings were, I suggest, of the `debased', fearful sort, because, 
as we shall see, those feelings are certainly accessible to everyone. In the next 
section I propose to list some examples of apparent encounters with the uncanny, the 
supernatural, so as to make clearer the range of experiences people can have, and 
then discuss the prevalence and significance of such experiences. That human beings 
do experience a numinous fear in a variety of situations, we can then take to be 
given. It will remain in Chapters 4 and 5 to try to account for that uncanny, ghostly 
quality which applies to such experiences, given that, as discussed above, there need 
not be an external object. Such experiences, I shall further presume, were not limited 
to modern humans, but may have been endured by our remote, even prehuman, 
ancestors. In Chapters 7 and 8 I shall then ask what early humans and prehumans 
could have made of their encounters with the merely other. 
Sense of presence 
Accounts of presence experiences 
I reproduce below two cases and in Appendix 3A a large number of episodes 
in which the experients felt that they were undergoing a paranormal or supernatural 
encounter and in which Otto's numinous element is clearly evident. In many cases 
there is an expression of fear, which will clarify the peculiar sensation of 
supernatural fear. They are all cases of a phenomenon widely known as the sense of 
presence or sensed presence or the entity. I shall only quote salient phrases from each 
episode. 
Even in recounting the experience to another, the subject has to some degree 
interpreted it. The subject has to recall what happened, perhaps distinguish several 
events and put them in sequence; and then, to narrate the account, is obliged to use 
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terminology from the general or religious discourse known to him or her. The raw 
experience may have been more inchoate and less continuous and sequenced than the 
account would lead us to believe. There is no avoidance of this problem, but the best 
accounts we can have are those in the first person. 
Case 1 
A fellow student of mine, when I was in my twenties, joined an evangelical 
Christian group and became subject to fear of the supernatural at night. On several 
occasions, he awoke to fmd a weight on his chest, which he attributed to a demon 
sitting on him. One time he said a prayer which he had been taught, to dismiss the 
demon. However, the demon did not depart, and he believed this was because he had 
said some of the prayer wrongly. (So the prayer amounted to a magical formula.) 
When he told me this, I was sitting on a chair in his room, and he said that one night 
he had looked across and saw a demon sitting where I then was. The demon was 
small and round -bodied, grinning, and the top of its head was scorched. 
Case 2 
A man whom William James (1902: 58 -60) describes as `one of the keenest 
intellects I know' had in 1884 his first startling experience of the sense of presence. 
... on the previous night I had had, after getting into bed ..., a vivid tactile 
hallucination of being grasped by the arm, which made me get up and search the 
room ...; but the sense of presence properly so called came on the next night. After I 
had got into bed and blown out the candle, I lay awake awhile thinking about the 
previous night's experience, when suddenly I felt something come into the room and 
stay close to my bed. It remained only a minute or two. I did not recognize it by any 
ordinary sense, and yet there was a horribly unpleasant `sensation' connected with 
it. It stirred something more at the roots of my being than any ordinary perception. 
The feeling had something of the quality of a very large tearing vital pain spreading 
chiefly over the chest, but within the organism - and yet the feeling was not pain so 
much as abhorrence. At all events, something was present with me, and I knew its 
presence far more surely than I have ever known the presence of any fleshly living 
creature. I was conscious of its departure as of its coming: an almost instantaneously 
swift going through the door, and the `horrible sensation' disappeared. 
On the third night when I retired, ... I became aware of the presence (though 
not of the coming) of the thing that was there the night before, and of the `horrible 
sensation'. 
The subject then commanded `this thing' to explain itself or to go. 
It went as on the previous night, and my body quickly recovered .... 
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The experient then makes the following extraordinary remark. Bear in mind 
that he was oppressed by `ghostly' fear and abhorrence. 
I felt it to be like unto myself so to speak, and finite, small, and distressful .... 
This almost compassionate response of the subject to his psychic assailant is 
unique in the literature I have read. It confirms that the experience was entirely 
lacking the element of awe concerning which Otto is so positive. Here we are dealing 
with the second, `debased' type of numinous sensation. James's informant identifies 
the finite creaturehood, rather than divinity, of the presence, a creaturehood shared 
with himself. 
I suspect that most experients whose encounters I describe would have been 
able to agree with James's informant about the creaturehood of the presence, had 
their fear not been so great and had they been of so generous a spirit as this man. The 
experient in one frightening encounter (Appendix 3A, Case 7) actually wished to 
struggle with the entity. One is reminded of Jacob wrestling all night with the `man' 
at the Jabbok (N. Wyatt, pers. comm.; Genesis 32: 22 -30). 
Further cases 
Another twenty -seven cases are recounted in Appendix 3A. 
Variety of presence encounters 
Many more accounts could be given of paranormal visions, auditions or other 
episodes in which the experient sensed the presence of some kind of intelligent 
being. A huge number of cases are given even in the few references which I have 
consulted. Evans (1984: 11) refers to the `colossal' quantity of material, and in 
confirmation tells us that between 1928 and 1975 no fewer than two hundred and 
thirty visions of the Blessed Virgin were notified to the Roman Catholic Church. 
Not only are the numbers great but also there is a huge variety of paranormal 
encounters with an apparently sentient entity. The entity may be terrifying or 
friendly, visible or invisible, a saint or an extraterrestrial, often one of the `grays' 
with silvery grey bodies and large slanting eyes. It may even appear as men -in- black, 
who seem to manifest in twos, wearing dark suits, and purport to be government 
agents attempting to intimidate the subject into not reporting to the authorities some 
earlier paranormal incident. Supernatural, extraterrestrial and other strange figures 
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have variously appeared at outdoor locations, haunted buildings or in people's 
homes, to experients who may be already awake or who believe they are roused from 
sleep. It is possible to classify experiences into types which share diagnostic 
characteristics, as Evans (1984) and Hufford (1982) have done. Even so, there 
appears to be, more or less, a continuum of experiences from the terrifying Old Hag 
and hauntings to the almost comic visitations by men -in- black. 
Objective reality improbable 
Some presences do not appear but are just sensed. Some apparitions are just 
faces or heads, or heads and legless bodies, or are whole bodies with heads and 
limbs. Some are unimpeded by physical obstacles; they pass as if insubstantial 
through doors and walls. Others take care to enter by a door, walk round furniture 
and people, and are reflected in mirrors. One subject said that when the apparition 
she saw passed in front of lights the lights were obscured, but the psychiatrist who 
was treating her was able to determine that at those times her eyes were still 
detecting the light (Evans 1984: 24, 189 -191). In their study of apparitions, Green 
and McCreery (1975: 4) discuss what they call metachoric hallucinations, cases in 
which the subject appears to hallucinate the entire surroundings - for example, the 
bedroom or living room - as well as the apparition itself. Blackmore (1982: 167 -169) 
puts forward a hypothesis that, during out -of -the -body experiences in which the 
subject apparently sees the real surroundings from a new vantage, the subject is not 
seeing at all but is mentally creating, in effect hallucinating, surroundings to 
correspond to that vantage. 
The diversity of identifiable types of apparition is also a stumbling -block for 
credibility. If only one type of encounter, say the ghostly type, were asserted to have 
a real external object, then we might be able to assign it some provisional credibility 
pending investigation. But if all types are supposed to have real external objects, then 
the conclusion must be that a variety of types of intermittently encountered and 
unpredictable non -human intelligent beings - including demons of divers aspects, 
ghosts, angels and saints, along with extraterrestrials of several different species - 
take a keen interest in the affairs of humanity as a whole and of individual ordinary 
humans (cf Evans 1984: 23). Evans intriguingly inquires what these beings occupy 
themselves with when they are not appearing to hapless humans. The improbability 
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of the conclusion casts doubt on the proposition that any kind of paranormal 
encounter has a real object. 
What perhaps most of all inclines one to disbelieve the objective reality and 
to assume the imaginary or hallucinatory nature of presence and apparition 
experiences is the dream -like irrationality of many of the encounters. There is nearly 
always something odd and inconclusive about the behaviour of the visitor. If the 
presence is real and has a message to impart or has some ill intent to carry out, why 
does it not just get on with it, rather than as it so often does, just stand looming 
beside the subject? 
Evans (1984: 155, 291 -292) points out that the conduct of alien (UFO) 
entities is `almost always bafflingly meaningless'. For instance, aliens often seek to 
warn humankind about the dangers of proceeding down a path of planetary 
destruction. However, instead of communicating with world leaders, they invariably 
appear in a desert and deliver a trite message to a nobody. Sagan (1987: 379 -380) 
reports a case in which a medium's spirit guide was alleged to have lived 35,000 
years ago. Instead of imparting what would have been fascinating information about 
his lifetime in the Old Stone Age - let alone the mysteries of the afterlife - what he 
vouchsafed were `banal homilies' indistinguishable from those delivered to UFO 
abductees. 
Entities often appear in forms suited to subjects' conditioning, or advocate 
policies which agree with the subjects' personal predilections. Good aliens have long 
blond hair; bad ones have scales and slanting eyes. Sometimes aliens bring a pro - 
vegetarian message or are anti -semitic; the Blessed Virgin wishes the restoration of 
Latin in church services (Evans 1984: 292 -293, 305 -308; cf Budden 1994: 35). The 
fact that entities appearing to different people express conflicting views of the 
extraterrestrial world or of the hereafter makes accepting the veridicality of any of 
these experiences problematical. A similar consideration applies to near -death 
experiences, in which subjects recount different types of visions and draw different 
and incompatible philosophical conclusions about the nature of the world and man's 
place in it (see accounts in Bailey and Yates 1996). 
Evans (1984: 178 -180) relates how students were asked to write an imaginary 
account of an alien abduction experience. The resulting productions included a 
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wealth of detail and were indistinguishable from accounts given by claimed 
abductees. Many included a medical examination of the subject's body, most often 
the sexual organs. Evans suggests that the details of both sets of accounts came from 
the same source, presumably what the layman would call imagination. 
Restricting the field 
For my purpose, I am not pursuing all kinds of paranormal experiences, but 
only those of a fairly simple form without cultural associations. 
I set aside those episodes experienced by several people and even by large 
numbers, such as some of the visions at Lourdes, or events where the subjects having 
the experience are witnessed by crowds of onlookers, as at Medjugorje. Forty per 
cent of visions of the Blessed Virgin are shared (Evans 1984: 109). Visions of saints, 
UFO visitations and encounters with men in black are loaded with interpretation 
even while the subject undergoes the experience.' UFO and alien encounters were 
unknown before the twentieth century, when awareness of the existence of other 
planets became accessible to more people because of education, science fiction and 
then the advent of rocketry and space travel. These experiences are culturally loaded 
with very specific associations. It is conceivable that the experiential content of some 
episodes interpreted by modern subjects as encounters with extraterrestrials would in 
an earlier century have been interpreted as encounters with demons, fairies or angels. 
Experiences such as these have too many present -day cultural associations to be dealt 
with in the context of my study of prehistoric origins. 
There are numerous varieties of hauntings and spiritualist manifestations, as 
well as alleged extrasensory perception, prescient dreams, unidentified lights in the 
sky or on the ground, and all the rest. To collate the instances, let alone seek to 
explain the varieties of phenomena, would be a lifetime's work. For example, 
apparitions can be of the dead or of the living, rendering the simple hypothesis of 
ghosts or revenants inadequate to account for all the encounters. In fact, in the 1894 
`Census of Hallucinations' published by the Society for Psychical Research, nearly 
1 In fairness, Bernadette Soubirou, even after her sixth vision at Lourdes, continued to refer to the 
object as `it' and told a priest, `I do not know that it is she [the Blessed Virgin] ... she has not told me 
that' (Evans 1984: 108). So she was not explicitly interpreting what she saw, even if those around her 
were doing so. 
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twice as many apparitions of the living were reported as of the dead (Green and 
McCreery 1975: 9). 
There is such a mass and diversity of reported paranormal phenomena that it 
would be rather optimistic to expect that a single manageable theory should account 
for all of them. Fortunately, that is not the task I have set myself. With a view to 
Chapter 5, I concentrate on the sensed presence. 
The plain experience of sensed presence, in the form most relevant to the 
present inquiry, is low -key, personal, and with minimal associations, as in most of 
the selected cases recounted here and in Appendix 3A. Except in a few cases, such as 
those in which old friends or even the self appear, the subject can make no 
supposition as to the identity of the presence. The episode usually lacks firm 
interpretation by the experient, who is confused and usually fearful. It is this kind of 
experience, without transmissible cultural content or interpretation, that might have 
occurred to prehistoric people and even to prehumans. This is the kind of experience 
which, occurring in prehistory, might have introduced to the world Otto's `debased' 
form of the numinous. 
The Old Hag 
Hufford distinguishes a specific variety of experience, which he calls the Old 
Hag. This is the term used colloquially in Newfoundland, where he carried out initial 
surveys, and where there has been a folk understanding of it as a supernatural 
encounter ( Hufford 1982: 1 -11). The Old Hag is so called because sometimes the 
entity appears literally as a hideous old woman, although, as we have seen, the visual 
presence may take on many guises. Hufford (1982: 25 -27) lists the features which 
distinguish the Old Hag. 
Primary features 
1. Subjective impression of wakefulness 
2. Immobility 
3. Realistic perception of actual environnent 
4. Fear 
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Secondary features: 
1. Supine position (very common) 
2. Feeling of presence (very common) 
3. Feeling of pressure, usually on chest (common) 
4. Numinous quality (common) 
5. Fear of death (somewhat common) 
Strictly, the Old Hag, on the above definition of primary features, does not 
require a presence at all, although the fact that the experience is so called seems to 
indicate that the presence of an entity is assumed. However, I think Hufford's point 
is that cases of say, seeing an apparition or feeling pressure on the chest, without the 
complex of the four primary features (wakefulness, immobility, fear and realistic 
perception of surroundings), might be regarded as dreaming, a heart attack, haunting 
or heartburn, but would not count as the Old Hag. 
When the presence occurs, it may be apprehended without being seen, heard 
or touched; it may be `overwhelming', it is felt to be at a particular place in the room 
or in the house, it often moves toward the experient, it may have gender, it has a 
`numinous quality' and `almost always' threatening intent, and it may be felt to be 
evil (Hufford 1982: 22 -23). Hufford does not explicate what he means by `numinous 
quality' but I think we may infer that it refers to daemonic dread or the uncanny 
threat that is sensed in the presence. 
Other secondary features reported in some cases are a tingling or rippling, 
`electrical' sensation through the body (Hufford 109 -113, 195 -197, 242), hearing 
one's name called (Hufford 1982: 106, 108, 181 -182, 193), and a sound of footsteps, 
shuffling or padding as the entity approaches (Hufford 1982: 32 -33, 39, 87, 89, 94, 
99). I suggest that the rustling of clothing, as in one of MacKenzie's hauntings 
(Appendix 3A, Case 14), and the shuffling in one of Budden's cases (Case 10) may 
also correspond to the footsteps. 
On reporting the experience, the subject generally believes that he or she was 
awake during it. The room in which the subject is lying is seen as it actually is. There 
is no dream landscape or swift, fluid transition from one location to another or from 
one group of companions to another. There is a general sense of reality about the 
circumstances which, for each subject, distinguishes the experience from dreaming. 
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The physiological component of the core experience seems to be wakeful 
paralysis: the subject wakens from sleep but is unable to move. The condition is also 
known as sleep paralysis. During REM sleep the brain's quiescent system 
immobilizes the body; signals from the motor cortex are blocked from reaching the 
spinal cord. 
The helplessness of that condition might give rise to secondary imagined or 
inferred features that involve a threat. Hufford points out that, in theory, the threat 
could then take a variety of forms, such as a fire, the sound of a riot outside, the 
ceiling collapsing. But in fact the threat arising in wakeful paralysis always takes the 
form of a presence, a sentient being or `entity', human or non -human, within the 
house (Hufford 1982: 28). Jones (1931: 243) says, `From the earliest times the 
oppressing agency experienced during sleep was personified'. This fact, for Hufford, 
argues against the entity being merely a secondary development or inference from 
the basic physiological features of the oppression experience. However, as will be 
shown in Chapter 7, human beings have a tendency to assume personal agency 
behind any unknown occurrence or predicament. This is not conscious inference but 
an innate, involuntary, unconscious process. It is possible, then, that the entity should 
be a subconsciously `inferred' personification. 
However, on some, and perhaps all, occasions, rather than personifying an at 
first impersonal threat, the sense of presence is prior to, and is what gives rise to, the 
feeling of being threatened. Sometimes the episode begins with a sense of presence 
not immediately accompanied by fear, and only as the experience takes its course, as 
the subject becomes aware of the predicament of being approached by something 
unknown, does fear develop (Appendix 3A, Cases 15 and 18). In other cases the fear 
is concomitant; I do not recall any instances in the literature in which fear precedes 
the sense that something is there. Benign visitations (Appendix 3A, Cases 21 -27) are 
not personifications of threat, yet the sense -of- presence component seems to be the 
same sort of sensation as in the frightening cases. 
In Newfoundland Hufford found that 23 per cent of those surveyed had had 
the experience of waking up and being unable to move. In groups surveyed in several 
areas of the United States, the positive response was 10 -25 per cent. He estimates 
that a recognizable Old Hag has been experienced by about 15 per cent of the 
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population (Hufford 1982: 20, 50, 245, 247). These data show that the experience is 
not at all uncommon. 
Further, the Old Hag has recognizable characteristics regardless of cultural 
tradition in the locality. In Newfoundland it was well known among the older 
generation, but on the mainland it was not. People who had not heard of it from 
others but had experienced it themselves described the same characteristic 
phenomena. There is a persistent pattern ( Hufford 1982: 64 -65, 245 -248). These 
facts militate against the hypothesis that traditions of the supernatural in one's local 
culture induce the experience, rather as reading or watching a ghost story might 
induce unpleasant dreams. Certainly, some people may be more susceptible than 
others, and in the next two chapters I shall try to uncover possible factors which may 
underlie susceptibility. However, I think the significant conclusion toward which 
Hufford's evidence should incline us is that the phenomena of the Old Hag are not 
culturally determined but constitute an experience intrinsic to human nature. 
Nightmares 
Nowadays the word `nightmare' is used to mean `unpleasant dream', but 
originally, as one would expect from the etymology, denoted Old Hag or incubus 
experiences, in which the experient felt himself or herself trapped and oppressed or 
ridden upon by some horrific entity. 
Jones (1931: 20, 52, 74 -75) gives three cardinal features to distinguish what 
he calls nightmare. 
1. agonizing dread 
2. sense of oppression or weight on the chest 
3. conviction of helpless paralysis 
All three features occur as primary (fear, immobility) or secondary (pressure) in 
Hufford's definition of the Old Hag. 
Hufford's remaining primary features (sense of wakefulness and realism) are 
added by Waller (1816, quoted in Jones 1931: 74): `The degree of consciousness 
during a paroxysm of nightmare is so much greater than ever happens in a dream, 
that a person who has had a vision of this kind cannot easily bring himself to 
acknowledge the deceit ... 
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A chronic sufferer of nightmares, Macnish (1834, quoted in Jones 1931: 17- 
21), says: `The whole mind, during the paroxysm, is wrought up to a pitch of 
unutterable despair ... utter and incomprehensible dread. ... At one moment he may 
have the consciousness of a malignant demon being at his side: then to shun the sight 
of so appalling an object he will close his eyes, but still the fearful being makes its 
presence known ... then he knows that he is face to face with a fiend. Then, if he 
looks up, he beholds horrid eyes glaring upon him ... . Or, he may have the idea of a 
monstrous hag squatted upon his breast - whose intolerable weight crushes the 
breath out of his body, and whose fixed, deadly, incessant stare petrifies him with 
horror.' And: `No firmness of mind can at all times withstand the influence of these 
deadly terrors. ... all the ... horrid superstitions of sleep arise to indicate their power 
in the mind, which, under the fancied protection of reason and science, conceived 
itself shielded from all such attacks, but which, in the hour of trial, often sinks 
beneath the influence ....' 
According to Jones (1931: 25), Angst attacks indistinguishable from 
nightmares `may run their whole course during the waking state'. He quotes Macnish 
(1834) again: `The more awake we are, the greater is the violence of the paroxysm. I 
have experienced the affection stealing upon me while in perfect possession of my 
faculties, and have undergone ... being haunted by spectres, hags and every sort of 
phantom - having, at the same time, a full consciousness that I was labouring under 
incubus, and that all the terrifying objects around me were the creations of my own 
brain.' This quotation is particularly interesting in that it illustrates not only 
hallucinations during a waking state, but also that the fear accompanying the 
appearances was independent of the subject's evaluation that they were non- 
veridical. 
Jones (1931: 44, 79) tells us that the nightmare is only one variety of anxiety 
dream but shares important features with other types, such as `dreams of grimacing 
beings, dreams of being examined, pursued, etc'. In the nightmare, he states, dread 
reaches the maximum intensity known in waking or sleeping. I take this dread to be 
what I have called the supernatural fear: firstly, because from mercifully limited 
personal experience I would identify the two, and I suspect others would do the 
same; secondly, because the kinds of entities whose presence is sensed defy our 
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expectations of appearance or behaviour derived from natural creatures; and thirdly, 
because the panic in the face of the unknown and unpredictable as described above is 
consonant with the numinous dread delineated by Otto. 
Diversity of explanations 
Clearly some experiences, as in the more baffling cases, are not perceptions 
of actual objects. One wonders whether certain cases, such as one recounted in a 
television documentary', represent actual physical incidents perpetrated on the 
subject by an all- too -real living human. In this case, which resulted in long -term 
trauma, an adult man recalled that, when he was a teenager, he was sodomized by a 
male entity which entered his bedroom at night. Jones (1931: 84) relates a mediaeval 
case in which a young lady cried out when attacked by an incubus; her friends on 
entering found the offending supernatural being under her bed, where it had 
cunningly assumed the disguise of a bishop. One suspects, however, that most cases 
are not of real objects, supernatural or otherwise. 
Sleep 
This subsection deals with the physiological conditions which may underlie 
some presence encounters. 
Sleep research identifies two major forms: REM (rapid eye movement) and 
non -REM, although the latter can be further subdivided. Non -REM stage 1 takes 
place as the subject loses consciousness, lasting only a few minutes. During it, 
relaxed waking alpha rhythm (8 -13 Hz) gives way to slower theta waves (4 -7 Hz). 
Stage 1 is followed by stage 2, which is repeated throughout the night and constitutes 
about fifty per cent of the whole sleep cycle. Stage 2 EEG shows the sleep spindle, 
made up of waves at 8 -14 Hz. Stages 3 and 4 are deep sleep, in which EEG is 
characterized by some theta and mostly very slow, high- amplitude delta rhythm (3 
Hz and below) ( Hufford 1982: 119 -120; Bear et al. 2001: 616). 
During REM sleep, the electroencephalograph (EEG) is similar to that of a 
waking subject, showing fast, shallow beta waves (above 14 Hz). The subject often 
dreams, and motor centres in the frontal lobe issue signals for body movements. 
However, brain -stem nuclei which control the musculature do not relay the signals. 
The Entity, Channel 4 Television, 2001. 
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Apart from eye and ear muscles, the body is paralysed, even respiration being 
minimal. The paralysis appears to be a safety mechanism to prevent us from injuring 
ourselves while asleep. Wakeful paralysis, also contrarily known as sleep paralysis, 
occurs when the subject wakes while the body is in this paralysed condition (Bear et 
al. 2001: 614 -616). 
During non -REM sleep, the body is not paralysed, but the cortex, including 
motor cortex, is quiescent. If somnambulism takes place, it usually occurs during 
deep non -REM sleep. Up to forty per cent of children have an episode, but it occurs 
less commonly among adults. Eyes can be open and the subject avoids obstacles on 
his or her travels. Night terrors, or sleep terrors, in which the subject awakes with 
panic and screaming, occur mostly among young children and are also the product of 
stage 4 deep non -REM sleep (Bear et al. 2001: 609, 614 -617; Hufford 1982: 122, 
137). 
Hufford (1982: 163 -164) distinguishes Old Hag encounters from night 
terrors. The latter occur during stage 4 non -REM sleep, as does somnambulism. 
During somnambulism, although the experient is deeply asleep, the brain's sensory 
and motor cortices and the brainstem nuclei which mediate sensory and motor 
signals are evidently highly active. In night terrors it may be that the brain's centres 
which mediate fear responses are spontaneously activated without any accompanying 
subjective experience, so that the subject wakes screaming for no reason. 
Alternatively, perhaps sometimes a short-lived continuous brain process, this time 
subjective but `unconscious', may also be under way, producing a frightening 
experience which is usually forgotten on waking. If this is so, however, one would 
expect evidence of activity on the EEG. 
Clearly, wakeful paralysis is likely to be a major component of the incubus 
experience and of some Old Hag experiences. Wakeful paralysis is associated with 
REM sleep and therefore with dreaming. Hypnagogic hallucinations, in which there 
is an awareness of one's real surroundings, are dreamlike episodes at the onset of 
sleep and often associated with sleep paralysis (Bear et al. 2001: 625). Hufford 
concludes that Old Hag and incubus experiences occur when REM activity, normally 
limited to a period following stage 2 sleep, occur anomalously during stage 1. This is 
the combination of sleep paralysis and a hypnagogic hallucination. The body is 
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paralysed and a dream of sorts takes place while the subject is not fully asleep and is 
still aware of his or her actual surroundings. Such an explanation is consistent with 
the large proportion of Old Hag episodes experienced while napping or fatigued 
(Hufford 1982: 149 -168, 246). 
The subjective content of Old Hag experiences is much less diverse than that 
of normal dreams. This cross -cultural similarity has to be accounted for (Hufford 
1982: 162, 245 -248). Salient features are the heightened, non -dreamlike sense of 
reality and the feeling of a sentient presence. 
Psychical hypotheses 
These are interesting but, as they violate the principle of parsimony, I have 
relegated them to Appendix 3B. 
A psychoanalytic hypothesis 
This interesting but unfalsifiable hypothesis of Jones is discussed in 
Appendix 3C. 
Hypothesis of a subconscious warning 
Budden (1994: 6 -7) regards presences and apparitions as hallucinations 
produced by the subject's subconscious to warn the subject about dangers to health. 
He makes a case that dangers are posed principally by the electrical fields and 
electromagnetic radiation by which in the age of technology and communications we 
are surrounded. Some entities warn by frightening the subject; others give advice and 
reassurance. In either case the subject's own body has apprehended the danger, even 
if the danger is not obvious to the conscious mind. 
Employing a similar but more general conception, Evans sees apparitions as 
being sometimes projections of the subject's personal anxieties or desires onto a 
presumed external object which can then symbolize them and render them 
manageable. In this way, an entity encounter can be a kind of `self -administered 
psychotherapy' (Evans 1984: 293 -294). This understanding makes sense of some 
encounters, for example those in which the presence or apparition bestows comfort 
or imparts beneficial advice. However, the frightening Old Hag and incubus 
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encounters do not render fears manageable but rather make matters worse and cause 
sleepless nights (Hufford 1982). 
The producer hypothesis 
Evans (1984: 39, 238, 242, 256, 300 -302, 307 -308) proposes that the human 
mind contains a function or faculty of some kind which generates dreams and those 
waking apparitions which we regard as paranormal, and calls this the producer. The 
producer is a faculty in the mind of the percipient, but has not necessarily just an 
imaginative or hallucinatory function. He does not dismiss the idea that some 
experiences may be genuine encounters with external agents, whether living humans 
projecting a double, supernatural beings or extraterrestrials. In such cases, the 
percipient's producer would be activated by the external agent. For example, a dying 
aunt far away may interact with the subject's producer to cause an apparition of the 
aunt to the subject. Intoxication, life crises and altered states of consciousness may 
be varieties of enabling condition for such experiences (veridical or false) to take 
place. In most cases, however, he thinks it is unnecessary to posit an external agent, 
so that most experiences are attributable to the producer alone. 
During dreams, the producer is monitoring real life even while generating a 
fantasy. It can incorporate sounds and sensations from the real world into the dream, 
for example making up a dream explanation, say, a snowstorm, for the real cold 
sensed by the sleeper when the sheets slide off the bed. In age- regression hypnotism, 
the producer creates a role for the hypnotist in the `past' scenes which the subject is 
witnessing; because otherwise the hypnotist, of whose presence the subject is by 
necessity aware, would be out of place there. Under hypnotism, the producer fills out 
scenes and elaborates on memories, sometimes correctly but sometimes with details 
which are apposite but incorrect and stated by other observers of the original events 
not to have been part of the scene. It stages a display for the conscious mind, which 
it is sometimes able to deceive completely. 
In all this, the producer acts like an autonomous personality. Entities in 
sensed- presence experiences act contrarily to the subject's wishes and in ways which 
the subject cannot predict. The producer seems to know everything that the conscious 
mind knows (cf Schatzman and Fenwick 1994: 234 -235). What makes Evans allow 
the possibility that the producer can be influenced by external agencies is that, on his 
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analysis, the entity seems to have access not only to all the information available to 
our conscious minds but also sometimes to information not known to the percipient, 
or even to the apparent when the latter is a living person (Evans 1984: 39, 256, 300). 
The producer has considerable value as an explanatory hypothesis, but the 
idea that this faculty can be influenced paranormally by an external agent is 
problematical. If we assume that all paranormal perception is false, that is, non- 
veridical, then conceivably the component of the brain that produces it may at one 
time be visual cortex, at another time auditory cortex, at another time limbic 
structures, and so forth, depending on what sort of imagery or perception is being 
experienced. There is no obvious need for a single part of the brain to be a 
specialized producer of such imagery. But if the producer can not only generate 
imagery by itself (that is, false perceptions) but also can be stimulated by external 
agencies to produce similar imagery (in this case veridical paranormal perceptions), 
then I think one would expect it to be some discrete faculty, with its neural basis in a 
discrete bank of neurons or set of nuclei in the brain, dedicated to producing this odd 
type of imagery which we think of as paranormal. The problem then arises to identify 
anything which could be this physiological component susceptible of being 
influenced at a distance by external agents. 
Evans (1984: 307) quotes a suggestion of G. R. Taylor that the production of 
imagery may be going on all the time, and is the product of `the older, more 
primitive part of the brain'. On this hypothesis, normally the imagery is ignored or 
suppressed by the cortex, but if the cortex is numbed or when the imagery is loaded 
with an exceptional degree of affect, then it can break through into consciousness. 
A neuropsychological producer 
The entity seems to have access to everything the subject knows (Evans 
1984: 308). This fact would be consistent with the entity being ultimately the subject 
himself or herself. In some episodes the experient sees himself or herself (Appendix 
3A, Cases 16 and 17), and in others the entity embodies some of the experient's own 
characteristics (Case 9). 
The entity could be a representation of some part of the subject, but a part 
evidently unknown to the experiencing self, the `I'. For instance, the entity could be 
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produced by a separate pseudo -self, a complex of mental processes analogous to an 
`I' but independent of those processes which subserve the `I'. These processes would 
not ordinarily be conscious or perceptible to the consciousness which we call `I'. 
Such considerations lead to the neuropsychological theory developed by Persinger to 
account for many putative supernatural experiences, a theory which I shall explore in 
detail in Chapter 5. 
Summary 
In this chapter I have discussed the phenomenon of the numinous. Beginning 
with the concept of the numen originally described by Otto, two distinct numinous 
sensations have been identified. One sensation is a religious or mystical sense of awe 
and abasement in the face of the mighty and wholly other. The other sensation is fear 
of the supernatural, supernatural fear, fear of the merely other. Whereas the 
numinous awe is not universally experienced, the numinous fear probably is, and 
therefore it was probably known to human beings or their predecessors in prehistory. 
This supernatural fear is distinct from fear of wild animals and dangerous 
situations. It is identified by Otto as a `debased' form of numinous sensation and for 
him well exemplified by the fear of ghosts. It is exclusively associated with the 
supernatural. We know that we can experience this thrilling fear even when just 
reading about or watching a drama about the supernatural, so that we know it need 
not have a real object. The putative object of the supernatural fear is always an 
unknown and personal entity which thinks more or less like a human and whose 
behaviour is as in a dream, not limited by physical laws. 
Given the huge and more or less continuous variety of presences and 
apparitions, of which some present as supernatural and others present as 
extraterrestrial beings or humans from threatening agencies, I have maintained that 
none of the presences and apparitions in question are real but that all are the product 
of dreams and hallucinations. Some evidence suggests that the presences and 
apparitions may be representations of the subject himself or herself. It seems likely 
that the experiences originate from brain processes distinct from and independent of 
those which mediate what I have called the `I', the self, that part of the conscious 
subject which has will. 
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I have not argued in detail for the purely illusory or hallucinatory nature of 
presence and apparition encounters, as such an argument would require a research 
project in its own right. However, I have given reasons and stated a position from 
which I can take forward my thesis that the elements of religion have a natural 
origin. 
It would be absurd to claim that I have explained the Old Hag, incubus or any 
other such experiences, and I accept the cautions of Evans (1984) and Hufford 
(1982) concerning the inadequacy of previous purported explanations to account for 
all aspects of the phenomena. Like them, I think research on this subject is a matter 
which has been largely neglected by science for a hundred years, but the deficit has 
begun to be redressed, not least by their researches. Further research will show, I 
suspect, that the entity phenomena in question are hallucinatory and that other sorts 
of paranormal phenomena are also attributable to a variety of natural causes. I shall 
allude to some recent work in Chapter 5. 
The principal task of the next two chapters is to try to clarify what neural 
processes occur in the subject's brain when numinous sensations are experienced, 
and what provokes such processes to occur. If this matter can be clarified, then, on 
the basis of brain development, we may be able to tell at what stage in prehistory 
numinous sensations could have begun to figure in the lives of our ancestors. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE NEURAL: BRAIN STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 
The chief thrust of this chapter is to lay the groundwork for an attempt to 
bring findings from neurological research to bear on elucidating the nature of 
subjective experiences of the supernatural. In Chapter 5 I shall propose that certain 
specific subjective religious or supernatural experiences are correlated with specific, 
identifiable types of neural processes traceable within specific parts of the human 
brain, and that those processes are precipitated in susceptible persons sometimes 
spontaneously and sometimes in certain environmental conditions. In Chapter 7 I 
shall try to show how, in prehistory, the occurrence of those neurological processes 
may have contributed to bring about the belief that non -physical intelligent entities 
exist and interact with human beings. 
In accordance with established practice I use the words `neural' and 
`neurological' almost interchangeably to refer to brain structures and processes. 
Strictly, `neural' should refer to the structures and processes and `neurological' to the 
study of the former. 
A survey of the main structures of the human brain, referred to in this and 
following chapters, is given as Appendix 4A. 
Subjective experiences correlate with neural processes 
The soul 
The proposal that subjective religious experiences should be correlated with 
neurological events should not in itself be surprising or contentious, unless one 
wishes to maintain, rather in the manner of Descartes (1642), that the conscious 
component of a human being is really a non -physical entity, a soul. 
One might theorize that the soul communicates with the body by receiving 
inputs from the body and sending outputs to the body, perhaps via the brain or a 
particular structure within the brain. At one time the pineal gland was regarded as the 
possible locus of this communication (Springer and Deutsch 1989: 320 -322). On this 
view, all sensation, cogitation, decision making, all awareness, is carried out by the 
soul, not by the brain. The brain is thus not even a vehicle for consciousness but 
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rather is the material component of a communication system for connecting the 
material world with the spiritual. So, when there is a stimulus, the sight of a 
dangerous animal, for instance, a signal is sent to the brain and transferred to the 
soul, which then decides what to do. The soul communicates its decision to the brain, 
and the brain activates the appropriate muscles or carries out whatever response has 
been decided. In the sequence of stimulus - input- process- output- response, the soul 
plays the processing role. 
What we actually see is that neurons are connected to other neurons 
throughout the body and brain, except in such cases as sensory nerves, whose 
dendrites receive information from the surroundings in which they are embedded, 
skin, intestines and the rest, and motor nerves, whose axons activate muscles. The 
brain is composed of a densely connected mass of nervous tissue, discriminable into 
various structures, certainly, but such that signals pass from one neuron to other 
neurons without any gap in which a non -physical component might reside. It is 
possible with modern technology to observe waves of neuronal activity spreading 
across the cerebral cortex, indicating that the firing of neurons in one area sets off 
activity in others. Examination of human and animal brains has elucidated the 
connections, in the form of neuronal projections, between areas all over the brain, 
showing the pathways by which the various functional structures communicate. In 
this system of complete neural continuity, there does not seem to be a place for the 
soul to fit in as a component of processing. 
Experiments since the 1940s, when the neurosurgeon Penfield first explored 
the exposed brains of living patients, have shown that ideas, memories and emotions 
can be produced in the experience of a conscious subject by stimulating the surface 
of the cortex or the deep structures of the limbic system. While they may well 
contain snippets of memories from past experience, these ideas arise in 
consciousness à propos of nothing, unconnected with previous thoughts, and are 
clearly brought about by the artificial stimulus and not by an internal act of will on 
the part of the subject. Unless we are prepared to say that a non -physical soul can be 
stimulated artificially, then it seems that one of three options must follow: (1) the 
soul does not exist, (2) it does exist but is not the conscious part of a human being, 
(3) it is or includes the conscious part of a human being but is intimately associated 
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with and operates strictly in parallel with the electrochemical processes of the brain. 
If the third option is favoured, then the soul may well be regarded as a superfluous 
postulate for the purposes of objectively analysing mental processes, since mental 
processes can at least in principle be traced in terms of purely neuronal activity. 
Option 2 above is compatible with some Christian interpretations. On both 
Biblical and scientific grounds, according to Polkinghorne (1998: 22), a human being 
can be regarded as a psychosomatic unity in which consciousness and the brain are 
intimately connected. 
I think research has adequately shown that mental processes and states of 
numerous types, sensations, memories, emotions, the formation of speech sounds, 
anxiety, elation and others, can be traced to specific types or locations of neuronal 
activity. In the system of neural connections there is no gap which would give rise to 
a need to postulate a non -physical component to carry out mental processing 
uncorrelated with neural processes. It is therefore to be expected that mental states 
and processes of all kinds should be correlated each with their own specific types of 
neural activity. Religious experiences and experiences of encounters with the 
supernatural are mental processes: therefore, they too should all be expected to have 
neural correlates. 
The neural substrate and veridicality 
Both veridical and false sense perception has a neural correlate. In the case of 
a veridical visual perception, the neural correlate of the subjective experience is the 
sequence of neural activity from the retina along the optic nerves to the lateral 
geniculate body of the thalamus and on to the primary visual cortex, and from there 
to secondary visual cortices, and finally to association cortex in the temporal and 
frontal lobes. One suspects that only the latter parts of the sequence are strictly 
correlated with the conscious subjective experience. But what makes the visual 
experience veridical, if it is, is that the subject is seeing an object which is actually 
there. What makes a visual experience false or non -veridical, if it is, is not that it has 
a neural correlate but that the object which the subject sees is not actually there. The 
fact that there is a neural correlate has no bearing on the veridicality or otherwise of 
the perception, because there is always a neural correlate. However, the nature of that 
neural correlate and the conditions in which it comes about, in particular its 
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originating processes, do bear on how we ought to estimate the veridicality or 
falsehood of the perception. 
I suggest that not all experiences are subject to the veridical /false dichotomy. 
A wish to go somewhere has a neural correlate. If the wish can be induced 
artificially, at the whim of a neurological experimenter or another party, is the 
experience of the wish invalidated? By this I mean, is it not still a wish? I think it is 
still a wish. If it occurs as a result of an illness, a fever or other disturbance of the 
subject's normal condition, I should think again that it is still a wish. If it is induced 
in the brain by the presence of an external magnetic field, again it is still a wish. 
When the wish arises spontaneously, without artificial stimulation, it is still, one 
expects, the result of some prior processing in the subject's brain, which earlier was 
probably set in train by an external cause. 
Declarative experiences, however, are subject to the veridical /false 
dichotomy. By `declarative experiences' I mean experiences such as thoughts that 
something is the case, memories of something being the case, perceptions which 
represent that something is the case. My thought that the neighbour's cat is in the 
garden is veridical - commonly we would say `true' - if and only if the cat is in the 
garden. My memory of crossing the dual carriageway this morning is veridical - 
commonly, `accurate' - if and only if I crossed the dual carriageway this morning 
and the conditions were as I purport to remember them. 
Suppose that, at least in principle, a neurosurgical experimenter can induce a 
vision of a vase of flowers in a blindfold subject's mind, indistinguishable from the 
vision which he or she has earlier experienced on looking at a particular vase of 
flowers which actually exists in another room of the laboratory. The neural activity 
in the frontal lobes, perhaps also in the visual cortices, would be the same in both 
these visual experiences, although the activity in the thalamus would not, since in the 
induced experimental case no signals representing the vase of flowers would be 
received from the optic nerves. One vision is veridical because the subject is actually 
seeing the vase of flowers, and the other vision is false because the subject is not 
seeing a vase of flowers. It is the presence of an external object of actual vision that 
renders the one vision veridical. The same principle applies to hearing or any other 
perceptual modality. 
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Say one experiences a sense of presence. What would make the sensation 
veridical is the actual presence of an external object that one is sensing. In this case it 
would be a presumably conscious agent. If the sense of presence occurs in the 
absence of an external object, then it is a false or mistaken perception: the experience 
is not veridical. Hallucinations fall into the latter category. 
The self 
Conceding that the pineal gland is not the location of the soul, and nothing 
else is either, one may still be intrigued to consider whether some brain structure or 
complex of structures could be the location of processes which we might identify 
with the self, the `I' or consciousness. I use the word `self as an abbreviation for `the 
subjective sense of self, the I, consciousness, the self -aware part of a person'. I do 
not mean to suggest that a human being is anything other than a material body with 
consciousness, Polkinghorne's psychosomatic unity. 
The idea that certain parts of the brain might carry out processes which 
manifest in consciousness is given plausibility by these facts: (1) of all the bodily 
organs, it is clear that only the brain is involved in consciousness, not, for example, 
the liver; (2) many parts of the brain seem to be specialized for circumscribed 
processes which are not conscious. The reception and initial structuring of visual data 
takes place without our knowledge in primary and secondary visual cortex of the 
occipital lobes. The movement of limbs in learned action such as walking, swimming 
and driving is unconscious or not fully conscious, yet involves the motor cortex of 
the frontal lobes to initiate the action and the somatosensory cortex of the parietal 
lobes to check that movements are happening, along with brainstem nuclei and the 
cerebellum. The autonomic nervous system, with its scattered nuclei in the brainstem 
and hypothalamus, is evidently unconscious, although on occasion effects of its 
processing, such as heightened alertness, have consequences in consciousness. All 
these, then, are among the brain areas not essentially involved with the conscious 
mind. 
In the literature there seem to be two candidate areas for the location of what 
I have called the self: these are (1) prefrontal association cortices of the frontal lobes, 
and (2) association cortices of the temporal lobes together with some limbic 
structures. 
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Frontal lobes 
Carter (1998: 61, 67) says that the frontal lobes are concerned with the 
highest cognitive processes such as thinking and planning, and with emotion. 
Stuss (1991: 257 -259) proposes that the frontal lobes are responsible for the 
highest functions of the brain, which he classifies in three layers, from lowest to 
highest: (1) the organization of information, which includes attention, memory, 
language and cognition based on autonomic, emotional, perceptual and motor data, 
(2) anticipation, goal selection, planning and monitoring, and (3) self -awareness. In 
his view, the self is related to memory function, in that a person remembers his or her 
own memories with a warmth and immediacy absent from mere factual knowledge. 
It is these episodic memories that enable recognition of what counts as the `I' of 
consciousness. Episodic memories are related to frontal lobe function. 
Patients with frontal lobe damage often show reduced emotional involvement 
in their own situation. One frontal -lobe patient was said never to be self -absorbed, 
never to daydream or introspect. Some patients who had had frontal -lobe surgery 
either denied having had the operation or acknowledged it without resentment or 
interest. Other patients described their own faults and vices as a curious matter of 
fact and without any sense of shame (Stuss 1991: 264, 272). 
Stuss describes a central executive function, located in the frontal lobes, 
which makes decisions, generating output from the input received from posterior 
centres, including the limbic system. The control or executive function is on Stuss's 
second level. At the highest level is self -awareness, which does not depend upon 
sensory input. Inputs here are the abstract mental representations of the choices 
available to the executive. The location of this processing is proposed as the 
anteromedial prefrontal cortex (Passingham's ventral prefrontal cortex: see below), 
particularly on the right (Stuss 1991: 273 -274). 
The dorsal prefrontal cortex (behind the forehead in Homo sapiens) receives 
the main projections from the parietal lobes delivering information about the 
organism and its surroundings. PET scans of human subjects show activity in these 
areas when people generate actions at will (Passingham 1993: 156). 
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The ventral prefrontal cortex (on either side of the forehead and above the 
eyes) has connections principally with temporal association cortex and with the 
amygdala and hypothalamus. The ventral prefrontal cortex therefore receives 
processed information derived from all sensory modalities and memory together with 
emotional associations. Passingham argues that the ventral prefrontal cortex selects 
goals for action based on the current context of both perception and emotion. The 
prefrontal cortex has both corticocortical projections and also connections via the 
basal ganglia whereby it influences premotor cortex to initiate action (Passingham 
1993: 154, 157, 159, 170 -171, 201). 
Once an association is set up between stimulus and action, the prefrontal 
cortex is not involved. Prefrontal areas remain inactive when human subjects repeat 
words that they hear, but are active in learning. When a new decision is required 
about what to do, the prefrontal cortex is activated, but when a response has become 
routine, it ceases to be activated (Passingham 1993: 220, 250 -251). 
The human ability to plan future action, to consider possible consequences by 
mental trial and error and thereby select between options for action, the capacity for 
voluntary action in the strongest sense can be attributed to development of the 
prefrontal cortex. In the course of primate evolution, human beings have acquired not 
only the largest brains but also the largest proportion of prefrontal cortex. A 
consequence of the prefrontal cortex reaching the size it has attained in humans may 
be the possibility of genuine voluntary action (Passingham 1993: 222, 236 -237, 259- 
260). 
Rabbitt (1997: 2 -3, 7) discusses the concept of the central executive process 
to which voluntary action is referred. It is possible to distinguish between situations 
in which a human agent has a single feasible course of action and those in which 
there is a choice. Only in the latter case does the central executive have to be invoked 
to evaluate alternatives. Executive behaviour is accessible to consciousness, while 
non -executive behaviours are not. The executive has, or has access to, `prospective 
memory', the ability to hold intended sequences of actions in mind over long periods 
so as to carry them out when appropriate circumstances arise. Rabbitt notes the 
resemblance between the characteristics attributed to the central executive and the 
criteria for commission of sin in Catholic doctrine. It is the executive, with awareness 
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of the self as the intending perpetrator of an act and, by virtue of a theory of mind, 
recognition of the consequences for others, that would be able to commit sin. 
While supposed executive processes such as planning, inhibition and 
monitoring can be defined by behavioural examples, they need not correspond to 
distinct, localized neural processes (Rabbitt 1997: 8). In a similar vein, Deacon 
(1997: 293 -297) marshals evidence against the presumption that, because human 
beings can process grammar, our brains need have a distinct neural functional unit 
identifiable as a grammar module. In his view, functional units which already existed 
in ancestral primate brains and carried out tasks related to behaviour in their lives 
have been adapted or coopted to be used in language processing in humans. 
Similarly, it is not necessary that there be a specific planning module somewhere in 
the brain; all that is necessary is that the processing for planning be carried out by 
one or more functional units. 
Some authorities propose that consciousness is related to short-term working 
memory. Long -term memory is laid down by the hippocampus and adjacent temporal 
cortex. On the basis of human and other primate studies, short-term memory can be 
localized to the dorsolateral and orbital (ventrolateral) prefrontal cortices, as well as 
the anterior cingulate gyrus. Sensory data and stored data processed by the prefrontal 
cortex is given an emotional charge by projections from the amygdala which are 
received in the orbital prefrontal cortex (Le Doux 2000: 300 -301; Davis 2000: 254). 
I think it would be uncontentious to say that when a person attends carefully 
to something, it is the `I' that is attending. Manly and Robertson (1997) describe 
results of research on attention. Attentive listening was associated with increased 
activity in the right prefrontal cortex, and decreased activity in the anterior cingulate 
cortex and posterior parietal areas, suggesting that the reduced activity in the latter 
was caused by inhibitory signals from the prefrontal. It is suggested that, in 
subjective terms, the subject was clearing the mind. The enhanced activity in the 
right prefrontal was found to be more specifically in the middle prefrontal gyrus. 
Another study in which the subject was alert waiting for stimulation to a toe showed 
elevated activity in parietal somatosensory areas and in the right prefrontal and a 
right superior parietal area. The left prefrontal showed no elevation in activity 
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compared with rest. Visual fixation produced increased activity in the right prefrontal 
and superior parietal areas. 
There seems to be a consensus (Phillips 1997: 192) that there exists a central 
executive brain process more or less corresponding to what in traditional western 
philosophy was known as the will. I cannot really be different from my will, 
although I could be more than my will, so this process should be, or be part of, the 
neurological substrate of the self I note, however, that Stuss makes self -awareness 
something higher than the central executive (see above). 
Temporal lobes 
Ramachandran (1999: 228, 249, 252) proposes that the sense of self and 
consciousness are mediated only by certain structures, and lists these as parts of the 
temporal lobe, the amygdala, septum, hypothalamus, insula and the cingulate gyrus. 
Commenting that the central executive or control process is generally thought to be a 
prefrontal function, he suggests that subjective experience occurs as a correlate of a 
brain process which connects perception with emotions or goals. The self 
traditionally is that which makes choices based on perception, emotion and goals. 
Here, I suggest, perception includes both current perception and background 
knowledge from memory, while emotion includes the emotional associations of 
knowledge of one's current state. The self is then a process by which areas of the 
brain which mediate perceptual and motivational functions influence those areas 
concerned with action, particularly motor functions. Presumably on this ground, 
Ramachandran adds to those areas listed above the supplementary motor areas 
(SMA) of the frontal lobes, saying that consciousness has been defined as `a 
conditional readiness to act'. 
Peringer and Makarec (1992: 220) propose that the sense of self is associated 
with patterns of electrical activity in the limbic structures and adjacent cortex of the 
left temporal lobe. This is where interaction can take place between processes of the 
limbic structures mediating internal data and those of the association cortex 
mediating data ultimately from external sources. A sense of self requires a memory 
containing symbolic (linguistic) sequences and image -based representations. It is 
believed that memory or, at any rate, the store and recall function, is principally 
represented in the temporal lobes. 
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In a series of laboratory experiments, subjective experience resulted from 
electrical stimulation of the subcortical structures of the temporal lobe, and not the 
cortical gyri. Limbic activation may therefore be necessary for bringing percepts 
mediated by the temporal cortex to conscious level. The attachment of emotional or 
motivational significance may be not just a dispensable additive but in fact the 
prerequisite for percepts and memories to reach consciousness and assume 
`experiential immediacy' (Gloor et al. 1982: 140 -141). If this is so, then it would 
seem that having a sense of self is acutely dependent on the amygdala and 
hippocampus. 
Deacon (1997: 451 -452) argues that consciousness is possible only by means 
of symbolic representation, whereby we represent ourselves to ourselves, and that 
symbolic thinking is a linguistic phenomenon. Similarly, Jaynes (1976: 66 -67, 101- 
103) contends that consciousness depends on a linguistic faculty, mediated by three 
areas of the brain: Wernicke's area, Broca's area and the supplementary motor area. 
Wernicke's area is of course loosely defined, but is in the temporo -parietal region 
centred on the angular gyrus, which curves round the end of the Sylvian fissure. 
Broca's area is in the premotor cortex of the frontal lobe, and the SMA is of course 
also in the frontal. Broca's area is related principally to speech. It is Wernicke's area 
that seems to be crucial for the understanding of language, whether heard, read, 
spoken or written. 
I do not think it is certain that thought must be linguistic. Bisiach (1988: 464, 
476 -479) defines thoughts as `non -linguistic statement representations expressly 
conceived as neurodynamic structures bearing information (about actual or simulated 
states of affairs in the world) in active memory'. Meaning is not ascribed to these 
representations by a linguistic process but is `intrinsic and immediate'. He notes that 
so- called `inner speech' is fragmentary and asyntactic, and suggests that it consists of 
linguistic components merely entrained by normal, ongoing non -verbal thought 
processes. An important part of his argument is that an enormous quantity of prior 
knowledge is accessed and evaluated whenever we solve a problem, and this may 
have to be processed in parallel. He argues that inner speech, being sequential, could 
not cope with the quantity of information. The representations which we store are not 
linguistically encoded but may be records of the appearance of objects as given. Such 
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unencoded records later allow us to elaborate properties of the objects which we 
could not have anticipated the need to know about at the time when we laid down the 
memory. It seems to me that Bisiach makes a cogent case for non -linguistic thought, 
and commonplace examples such as listening to music, mathematical thinking, 
dreaming and daydreaming come to mind (Kertesz 1988: 460). In the end, both 
linguistic and non -linguistic thinking seem to have their part in consciousness. 
The functioning linguistic areas are located in the left hemisphere. The 
temporal lobes are concerned with memory. Apart from the brainstem, hypothalamus 
and septum, the brain structures concerned with emotion are the amygdala and 
hippocampus, deep within the temporal lobe. On this basis, if the self can be located, 
then it should be centred in the temporal region of the left hemisphere. 
Conclusion 
One understands why Passingham (1993: 203 -204) expresses caution about 
attempting any sort of synthesis concerning localization of brain function. There is 
strong evidence that the initiation of voluntary action, and central executive function 
generally, is a prefrontal phenomenon. Yet I noted above that Stuss, while 
emphasizing the role of the frontal lobes, counts personal memory and emotion as 
essential to self -awareness. Memory of events, declarative memory, is particularly 
related to temporal -lobe function: memories seem to be laid down by the 
hippocampus, a limbic structure deep in the temporal lobe, and stored in the cortex, 
though not necessarily in the temporal cortex (Greenfield 1996: 131; Bear et al. 
2001: 752-758; Davis 2000: 254). 
From the evidence, it seems that the will is a prefrontal phenomenon, whereas 
the reflective awareness of self, including memories and with its possibly linguistic - 
symbolic basis, is largely a temporal -lobe phenomenon. As noted above, the ventral 
prefrontal cortex has copious connections with the temporal cortex and associated 
limbic structures. Altogether, while it is fairly clear that such areas as the occipital 
lobe do not contribute to neural processing attributable to the self, it would seem 
premature to dismiss from consideration any of the prefrontal, temporal and 
temporo -parietal (Wernicke's) areas, the cingulate gyrus or the temporo -limbic 
structures (amygdala and hippocampus). 
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Left and right hemispheres 
Specialization 
In the neurophysio logical literature, hypotheses regarding the normal function 
of a brain structure are often based, from necessity, on studies of pathological cases 
which afford a relative isolation of that structure not available in normal life. One 
must bear in mind that disturbances of localized brain function caused by defective 
development or by trauma may produce symptoms of either hyperactivity or 
hypoactivity, depending on the exact nature of the lesion. In other words, 
pathological cases may demonstrate the normal function exaggerated or the normal 
function reduced or suppressed. The conclusion to be drawn may therefore not be 
obvious at first glance. 
The most obvious specialization of the hemispheres is handedness. About 92 
per cent of humans are right- handed, and therefore left- hemisphere- dominant for 
hand usage. The proportion of right- handers seems to have been constant since 
prehistoric times. While other animals, chimpanzees for example, have handedness, 
the proportion of left- and right- handers among them seems to be nearly equal (Bear 
et al. 2001: 655; Springer and Deutsch 1989: 142). 
The second well -known specialization of the left hemisphere is its language 
dominance. Of left- handers, 70 per cent still have left -hemisphere dominance for 
language, like virtually all right- handers. In the great majority of people, therefore, it 
is the left hemisphere that contains Wernicke's area, centring on the posterior region 
of the superior gyrus of the temporal lobe, and Broca's area, in the premotor cortex 
of the frontal lobe. Wernicke's area is concerned with interpreting heard and written 
language and with generating language to be spoken or written. Broca's area is 
concerned with speech (Bear et al. 2001: 655 -656; Springer and Deutsch 1989: 176- 
177). 
Springer and Deutsch (1989: 17, 204 -206, 284 -285, 307 -311) discuss 
research indicating that the hemispheres may have different strengths. While the left 
hemisphere processes syntax, the right hemisphere seems to contribute the semantic 
and contextual aspects of language, meaning as opposed to structure. The left 
hemisphere processes sequence, timing and arithmetic, while the right hemisphere 
seems to have an advantage in spatial and topological comprehension, and in 
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drawing pictures. For the appreciation of music, the left ear (and right hemisphere) is 
preferred by the untrained; but trained musicians prefer the right ear (and left 
hemisphere), perhaps because their musical understanding is formalized. When 
Ravel suffered a stroke and developed an aphasia (so that presumably the stroke was 
in his left hemisphere), recognition and appreciation of music was undiminished, but 
he could no longer read, compose or play music. There is a widespread popular idea 
that the left hemisphere is logical, analytical and verbal, while the right hemisphere is 
intuitive, holistic and artistic. 
Using studies which indicate that the right hemisphere is typically slightly 
larger, in particular containing more white matter, and has a higher proportion of 
association cortex, Goldberg and Costa (1981: 145 -156) have proposed that the right 
hemisphere has more inter -area connections, while the left has more dense intra -area 
connections. On their theory, the neural organization of the right hemisphere favours 
a greater ability to cope with complexity and integrate a variety of information, while 
the left hemisphere is better able to focus on more closely defined and repeated tasks. 
However, they stress that each hemisphere can take on many of the tasks of the other, 
and does so after injury; there is no fixed specialization. 
Some reports indicate that patients with damage to posterior areas of the right 
hemisphere cease to dream, giving rise to the hypothesis that the right hemisphere is 
the source of dreams, which tend to be highly visual and not clearly sequenced. 
However, in an experiment, patients who had had the corpus callosum resected and 
whose left and right hemispheres therefore could not communicate directly (see 
below), were able to describe dreams on being awakened from REM sleep. The fact 
that they were able to talk about dreams indicates that the left hemisphere had access 
to at least some of the content, which was presumably therefore stored in the left 
hemisphere. 
Electroconvulsive shock therapy has long been applied in cases of intractable 
depression, and is frequently effective in relieving the condition. When it is applied 
bilaterally, confusion and memory loss are common side effects. If applied 
unilaterally, it is more effective on the right side of the head. Consistently with these 
results, research on epileptic patients who were also psychotic appears to indicate 
that schizophrenic patients had an epileptic focus in the left hemisphere, while those 
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with affective psychosis (manic depression) had a focus in the right (Springer and 
Deutsch 1989: 278 -279). 
Beaton states that temporal -lobe epileptic subjects with a right -side focus 
tend to be emotionally labile, while those with a left -side focus are more concerned 
with philosophical ideas and their own place in the scheme of things. He agrees that 
evidence using a variety of methods points to an association of schizophrenia with 
left -hemisphere dysfunction, but is unconvinced regarding the association of 
affective disorder with right- hemisphere problems. In fact, he cites evidence that 
depression often follows damage to the left hemisphere, while damage to the right 
hemisphere may produce indifference or even euphoria. He notes that right - 
hemisphere lesions have been known to impede recall of emotionally charged matter: 
hence the indifference (Beaton 1985: 236, 247, 264, 271). To reconcile those results, 
a layman might surmise that the effect of electroconvulsive shock therapy is to 
suppress an overactive depressive right -hemisphere function. 
Using a range of evidence, Ramachandran (1999: 133 -136) proposes that the 
left hemisphere seeks to operate with a stable model of the self, body image and the 
surrounding world, built up in the course of life, whereas the right hemisphere is alert 
to discrepancies. When discrepancies are noticed, the left hemisphere tries to 
integrate them into its model or framework, and if it is unable to do so, ignores them. 
If the discrepancies are too great, the right hemisphere forces a change to the model. 
However, if the right hemisphere is damaged and is unable to force its disquiet upon 
the left, then the left hemisphere carries on with its model in the face of conflicting 
evidence. The maintenance of a stable model of oneself and one's relation to the 
world is of survival value. The brain is constantly bombarded with sensory 
information and cannot take all of it into account. If a human being or any other 
organism had to revise its model for every small apparent discrepancy, or had to 
investigate every apparent discrepancy to see whether it was real, then it would be 
indecisive in the face of events. To avoid predators, to seek prey and to survive, an 
organism cannot afford to be indecisive. It is better to operate with a constant model 
that is mainly correct - or, rather, effective for daily life - even if it contains some 
inaccuracies, than to keep changing the model. It is worthwhile to maintain a stable 
model even if that requires a degree of self -deception. At the same time, gross 
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discrepancies cannot be ignored. It makes sense, then, that the brain should have a 
tendency or operator to resist changing its model, but also a mechanism or operator 
to force a change in the event of gross discrepancies. Evidence indicates that those 
operators are located in left and right hemispheres respectively. 
While it has been suggested that the right hemisphere is the locus of 
emotional processes, a study by Vingiano (1989) concludes that the right hemisphere 
subserves negative affect and the left positive. On this hypothesis, subjects with left- 
hemisphere dominance should be more confident and outgoing, with a greater 
propensity to egotism; right- hemisphere- dominant people should be more shy and 
have more doubts about their worthiness. This hypothesis is consistent with the 
lateralization of maintaining (left) and doubting (right) the working model of the self 
and the world as proposed by Ramachandran (see above). 
Further evidence for this hypothesis comes from Davidson (1995), who 
presents evidence for affective differentiation between the hemispheres, but relates 
this primarily to the prefrontal cortices, particularly the cortex at the frontal poles. 
Negative attitude and behaviour is associated with elevated activity at the right 
frontal pole and positive with left frontal activity. Patients who developed mania 
following brain injury were more likely to have sustained damage to the right frontal 
lobe, and those with damage to the left had more severe depressive symptoms. Those 
with a more active right frontal at rest were more prone to be made depressed on 
encountering depressive stimuli, and the reverse was the case for subjects with 
generally more active left frontals. Activity was measured by EEG and by PET 
scans. In studies of babies and infants, differences between left and right frontal 
activity were found, and correlated with the degree of boldness or timidity observed 
in circumstances such as temporary separation from the mother, the availability of 
unfamiliar play objects and the sudden appearance of a remote -controlled robot. The 
children with relatively more left frontal activity were bolder than those with 
relatively more right frontal activity. 
While one hemisphere may dominate most of the time, it seems that effective 
hemisphericity can alternate in the same person. The alternation can even be 
provoked by something as trivial as breathing through one nostril rather than the 
other. At any time one nostril tends to be more open than the other, and there is 
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alleged to be a natural cycle or alternation. Studies have shown increased activity on 
EEG in the contralateral hemisphere when a subject is forced to breathe through one 
nostril. Other work on unilateral nostril -breathing related enhanced verbal skills to 
breathing through the right nostril and enhanced spatial skills to breathing through 
the left nostril (Backon and Kullok 1989: 212). 
Gordon (1989: 47 -53) cautions against a simplistic idea of lateralization, 
stating that the popular belief in the analytical left hemisphere and holistic right 
hemisphere is `based on embarrassingly little evidence'. But he does agree that on 
certain tasks one hemisphere tends to perform better than the other. Brown and 
Kosslyn (1995: 79), while agreeing that there is evidence for hemispheric 
specialization, also caution against overestimating it. 
Communication 
The neocortices are able to communicate via the corpus callosum, and the 
subcortical structures communicate via the smaller but more numerous commissures. 
Exactly what is communicated is not known. 
The traditional view is that specific, contextualized information is shared by 
the cortices over the corpus callosum, while only crude, low- resolution data can be 
passed via the commissures. Experiments with patients who have had the corpus 
callosum resected appear to bear out this view. For example, a picture of the present 
Queen was shown in a patient's left visual field, which therefore was apprehended 
only by the right hemisphere.' The patient was able to say that the person was 
female, and rich although she did not work. Note that at this point the speech centre 
in the left hemisphere was describing what the right hemisphere had seen. When the 
same picture was afterwards shown in the right visual field, so that the left 
hemisphere apprehended it, the patient identified the person as the Queen, but 
insisted that he had not seen the picture before. On the first showing, only categorical 
rather than specific information seems to have been communicated from the right to 
the left hemisphere (Liederman 1995: 453 -457). In another case frequently cited in 
the literature, a split -brain patient was shown a photograph of a nude person, in her 
' Each eye sends nerve projections to primary visual cortex in both left and right occipital lobes, but 
the field of vision on the left of each eye is projected to the right hemisphere, and the right field 
projected to the left hemisphere. 
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left visual field and therefore to her right hemisphere. She began to giggle but could 
not identify what was amusing (Bear et al. 2001: 654). 
A split -brain patient was shown on the right (therefore left hemisphere) a 
picture of a chicken claw, and asked to select with his right hand from three 
drawings: fruit, chicken head, hammer. He chose the chicken head. On the left 
(therefore right hemisphere) he was shown a picture of a snow scene, and asked to 
select with his left hand from three drawings: toaster, shovel, lawnmower. He chose 
the shovel. When asked why, he said that one had to clean out a chicken shed with a 
shovel. The right hemisphere, without speech, could not contribute to the 
explanation. It seems that his left hemisphere, unaware of the snow scene which had 
presumably prompted the right hemisphere to select the shovel, rationalized the 
selection according to the information available to it (Springer and Deutsch 1989: 
330 -331). 
Independence 
The proportion of the brain which is duplicated - neocortex, limbic system, 
basal ganglia - is many times larger than that which is singular - such as the 
brainstem, septum and pineal gland. Each hemisphere has a complete set of 
components in parallel. A hemispherectomy is an operation which removes the entire 
cerebral cortex of one side. When this has been performed on infants with congenital 
brain defects on one side, they have grown up able to function as normal people, with 
no obvious lateralization effects. Where the left cortex is removed, the right 
hemisphere seems to be able to acquire even language ability. In adult cases of left 
hemispherectomy there is impaired language ability but some recovery. When the 
right hemisphere was removed from one adult patient, the patient improved, as if the 
damaged right hemisphere had impaired the function of the left (Springer and 
Deutsch 1989: 182, 234 -236). 
Dolphins cannot sleep for hours like us, because they have to breach the 
surface every so often to breathe all day and night. However, electroencephalographs 
have shown that they are able for two hours at a time to have one hemisphere 
dormant while the other continues awake, and to alternate the two over half a day 
(Bear et al. 2001: 618). While the case is not human, this point illustrates the 
potential independence of the hemispheres in a mammalian brain. 
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On a prima facie basis, therefore, one would expect that the two hemispheres 
of the human brain should have some degree of independence and the possibility of 
parallel functions. However, all healthy people seem to have a single consciousness 
and personality, in the maintenance of which presumably both hemispheres of our 
brain contribute and collaborate seamlessly. 
In a study of a split -brain case, the patient was asked to arrange some blocks 
to match a pattern seen on a card, but using only the right hand, and consequently the 
left hemisphere. The right hand took some time in the process, and the left hand, 
controlled by the presumably more spatially orientated right hemisphere, kept 
reaching in to push the right hand away and do the task itself, so that the 
experimenter had to restrain it (Bear et al. 2001: 654). 
In the literature there is now a collection of split -brain `alien hand' cases in 
which the left hand interfered with what the right hand was doing. For example, a 
woman took hours to get dressed because, when she selected something to wear with 
her right hand, the left hand would select something else, usually more colourful, and 
she (that is, the left hemisphere) could not make the left hand let go. She had to call 
someone to help her prise the fingers open. Another woman attempted to hug her 
husband with one arm while the other pushed him away (Carter 1998: 49 -50). 
As speech and writing are nearly always controlled by the left hemisphere, 
the right hemisphere does not normally have a chance to express itself in language, 
since the corpus callosum transmits excitatory and inhibitory signals which ensure 
cooperation (Liederman 2001). It may be that the left hemisphere takes on any task 
demanding a linguistic response and inhibits the right from participating (Carter 
1998: 50). Even when this inhibitory influence is removed, as in a split -brain patient, 
the right hemisphere usually has too little linguistic capacity to be able to write or 
otherwise spell out an utterance. In a striking case, however, a boy who had had the 
corpus callosum resected (patient P.S.) possessed the normal left -hemisphere 
capabilities, but also seems to have had considerably more than usual linguistic 
capacity in the right hemisphere. He was able to deliver responses by hand using 
scrabble letters in answer to questions presented visually to one hemisphere at a time. 
Asked about likes and dislikes, the right hemisphere (left hand) consistently gave 
lower evaluations than the left. When asked what he wanted to do when he 
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graduated, the right hand answered `draftsman', but the left hand (right hemisphere) 
spelled out `automobile race[r]'. The investigators concluded that each hemisphere in 
this patient had a sense of self and its own ability to make evaluations and set 
priorities. They suggested that, in the absence of a sophisticated linguistic capacity, 
the organism (in this case, one hemisphere) `functions mainly at the perceptual motor 
level', but that, when a linguistic system is added, `a human being with the capacity 
to value, aspire and reflect' comes into being (LeDoux and Gazzaniga, cited by 
Springer and Deutsch 1989: 323 -325; Carter 1998: 50 -51). 
A number of studies of responses in both normal and split -brain subjects 
appear to have shown that the linguistic competence of the right hemisphere is 
limited to that of a child. It can identify words and has the auditory lexicon of an 11- 
16- year -old, but its symbolic competence is limited to naming or reference, the 
relation between a lexical item and what it designates. In relating arbitrary names to 
arbitrary shapes it outperforms the left hemisphere. However, when the semantic 
requirement includes dealing with relationships between symbols, relations between 
lexical items themselves rather than between their objects or designations, the right 
hemisphere is unable to cope. It has been suggested that this ability is developed 
between the ages of 6 and 12, and the right hemisphere is left at the level of a 6 -year- 
old (Goldberg and Costa 1981: 159 -161). 
Springer and Deutsch (1989: 322 -323) report the opinion of Eccles that 
commissurotomy does not split consciousness. He makes a distinction between mere 
consciousness, as shared by humans with animals, and thought, which is mediated by 
language. The patient who smiles when only her right hemisphere sees a nude picture 
does not know why she smiles, because only the left (linguistic) hemisphere can 
think or know. However, it would be hard to deny that patient P.S., described above, 
qualifies as being able to think with the right hemisphere. Carter (1998: 51) raises the 
idea that we might be carrying another personality around in our right hemisphere, 
one who is unable to communicate, `a mute prisoner'. Yet without being able to 
communicate interactively, ask questions and receive answers from other people, ask 
oneself questions internally and think things out sequentially, linguistically, in an 
internal dialogue (cf. Dennett 1991: 195 -196), learning and growing from birth 
onwards, one imagines such personality as there might be would remain rudimentary. 
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Epilepsy 
Epilepsy was known in ancient Greece as `the sacred disease', and it has long 
been commonplace for experients and observers to make a connection between 
epileptic conditions and quasi- religious experience, particularly spirit possession 
(Saver and Rabin 1997: 499 -500). A number of modern writers have observed that 
some epileptic patients are subject to paranormal or religious experiences in the 
course of or immediately before or after seizures, and that some patients develop a 
long -term religious turn of mind. I propose here to delineate the neural events which 
give rise to seizures and the types of experience reported by subjects, and in the next 
chapter to discuss the conclusions drawn by recent authors about the neural basis of 
certain kinds of supernatural experience. 
Seizures 
Most people have heard of, even if they have not experienced or witnessed, 
epileptic seizures of two traditional types, petit mal and grand mal, as they are 
known in children. Petit mal is an `absence' in which the subject stops paying 
attention and is still, perhaps staring, with arrested speech, for a few seconds or 
more. Sometimes there are automatisms such as lip- smacking. Grand mal is a motor 
seizure with convulsions (Greenfield 1996: 56). A generalized seizure affects both 
hemispheres of the brain and causes convulsions and complete loss of consciousness. 
In the postictal state, on recovering consciousness the patient may remain 
disorientated for some time. At worst, a patient may go into status epilepticus, a 
medical emergency indicated by repeated generalized seizures without recovery of 
consciousness in the interictal state (Leppik 2001; cf. Shorvon 1994: 15 -16, 21 -23). 
In fact, there are numerous gradations and varieties of seizures. Epileptic conditions 
can be treated by drugs and, in less tractable cases, surgical excision of the 
epileptogenic tissue at the focal point of onset. 
A seizure is an abnormal excitation of a population of neurons in an area of 
the brain, which begin to fire synchronously. Neurons stimulate adjacent neurons to 
fire in a chain reaction, which has a tendency to spread to adjacent populations of 
neurons, sometimes across the entire cortex. Seizures may begin in any part of the 
cortex or limbic system: frontal, occipital, parietal and temporal seizures are all well 
documented. When motor areas of the frontal cortex are affected, a tonic seizure with 
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contraction of the skeletal musculature may result, or a clonic seizure with 
convulsive movements in which the muscles contract and relax repeatedly. When a 
seizure affects only one side of the brain, the patient may still be able to 
communicate if the unaffected side is the language- dominant hemisphere, usually the 
left. As a seizure may begin in one area of the brain and spread, the major symptoms 
manifested by a patient may indicate a secondarily excited area, for example, motor 
cortex, rather than the focal point where the activity began (Noachtar 2001, Ebner 
2001: 175; Weiss et al. 2000: 156). 
The temporal lobes, including both cortex and deep temporal structures 
(limbic components), are much the most common areas for the onset of seizures. The 
amygdala, hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus are among the parts of the brain 
with the lowest threshold for epileptic activity (Ebner 2001: 172). 
Seizures are characterized by distinctive electroencephalograph readings 
which show synchronous or high -amplitude waves and spikes. Seizure EEGs are of 
various recognizable types. Electrodes can be placed at diagnostic points over the 
scalp and sometimes intracranially to show activity in different regions. If recording 
is under way when a seizure begins, its progress can be followed across the affected 
areas of the brain (Dinner 2001). 
Because of its copious reciprocal and looped internal connections, the 
neocortex is susceptible to runaway excitation once a focal seizure begins (Bear et al. 
2001: 613). Monkeys as well as humans may suffer (Springer and Deutch 1989: 27). 
Damage to an area of neural tissue may cause it to become more excitable. Epileptic 
conditions therefore typically result from congenital abnormalities or injuries 
sustained in the course of life such as to produce, for example, cortical malformation, 
tumours, calcification of neural tissue, or cysts forming below skull fractures. Brain 
imaging techniques can be used to identify the location and types of lesions 
(Ruggieri et al. 2001). The incidence of epilepsy is higher among children than 
among adults. Above the age of sixty, the incidence of epilepsy rises again, as a 
consequence of degenerative disorders (Ebner 2001: 169). 
An aura is a subjective experience which may constitute the sole 
manifestation of a simple partial seizure, but in clinical cases auras usually progress 
after a few seconds or minutes into a complex partial or a generalized seizure, in 
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which the subject loses consciousness. Frontal lobe seizures are predominantly 
characterized by motor symptoms unaccompanied by auras. Excitation of the 
somatosensory areas of the parietal lobe may produce auras taking the form of 
tingling or numbness in certain parts of the body. Abdominal auras, often 
experienced by temporal -lobe epileptic subjects, consist of gastric or nauseous 
feelings and are believed to result from activation of the insula. Olfactory auras, 
giving rise to peculiar smells, are often accompanied by memories and emotional 
associations, since the olfactory centres of the brain are connected directly to the 
limbic system (Carter 1998: 114). Auditory auras consist of sounds, arising from 
activation of the temporal cortex. When hallucinated voices or music are heard, 
temporal association cortex is again believed to be involved. Visual auras may 
involve seeing bright lights or dark spots in the visual field, possibly only on the 
contralateral side if only one hemisphere is affected; these result from activity in the 
occipital lobe. When visual auras extend to hallucinations of objects and human 
figures, temporal association cortex is believed to be affected as well. A `psychic 
aura' may include visual and other hallucinations, distorted perception so that objects 
seem nearer or farther away than they are, or jamais vu or déjà vu, in which familiar 
surroundings seem unfamiliar or vice versa, and is often accompanied by anxiety or 
fear. Again, the temporal association cortex is affected in these cases. An aura may 
involve several sensory modalities (Noachtar 2001: 128 -130; Ebner 2001: 177 -178; 
Bear et al. 2001: 614; Davis 2000: 237). 
Artificial induction of epileptiform activity 
Carter (1998: 92) relates the case of a woman who was subject to panic 
attacks and dreamlike absences, for which she was amnesic on recovery. On one 
occasion when this state supervened, she stabbed another person in the heart, but 
knew nothing about it afterwards. As activity in the amygdala is associated with fear 
(e.g. Davis 2000), it appeared that excessive discharges there might be the source of 
the attacks. In a neurosurgical procedure, electrodes were placed deep into her 
temporal lobes, terminating in and around the amygdalae. When an electric current 
was directed to the basolateral nucleus of one amygdala, the subject suddenly 
became wild and violent, but the behaviour ceased when stimulation was withdrawn. 
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When this part of the amygdala was surgically destroyed, the subject suffered no 
more attacks. 
In Chapter 5 I shall discuss the theory of Persinger which purports to explain 
how a number of paranormal experiences can come about. Among his experiments 
has been the application of complex weak magnetic fields to either side of the head, 
using epileptic and non -epileptic subjects, while continuously recording EEG. In 
epileptic subjects the magnetic fields induced subclinical discharges, as shown by 
patterns in the EEG, and these were localized in the primary epileptogenic areas of 
those patients. In some cases the epileptiform activity was induced during the 
stimulation; in others it was `entrained' within the following ten seconds. Also, in 
some cases fear and odd tastes were experienced (Persinger et al. 1997: 527 -528). 
In six epileptic patients the application of magnetic fields, using coils in a 
helmet suspended above the cranium, resulted in epileptiform activity, as measured 
by EEG using both scalp and intracranial electrodes. Intracranial electrodes are used 
clinically to monitor the limbic structures within the temporal lobes, the hippocampal 
formation and amygdala. The discharges resulted on cessation of the fields, which 
suggested that change was more important than the mere presence of a field. Again, 
the enhanced activity was observed to arise in the primary epileptogenic zones of 
those patients. In a non -epileptic control subject, no increased activity was observed 
using only scalp electrodes (Fuller et al. 1995). 
A woman who suffered from temporal -lobe epilepsy with accompanying 
visual hallucinations was studied using EEG and deep intracranial electrodes 
(Weingarten et al. 1977). The subject's seizures had a focus in the right amygdala 
and were sometimes generalized bilaterally and over the whole cortex. During 
spontaneous seizures she sometimes saw objects, such as a grinning cat or a 
menacing figure like her father, and once a scene of people storming a castle. Using 
the electrodes to stimulate the amygdala, hippocampus and temporal gyri, it was 
possible to induce localized seizures limited to the temporal lobe, and the patient 
experienced `hallucinations' (or possibly vivid memories) of being a child at her old 
high school or in the back yard of her house. After the woman had a right temporal 
lobectomy, the seizures and hallucinations ceased. Similar stimulation procedures 
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carried out on some other subjects produced auras including gastric and tingling 
sensations, and seven reported dream -like experiences. 
Fear and the amygdala 
Davis (2000: 218, 237), citing Gloor, states that the most common affective 
experience in temporal -lobe epilepsy is fear, coming suddenly and ranging from mild 
anxiety to intense terror, sometimes accompanied by flashbacks or hallucinations. 
With few exceptions, authorities seem to agree that the focal point of neural 
processes concerned with fear, anxiety and the response to threat is the amygdala (Le 
Doux 2000: 301). 
On the basis of studies of rats, Davis et al. (1997) distinguish between fear, as 
a short-term response to perceived danger, and anxiety, as a longer -term state of 
alertness induced by threatening stimuli to which it is not possible to react. Surgical 
and chemical studies indicate that fear is mediated by the central nucleus of the 
amygdala and anxiety by a nearby nucleus, the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis. 
They hypothesize that natural selection would favour those organisms having 
separate structures to process fear and anxiety; on the ground that, if there were only 
one structure, it might become saturated by the influence of anxiety -inducing stimuli, 
so that the organism would have no means of responding to a suddenly present 
danger requiring immediate reaction. Having two allows the organism to maintain an 
anxious state of readiness, while retaining the ability to react to immediate danger. 
The amygdala receives projections from the temporal visual association 
cortex and is involved in facial recognition in both monkeys and humans. It responds 
to facial expressions of anger and fear in conspecifics (Beaton and Aggleton 2000: 
499 -501). An angry face is itself a sign of threat, and a fear expression in one animal 
may alert its fellows to danger - for example, a predator - in the neighbourhood. 
Equally, it seems that the amygdala is responsible for bringing about a fearful 
expression in the threatened animal (Davis 2000: 223). The neuronal response in the 
left amygdala is greater for fearful faces than for happy faces. Moreover, in studies 
of emotional state, activity in the left amygdala was high with fear and low with 
euphoria (Morris et al. 1996: 812). 
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It appears that the left amygdala may be active principally in processing 
supraliminal (conscious) stimuli, while the right may respond principally to 
subliminal stimuli. Activity in the right amygdala has been correlated with activation 
of two brainstem structures (superior colliculus and pulvinar nucleus) which form 
part of the subcortical visual pathway from the optic nerves (Morris et al. 1999). The 
existence of this pathway gives rise to the phenomenon of blindsight, whereby 
patients who consciously are blind are still able to dodge or catch moving targets 
(Carter 1998: 184 -189). Similarly, the amygdala appears to receive projections from 
the medial geniculate nucleus of the thalamus which carry auditory information. This 
would allow audible signs of threat to be received subliminally (Dolan 2000: 640). 
Efferent projections which indirectly reach the thalamus and brainstem 
structures such as the locus coeruleus and raphé nuclei may enable the amygdala to 
detect environmental signs of danger and to promote increased alertness and 
enhanced motor performance (Davis 2000: 216 -217; Davis et al. 1997: 306). 
It is hypothesized that the amygdala, by virtue of its subcortical projections 
from and to brainstem structures, provides a system for rapid and preconscious 
recognition of signs of potential harm together with an automatic promotion of 
physiological conditions to enable the organism to act (Morris et al. 1996; Adolphs 
and Tranel 2000: 596 -597, 602, 614). It is also suggested that the amygdala can 
initiate access to memories of past experiences - that is, prior learning - to ensure 
appropriate response to anticipated danger (Dolan 2000: 639). 
These mechanisms allow fear and readiness to deal with threat to be 
promoted without conscious awareness of an object. Of course, as the state of fear 
progresses, the subject becomes conscious of it, otherwise it would not be fear as 
generally understood. But we can be afraid without knowingly having perceived 
anything to be afraid of 
Kindling 
Brain tissue does not become inured to repeated stimulus: instead, the more 
often a stimulus is applied, the more responsive to that stimulus the tissue becomes. 
Neural pathways become more established with repeated activation, and it appears 
that learning comes about by means of this process (Klix 1982: 228). Kindling is the 
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process whereby a brain structure can be activated more and more readily on 
successive occasions by repetition of a stimulus, and the structure's heightened 
sensitivity may reach a stage where it displays the same activity spontaneously in the 
absence of the stimulus. The amygdala is particularly susceptible to kindling. 
Studies of lower primates and rats have shown that daily application of brief 
electrical stimulus to the amygdala, producing localized seizure activity, can result in 
generalized seizures after one or two weeks. Even after months of no stimulation, a 
single stimulus can produce a generalized seizure. Eventually seizures occur 
spontaneously in the amygdala thus rendered hypersensitive. Not only electrical 
stimulation but also exposure to certain chemical agents can result in kindling 
effects. Didocaine and cocaine ingestion can eventually produce spontaneous 
seizures. Anxiety and panic attacks induced by cocaine addiction appear to follow a 
kindling -like progression, and may continue after cessation of the habit (Weiss et al. 
2000: 159, 177). 
Kindling is seen as a mechanism for the development of temporal -lobe 
epilepsy (Aggleton and Saunders 2000: 15). 
Implications for supernatural experiences 
Epilepsy 
I noted above that in clinical cases epileptic auras tend to progress into more 
severe seizures, which are recognized as such and become the object of medical 
treatment. However, if a person were subject to auras which did not progress into 
more obvious seizures, it is unlikely that the case would come to medical attention. 
Recognized epileptic symptoms occur with varying effects and degrees of severity, 
from repeated, potentially life -threatening generalized ictal events in status 
epilepticus to mere auras. As it is, between seven and ten per cent of the general 
population have at least one clinical seizure in a lifetime (Bear et al. 2001: 613). 
On a prima facie basis one would expect that the cases which we call 
epileptic represent the tip of an iceberg, the severe extreme of a continuum which 
may extend from such clinical subjects through ordinary `non -epileptic' people who 
have occasional flurries of abnormal neuronal activity, all the way to those who 
never have any such activity (cf Persinger and Makarec 1993). Such occasional 
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flurries of activity, if limited to the initial focal region, never occasioning physical 
distress and not occurring regularly, could occur widely in the general population 
without coming to the attention of anyone except the subjects and those to whom 
they chose to confide the experience. Anecdotally, one suspects that occasional 
tingling in the limbs, odd smells and sounds, bright lights, déjà vu and other aural 
symptoms are not uncommon. In other words, `paranormal' sensations due to 
subclinical simple partial seizures may occur in the general population with a 
frequency much greater than that of reported epilepsy. 
A reader's letter recently published in a national newspaper2 is so apposite to 
my argument at this point that I reproduce it here in its entirety. 
I'm a fit, intelligent, professional woman, not stressed and have never been 
near death. 
I am, however, a registered epileptic who has experienced all of the supposed 
`out of body' phenomena as well as feelings of déjà vu, of having `lived before' and 
numerous other experiences and 'auras'. 
Before my diagnosis, I found all this inexplicable and confusing. At one point 
I thought I was to be the world's greatest psychic. 
However, after my first full epileptic fit (`grand mal) 12 years ago, 
everything slotted into place. It would appear that I had been experiencing 'petit 
mal ' attacks for years without realizing what they were. 
Now, whenever I feel my body being tugged along behind, or above and 
below, I just take my medication. 
In the next chapter, as well as reviewing the more obvious connections that 
have been drawn between epilepsy and religious experiences, I shall try to expound 
Persinger's theory concerning paranormal experiences as mediated by subclinical 
epileptiform activity, and in particular, drawing on evidence from studies of 
hemispheric function, the experience of the sensed presence. 
Brain structure and function 
More generally, accepting that all experience has its physiological substrate 
in the brain, we must consider what the consequences might be when certain 
structures of the brain with specific functions either (1) spontaneously malfunction, 
(2) are directly subjected to unusual external influences other than sensory input, (3) 
are fed abnormal signals from other parts of the brain, or (4) are deprived of their 
2 Daily Mail, 4 October 2002, page 69. 
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normal stream of input signals. All four of those contingencies may sometimes give 
rise to subjective experience. In the absence of normal input to a given structure, the 
experiences may be unusual, and any apparent perception may be - I would argue, is 
likely to be - non -veridical. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE NUMINOUS NEURAL: HYPOTHESES 
In this chapter I state a general point of view regarding the connection of 
numinous experiences with particular neural substrates, and review some recent 
theories on the subject, before offering with reasons specific hypotheses to which I 
adhere. It appears to me that this area of science - not neurology as such, which is 
well advanced, but the relation of specific subjective experience with specific neural 
activity - is in its beginnings. In particular, the investigation of paranormal 
experience with a view to explanation in terms of neural activity and the 
investigation of mechanisms whereby that activity might be brought about by non - 
supernatural means are in their beginnings. Given the advances over the last few 
decades in technology for imaging activity in the live brain, I expect that within a 
few decades more this realm of human life will be much clarified. 
Relating the numinous and the neural 
Types of numinous feeling 
Minor paranormal 







Out of the body experience 
Near death experience 
Sense of presence 
Benign 
Threatening 
Sense of oneness 
Mystical union with all being 
Mystical union with the deity 
Table 5.1 
Table 5.1 lists a variety of paranormal and numinous experiences. It is meant 
to be representative but not necessarily complete. Table 5.2 lists brain structures 
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implicated by various researchers as being involved in paranormal and numinous 
experiences. Table 5.3 lists possible causes that might induce neural activity which 
has been correlated with numinous experience. 
Brain structures identified in numinous neural activity 
Prefrontal cortex 
Concentration, meditation 
Superior parietal cortex 
Location in space, boundaries of self 
Temporal cortex and hippocampus 
Association, memory, language, self 
Amygdala 
Emotion, fear, excitement 
Hypothalamus 
Emotion, arousal, quiescence, bliss 
Table 5.2 
Aetiology of neural activity correlated with numinous feeling 
Spontaneous activity 
Epilepsy 
Subclinical epileptic or quasi -epileptic activity 
Abnormal input affecting neurotransmission 
Elevated stress 
External electrical or magnetic fields 
Ingested chemical substances 
Deprivation of input 
Disruption of normal neural pathways by ingested chemical substances 
Disruption of normal neural pathways by concentrated meditation 
Table 5.3 
A complete theory of the numinous in terms of the neural would be able to do 
two things: (1) correlate each type of experience with specific types of neural activity 
in specific locations in the brain, and (2) show how the specific neural activity is 
induced by specific causes. No satisfactory complete theory has been put forward, 
but research has been done which throws some light on both (1) and (2). 
It is probably uncontentious to say that numinous or religious experiences of 
all kinds are the subjective correlate of unusual activity in the brain, at least in the 
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sense that most people are not having religious experiences most of the time. The 
general point of view which I espouse is that these experiences are sometimes - but 
not always - the subjective correlate of abnormal activity in the brain. The 
abnormality of the activity may be, but need not be, pathological, caused by a lesion 
to a brain structure. It may be simply that a brain structure is hypersensitized by the 
subject's ingestion of substances which mimic natural neurotransmitters, or that it 
receives abnormal stimulation, from an ambient magnetic field, for example, or that 
it is deprived of its normal stream of input, say from the senses. 
Epilepsy 
The idea that epilepsy or subclinical epileptiform activity is an explanation of 
some kinds of religious experience is of course not new. Saver and Rabin (1997: 
500 -502) list a collection of religious figures and people with a religious 
preoccupation from St Paul to the nineteenth century Ste Thérèse of Lisieux. From 
what is documented about them, most seem to have exhibited some pathological 
symptoms and were known to be, or in medical literature have been claimed to be, 
epileptic subjects. Among the symptoms listed are: seeing a sudden bright light, 
falling to the ground, hearing a voice, visions, falling with convulsive movements, 
constant voices, hyperaesthesia, automatisms, transient loss of consciousness, 
mystical states, ecstasy, déjà vu, sense of vertigo, violent trembling, and in the case 
of Dostoyevsky, a sense of bliss followed by a fall and unambiguous generalized 
tonic -clonic seizure. 
Muhammad is one of the religious figures listed. Parrinder (1976: 125) 
dismissively states that the Prophet's behaviour is not diagnostic of epilepsy, but the 
description of `pallor, appearance of intoxication, falling, profuse sweating, visual 
and auditory hallucinations' would seem to be at least consistent with the suggested 
diagnosis of complex partial seizures (Saver and Rabin 1997: 501). 
Epileptic discharges may mediate religious experiences, and the lasting effect 
of chronic recurrence of these experiences is sometimes to produce a hyperreligious 
temperament or frame of mind. This is characterized by any or all of various changes 
in personality, such as attributing importance to oneself and events in one's own life 
(grandiosity), feeling things more strongly, humourlessness, writing much material 
which seems meaningful (hypergraphia), hypermoralism, a heightened interest in 
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philosophical issues and a sense of impending death. Some of these effects, if 
extreme, are treated medically as a psychotic condition. In psychological tests for 
religiosity traits, patients with temporal -lobe epilepsy scored higher than controls and 
on a similar level with schizophrenics (Saver and Rabin 1997: 503 -504). 
In Appendix 5A, I discuss Mesulam's fmdings of epileptiform EEG in cases 
of multiple personality and possession. 
A homologue self in the non -linguistic hemisphere 
The non -linguistic hemisphere is the hemisphere that does not process 
language and control speech. Usually language is processed by the left hemisphere, 
so that the non -linguistic hemisphere is the right. The non -dominant hemisphere is 
the hemisphere that does not control the dominant hand. For example, if one is right - 
handed, the non -dominant hemisphere is the right. The non -linguistic and non - 
dominant hemispheres are usually the same, and usually the right, but need not be the 
same. A left- handed person may still process language in the left hemisphere, so that 
the right hemisphere is non -linguistic but the left is non -dominant. For convenience, 
I shall refer to the language- dominant hemisphere as the left, with the proviso that in 
some subjects the functions are reversed, unless it is necessary to draw attention to 
exceptional cases. 
The idea that unusual activity in the non -dominant or non -linguistic 
hemisphere may produce activity in the other hemisphere as a substrate of unusual 
experience has a history. In 1885 Myers proposed that the unconscious mind, which 
he believed was able to communicate with a spiritual world, was located in the right 
hemisphere. He drew attention to resemblances between the speech of mediums and 
the distorted and disinhibited speech of people who were thought, in consequence of 
left- hemisphere damage, to be speaking from their right hemispheres. Lambroso in 
1908 also thought the right hemisphere was unusually active in mediumistic states 
(Harrington 1995: 15). 
The bicameral mind 
Jaynes (1976) proposes that up to early antiquity people enjoyed a bicameral 
mind, in which the neural processing of the two cerebral cortices was conducted with 
considerable independence. On every occasion when a decision had to be made, 
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elevated stress occurred quite normally, mediated by the hypothalamus. and this 
provoked communication between hemispheres. The right hemisphere never failed to 
give advice to the left, and so the self (located in the left hemisphere) never actually 
experienced decision .stress from having to think what to do. In fact the person did 
not really think at all and was not even (fully) conscious. The bicameral mind began 
to break down about 1250 BCE and modern, conscious people were the result. I shall 
not discuss the theory in full, but rather make use of some of Jaynes' insights. 
The cognitive function of the right hemisphere, which exceeds the ability of 
the left in spatial and synthetic processing, is to collate and organize information. On 
the basis of that organized information it can send advisory signals from its own 
homologous language area to the genuine language area (Wernicke's) of the left 
hemisphere, via the anterior commissure. The signals are typically perceived as 
voices, because they are sent and received by language centres. Voices hallucinated 
by schizophrenics today are generally admonitory, and Jaynes regards schizophrenics 
as bicameral survivors. (See Appendix 5B for discussion.) In experiments on patients 
in which the cortex of the right hemisphere was stimulated over the area 
corresponding to Wernicke's area on the left, admonitory voices were sometimes 
heard in response to the stimulation. This way the origin of admonitory voices can be 
located in the right hemisphere (Jaynes 1976: 87 -93, 104 -106, 109 -111, 118). 
This theory is consistent with observations of Chapter 4 that the language 
centre and certain other structures of the left hemisphere subserve the ego or self, and 
that the rudimentary right- hemisphere homologue self, when it operates 
independently, is perceived by the left - on occasions when it is perceived at all - as 
ego -alien. 
If it is accepted that intrusive communications can take place between the 
hemispheres, more or less as described above, a number of possibilities arise. 
Perhaps the communications need not take the form of voices, especially if the 
linguistic temporal lobe is not ready to receive them as such. They could take a 
garbled linguistic form, the form of non -verbal sounds, or not be auditory at all. 
Perhaps the intrusions can take place in random situations in the absence of stress - 
initiated hypothalamic input, if the temporal -lobe structures of the non -linguistic 
hemisphere in which they originate are spontaneously activated in such a way as to 
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mimic the communication process. Such might be the case if quasi- epileptic 
discharges of a particular form take place in the relevant structures. 
It is not necessary to accept Jaynes theory of the bicameral mind in full, to be 
able to accept the possibility of interhemispheric communication in a form such as he 
describes. As discussed in the previous chapter, there is evidence from split -brain 
patients that the non -linguistic right hemisphere has some capability, limited though 
it may be, to understand and even, in some people, use or utter (in writing) language. 
In normal circumstances its capability is suppressed because the left hemisphere 
takes on any linguistic task and is presumed to inhibit right- hemisphere processing. 
It is plausible that in abnormal circumstances right- hemisphere quasi - 
linguistic or proto- conscious processes may be activated, and that signal patterns 
arising from those processes may be communicated via the commissures or corpus 
callosum to the left hemisphere. By 'proto- conscious processes' I mean processes 
which, if they took place in the left hemisphere, would be part of the conscious self 
Taking place in the right hemisphere, such processes are isolated and not part of the 
conscious self', but rather part of what we might call a `subliminal' or homologue 
self In the preceding chapter, particularly taking into account Eccles' opinion 
(reported in Springer and Deutsch 1989: 322 -323) that without a fully fledged 
linguistic function the right hemisphere does not think, I proposed that the right - 
hemisphere homologue of the self is only rudimentary. We should therefore expect 
communications not to be necessarily coherent. Certainly, communications should 
not be expected to be bidirectional: they are not conversations between equal 
participants, sequences of responses each of which takes into account what has gone 
before. 
Normally the two hemispheres continually and successfully communicate 
information and excitatory and inhibitory signals, operating together as a single 
coherent brain. What I am considering here is abnormal processing, arising either 
from stress or spontaneously, taking place in temporal -lobe structures which in the 
left hemisphere are specialized for language and contribute to the sense of self, and 
in the homologous structures in the right hemisphere. 
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Multiple personality 
In cases of multiple personality and possession, it is tempting to attribute the 
second personality or alien spirit to the right- hemisphere homologue self. In some 
cases this attribution may be plausible. However, there may be more than one extra 
personality. In the famous case of Miss Beauchamp, there were at least three 
personalities (Evans 1984: 271). Psychiatrists do not universally accept the condition 
as genuine, and it seems that something resembling it can be induced in ordinary 
people by suggestion (Carter 1998: 175). This would indicate that in clinical cases it 
could be a matter of the single real personality acting a role temporarily and then 
suffering intermittent amnesia. However, if the phenomenon is genuine and neurally 
based, then each personality would be associated with distinct neural circuits. If this 
is so, there could be two or more rudimentary homologue selves, not necessarily all 
located in the right hemisphere. 
Right- hemisphere intrusions 
If the discussion so far makes sense, we are ready to pass on to a theory of 
Persinger and co- workers which uses these concepts to explain a variety of 
personality traits and paranormal experiences, and in particular the sensed presence. 
On this theory, a person's sense of self is primarily based on linguistic left- 
hemisphere processes (Persinger and Makarec 1991; Persinger 1994: 1067), which 
occur in temporo -parietal areas including the neocortical Wernicke's area, the 
temporal association gyri, the amygdala and hippocampus. Given the information 
discussed in the previous chapter, I think it is hard to deny the prefrontal cortex, 
bilaterally, some role in maintaining the sense of personal identity. Even so, it is 
undeniable that linguistic processes, limited in most people to the left hemisphere, 
make a major contribution. The temporal lobes, more than any other region, also 
subserve memory, which enables the sense of personal continuity. The limbic 
structures subserve emotion and valuation of experience. It is possible, therefore, 
with qualifications, to accept that major functions which contribute to the sense of 
self are located only in the left hemisphere. 
In the absence of evidence that they subserve a completely different function, 
it becomes plausible that corresponding temporo -parietal areas of the right 
hemisphere contain proto- linguistic and other processes which give rise to an 
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homologous sense of self. As has been discussed before, this 'self, without much 
language capability, would be rudimentary and incoherent. For example, it would 
lack the cohesiveness to be able to generate definitive signals to influence and 
communicate with frontal processes in the way that the left -hemisphere self is able to 
do. One should not think of it really as another `self but rather as a diffuse collection 
of processes, some of which are homologous to the coherent processes of the left 
temporo -parietal region. 
On the theory elaborated by Persinger and co- workers, circumstances arise in 
which `intercalation' takes place between the hemispheres. Intercalation is defined 
as the inclusion of signal sequences from one hemisphere within a time frame which 
allows recognition and discrimination by the opposite hemisphere. There is 
recognition because the receiving hemisphere is aware of a process other than its 
own, and discrimination because this process is not fully integrated into its own 
processing. As the hemispheres presumably do coprocess in an integrated way most 
of the time, we may ask what makes intercalation different. In answer, it is assumed 
that, normally, competition between the hemispheres is prevented by inhibitory 
signals carried by the corpus callosum. Normally, local neural processes - 
presumably those which are not part of a major active circuit, which may include 
cooperating inter -hemispheric processes - are compartmentalized, and what would 
be their subjective correlate remains unconscious (Persinger 1993: 915). 
Abnormally, a resonance is set up between the electrical activities of left and 
right hemispheres, and the left- hemisphere self and its right- hemisphere homologue 
come temporarily into anomalous communication. The temporal cortices transmit 
cognitive or perceptual data via the corpus callosum and the limbic structures 
transmit affective nuances chiefly via the anterior commissure but also via basal 
amygdalar nuclei and brainstem pathways. This communication can disturb the 
subject's sense of identity and continuity, and may be the cause of diplopic 
sensations such as out -of -the -body and near -death experiences, déjà vu, jamais vu, a 
feeling of loss of self, voices, thoughts which seem to be imposed from outside, 
panic attacks, and commonly negative affect (Persinger and Makarec 1991: 1244; 
Munro and Persinger 1992: 899, 903; Richards et al. 1992: 667; Persinger 1993: 915- 
918; Persinger 1994: 1060, 1063). 
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In particular, when the right hemisphere homologue of the self intrudes into 
left -hemisphere awareness, then the subject may experience the sense of a presence 
(e.g., Persinger and Makarec 1991: 1244; Persinger 1993; Persinger 1994: 1059). 
The concept makes best sense to me if the other experiences, strangeness, déjà vu 
and the rest, should be the result of a variety of diffuse communications, whereas in 
the sensed -presence experience the right -hemisphere homologue is imposing itself 
rather more coherently upon the awareness of the left hemisphere. Phrases used to 
describe this condition include `intrusions of right- hemisphere processes into left - 
hemisphere awareness' (Tiller and Persinger 1994: 1530), left- hemisphere 
"awareness" of the right- hemisphere homologue' (Munro and Persinger 1992: 899). 
Among the experiences which are referred to the sensed presence and this aetiology 
are those of `the stranger', `the other' (Suedfeld and Mocellin 1987: 919), `entities', 
`old hags', spiritual beings (Persinger 1993: 916), someone standing nearby 
(Persinger 1994: 1067), muses, succubi, demons and extraterrestrials (Persinger and 
Makarec 1992; Persinger et al. 1997: 534). 
Process of intercalation between hemispheres 
Transient intercalation may occur when either hemisphere is activated to a 
degree above or below its normal functioning. The most common transient is 
elevated activity in the right hemisphere compared to normal left- hemisphere levels, 
and this is the basis for intercalation resulting in the sensed presence (Persinger 1993: 
917, 919). This and the reverse imbalance may also give rise to intercalation 
resulting in other unusual feelings and perceptual distortions. 
For example, Persinger (1994: 918) gives an account of déjà vu, which I 
interpret as follows. Activity with its origin in the right amygdalo -hippocampal 
complex could be communicated through the central amygdalar nuclei to the 
thalamus and thence to the left limbic structures and cortex. Meanwhile, intercalation 
could occur at a different rate between the cortices via the anterior commissure. Thus 
the left- hemisphere `self' would receive within a brief interval two sets of neuronal 
sequences with a common origin and therefore similar patterns, and the subject 
would have two experiences with similar content. 
I shall not discuss other types of experience further here, but concentrate 
again on `ego -alien intrusion' and the sensed presence. 
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Tests were made of an hypothesis that greater alpha and theta activity in the 
right- hemisphere rather than the left should promote the occurrence of inter- 
hemispheric communication and hence, on the theory, of ego -alien experiences such 
as sensed presence and mental diplopia. During normal waking beta activity, only 
small groups of neurons are discharging together. During waking alpha and theta 
activity, much larger populations of neurons are discharging rhythmically. Large - 
scale activity should encourage inter- hemispheric communication. Subjects with 
greater chronic waking alpha and theta should therefore also report more ego -alien 
experiences generally, and specifically in a setting of partial sensory deprivation. A 
correlation was shown in women between chronic elevated right- hemisphere theta 
activity and a proclivity to experience ego -alien intrusions. For both sexes, elevated 
right- hemisphere theta was correlated with the experience of fear in conditions of 
mild sensory deprivation (Munro and Persinger 1992). 
People who have suffered closed -head injury may exhibit an increased 
incidence of intrusive experiences. Fifty such patients were questioned. Of these, ten 
per cent had a near -death experience at the time of trauma. Sixty -two per cent 
reported a sense of presence which had begun since the injury. Of twenty -eight 
patients who reported presences, seventy -one per cent had them on the left, only 
nineteen per cent on the right, and ten per cent had them on both sides. All those who 
had right -side presences regarded them positively: eighty -three per cent of those 
referred the presences to angels, and some heard voices. The sensed presences 
generally were correlated with symptoms such as seeing lights, sensing movement in 
peripheral vision, a feeling of strangeness, and also with suicidal thoughts (Persinger 
1994). The cases of coherent instructions from right -side presences are interestingly 
attributed to `anomalously activated' left -hemisphere linguistic processes (Persinger 
1994: 1063). Some of those who had left -side presences heard utterances which did 
not make sense: one would incline to attribute those to minimally linguistic right - 
hemisphere intrusions. 
In a study of patients with lesions to one or other hemisphere who 
experienced a sense of presence, presences were felt equally on left and right, but 
were contralateral to the damaged hemisphere (Brugger 1994: 1200- 1201). Brugger 
regards the sense of self as a phenomenon not concentrated in the left temporo -limbic 
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area but subserved by a wider range of structures across both hemispheres of the 
brain. He refers to a theory of Melzack that the `self' is represented by a 
`neuromatrix', a large population of interconnected neurons which develop in unison 
from birth and form a coherent complex spanning both hemispheres. However, 
Melzack's (1990) theory is designed to account for, not the conscious `I', but the 
representation of the body; because, on the evidence of phantom limb experiences, 
this seems to involve additional parts of the brain besides the parietal somatosensory 
areas. 
Neurons which inhibit inter- hemispheric communication are said to be among 
the most vulnerable to reductions in metabolic levels of glucose and oxygen. 
Therefore right -hemisphere intrusions should be facilitated by lowered general 
metabolic activity. They should also be facilitated by subjective fragility of the self, 
as when a person undergoes a life crisis such as the breakup of a relationship or the 
death of a close relative. Depression is related to disruption of the left- hemisphere 
sense of self: in such a condition, right- hemisphere processes are more likely to 
intrude (Persinger 1994: 1067). While there is an overlap in identification of cause 
and effect in this part of the discussion, one can see the cogency of the case. 
Essentially, the left hemisphere maintains the sense of self: right- hemisphere 
intrusions disturb it, and also reduced cohesion of the sense of self makes such 
intrusions easier. Moreover, if indeed the right hemisphere subserves vigilance and 
doubt, constantly checking for something wrong, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, one should expect its intrusions to depress the subject. In more extreme 
cases, the negative affect introduced by right -hemisphere intrusions may cause 
anxiety, fear and panic (Persinger 1993: 919). 
Content of sensed presence experience 
The cognitive content of experience is believed to be dependent upon the 
specific functions of brain structures that are most active at a given moment, as is 
indicated by the correlation between experiences and focal activity shown by EEG, 
PET scans and fMRI. 
Studies indicate that areas within the ventral temporal cortex and 
parahippocampal gyrus are involved in recognition of faces and hands. Stimulation 
of these cell populations may produce potential experiential representations of those 
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body parts. If such images are communicated imperfectly from one hemisphere to the 
other, then distorted images may intrude into awareness. In one case, a patient who 
had abnormal spikes in the right temporal EEG during distress would experience 
fear, then the sense of a presence, and within ten seconds a gnarled hand would 
appear in her left visual field. It is suggested that the odd - shaped humanoid forms 
which appear in the most extreme cases of the sensed presence, such as the entity and 
Old Hag (Appendix 3A), may be the product of such anomalous representations 
(Persinger 1993: 919). 
Budden (1994: 20 -21) seems to suggest that the entity sometimes witnessed is 
a hallucinated representation of the body image or homunculus from the 
somatosensory cortex. On the theory of right- hemisphere intrusion, we should 
interpret this as a right parietal homunculus being communicated imperfectly to the 
left hemisphere. 
Inducing the sensed presence experimentally 
Experiences of a presence have been induced in a laboratory setting. The 
experiences were facilitated by weak complex magnetic fields introduced bilaterally 
over left, right or both temporo -parietal regions, by means of a helmet containing 
solenoids. The most effective fields were those which simulated `burst firing' 
patterns taken from a population of amygdalar and hippocampal neurons as observed 
in a temporal -lobe epileptic patient. Also used was a `Thomas pulse', a sequence of 
variations on a millisecond scale. This tended to cause unpleasant vibrations through 
the body, and is said to have produced in other experiments coldness, shivering, a 
bright light and a sense of impending death. 
In one experiment, subjects were seated, masked, in an acoustic chamber, and 
pushed a button if they felt a presence. The most frequent experiences occurred 
during burst firing. One woman, on receiving stimulation over the right hemisphere, 
reported a presence mostly behind her but also along her left side. She also had a 
feeling of detachment, as if she were rising up, but connected to her body by a 
thread. Another woman on several occasions reported a presence behind and on her 
left side following right- hemisphere stimulation. During this experience she felt 
apprehension. Some subjects reported a sense of presence on the right side whether 
or not they were receiving a pulse. A presence on the left side was reported twice as 
Chapter 5 104 
often with a pulse as without, and three times as often as a presence on the right. A 
presence behind was reported three times as often with as without a pulse (Cook and 
Persinger 1997). 
The sensed presence induced by environmental factors 
Electrical and magnetic fields, of geophysical and artificial origin 
Localized geophysical processes 
Persinger and Cameron (1986) report a series of poltergeist -like occurrences 
in an Ontario apartment, and attribute them to geomagnetic causes. 
The tenants' subjective phenomena included waking up several times at night 
feeling a `presence of evil', seeing an image of a baby on the window shade, and 
`feeling' the forms of a man and woman, hearing footsteps in the hallway, seeing two 
figures at the foot of the bed, seeing a small white light crossing the wall, hearing a 
swishing sound like bedclothes being moved, and the conversation of two people. 
The same images occurred on several nights, and eventually both tenants had had 
enough and vacated the property. In some of the phenomena, Hufford's Old Hag 
experience (Chapter 3) can be recognized. Extra events are the small white light and 
perhaps the odd images of the baby. The case shares with most such occurrences a 
senseless, baffling quality. 
Two sensors were introduced to record both vibrations and magnetic fields. 
Only the sensor connected with a coil registered any of the events, so that they 
appear to have been electrical or magnetic in origin and not surface -detectable 
vibrations. The apartment was located 200 metres from each of two fault lines, and 
the region undergoes a detectable tremor about every ten years. The hypothesis was 
formed that the phenomena were caused by transient alternating electromagnetic 
fields produced by underground tectonic or `tectonogenic' forces. 
The small light could have been an objective phenomenon resembling ball 
lightning on a small scale and produced by the electrical activity, which, given this 
visible physical manifestation, was presumably more intense than before. At the 
same time, one tenant had her most frightening experience, a classic Old Hag. 
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Suess and Persinger (2001) report paranormal phenomena at the site of a 
former magnetite (iron oxide) mine in Ontario. The mine was closed in 1978. and 
since then a large hollow from which ore was removed has been filling with millions 
of gallons of water. Nearby is an old Ojibwa site with petroglyphs. The devout 
Christian owners of a farm at the site have established stations of the cross there, and 
visitors and pilgrims have reported spiritual experiences, including visions of angels 
and the Blessed Virgin, glowing colours in the sky, peacefulness and trance -like 
states. 
The researchers suggest that the accumulating weight of water causes 
localized tectonic strain. Rocky outcrops containing magnetite there have sufficient 
magnetism to hold miniature magnets. Electrostatic fields induced by strain within 
the rock, extending several hundred metres into the earth, would be strong enough to 
orient particles in the air, causing diffraction and glows. Instruments detected 
magnetic fields of different intensities at various surface points, fluctuating at 
intervals of between 1 and 10 seconds. On the basis of laboratory experiments, these 
fields are hypothesized to affect the temporal lobes and limbic structures of sensitive 
individuals, producing opiate -like effects, and - it would seem -a sense of presence. 
Above a Coptic church at Zeitoun in Egypt, in 1968 -71, subjects experienced 
apparitions of the Blessed Virgin and of doves. Photographs showed blobs of light, 
and there were glows over high points of the edifice. At this period there had been an 
increase in local seismic activity, and earthquakes began a year after the beginning of 
the paranormal phenomena (Derr and Persinger 1989: 123 -128). 
A team from the University of Hertfordshire recently investigated the 
Flaunted Gallery and Georgian Rooms at Hampton Court Palace and the South 
Bridge Vaults in Edinburgh, locations which have a reputation for being haunted. 
Rooms and areas reputed to be most haunted produced the greatest number of 
unusual experiences. In both experiments ambient magnetic fields were measured. 
There was no correlation with strength of magnetic field, but some correlation 
between variance of the magnetic field and the precise areas producing the greatest 
incidence of unusual experiences. At Hampton Court the variance of magnetic field 
was greater in the `most haunted' areas than in control areas (R. Wiseman, pers. 
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comm.). These results offer support for the hypothesis that temporal -lobe structures 
may be directly affected by local magnetic flux. 
Man -made electromagnetic pollution 
Budden (1994) proposes a theory that paranormal experiences are the body's 
expression of a physiological malaise, which has a parallel manifestation in the 
allergies suffered by many experients. Causes of this malaise are constant exposure 
to electromagnetic fields produced by earth faults and, more often, radio -frequency 
(RF) radiation produced by transmitters and fields produced by power lines. Radio - 
frequency transmissions have two components: one parallel to the ground and 
another which is reflected off the ground between 500 and 700 metres away. At this 
intersection a `hot spot' exists, and Budden cites World Health Organization 
information regarding the health implications of hot spots. This theory associates 
with electromagnetic disturbances not only subjective paranormal experiences but 
also objective phenomena often found associated in poltergeist and UFO cases, such 
as electrical appliances switching themselves on and off, and lights resembling ball 
lightning. The physical occurrences are attributed to power surges and the influence 
of variable electric fields, often confined to a small space around some conducting 
iron object. 
Cases of the sensed presence from Budden are mostly associated with hot 
spots. The woman who saw an old man near her bed (Appendix 3A, Case 8) lived at 
the intersection of two RF beams from local transmitters. Tape recordings turned out 
blank; a kettle and the bedroom light went on and off by themselves. The woman 
who saw a dark figure shuffle into her room (Case 10) lived 600 metres from one 
large antenna, and close to another. Her radio and television sometimes switched 
themselves on and off at random. 
The extraterrestrials called `grays' seen by some UFO experients are said to 
be sensory models produced by electrical stimulation of the visual cortex. Budden 
points out that the grays have all features reduced except the eyes, which are 
exaggerated. One is reminded here of one of Hufford's cases, in which the subject 
saw a large dark figure, of which the only distinct feature was the piercing black eyes 
(Appendix 3A, Case 7). 
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Discussion 
Persinger and Cameron (1986) report research by others showing that some 
subjects who have been the focus of poltergeist episodes had EEG profiles with 
abnormal, epileptic -like temporal -lobe characteristics. In cases of hauntings and 
poltergeist activity, if tectonic forces are the ultimate cause, then the people involved 
may be exposed to repeated stimulation by the electromagnetic fields produced by 
underground activity. Repeated stimulation may have a kindling effect, rendering the 
affected neural structures more susceptible to react strongly to further stimulation. In 
this way, subjects may come to have more intense experiences the longer they stay in 
a location where they are exposed to such stimulation. 
Rutkowski (1984) cautioned that the geophysical data were as yet inadequate 
to support the theory that tectonic strain could be a source of electrical activity 
sufficient to produce luminosities interpreted as UFOs or of fields which could 
influence the temporal lobes of human brains. In my view, Rutkowski's (1984; 1986) 
and others' objections to the tectonic strain theory have been fairly convincingly 
countered by Persinger (1985) and Little (1987). In particular, earthquakes are not 
stated to be the cause of geomagnetic fields which are alleged to influence human 
brains. On the tectonic strain theory, increased pressure or strain within volumes of 
the earth's crust is the primary source of the other phenomena. Earthquakes are one 
consequence of these pressures, and may occur long after the strain begins to 
increase. The generation of geomagnetic fields is another, parallel, consequence, and 
the alleged effects of these, in the form of paranormal phenomena, may occur 
without any correlation with earthquakes (Persinger 1985: 576). 
Other workers have taken up the general idea that geophysical phenomena 
have effects on human subjective experience. For example, in a small -scale study 
which is acknowledged to need expansion to much larger numbers of subjects, 
Conesa (1997) has correlated incidence of vivid dreams and sleep paralysis with an 
increase and decrease, respectively, of ambient geomagnetic activity. 
Budden's (1994) theory has some implications. Since in the western world 
we are all surrounded by RF transmissions, more paranormal phenomena should be 
reported in the west than in remote parts of the world. Also, there should be much 
more than occurred prior to the era of man -made electrical pollution, which dates 
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from no earlier than the middle of the nineteenth century when electricity generation 
and telegraphy were beginning. 
Whatever the merits and shortcomings of Budden's and Persinger's theories 
on this subject, they are testable. A worthwhile research project would be to find out 
the incidence and typology of paranormal phenomena in different parts of the world 
and in different periods of history. Another would be to conduct a widespread survey 
of locations where paranormal phenomena are alleged to have occurred and 
determine the association with electricity cables, RF transmitters, geological fault 
lines, concentrations of iron ore and other possible sources of electrical or magnetic 
influences. Paranormal phenomena would include both objective effects on electrical 
appliances and detection equipment and the subjective experiences of inhabitants. As 
a corollary, those who have lived a long time in a location subject to unusual 
electromagnetic influences should show elevated susceptibility to paranormal 
subjective experience, in that their brains should have been rendered hypersensitive 
by kindling effects. I am not aware that any such surveys on a large scale have been 
conducted. 
Stress 
Intolerance of ambiguity 
Above, I noted the possibility of isolating objective from subjective 
phenomena in paranormal events, where both might be attributed to electromagnetic 
radiation or ambient fields. Houran and Lange (1996) emphasize that the subjective 
experience and objective occurrences in paranormal events such as poltergeist 
episodes may have different causes. 
Objective phenomena such as inexplicable movement of objects and erratic 
functioning of electrical equipment may be unrelated to the subjective experience of 
those who are present. Unexpected occurrences which would not be regarded as 
paranormal by an average observer may assume importance for a subject who is 
disposed to look out for paranormal events. When an ambiguous objective 
occurrence takes place, such as, perhaps, an odd sound or a flickering lamp, the 
subject may interpret it as confirmation that a paranormal episode is under way. 
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Houran and Lange (1996: 1308 -1310; Houran 1997: 340) propose that, as 
described earlier, subjective experiences may be caused by the action of 
electromagnetic fields on structures of the temporal lobes, leading to quasi -epileptic 
microseizures. They cite research showing a connection between poltergeist 
phenomena and physical energies such as ionizing radiation, electrostatic fields and 
geomagnetic activity. They further propose, however, that stress and suggestion 
alone may be sufficient to set these neurological processes in motion. The 
observation of ambiguous objective occurrences may be enough to trigger them. The 
content of the subjective experience, which may reach the stage of hallucination, is 
determined by the subject's expectation and by the context: for example, a haunted 
house. 
Those who are unusually alert to environmental cues, who have an 
intolerance of ambiguous or unexpected events around them, and those who are 
responsive to suggestion and hypnosis should be more likely than the average person 
to have paranormal experiences. Houran and Lange (1996: 1312; Houran 1997: 339- 
340) cite research consistent with this hypothesis. One wonders, however, whether it 
may be too easy to define these susceptibilities circularly in terms of each other. 
Even so, alertness to change in the immediate environment should be determinable 
by psychological testing independently of susceptibility to paranormal experience. 
Isolation and cold 
Suedfeld and Mocellin (1987: 36 -41) cite cases of sailors, mountaineers and 
polar explorers in small parties or alone, among whom the sense of presence seems 
to be almost common (see also Appendix 3A, Cases 22 -25). Interestingly, neither 
they nor I have found any reports of the sensed presence among explorers in tropical 
countries or even in hot deserts. Low temperatures, monotonous winds, isolation and 
the uncertainty of assistance seem to be common themes. Among cold -environment 
explorers, the presence seems to be virtually always benign, either neutral or 
positively comforting. For example, in a dinghy adrift in the Pacific, the presence 
helped to fight a storm; in the Antarctic, a presence posed no danger but followed the 
subject through tunnels of ice. 
They dispute whether stress is a cause of the sensed presence experience. 
Although they do not define `stress', it appears to me that they use the word to mean 
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a medically detectable condition. They do state that provoking factors seem to be 
`monotony, isolation, and ambient cold' along with contributory factors such as 
sleeplessness, exhaustion, uncertainty and fear. I should think that a human being in 
such conditions is definitely under stress, at any rate in an informal sense of the 
word. 
In their view (1987: 49), the benign presences are not a pathological symptom 
but an adaptive response to uncertain environments. They are part of an unconscious 
coping strategy which enables the subject to survive. Stress, even in a wide sense of 
the word, is insufficient on its own to provoke the experience in everyone, since it is 
clear that many people engaged in polar exploration and other hazardous activities do 
not experience the sensed presence. It is suggested that expectation plays a part: 
some of those who have experienced presences were already of a religious 
temperament. A parallel is drawn between the experiences of westerners in adverse 
environments and the arduous spirit quest engaged in by young men of some North 
American native tribes, in which the subject expects to encounter a spirit being, 
which manifests as a `presence'. 
As to the mechanism, Suedfeld and Mocellin (1987: 45 -48) review various 
possibilities. Physiological changes involved may include low levels of oxygen 
reaching the brain; change in the activity of the reticular activating system in the 
brainstem because of monotonous stimulation; deactivation of the dominant 
hemisphere; an accumulation of hormones and chemicals which affect 
neurotransmission. Citing unpublished work by Green et al., they note that `twilight 
states' - characterized by waking theta wave activity - have been claimed to give 
rise to the appearance of ̀ Jungian archetypes' such as a wise old man. 
Hypervigilance, enhanced alertness to environmental cues and intolerance of 
ambiguity, as discussed by Houran and Lange (1996), may also occur in states of 
deprivation and sleeplessness. It may sound contrary to associate lack of sleep and 
increased vigilance, but I invite the reader to think of an occasion when he or she has 
been working late at night and is tired: sometimes then one begins to notice minor 
phenomena, sounds and things seen out of the corner of one's eye, which would 
normally be disregarded. 
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Vulnerability 
In the study cited above, participants in the experiment in the South Bridge 
Vaults in Edinburgh reported apparitions (of exactly what is not stated), an uneasy 
sense of being watched, burning sensations and odd odours. In these we recognize 
familiar aural symptoms, as well as the sense of presence. Among the environmental 
measurements, light levels were recorded. The strongest correlations shown in the 
study were that incidence of unusual experiences varied with light level in the 
passage exterior to the vault where the participant was, and secondly the height of the 
vault. It is hypothesized that moving from a relatively bright environment to being in 
a relatively dark environment, when one can see a brighter environment immediately 
outside, creates a mild form of sensory deprivation. Being below a high ceiling in an 
unknown place may create a feeling of vulnerability, as indeed would being in 
relative darkness. In either case the result is to induce anxiety. Hypervigilance, 
noticing shadows and changes in temperature, may contribute to the anxious state (R. 
Wiseman, pers. comm.). The results are consistent with the hypothesis that stress or 
ongoing anxiety may in some individuals stimulate temporal -lobe structures 
sufficiently to induce microseizural activity. 
Discussion 
All the presences described by Suedfeld and Mocellin are benign, and their 
hypothesis of the experience as a coping strategy makes sense of the data cited. On 
the other hand, it must be clear that presences can be anything but benign. Yet it 
seems clear that the sense of presence is the same type of phenomenon in both cases. 
On the basis of the literature reviewed, it seems to me that with benign presences a 
strong feeling of a presence is much more common than an actual vision, whereas 
with malign presences visions form a higher proportion of encounters than with 
benign ones. Even so, it is principally the affect that differs. The emotion 
accompanying presence experiences is frequently extreme, whether comfort or terror. 
In discussion with religious people, I have myself heard personal narratives 
about a comforting presence and noted a complacent acceptance of the reality of such 
experiences occurring to others in adversity. These benign presences are regarded as 
having objective existence and are often attributed to angels or indeed the deity. It is 
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nice to think that an angel may be looking after one, but people are not so keen to 
accept the objective reality of terrifying presences. 
Archetypes are hard to find among presences and, when they do occur, are 
usually abstract and without emotional association (Evans 1984: 306). As for the 
alleged archetypal wise old man, I have not found any instance which conforms to 
this prototype. Rather than Obiwan Kenobi as portrayed by Alec Guinness', the 
nearest instance (perhaps Chapter 3, Case 1) more closely resembles an unsavoury 
alter -ego of Yoda. 
Sleep 
While experiences of the sensed presence, benign or malign, can occur while 
waking, it would appear that the most frightening variety, the Old Hag, occurs 
mostly during sleep. One would expect that perceived stress levels should be low 
during sleep. During sleep, brain scans show lowered activity in limbic areas (Carter 
1998: 194). Even so, the evidence reviewed in Chapter 3 makes clear the intensity of 
nightmares and Old Hags that assault the subject when he or she should be most 
relaxed. I think that it is possible to come up with an aetiology. 
The Old Hag and incubus may probably be explained by sleep paralysis 
combined with hypnagogic hallucination (Hufford; see Chapter 3). This is an 
anomalous occurrence of the two conditions proper to REM sleep, muscular atonia 
and dreaming, in what is normally non -REM sleep stage 1. The Old Hag typically 
occurs also at times when the subject takes a nap or is overtired. Both the occurrence 
and the content of the anomalous `dreaming' is perhaps the result of an inter- 
hemispheric intercalation which becomes possible owing to relatively lowered 
metabolism in the left hemisphere as opposed to the right. The `self , a 
predominantly left- hemisphere phenomenon, is stressed and vulnerable. One would 
predict that EEG of limbic areas during this anomalous stage 1 sleep with paralysis 
and hallucination should not show lowered activity but rather the reverse, while 
intercalation takes place. Intracranial EEG might be expected to show quasi -epileptic 
spikes in limbic areas. The tingling reported during some Old Hag experiences may 
well be an epileptic symptom (Chapter 4). As in normal REM, one would predict that 
surface EEG should show the beta rhythm associated with dreaming. 
Star Wars, Twentieth Century Fox 1977. 
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Moreover, while asleep, we are in the same location and position for a 
lengthy period. If there is a varying magnetic field in or around the dwelling, then 
this is precisely the time when we are most vulnerable to its influence (Budden 1994: 
4). 
Conclusions 
All the environmental factors discussed in this section as possible causes of 
numinous, particularly sensed -presence, experience are compatible with the general 
hypothesis that the neural substrate is unusual brain activity with a temporal -lobe 
focus. 
The similarity between experiences in non -clinical settings and those 
produced by experimental stimulation indicates that the neural substrates underlying 
both are essentially the same. This neural activity associated with paranormal or 
numinous experience is quasi -epileptic, in the sense that the EEG in experimental 
contexts resembles that of epileptic discharges and the subjective experience 
resembles that of epileptic auras. 
I do not wish to make a simplistic connection between any kind of epileptic 
condition and numinous or inexplicable frightening experiences, because such a 
connection is obviously unsustainable. However, this is an area for research. For 
example, it would be interesting to examine subjects who report night terrors, and 
find out whether, when they are in deep sleep, normal temporal -lobe delta rhythms 
take on spikes or other epileptiform characteristics. Studies have shown the incidence 
of night terrors to be higher among epileptic subjects than among controls (Stores 
2001: 98; cf Shorvon 1994: 44, 47 -52). 
In the population at large, the experience of sensed presence, together with 
other paranormal feelings such as déjà vu, depersonalization and the like, can occur 
in various contexts. I hypothesize that electrical and magnetic fields, some 
originating from tectonic forces in active faults, some originating from man -made 
structures such as electricity pylons and transmitters, may directly stimulate temporo- 
limbic structures of the human brain and provoke quasi -epileptic microseizures 
which manifest subjectively as numinous feelings. I also hypothesize that stressful 
situations of isolation, sensory deprivation, expectation of threat, inability to tolerate 
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ambiguity and heightened alertness to environmental cues may cause physiological 
changes such as altered levels of neurotransmitters, such as to facilitate the same 
types of quasi - epileptic microseizures. 
Not all people respond in the same way to the same situations. Some people 
are more susceptible than others to temporal -lobe disturbances, whether provoked 
directly by environmental electromagnetic phenomena or by various forms of stress. 
This is so because across the general population there is a continuum of degrees of 
lability in temporo -limbic structures, ranging from clinical epileptic patients through 
those who have occasional subclinical epileptiform activity to those whose temporo- 
limbic structures are in effect entirely stable. 
In particular, the sensed presence is explicable as the subjective awareness by 
the left hemisphere of a right -hemisphere homologue of the sense of self, according 
to the theory proposed and elaborated by Persinger following Jaynes. This inter- 
hemispheric communication is facilitated when right -hemisphere temporo- limbic 
activity exceeds that of the left. When somatosensory (homunculus) data originating 
in the parietal lobe of the non -dominant hemisphere is communicated as part of this 
intrusion, visual hallucinations of humanoid figures may result. 
The precise sensation of numinousness needs a little further analysis. It seems 
to be a discrete affective sensation. It has the character of fear or thrill, perhaps even 
when a benign presence is sensed, in which case it may be called `godly fear'. We 
know that fear is associated, principally of all brain structures, with the amygdala. I 
hypothesize that the numinous fear is the subjective correlate of a particular type of 
intense and aberrant activity in particular nuclei of the amygdala. This activity may 
be stimulated directly and experienced spontaneously and at the very beginning of an 
epileptic aura or numinous experience. At other times, it may follow from the spread, 
spillover or intensification of other, originally non -numinous, amygdalar activity. 
Subjectively, the latter case would correlate with numinous fear following intense or 
prolonged anxiety during the onset of an epileptic aura or in the face of some 
threatening situation. 
The above ideas are of course speculative. The foundation comes from 
Persinger, Jaynes and others; some ideas are my own. At the present time I do not 
think that the hypotheses have been refuted. They are, however, in principle testable. 
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What is needed is brain scanning technology which can show neural activity in finer 
detail than fMRI is at present able to do. It would be necessary to localize neural 
activity to the level of particular nuclei within brain structures such as the amygdala 
and determine patterns and degrees of intensity of neural activation corresponding to 
experience as it applies to each subject. With Saver and Rabin (1997: 508), I believe 
the science of correlating experience, particularly religious experience, with neural 
activity is in its infancy. Apart from the electroencephalograph, the scanning 
technology available at the time of writing this chapter was not around thirty years 
ago. The required technology will come, and within twenty to thirty years I believe 
these matters will be much better understood than they are now. 
Mystical experience 
Appendix 5C discusses the theory of d'Aquili and Newberg regarding the 
neural correlates of mystical experience incorporating religious awe, the opposite 
extreme of Otto's numinous sense from the fear with which I have principally been 
concerned in this chapter. I have diverted mystical experience to an appendix not 
only to shorten this chapter but also because it does not figure strongly in the 
discussion of specific religious elements to follow in Chapters 7 -11. 
I accept that mysticism is perhaps the highest and most significant 
manifestation of religion and of dealings with the supernatural. However, its origins 
in prehistory, if it has prehistoric origins, are probably harder to trace than the origins 
of other religious elements which, as I shall argue, certainly do have their origins in 
prehistory. Accordingly, in the rest of this work I do not intend to deal any further 
with mystical states, but only with supernatural elements of a lower order. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE SIMIAN SUBSTRATE 
Human beings have religion; apes do not. At some period after our ancestors. 
the earliest hominins, split from the stock of chimpanzees and gorillas, and before the 
earliest archaeological evidence of religion was deposited, is the time when religion 
began. 
The purpose of this chapter is to clarify what sort of mentality might have 
existed among the earliest hominins, and what scope there was among them for the 
development of a religious consciousness or religious or quasi- religious behaviour. 
Archaeology has recovered some remains of their bodies, but evidence of their way 
of life is minimal. There is no means of observing their behaviour. However, it is 
possible to observe the behaviour of present -day apes. I shall try to determine what 
basis there was for the development of a religious component to life among our 
remote ancestors, given what is known about the earliest hominins, and given the 
capabilities, society and mentality of those creatures which appear to be our nearest 
living relatives, the chimpanzees. 
The earliest archaeological records of religion, according to various 
authorities, may be the written records of ancient Mesopotamia or Egypt, or the 
parietal art and `Venus' figurines of the European Upper Palaeolithic, or the human 
burials of the Middle Palaeolithic in the Near East and Europe. The Upper 
Palaeolithic art and the earlier burials have been interpreted as evidence of religion, 
but even they were the work of human beings very recent in the timescale of hominin 
evolution. In this chapter I am concerned with pre- human, apelike and ape 
mentalities. A contentious matter may be the identity of humans' nearest living 
relatives: some authorities have maintained that gorillas, or even orang -utans, rather 
than chimpanzees, are closer to us. I proceed on the basis that chimpanzees are closer 
to us, and give reasons. 
I do not expect to find religious leanings among present -day apes, nor do I 
propose that our ancestors, shortly after the split from apes, immediately began to 
have religious leanings. I do not even suggest, although evidence may be raised by 
archaeology, that anything which most authorities would interpret as an actual 
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religion or religious complex appeared at any time in prehistory before the last 
hundred thousand years. 
The earliest hominins must have been indistinguishable from apes in terms of 
their appearance and behaviour, and probably remained so for some hundreds of 
millennia, if not millions of years, after the split. It is reasonable to suppose that the 
earliest undisputed hominins, the australopithecines, were not much less acute in 
their general mentality than modern African apes, although their behaviours may 
well have been to some degree less developed. I suggest the last point because, on a 
prima facie basis, it seems likely that modern apes are more sophisticated than their 
ancestors, just as we are than ours. 
As far as body size and habitat are concerned, the nearest analogy among 
living apes to the australopithecines are the common chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), 
and the bonobo or pygmy chimpanzee (Pan paniscus). I seek to show that in 
chimpanzee behaviour today there are signs of a mentality and way of living from 
which certain religious elements could develop. 
Now I do not say that chimpanzees in the wild or in zoos are on the point of 
developing religion, or even that they would do so in the course of the next million 
years, whether they were left on their own or encouraged and educated by human 
beings. It is conceivable that in the course of several million years, if chimpanzees 
survived in the wild and were left to themselves, then religious behaviour, in the 
form of certain religious elements (as I have defined those in Chapter 1), might be 
precipitated by changes in habitat, subsistence, group size and means of 
communication. I say this because I believe that, for the ancestors of human beings, 
religion was a natural development. So if another species from similar beginnings, 
such as chimpanzees, had the opportunity of similar evolutionary changes, similar 
cultural and religious developments would occur within that species or its descendant 
species. 
In the natural societies of chimpanzees and with the mental abilities which 
they possess, I propose that certain conditions are present which are necessary 
conditions for the development of some of the basic elements of religious behaviour, 
as those were outlined in my introduction. Those conditions are present among apes 
whereas they are not present, for example, in the behaviour of dogs, bears, cats, tree 
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shrews or virtually any other genus. Equally, of course, those conditions are not 
themselves sufficient to bring about religious behaviour, otherwise we would see 
exactly that now among chimpanzees. 
I acknowledge that the use of chimpanzees as a model for our earliest 
ancestors is not wholly legitimate: one is taking a known condition (the life of 
chimpanzees) and trying to claim that our past was like their present (Binford 1989: 
286). Chimpanzees today represent the outcome of five million or more years of 
evolution on their lineage, just as we are on ours. They may have changed 
substantially since the time of the common ancestor. With respect to way of life, 
such behaviours as hunting, tool use and tool making, living in multi -male 
communities without harems, fighting between communities, and many others in 
which they resemble us, may all have developed since the split. In other words, the 
common ancestor may not have possessed those behaviours. However, the fact that 
those behaviours are shared by us with living chimpanzees indicates that, even if 
they were not shared with the common ancestor, they could have developed in our 
lineage at an early stage when our ancestors were anatomically more apelike than we 
are now: that is, at the stage of australopithecines. 
Clearly, we have changed much more than chimpanzees, anatomically over 
millions of years but especially in behavioural characteristics within the last fifty 
thousand years. All the evidence indicates that chimpanzees are more like the 
common ancestor than living humans are. As we have no closer or better living 
model, I think it is legitimate to draw inferences from chimpanzee behaviour to shed 
light on what our ancestors may have been like. 
Earliest hominins 
A detailed presentation of information about the divergence of the human 
lineage from the apes and about the australopithecines and earliest Homo, including 
references, is given as Appendix 6A. 
Chimpanzees 
A discussion of chimpanzee mentality is given as Appendix 6B, with 
references. 
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Pre -religious behaviour 
By pre -religious behaviour I mean behaviour which shows resemblances to 
human behaviour in certain situations of stress which in humans historically have 
evoked a religious response. Generally, this excludes stress arising from inter- 
personal or inter -community contention, but includes stress induced by having to 
face sickness, death and the unknown. 
Pre -religious behaviour in higher primates 
Compassion 
Family loyalty is general among chimpanzees. As paternity is not identifiable 
among them, the family is limited to mothers and their offspring. In dominance 
struggles, brothers help each other (Goodall 1986: 178). In other cases of aggression, 
mothers usually defend their offspring, and offspring defend their mothers. 
Chimpanzees frequently, but not invariably, show concern for sick or 
distressed relatives. An adult female received severe injuries during the conflict 
between the Kasakela and Kahama communities at Gombe. Her younger daughter 
remained with her for five days, grooming her and keeping flies away until she died. 
However, the older daughter was with the attackers, because she had joined their 
community, and returned with them to their territory after the attack, ignoring her 
mother. Siblings often care for the youngest infant when the mother dies. For 
instance, on the death of their mother, a juvenile male took charge of his fourteen - 
month -old sister, and carried her about everywhere. A sister looked after her younger 
brother. A sister and brother looked after a youngest brother. When an older brother 
suffered an injured foot and could only move around slowly, his younger brother 
became solicitous towards him, and on one occasion whimpered to their mother to 
make her wait for the older brother when she was moving off. When an old male lost 
the use of his legs owing to polio, another male who may have been a brother spent 
several hours each day with him for the last two weeks of his life, and also attacked a 
much larger dominant male in his defence (Goodall 1971: 202 -203; 1986: 72, 383- 
385). 
It is rare for chimpanzees to show care for unrelated community members in 
the wild. However, captive chimpanzees seem to be more solicitous of those 
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unrelated. At an island colony surrounded by water in Oklahoma, chimpanzees 
attempted to rescue others who fell into the moat. In captive colonies, chimpanzees 
have been witnessed removing splinters from another's skin. One chimpanzee 
extracted a loose deciduous tooth from another's mouth, and one removed grit from 
another's eye, a delicate enough operation for humans. To be able to act 
compassionately, the subject must have an understanding of the wants of the sufferer 
(Goodall 1986: 378, 385 -386). Without having access to details, one suspects that 
chimpanzees were introduced individually into the Oklahoma and other captive 
colonies cited, and had no family ties: in such a case, it may be that the community 
as a whole effectively becomes a family to the individual. 
Depression following death of a close relative 
Human beings have developed sophisticated ways of deciding on what counts 
as death. In a hospital, where it is feasible to resuscitate a patient whose heart has 
stopped for some minutes, what counts is cessation of heartbeat along with brain 
death, when an electroencephalograph shows no activity. In other circumstances, 
cessation of pulse or heartbeat is enough. Chimpanzees do not check each other's 
pulse, of course, but seem to recognize prolonged inactivity or unresponsiveness as a 
new condition, on observing which they begin to treat one of their fellows 
differently. 
The strongest bond between chimpanzees is between a mother and offspring. 
Sometimes chimpanzees become agitated when they lose sight of their mother, even 
in the course of a day's foraging. Females with infants of their own have been known 
to search for hours, whimpering, when they discover that their mothers have moved 
away (Goodall 1986: 203). 
De Waal (1982: 67 -70) describes a female chimpanzee, curiously known as 
Gorilla, who had a succession of babies die, possibly because she produced too little 
milk, although she handled them maternally and had plenty of practice as an `aunt' in 
looking after other females' babies and infants. After each death, she went into a 
state which in humans would unhesitatingly be called depression. She ignored the 
activity around her and sat huddled in a corner for weeks on end, sometimes letting 
out shrieks for no immediate reason. Interestingly, keepers showed this female how 
to bottle -feed the orphaned baby of another, and she readily adopted him. 
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During a poliomyelitis epidemic at Gombe, a one -month -old infant 
contracted the disease and lost the use of both arms and legs. The mother carried the 
baby around, cradled in her arms. If he screamed, she arranged his limbs to avoid 
crushing them. However, when he ceased to move or vocalize, either from death at 
that point or loss of consciousness with death soon afterwards, she immediately 
ceased to show maternal concern. For three days she continued to carry the body 
around, throwing it onto her back and dangling it by one leg. Young female 
chimpanzees came to stare, but did not touch. On the third day, an older daughter 
tried to play with what was by then definitely the corpse of her sibling, but when she 
picked it up, the mother snatched it back. Throughout this time the mother looked 
dazed, staring into space. Eventually the body was abandoned in the forest (Goodall 
1971: 195 -196; 1986: 383). The mother's behaviour indicates recognition of change 
of state in the baby. She had been responsive to its signs of life, and when the latter 
ceased, she ceased to respond with care. This reaction would indicate that giving care 
is an instinctive stimulus -response process. It is not clear what motivated the mother 
to continue to carry the corpse around. However, her bewilderment after the death is 
of interest in the present study. If she were human, we would probably say she was 
`in shock'. 
Goodall (1986: 66, 74, 101, 203 -204) describes a number of cases of infants' 
and juveniles' distress following the death of a mother. When an infant has not yet 
been weaned, of course it is likely to die even if adopted by an older sibling or an 
`aunt'. Goodall uses the phrase `clinical depression' to describe the condition seen in 
several infants. In laboratory experiments on rhesus monkeys, body temperature, 
heart rate and rhythm were all affected when infants were separated from mothers; 
outward expressions were a `sad' face, lethargy and withdrawal. 
One infant chimpanzee lived for eighteen months after the death of his 
mother. Despite being looked after by his older sister, he remained listless, huddled, 
and performed repetitive behaviours, pulling out hairs and rocking back and forth. 
The youngest child of an old mother was eight and a half years old when she died. 
He had a very close attachment to her, was weaned late, and used to ride on her back 
well past the age when other juveniles would have been forced to be more 
independent. When she died, he remained by the body for many hours. Healthy at the 
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beginning, he lived only a further three and a half weeks, deteriorating physically and 
becoming lethargic. An autopsy showed gastroenteritis and peritonitis, but it seems 
that depression lowered his resistance to infection. One female infant disappeared in 
the forest eight months after the mother's death, and probably died. Others, adopted 
by relatives, showed signs of depression, but after some months recovered. Two of 
those who recovered were subsequently retarded in physical development, reaching 
puberty several years later than normal. In humans, social workers would call these 
symptoms `failure to thrive'. Given that those infants were more or less weaned, it 
seems idle to suggest that the cause of their depressive symptoms was other than 
psychological trauma. 
Fearful response to sickness and death of others 
Whereas above I mentioned instances of care for others, chimpanzees do not 
habitually treat the sick solicitously. Sometimes others will sniff at parts of the body 
of a sick member of the community. During the poliomyelitis epidemic at Gombe, 
when three chimpanzees lost the full use of their limbs and could not move normally, 
others showed grins of fear, rushing to embrace and pat each other, apparently 
comforting each other while continuing to stare at the cripples. When an old male 
suffered paralysis of the legs and was unable to move around, other males would not 
take part in grooming when he approached, but moved away. Two adult males 
displayed at and attacked this old community member. When a female suffered a cut 
on her head, the others showed fear and shunned her. One chimpanzee in a captive 
colony was returned to the community after medical treatment still not fully 
conscious after the anaesthetic. He was attacked by others and would have been 
killed if humans had not intervened (Goodall 1971: 201; 1986: 139, 330 -331, 385). 
After a fight, chimpanzees may intently sniff and even lick blood spilled onto 
vegetation. Leaves may be used to wipe wounds. Other chimpanzees have been seen 
to pick up such bloodstained leaves and smell them. Chimpanzees sniff carefully at 
dead bodies of their conspecifics, and at places where a dead body has lain. They 
sometimes go back to a place where they attacked a stranger, as if to check that the 
stranger is dead (Goodall 1986: 139, 529 -530). 
When an adult male fell out of a tree and broke his neck, dying instantly, the 
others showed intense excitement, performing aggressive displays round the dead 
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body and throwing stones at it. The excitement led to aggression among the living. 
directed against each other. In the course of fighting between communities, an adult 
female was fatally injured. An adult male of the other community displayed round 
her and waved branches until she moved again, as if he could not be sure the attack 
had been successful (Goodall 1986: 330, 530). 
Chimpanzees seem to have a hatred of strangers from other communities. 
Goodall (1986: 331, 532) proposes that they treat strangers as if they are prey rather 
than members of the same species. She draws attention to a similar process among 
human beings, when we treat other nationalities and races as subhuman. Many 
human groups call themselves `the people', distinguishing themselves from all 
others, who do not count. However, I suggest that the victims of chimpanzee inter - 
community violence are not treated as prey, strictly speaking, as it appears that, 
although strangers of all ages are attacked, only babies are actually eaten. 
On the above evidence, one might add to a hatred of strangers a hatred of 
strangeness. The movements of crippled individuals, the immobility of the dying, the 
unresponsiveness of a dead body are all strange because they show a change of state 
from the accustomed behaviour of the subjects. The strangeness evokes fear, which 
in turn produces a need to deal with the fear by attacking its object. Goodall (1986: 
533) suggests that the bizarre behaviour of males round a corpse could develop into 
ritual. It could be that, after a fight, displays are merely intended to provoke the 
unresponsive victim into movement, to fmd out whether it is still alive, so that, if it 
is, the attacker can finish it off. However, in the case of the male who fell from a 
tree, there was no initial attack on this individual. The aggression directed at his body 
seems to be provoked only by strangeness. 
There is no fear of blood, but there is a degree of interest in it, as witnessed 
by the sniffing and licking. One is tempted to see here the beginning of the 
fascination with blood in human culture. 
Alertness and challenge in face of natural phenomena 
When on patrol, chimpanzees may be startled by a snapping twig or a rustle 
in the bushes, and then they generally show fearful behaviour. On return to the home 
range, they display, throwing rocks and branches, and may attack a subdominant 
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member of the community, as if redirecting suppressed aggression (Goodall 1986: 
331). In this case, the chimpanzees are expecting to encounter males of a hostile 
neighbouring community. Any sound may be evidence that a hostile patrol is 
nearby, and therefore causes a heightened state of alert. 
Three females were feeding in a fig tree. Lightning struck near the top of the 
tree, with virtually simultaneous thunder. The two young females took no notice and 
continued to feed, but the old female stared at the human observer. It is suggested 
that the old female may have had a recollection of humans with firearms (Ghiglieri 
1984: 119). Here the thunder and lightning as phenomena in their own right caused 
no reaction. 
During heavy rain chimpanzees become less active and sit huddled. However, 
at the onset of heavy rain there may be wild displays by adult males, which 
sometimes leads to aggression between members of the group. Goodall refers to this 
behaviour as the `rain dance'. The first she witnessed at Gombe began when the rain 
was already falling and a thunderclap sounded overhead. A group of chimpanzees 
had climbed up a slope to an open ridge. First one adult male stood upright, making 
pant -hoot sounds and swaying, then charged down the slope. Another five in 
succession followed, breaking branches and dragging them down the slope. As they 
arrived at the bottom, they climbed into trees, but then left the trees in the same 
succession to return to the top of the ridge. They repeated the downward charge 
twice. Meanwhile, females and juveniles watched the performance. The `rain dance' 
was observed three times in one year. Usually it is an individual performance, 
whereas this first case involved the whole group of adult males. In a similar way, 
chimpanzees may display at a noisy waterfall or stream.' Goodall likens the 
performance to challenging the elements, as she envisages primitive humans may 
have done (Goodall 1971: 58 -59; 1986: 67, 335). 
Melancholy 
As I have no relevant information about chimpanzees on this subject, here I 
turn from chimpanzees to baboons. 
Primates, BBC Television 1999. 
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Among human beings there is a tendency to melancholy at the approach of 
evening, a tendency of which I can speak from personal experience. Eugène Marais 
(1969: 133 -139), writing in the early part of the twentieth century, observed a general 
quiescence of activity among tribal people at this time of day, when children creep 
closer to parents and conversation drops. When night finally comes, activity and 
happy chatter resume, so it is not a fear of darkness that promotes the sense of 
sadness at twilight. Marais found that both Europeans and native Africans discussed 
this phenomenon without dispute as a familiar experience in their own lives, 
although it can be expected to be muted among city- dwellers and when artificial light 
is available on demand. However, Marais observed the same quiescence at evening 
among baboons on the high veld of South Africa, when adults would sit silent on 
rocky outcrops and the juveniles would cease to play. Again, activity would resume 
after sunset, and would continue for hours on moonlit nights. Marais has no doubt 
that the experience of baboons and humans is the same, and calls this phenomenon 
`hesperian depression'. 
Marais (1969: 124 -133) also draws attention to the propensity of the baboon 
in captivity to become addicted to tobacco and alcohol. In the wild, he describes 
cases where baboon troops ate parts of toxic plants. The roots of an aquatic plant, 
used by human inhabitants as a purgative, were often chewed and sucked by 
baboons. The ripe fruits of a particular mountain shrub, which caused convulsions 
and sometimes death in humans, were also consumed in considerable quantity by 
baboons. He recounts that local people observed baboons eating these fruits even 
when there was plenty of more nutritious material available, and subsequently 
showing symptoms of drunkenness, staggering and becoming reckless of their own 
safety as they climbed. 
Marais proposes that the baboons desire to become intoxicated, and attributes 
this desire in them and in humans to what he calls `the pain of consciousness' 
(Marais 1969: 117). He believed that apes and monkeys have a level of awareness 
which is intermediate between ours and that of the lower animals, and that this 
awareness (I hesitate to say `self -awareness') is at times so oppressive that they, like 
ourselves, wish to put a stop to it, at least temporarily. One suspects that the 
circumstances of his own life, which was brought to a premature end by an overdose 
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of morphine, coloured his attitude to awareness, but that he was right in attributing to 
higher primates a capacity for bewilderment, sadness and depression. 
Precursors of religious elements among the australopithecines 
Australopithecine behaviour 
On the basis of the evidence detailed above, here are some speculations about 
salient characteristics of the early hominins, which are represented in the fossil 
record by the creatures which we may broadly call the australopithecines, from 
Orrorin or Ardipithecus onward. 
They were approximately the size of a chimpanzee. They walked upright and 
travelled considerable distances on the ground but were almost equally at home in 
the trees, to which they probably retreated for safety when large carnivores 
approached. They may have used sticks and stones as tools, but did not yet make 
stone tools, as chipped stone tools are not known until more than two million years 
after the lineages of hominins and chimpanzees split up. In fact, it seems likely that 
tool use has been invented separately by hominins and chimpanzees. They probably 
lived in communities. Early hominins show considerable sexual dimorphism: males 
were bigger and stronger than females. It may be that adult males defended the 
community from predators and from males of other communities or tribes. They 
could not speak. 
Early hominins probably formed affectionate bonds between mothers and 
offspring and between siblings, which may have lasted for life. They groomed, 
embraced and kissed, and were excited on meeting again after an absence. In their 
multi -male, multi- female communities, sexual activity was not restricted to alpha 
males. It may be that chimpanzees have separately developed the consortship, in 
which a male and female travel together apart from the rest (Goodall 1986: 453 -465, 
481 -482), but some similar practices may have come into being at times among 
hominins. They may have helped each other in adversity, but there was probably a 
great deal of intra- community violence, mostly perpetrated by adult males. They ate 
fruits and other vegetation, probably digging up roots and grubs with sticks. They 
hunted animals smaller than themselves, probably setting out deliberately in 
cooperative bands, signalling to one another by gesture. They shared food with 
Chapter 6 127 
varying degrees of willingness. They threw sticks and stones to ward off snakes and 
other predators. 
They expected others to reciprocate help and support. In the family and in 
hunting bands they counted on each other's help against outsiders. Yet in relations 
between individuals they guessed each other's intentions and deceived each other for 
personal advantage in feeding and mating. 
When a family member was sick, others in the family were solicitous. When 
a mother died, the offspring, especially those still infants or juveniles, became 
depressed; some pined away and died. When a child died, the mother became 
depressed and bewildered. 
Those not in the family were curious and yet repelled by the sick and dying. 
They shunned the sick, disturbed by the strangeness of a community member who 
did not behave normally, and sometimes they reacted with threats and violence if the 
sick member approached. When a community member died, others were frightened 
by the strange inanimacy of the corpse. They came near to the body, and sometimes 
carried out threat displays, kicking it, prodding it with a stick, jumping round it, 
always afraid that it might suddenly come back to life, leap up and attack them. 
In the forest, noises which might be caused by predators or an approaching 
band from a hostile community frightened them. They were in a state of alert when 
near the borders of their range and approaching unfamiliar territory, where strangers 
might suddenly appear. Noisy natural phenomena such as thunder, waterfalls and 
heavy rain frightened them and they reacted by performing threat displays. In these 
cases, as there was no tangible or manageable object, the displays were longer on 
wild, expansive gestures and shorter on practical blows than if directed at another 
hominin or animal. 
On open ridges and in forest clearings, noticing the dimming of the sky, they 
became subdued and experienced another moment of that uneasy bewilderment 
which touched them on the death of one of their fellows. When they felt sick, they 
ate plant material which purged the system or counteracted the infection or 
infestation. The toxins in some plants produced a temporary bewilderment of a more 
liberating nature. 
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Precursors of elements of religion 
In the behaviour of our remote ancestors, if it resembled my sketch above, we 
see what I believe, with Goodall (1986: 386), to be the precursors of love. 
compassion, charity and community spirit. These are all components of human life 
and especially of the religious life in some of its manifestations. However, I intend to 
concentrate on those behaviours which bear directly upon the supernatural. 
In the behaviour of our ancestors, and indeed in chimpanzees, we do not see 
elements of religion, but I think we do see the precursors of certain religious 
elements. 
One precursor is the display behaviour round a corpse and in face of natural 
phenomena. Normally, aggressive displays are directed at conspecifics or against 
predators, so as to provoke a submission or flight reaction from the other. In the case 
of corpses and natural phenomena, the display behaviour is directed at an object 
which does not recognize or react to it. The displays may continue at some length, 
perhaps because, in the absence of a reaction or response, it is difficult to know when 
to stop. As far as threatening the inert object is concerned, from our vantage we can 
tell that the behaviour is futile. As far as the unknowing subject is concerned, it may 
not be futile. And the display behaviour may be helpful to the subject by defusing the 
tension and fear created by the predicament. In these objectively futile activities, I 
suggest, we see a precursor of apotropaic ritual. 
Religious ritual is tied to a belief in an agent towards whom the ritual actions 
may be directed. However, some rituals and ceremonies in human society are carried 
out principally, solely or even explicitly for the benefit of or to fulfil the expectations 
of the participants and observers. Such an objective renders these rituals and 
ceremonies primarily or entirely social rather than religious phenomena. The singing 
of national anthems at the beginning of an international football match and the 
swearing in of the President of the United States are social, not religious, ceremonies. 
In the chimpanzee cases considered above, the display or pre- ritual behaviour 
is not carried out either for fun or with intent to fulfil the expectations of other 
chimpanzees, but is clearly directed at objects other than the chimpanzees 
participating or observing. Those objects, while physical and visible in the cases 
considered, may be replaced in genuinely religious ritual by putative supernatural 
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agents: beings which are thought to receive or recognize and respond to ritual actions 
directed towards them. In later chapters I deal with the origins of two kinds of such 
supernatural beings, but I do not attempt any further discussion of ritual itself in this 
work. 
I intend from now on to concentrate on three elements of religion concerned 
with belief in the supernatural. In the behaviour of chimpanzees we see at least three 
precursors of religious elements concerned with supernatural belief These precursors 
would have been present in the lives of the australopithecines. One precursor is the 
interpretation of certain natural phenomena as indications of threat from another 
personal or animal agency: this is the precursor of the religious element which I call 
animalism. Another precursor is the sense of strangeness associated with death: this 
contributes to the religious element which I call animism. A third precursor is the 
eating of vegetable material, the intoxication from which may induce a sense of 
detachment from the everyday world: such intoxication is, I contend, a precursor of 
the religious element of belief in another world. 
These three precursors form the bases from which, as I hope to show, three 
fundamental religious elements could have developed in prehistory. In the next four 
chapters, I shall try to explicate how those developments would have occurred. 
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CHAPTER 7 
ANIMATISM: NUMINA, DAEMONS 
A spirit being, with reference to Tylor (1871, II: 108), is supposed to be a 
more or less self -aware entity which generally is invisible, may move around or may 
more or less permanently be associated with, be located in, inhabit or control what 
we call inanimate objects, as well as places and natural phenomena. Spirit beings are 
taken to be supernatural agencies which cause events to happen in the physical 
world: storms, disease, strange noises or shadows. They are not seen as the only 
cause of such phenomena, but they are sometimes put forward as a possible cause. 
By `spirit beings', a term often used by researchers of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, I do not mean souls, spirits of the dead or soul -like spirits, 
but, rather, non -human personalities of inanimate objects, places and phenomena: 
what Otto calls numina or daemons. These may be, but are not necessarily, demons 
(evil spirits). 
While I propose that any given religion is made up of a collection of 
elements, some of which could be absent without the remnant ceasing to constitute a 
religion, the belief in spirit beings is certainly a major element. In discussing whether 
there are any societies without religion, Tylor feels able to sideline elements such as 
the belief in a supreme deity, judgement after death, the adoration of idols and the 
practice of sacrifice, but makes the belief in spirit beings the minimum definition of 
religion. On this basis there are no recorded human societies without religion (Tylor 
1871, I: 424). 
The subject of animatism, usually called `animism', has been rediscovered by 
anthropology in the 1990s, and a major contribution to study of its origin has been 
made by Guthrie (1993). Other writers mostly treat it as a timeless phenomenon to be 
analysed. The distinction which I make below between animism (the attribution of 
souls to humans and creatures in general) and animatism (the attribution of 
personality to non -human objects and phenomena) is usually not made. 
Observing that many non- western cultures commonly attribute human 
dispositions and behaviours to non -human objects, Descola (1996: 82, 89, 94 -95) 
says that `animism ... conceptualizes a continuity between humans and non -humans 
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which it can produce only metaphorically, in the symbolic metamorphoses generated 
by rituals'. He contrasts animism with totemism. In this context, totemism appears to 
be a special case of animism in which animals are taken to be human kin (c f. Knight 
and Powers 1998: 129). Pedersen (2001) analyses the applicability of such concepts 
to North Asian societies. North Asian `animism' is not so much concerned with non- 
human souls as with the `perception of a potential interior spiritual quality in things'. 
Thus he distinguishes what I call animism from animalism. `Animism' and 
` totemism' identify different ontological principles through which the peoples of 
North North Asia (animists) and South North Asia (totemists) organize their 
societies of humans and non -humans (Pedersen 2001: 413 -414). 
In a highly interpretative article, Viveiros de Castro (1998) expounds 
perspectivism. According to his analysis of native Amazonian cultures, animals and 
some other creatures are treated as having a point of view, as being subjects, not 
mere objects of our perception. They possess `the capacities of conscious 
intentionality and agency' characteristic of humans. These capacities are `objectified 
as soul or spirit'. As subjects, animals have their own perspective. From their 
perspective, they are people. Thus, `animism is not a projection of substantive human 
qualities cast onto animals, but rather expresses the logical equivalent of the reflexive 
relations that humans and animals each have to themselves: salmon are to (see) 
salmon as humans are to (see) humans, namely (as) humans.' For instance, what to 
us is blood is maize beer to the jaguar; to a tapir a waterhole is a ceremonial house 
(Viveiros de Castro 1998: 469, 476 -478). 
While recent work such as the above elucidates some aspects of animism and 
animatism, for a theory of origins I make use of Marett (1914) and Guthrie (1993). 
Following Marett, I argue that the origin of the belief in spirit beings - that is, 
numina - is distinct from, earlier than and not dependent upon the belief in souls. I 
also argue, following Guthrie, that belief in spirit beings is the result of a natural 
tendency of humans and the lower animals to approach the world as if objects in it 
are intentional agents, and that in evolutionary terms this approach is selectively 
advantageous. The human tendency to anthropomorphism has long been recognized. 
What is new in Guthrie's treatment, I believe, is (1) the connection of treating 
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inanimate objects as if they have personalities to the anthropomorphic tendency; and 
(2) the explanation of this tendency in terms of selective advantage in prehistory. 
I further argue that the peculiar fear of the uncanny associated with numina or 
spirit beings can be accounted for by specific neural processes induced in the subject 
by a mistaken perception of a personal agent in the inanimate environment. 
Belief in spirit beings is neither the whole of religion nor the basis from 
which all the rest of religion springs, but I think it is a fundamental category, from 
which some other religious categories do spring. Belief in spirit beings is also, I 
should think, not a necessary category: that is, one without which any collection of 
remaining categories would not constitute a religion. However, whether it is a 
necessary category is, I think, not material to discussion of its origin. It is only with 
origins that I am concerned here. 
Souls versus numina 
To begin with Tylor, consider his account of how the idea arose that animals 
and what we call inanimate objects possessed spirits similar to the souls of human 
beings (1871, II: 109 -111). Early humans interpreted the world according to their 
understanding of themselves, and according to that understanding they possessed 
souls, a conclusion they had already arrived at by the thinking to be described in 
Chapter 8. The `rude men of old days', savage philosophers, exercised their reason 
and their imagination to people their vicinity and the world at large with phantoms or 
spirits. What motivated them to this conclusion was the reasonable inference that 
effects are due to causes; the spirit beings are personified causes of events in the 
world at large, events not attributable to the action of humans themselves. Just as the 
actions of everyday life were caused by a person's own soul, so the events of the 
outside world, whether to the advantage or disadvantage of humans, were held to be 
caused by external soul -like beings inhabiting objects in the environment. In the 
chapters following the synopsis of the account, Tylor gives copious examples which 
show the similarity of nature, presumed appearance and behaviour between the souls 
of humans and non -human spirits. 
It seems likely that early people who had sufficient leisure and interest and 
were capable of excogitating the notion of a soul would be able to carry out a further 
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process of speculation to arrive at the conclusion that soul -like spirits exist in the 
world at large. So far, I think Tylor has given us a credible account of the origin of 
the concept of soul -like spirits which inhabit non -human creatures and objects and 
cause events. 
We would have to date the idea of soul -like spirits to a time later than that at 
which the concept of soul itself came into being. It need not have been very much 
later on the timescale of human evolution, but perhaps several generations or even 
thousands of years later. 
As with soul, objections have been raised to Tylor's theory of the origin of 
the concept of spirit beings. It seems to me that some of those objections are valid. 
He himself says that a spirit being is a personified cause of events (1871, II: 108). 
This would seem to be an idea distinct from, and more primitive than, that of a soul - 
like spirit. I think Tylor was probably right that the idea of soul -like spirit arose as 
described above, but I suggest that humans, and indeed prehumans, already had a 
rudimentary notion of a spirit being, a numen, which dated from ages before. 
Supernatural beings, spirit beings and others 
It is almost, if not quite, a defining characteristic of a supernatural being of 
any kind that it is invisible, only intermittently visible, or visible only under special 
conditions, such as in the contrived environment of a darkened room or in altered 
states of consciousness. In contrast, ordinary non -supernatural beings are readily 
seen. If a dog is present and not hidden, then in daylight or artificial light sufficient 
for us to see our surroundings, we are guaranteed to see the dog. If a spirit being is 
supposed to be present, then no conditions can be specified under which it is 
guaranteed that it will be seen. It is always liable to be hidden or to depart when we 
try to look at it. No doubt there are some parallels here with experiments in physical 
science, which do not always go according to plan. In contrast to chemical 
substances, however, we may be told by an expert, such as a medicine man, that a 
spirit being has chosen not to appear to us. 
Science knows of no creature extant today with a human or superhuman 
degree of mentality, with insight, theory of mind, cunning, ambition, interpretative 
and decision -making skills and ability to communicate comparable to that of 
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humans. As discussed in Chapter 6, the nearest thing to such a being is the 
chimpanzee. In contrast, the supernaturalist view populates the world with all manner 
of non -human beings which can think and be motivated like humans (cf Boyer 2000: 
201 -202, 207). 
Supernatural beings include gods, angels, demons, ghosts, fairies, elves, 
dwarves, trolls, giants, dragons, and malevolent subhuman animals such as cats in 
the role of witches' familiars, which appear to have a greater understanding of 
human affairs than normal animals of their kind. Some of these beings are spiritual or 
soul -like, such as demons. Others, like dragons, giants and trolls, and perhaps elves, 
are material like us, but by virtue of their size, physiology or superhuman powers are 
not Homo sapiens. Not only are those material beings not of the same species as 
ourselves, but, rather interestingly, the physiologies of those various beings are so 
different one from another that one would have to classify them as belonging to 
several different genera or even families, let alone species. Yet some are so similar to 
us in terms of their physiognomy and mode of locomotion, like dwarves and perhaps 
elves, that they would have to share a more recent ancestry with us than the apes, and 
form a branch of the subfamily Homininae. 
However different in their substantial nature, all these beings, spiritual and 
material alike, share a mentality. They can choose, plan, deceive, anticipate, serve, 
love, hate, have a sense of honour and sometimes humour, and are motivated by 
wishes and ambitions which we can observe and empathize with in ourselves and our 
fellow humans. They can sometimes be outwitted; for example, an evil spirit can be 
intercepted coming along a path rather than through the bush (Parrinder 1954: 115). 
Whatever their physiology and genealogy, all these supernatural beings possess 
human -like minds, and most of them can communicate using human -like language. 
In those respects, they are unlike every non -human creature known to biology. 
Moreover, all these beings are postulated to possess, at least in some circumstances, 
a power which they can use at will to harm or help us and which is of a magnitude 
that we ignore at our peril. 
Animatism 
Marett (1914: 6) states that animism is `a more or less definite creed or body 
of ideas'. I shall try to make clear in Chapter 8 that, in its infancy, animism, the 
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belief in souls, must have been a collection of vague ideas regarding the images of 
absent people, and that those ideas were extended, possibly over many generations, 
to include souls of other creatures and spirits inhabiting other objects. It would 
certainly not initially have been a system or have been capable of expression or 
explanation in the form of a creed. Even so, I am persuaded that the belief that there 
is a separable conscious entity inhabiting bodies is, however dim initially, a product 
of intellect. Marett was right, I think, to look for the much more `dim heart- stirrings 
and fancies' which should have preceded animism, and which he calls animatism 
(1914: 14). 
Animalism is the attribution of mere personality to objects, processes or 
locations, so that one acts as if beings are there which are potentially aware of one's 
presence and as if one could relate to those beings rather as one person to another. 
The personality is not initially regarded as a soul or soul -like spirit. If the 
phenomenon is a delimitable physical object such as a stone, then the personality 
may be regarded as an intrinsic attribute of the phenomenon itself. If the 
phenomenon is a location, then the personality may be regarded as an unseen being 
inhabiting it. If it is a natural process such as a storm, then either view may apply. 
Marett's chief ethnographic examples of animatism are as follows. In South 
Africa, when a thunderstorm approaches, the inhabitants of a village, led by the 
witch doctor, may rush to the nearest hill and shout to divert the storm. In the Arctic, 
knives are brandished and dirt thrown at the Aurora Borealis to drive it away. Stones 
in the form of solitary pillars, a meteorite, a pebble in the shape of an animal are 
likely to be attributed powers. A tribe in Hawaii differentiated their sacred stones 
into male and female, and believed that little stones sometimes appeared beside the 
big ones (Marett 1914: 14, 18). 
According to Marett, the more startling manifestations of nature produce in 
man an awe which he takes to be religious. It is not merely the attribution of 
personality to non -human phenomena but also the fear of the unknown that creates 
the specifically religious mood (Marett 1914: 13, 14; cf. Karsten 1935: 27). 
The parallel between Marett's tribesmen shouting at the thunderstorm to 
drive it away and Goodall's chimpanzees excited by the thunderstorm and apparently 
performing threat behaviour, as related in Chapter 6, will be evident. 
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Bird -David cites conservation, if not veneration, of stones by the Nayaka in 
South India in recent years, where stones were brought into the house by women to 
live with the family. In her account, the stones do not appear to be inhabited by 
spirits, but the women relate to them. According to her, the reason why the Nayaka 
maintain social relationships with non -human beings is not because they consider 
them persons a priori' (prima facie ?), as she says Tylor held. Rather, they constitute 
those other beings as persons `as and when and because' they engage in those 
relationships (Bird -David 1999: S73 -S74). In other words, the attitude of being in 
relationship to other beings, or of being ready to take on relationships with other 
beings, is prior to the decision that other beings are persons. 
Bird -David (1999: S78) makes a case that the tendency to attribute 
personality to inanimate objects (she uses a verb `animate') is the outcome of 
humans' socially biased cognitive skills, which were selected for in evolution by the 
demands of interpersonal dealings with fellow humans (or hominins), including 
strategic planning and anticipation of action, response and reaction. 
All these are cases of treating non -human objects as if they possessed a 
human personality, a tendency which Tylor himself noted (1871, I: 477). 
Animatizing 
From everyday life as well as from ethnography, it is clear that human beings 
are prone to treat non -human objects as if they were human and to treat inanimate 
objects as if they were animate. Guthrie (1993: 62) calls the former 
anthropomorphizing and the latter animating. To refer to both or to either 
indiscriminately, I shall use the term `animatizing'. Animatism is the religious or 
supernaturalist view that the world contains non -human objects with human -like 
personality. I shall argue that animatism arises from the human propensity to 
animatize. 
Darwin notes `a tendency in savages to imagine that natural objects and 
agencies are animated by spiritual or living essences'. Evidence of this tendency in 
lower animals seems to be shown by an incident with his dog. An open parasol, 
which the dog would have disregarded if anyone had been near it, was occasionally 
stirred by a breeze; every time the parasol moved, the dog growled and barked. 
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Darwin suggests that the dog must have `reasoned to himself in a rapid and 
unconscious manner that movement without any apparent cause indicated the 
presence of some strange living agent' (Darwin 1871: 469). 
Examples of animatizing 
Anthropomorphism 
In everyday life, we constantly see human shapes and faces and human 
influence. I recall once looking out of a window at night and seeing an old woman in 
a black cloak crouched down behind the house. The edges of the hood of her cloak 
waved in the wind and she seemed to be shaking her head, as if grieving for someone 
lost. On closer inspection, she turned out to be a black plastic rubbish sack; the top 
had been tied and the edges above the tie waved in the wind. 
Until we get close, the headrests of car seats look like the heads of people 
sitting in the car. A taxi driver pulls up to a mail box thinking it is a potential 
passenger. A jogger sees street furniture in the distance as other people. When we 
hear a door slam in another part of the house or a branch tapping at a window, we 
assume at first that it may be a person, perhaps an intruder. An ornithologist in New 
Guinea assumed that a black figure which he glimpsed behind him from time to time 
was human, before seeing it clearly, whereupon it turned out to be a bird following 
him to catch insects (Guthrie 1993: 92 -93). 
In art and advertising, anthropomorphism is widely used to attract attention. 
Products are given human faces; the vaguely human shapes of some objects, such as 
Coca Cola bottles, are exaggerated in depictions. 
The reader is referred to Guthrie (1993) for more instances and for references. 
Animating 
A common -sense but reflective view of the world recognizes that some 
objects are animate and some are inanimate. For practical everyday purposes, only 
humans and animals of small insect size and above count as animate, while plants 
count as inanimate. There are microsocopic animals, of course, but they do not count 
for practical, everyday purposes. If we are concerned with the origins of religion, 
then only objects visible to the naked eye, such as prehistoric people and prehumans 
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could have been aware of, are significant. We, and other animals, often mistake 
inanimate objects for animate ones. We rarely mistake animate for inanimate objects. 
A jogger sees a bear crouching in the distance; on getting closer, he discovers 
it is a boulder (Guthrie 1993: 45). Out of the corner of my eye I once noticed a grey 
mouse in a corner of the kitchen floor; on looking straight at it, I saw it was a piece 
of fluff from the tumble drier. 
Some animals have evolved camouflage which allows them to appear 
inanimate and so evade detection by predators. A coyote coloured like the landscape 
may disappear when it stands still. Insects may look like twigs, leaves or even water 
droplets. A bird which detects and eats a twig -mimicking caterpillar then may peck 
at actual twigs as if they are also insects. Cats, especially kittens, are distracted by 
leaves and small moving objects which resemble their natural prey. Motion 
especially is treated by animals as a sign of possible animacy (Guthrie 1993: 48 -51). 
Again, the reader is directed to Guthrie (1993) for further examples and 
references. 
Reasons for animatizing 
Inadequate explanations 
From the above, I take it as given that human beings and other animals are 
prone to animate and anthropomorphize. Some reasons which have been offered to 
explain the animatizing tendency are discussed. 
Piaget attributes the tendency, among children and some primitives, to a lack 
of differentiation between self and other, so that we see humanity in the world at 
large. However, later authorities deny that there is confusion between self and other 
even in infancy, and others state that any continuing undifferentiation in functioning 
adults is very unlikely (Guthrie 1993: 40, 80). 
Another explanation is that wishful thinking induces us to see people where 
there are none. We are innately attracted to seek social relations with other people. 
Social contact is a deep human need. As a result, we wishfully populate our 
surroundings with human -like beings. See also the discussion in Appendix 7A on the 
objections of Bird -David regarding `socially biased cognitive skills'. In fact, 
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however, we anthropomorphize whether or not we seek company. Interpretation of a 
shadow as someone about to attack us is not an expression of a desire for company. 
Moreover, many of the quasi -human beings which religion postulates are anything 
but desirable companions. In fact, the demonic beings postulated by some tribal 
religions and by developed religions such as Christianity and Islam in the Middle 
Ages are frightening and can hardly be the product of wishful thinking (Guthrie 
1993: 41, 64, 72, 77 -78). 
The proposed explanation 
We and other animals animatize, in the sense of animating, because we need 
to spot other living creatures in our environment. Other living creatures may be 
predators or prey. It is important to evade predators and detect prey. Spotting either 
is not a matter of wishful thinking: To survive, we humans and other animals must be 
aware of other living creatures around us, whether they attract us or frighten us. 
All perception involves interpretation. The environment is not given to us; we 
unconsciously filter the stream of data coming from our senses to create our own 
picture of what is relevant. The filtering is inbuilt. It is a matter of pattern 
recognition. We filter so as to perceive what matters: in particular, we notice 
movement and signs of other creatures in the vicinity (Guthrie 1993: passim, but 
especially 64, 77, 121). 
Generation by generation our senses have been developed by natural 
selection to serve this function of detecting predators and prey. Creatures which are 
less able than others to detect predators or prey end up being eaten or starving before 
they can reproduce. Their genes for inadequate perception are thereby eliminated 
from the gene pool. Thus all surviving creatures tend to animate constantly. 
Our perceptions, our interpretations, are not always accurate. Sometimes we 
overestimate the degree of organization in the environment and think we detect a 
creature where there is none. Aware of animal mimicry, we may mistake inanimate 
objects for animate ones. Movement may be interpreted as a sign of a living creature, 
when in fact it is caused by a non -living agency. For survival, it is better to err this 
way, on the side of being too sensitive, than to be insufficiently alert. Animals from 
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frogs to people employ this strategy. The occasional mistake of overestimating what 
is present is a cost incurred by any creature which perceives (Guthrie 1993: 47, 61). 
What has been said about the need to animate applies a fortiori to 
anthropomorphizing. 
When we say that a perception is anthropomorphic, all this means is that we 
thought someone was there when they were not; we assigned more organization to 
the environment than was actually present. This does not mean that the perception is 
irrational. Anthropomorphism is not an irrational approach to the environment; it is a 
perceptual strategy which promotes the safety of the creature which 
anthropomorphizes. Sometimes we get it wrong. We do not know that we get it 
wrong until after the event. Sometimes perhaps we get it wrong and never discover 
that we got it wrong. 
Human beings are the most interesting and attractive creatures we know, and 
also the most dangerous. It is important to be aware of any human beings in our 
vicinity. If they are friendly we shall wish to have their company, and if they are 
hostile we shall need to know what they are up to. 
Our predisposition to perceive other human beings is motivated not just by 
the need for company of other creatures of our own kind, but also by fear. Sometimes 
we wish to look out for other human beings so as to avoid them, especially if we are 
weaker and in a compromising position: for instance, stealing food or reconnoitring 
the territory of another group. 
Anthropomorphism is `an attempt to see not what we want to see or what it is 
easy to see, but what it is important to see'. Human beings are the most highly 
complex, most fascinating and most powerful organisms we know. We have more 
intense and highly dependent relations with others of our own kind than with any 
other beings. For these reasons we have evolved an acute disposition to perceive, or 
an acute disposition not to miss, signs of human presence or activity in our 
environment (Guthrie 1993: passim, but especially 64, 74, 82 -83). 
Our disposition is innate, and shared mutatis mutandis with other primates. 
For all primates, the face is the most significant aspect of the creature; it may show 
intention, friendliness or hostility. It is the most important part of the animal to 
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recognize, the most important to separate from the background. Monkeys, even 
young monkeys which have been raised without meeting other monkeys, distinguish 
monkey faces from others. Human babies soon recognize human faces (Guthrie 
1993: 89, 104). Human beings appear to have specific neural circuits devoted to 
recognition of people. Those circuits are impaired in prosopagnosia (`face 
blindness'). One farmer who suffered from this condition after brain injury was 
unable to recognize people but still able to distinguish every one of his flock of 
sheep. Such a case indicates that in humans those circuits specifically function for 
recognition of our own kind (Carter 1998: 119 -121). Facial recognition is a function 
of temporal -lobe structures (Beaton and Aggleton 2000: 499 -501; Persinger 1993: 
919). 
Significance 
I believe Guthrie has demonstrated the origin of animatizing, both 
anthropomorphism and animating, as an unconscious perceptual strategy promoted in 
all animals by natural selection. However, without always distinguishing the two 
concepts, he also gives reasons why the animatizing tendency should survive in a 
creature which begins to reflect on the world around it. 
Because human beings are the most complex creatures we know, human 
agency offers great explanatory power. An organism is more significant than 
inorganic matter, an animal is more significant than a plant, and a human being is the 
most significant of all. If we seek meaning in our environment, reasons why things 
are as they are, then the presence of human beings would supply that meaning. 
Human beings are capable of many more varied kinds of action and of causing many 
more types of effect than any other creature we know. Explanatory or interpretative 
models of our environment based on human or human -like agency therefore account 
for the widest possible range of phenomena. Human or human -like agency provides 
our most powerful model for explaining the world around us. The model of human or 
human -like agency is promoted unconsciously by our disposition to 
anthropomorphize, but, to one seeking understanding of his or her environment, it is 
also reasonable, because it has great explanatory power (Guthrie 1993: passim, esp. 
64, 77 -78, 89 -90, 102, 121, 189; Boyer 2000: 203, 210). 
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The remaining problem is the transition from the concept of human agency in 
the world to the additional concept of human -like personal agency. That is what I 
seek to deal with next. 
Human -like personal agencies: numina 
I suggest that the religious dimension arises from mistaken perceptions as 
described above because the perceptions themselves are on some occasions so 
convincing. In certain circumstances, the sense of a personal presence in a 
phenomenon may be so strong that the experient is unable to accept that no personal 
being is present, although he or she may recognize that no human being is present. 
Consider a hominin approaching a shady grove where a spring trickles from a 
gap in a rock face above. From a few metres away, the leafy flicker of sunshine and 
shade combined with the irregular bubbling of the spring induce a sense that 
someone is moving to and fro and that a voice is speaking. The hominin waits for 
some time, listening to the putative voice from the stream and watching the 
movements of the shadows. The period of still attentiveness convinces him or her 
more and more that a stranger is there. On coming closer, the hominin discovers that 
the place is empty of other hominins, but the conviction of a sentient presence has by 
this time been strongly impressed. The hominin concludes that someone may indeed 
be there, but someone not human, and evidently not an animal either, someone who 
remains concealed. The process of drawing this conclusion is not one of conscious, 
explicit deduction involving predetermined categories of `human', `animal' and 
`person neither human nor animal', but rather the dawning of a notion in the light of 
the given perceptions. The notion is of the possibility of a numen. 
Numinousness and the origin of numina 
The question to be dealt with is this: why should the mistaken perception of 
something human or human -like give rise to specifically religious feeling? 
Marett characterizes religious sense or instinct as composed of several 
`moments': fear, admiration, wonder, awe, and even love. These arise from the 
unknown, in the sense that the subject's power of natural explanation is inadequate 
to account for the phenomenon (Marett 1914: 10 -11). He suggests that this emotion 
of awe and wonder promotes the impulse to personify the mysterious object, 
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whereas, on the basis of Guthrie's proposal, it appears to me that the perception and 
the act of personification is prior to, not subsequent to, the feeling. 
Karsten (1935: 25) states that, for primitive people, the supernatural generally 
enters into or coincides with nature. The mystery arises from the subject's inability to 
grasp the nature and connection of things, an ignorance of natural law. What is 
`divine' is always something mysterious which awakens sentiments of admiration, 
fear and awe, but need not be identical with the sublime or a power elevated above 
nature. In other words, the numinous need not have the character of sublime 
venerability but does involve fear of the unknown. 
This is the justification for referring to the putative personalities or conscious 
agencies associated with certain phenomena as numina. Otto gives a number of 
`moments' which compose the numinous sentiment in various contexts. In dealing 
with primordial religion, given the evidence of primitive religions, I think we can 
dispense with such moments as reverence and self -abasement. The numinous feeling 
which we have to deal with is, I believe, principally fear; and, in contrast to `natural' 
fear, it contains the moment of the uncanny. In this respect, I think Otto was 
probably correct that there is a sentiment peculiar to religion or the supernatural 
(Chapter 3). It may be that William James and others are insufficiently precise as to 
the moments composing the emotions which they claim to be common to many 
departments of life. 
In a scientifically literate society, we do not run out to remonstrate with a 
thunderstorm. This is because we know, at least vaguely, that there is an explanation 
of the phenomenon in terms of impersonal forces on which we can have no effect by 
merely shouting. The same applies to all the other natural phenomena, volcanoes, 
strange trees, waterfalls, hot springs, caves and the like, with which numina have 
been associated by our predecessors. We may still be afraid of the phenomenon: for 
example, we could be struck by lightning; inside a cave there could be a wild animal, 
or the floor might fall away in a hidden sheer drop. But now the fear is of the known 
or of known possibilities. We do not assume that there is some conscious being 
whose whims we have to take into account in deciding a course of action. 
If we went into a cave and a bear suddenly appeared, we would be faced with 
a conscious agency, a personality of sorts, whose whims would have to be taken into 
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account. The fear would be real enough, but there would be no sense of the uncanny. 
What prevents a sense of the uncanny is, I suggest, that we can see the bear. Seeing 
it, we can deal with it, probably by running away. 
If in the cave there were odd bear -like sounds but no sight of their source, 
then it is likely that we should be led to experience a sense of the uncanny. The 
invisibility of the putative object of fear, and a consequent inability to deal with the 
object causes fear to continue. We cannot ignore the possibility of a sentient being, 
because of inconsistency in the evidence which we cannot tolerate: some signs but 
not the others which should accompany them and make sense of them. For instance, 
if we heard bear -like sounds as a sign of a bear's presence, but inconsistently there 
were no other signs such as a sight or touch or breath of the bear, or disturbance of 
the surroundings such as rocks being rolled aside, then I think we would be led to 
have an uncanny experience. 
Recall that human beings and other animals animatize, and we do so because 
it is important to be aware of predators, prey and members of our own kind in our 
surroundings. Of those three, the most important to detect are predators or, for 
humans, our conspecifics: either of those represent danger. Whether it is veridical or 
mistaken, a perception of something which may represent danger results in emotions. 
Guthrie argues that `emotions are compound states of mind and body that include 
perceptions of situations'. It seems that perception, whether conscious or 
preconscious (Chapter 4), is prior to or accompanied by the associated emotion 
(Lazarus 1984; Zajonc 1984: 118 -119, 121 -122), and the emotion in question is fear. 
In our long prehistory as hominins, we first had an ape -like way of life and 
later were hunter -gatherers. Throughout this time we had to be alert to possible 
dangers in our environment. As hominins, humans or prehumans, when we perceive 
signs of danger, we prepare for action, which takes the form of fight or flight. 
Adrenalin flows, our state of alertness is enhanced. We thrill with the anticipation of 
seeing a predator or assailant at any moment. If the danger then appears in the form 
of a person or animal, we deal with it by fighting or fleeing, thereby utilizing and 
discharging the energy of the state of alertness which our body has assumed. 
What if we have a sense that something or someone is there, but the danger 
does not appear? In the heightened state of alertness, we are unwilling to accept that 
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nothing sentient is there. Our pounding heart, our strained breathing and our very 
hormones do not allow us to stand down from alert. So we continue to act as if a 
danger is there, but it is invisible. Our alertness and fear are thwarted of a visible 
object to deal with. Now the ongoing thrill and fear are directed towards an invisible 
object. The ongoing persuasion that there may be a person or creature which has to 
be dealt with, but the inability to see and satisfactorily deal with that putative person 
or creature causes the fear to continue. The mystery continues along with the fear, 
because no being has been satisfactorily apprehended as an object of the fear. 
It may be that the ongoing, undischarged state of alertness itself suffices to 
introduce into the fear the specifically numinous quality discussed in Chapter 3. I 
have hypothesized, in Chapter 5, that this feeling has as its neural substrate a 
particular type of intense activity in particular nuclei of the amygdala. In some cases, 
however, I suggest it is possible that the ongoing fear may stimulate subcortical 
structures in such a way that a specific sensed -presence experience is induced. 
Sense of presence 
In a state of fearful anticipation, as described above, the amygdala and 
hypothalamus are active. The amygdala mediates fear and anxiety, and hypothalamic 
nuclei mediate the state of alertness, connecting with the autonomic nervous system 
and preparing us for fight or flight. While fear and alertness remain undischarged, 
because we have no object to deal with, it is possible that activation of these 
subcortical and brainstem structures reaches a stage which provokes inter- 
hemispheric intercalation (Chapter 5). The right- hemisphere sense of self intrudes 
into left- hemisphere awareness. This experience will be interpreted as confirmation 
that there is a sentient but invisible being in the vicinity. In an extreme case, the 
intrusion may be accompanied by somatosensory data from the right hemisphere, and 
we may even visualize a shadowy humanoid form. This will be interpreted as 
overwhelming confirmation of the presence of a sentient being, something which can 
become visible apparently at its own whim, and something which probably looks 
vaguely or incompletely human. 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, the sense of presence is loaded with 
numinous feeling. If a sensed -presence experience occurs, then to the experient it 
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must seem that not only have we anticipated that something was there, but now we 
have actually encountered it, and it is something uncanny. 
The scenario given above posits fear of the unknown, in places where 
someone could be but is not seen, as the basis from which the experience arises. The 
evoking factor is a form of environmental stress, comparable with some cases from 
the experiments of Wiseman et al. (Chapter 5). The experimental case where a 
subject entered a darkened vault from a brighter passage is particularly comparable 
with the scenario of a primordial person entering a cave or shady grove. 
Equally, it is possible that, in some places, local electromagnetic activity 
arising from geological processes may have directly influenced temporo- limbic 
structures of the human or prehuman brain, so that individuals were induced to 
experience intercalation and a sense of presence, without the prior stage of 
anticipation. While it is not possible to conduct experiments on primordial people, it 
would be possible to investigate localities which have been popularly regarded as 
numinous, either in local folklore or by tribal peoples, and test for unusual 
electromagnetic fields. 
I suggest that, in remote antiquity, evoked by the stress of anticipation or 
directly in certain places, the sense of presence loaded with numinous fear was the 
origin of the idea of local numina or daemons. 
Lightning, storms and winds are not, in the way that caves, waterfalls, trees, 
groves and the like are, places or objects. Even so, the explanation of the numinous 
experience is similar. Again, as primordial humans or prehumans, our propensity to 
animatize leads us to feel that we are in the presence of an angry personality, which 
seems to be intent on frightening and harming us. Again, no recognizable sentient 
agent appears, but we are thrilled and on the alert because of the phenomenon, and 
cannot stand down from the state of alertness. We assume that the danger continues 
to be present, except that the personality is invisible or at any rate not clearly 
recognizable or on a human scale. It is therefore conceivable that ongoing fear of an 
approaching storm, leading to heightened activation of the amygdala and 
hypothalamus, might evoke the sense of a presence. The presence would then be 
identified with the personality of the storm. So we think we are in the presence of a 
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powerful numen. Thus is the belief engendered that large -scale natural processes are 
gods. 
Development 
In situations where we become fearful that something sentient is there, but no 
recognizable creature appears with whom or with which we can straightforwardly 
negotiate, then, if we are led to have a presence experience, we think there is a 
daemon. We think there is some agent which needs to be dealt with, but the agent is 
invisible. Even if it does appear, it may not approach visibly like a normal creature 
but just appear on the spot, and perhaps hazily. It therefore cannot be dealt with 
straightforwardly; it is mysterious. It is uncanny because it is imbued with the 
numinous feeling. 
Consider a cave, grove, waterfall or other geographical feature where we 
have had a numinous experience. It is not just on the first occasion of having such an 
experience in a certain location that the numinous moment occurs. When we revisit 
the scene of a previous numinous encounter, we shall expect the numen to be there 
again. Thus some locations will come to be accepted as the dwellings of daemons. 
On each subsequent visit, the fear will be evoked, and will from the outset have the 
character of the uncanny. When a strong wind buffets us or a storm or lightning 
approaches, we shall imagine that it embodies the same personality as the one which 
previously evoked the sense of presence. We shall think it is the same god. 
No language is necessary to have these experiences and beliefs. Beliefs about 
the existence of numina are not so much thought as felt, and need not be shared. For 
many thousands of years, I suspect, the `belief in daemons and gods - that is, the 
feeling that daemons and gods existed - persisted without ever being spoken about. 
Numinous feelings were re- experienced by individuals in each generation. However, 
when later human beings possessing speech communicated those experiences to 
others of their people, they will have established a folkloric geography of numinous 
places and a folkloric meteorology of numinous aerial phenomena. These will have 
developed into a classificatory ontology of numina. 
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In a rather trite way, Otto's mysterium tremendum et,fascinans is accounted 
for by this proposal. The natural phenomenon is one for which we have no 
explanation, so it is a mystery. We fear it, so it is tremendous. 
Objections 
In Appendix 7A, I deal with some objections to the animatist hypothesis. 
Primordial interpretations of the sensed -presence experience 
Daemons 
I have concentrated above on the fact that the lower animals and ourselves 
have an animatizing tendency. Then I have tried to show how in humans or 
prehumans this could lead to the belief - perhaps better, feeling - that a sentient 
being is associated with an inanimate natural phenomenon, and how this feeling 
could be accompanied by numinous fear. I described how in those circumstances the 
sensed -presence experience may play a part in bringing about or enhancing the 
numinous fear and in confirming for the experient the idea that an invisible sentient 
being is present. In this way, it is suggested, the idea of a daemon or genius loci 
entered the minds of humans or prehumans. 
Demons 
However, in Chapter 3, I discussed modern sensed -presence experiences 
which were more or less spontaneous. In particular, the occurrences in sleep of 
incubus and Old Hag encounters are suffused with numinous fear. Could such 
encounters have played a part in bringing about the idea of supernatural beings? On a 
prima facie basis, it would be incredible if such experiences did not have an effect on 
the ontological beliefs of those who endured them. It seems certain that human or 
prehuman subjects believed supernatural beings of some kind came to them in sleep. 
There is a difference, however, in that the presences encountered in sleep are 
not associated with natural objects, locations or processes. Unless the experient 
habitually has the experience in a particular sleeping place, such as a cave or grove, 
and associates it with that place, the presences will not seem to be genii loci. They 
are probably not going to be interpreted as daemons, in the narrow sense of genii loci 
or minor gods, but they may be interpreted as demons, in the sense of a free -ranging 
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spirit being. It is not that the experient assimilates the experience to a preexisting 
concept of demon, because we are discussing a period when there would have been 
no such concept. On the contrary, the incubus and Old Hag are probably the origin of 
the idea of demons and evil spirits, as has been proposed before. Clodd (1891, quoted 
in Jones 1931: 73) refers to `the nightmare ... to which is largely due the creation of 
the vast army of nocturnal demons that fill the folklore of the world'. 
I do not assert that very early people excogitated the difference between 
daemons and demons and invented a terminology which placed both under the 
category of `supernatural being'. Rather, I am saying that probably they 
distinguished the ideas. They imagined there were supernatural beings: that is, 
invisible or intermittently visible creatures associated with numinous fear. They 
further imagined that some were located in places, objects or processes such as 
weather encountered in the waking state, while others came to them in sleep. It is we 
who choose to give those types distinct names, while I suspect that primordial people 
merely recognized the types. Thousands of years after primordial people knew of 
different types of experience, at some much later stage in prehistory when old people 
sat round the campfire and exchanged ideas, stories might be told which would 
explicitly categorize the types of being. 
Visible frightening presences, as recounted by Hufford and others (Chapter 
3), often appear as humanoid entities, but only rarely represent identifiable living or 
even deceased individuals. These experiences, of incubus and Old Hag, tend to take 
place in anomalous REM sleep. The further issue arises that in dreams people 
sometimes meet other people. Sometimes those whom they meet are alive, and 
sometimes they are dead but appear alive in the dream. Such dreams tend to be 
normal dreams, taking place in true REM sleep, following stage 2 sleep, and are 
usually not frightening, even if the dead are encountered. A normal dream seems to 
occur in different circumstances from the sleeping sensed -presence experience. In the 
next chapter, dreams come into play as part of the explanation of the idea of soul. 
Dating 
The concept of soul and, a fortiori, the concept of a soul -like spirit would 
appear to be the products of conscious reflection, to be discussed in Chapter 8. In 
contrast, the tendency to imagine personality in inanimate objects is not the product 
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of conscious thought but the outcome of an unconscious interpretative perceptual 
strategy. I follow Marett in concluding that animism proper, with its human souls and 
soul -like spirits of other things, is predated by animatism. The tendency to animatize 
predates the Order Primates, let alone the genus Homo. Here we deal with not soul - 
like spirits but numina, personalities of phenomena - personalities of places, things, 
events, human -like personalities of non -human animals and even, for our non -human 
ancestors, ape -like personalities of non -ape phenomena and animal -like personalities 
of non -animal phenomena. We may therefore conjecture that the origin of the 
concept of spirit beings, in the sense of mere numina, could date from a very remote 
period. 
My own suspicion is that animatism is older than the genus Homo. It may be 
that we see a rudimentary animatism, or at least the precursor of animatism, in the 
rain dance of Goodall's chimpanzees and the leaping about at a waterfall by another 
chimpanzee (Chapter 6). 
Animatism for hundreds of millennia must have been unthinking and 
inchoate. For individual humans and prehumans it would have consisted of such 
experiences as a suspicion of shadows, a frisson at the entrance to a darkling cave, 
excitement at the noise and movement of a waterfall, terror and rapture at the sound 
and spectacle of a thunderbolt striking a tree. 
A more organized conception would have to await the development of 
language and the ability for one individual to communicate his or her sensations to 
another. Eventually, communicated experiences would result in a common world 
view within a small tribal community. Such communications between individuals 
would, in the course of tribal history, be dominated by intellectually acute or 
imaginative individuals. Here we are not yet talking about reasoning as such, but 
rather about individuals expressing their own felt reactions, hearing those of others 
and making sense of them, possibly in the form of story. At some stage, a consensus 
might develop and be passed on from one generation to the next. The story would be 
that some phenomena in nature were non -human persons aware of what went on in 
their vicinity. At this stage a recognizable animatism similar to that of some recent 
tribal peoples would have come about. I suspect that such developed animatism 
certainly existed from the outset among the people of the European Upper 
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Palaeolithic, and probably existed among their predecessors of the Eurasian Middle 
Palaeolithic and the African Middle Stone Age. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ANIMISM: GHOSTS, SOULS 
The soul may be described as the animating principle of a human being, 
which is associated with the body in life but may sometimes leave the body in life, to 
return later, and also may survive the death of the body (Tylor 1924, II: 24). In 
contrast, a spirit being or daemon is a more or less self -aware entity which generally 
is not itself seen. It may move around but may inhabit or be responsible for what we 
call inanimate objects, as well as places and natural phenomena. A spirit being is 
capable of interacting with physical objects and with human beings. It is a 
personified cause of events (Tylor 1924, II: 108). 
Whereas one thinks of souls as being associated with, usually, living things, 
spirit beings are generally thought of as being more or less independent of visible 
objects and free to roam around. The realm of spirit beings includes everything from 
elves through demons to gods (Tylor 1924, I: 426; II: 110). 
According to Tylor (1924, II: 110), the concept of soul is temporally prior to 
the concept of a spirit being, the latter being derived from the former. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, I follow Marett and disagree with this proposition. 
It would take a book in itself to set about listing and comparing instances of 
the concept of soul from different cultures, and that has in any case been done by 
Tylor and others. In this chapter, I try to present an argument explaining 
naturalistically the origin of the concept of soul, supplementing the original Tylorian 
theory with other evidence, then deal with a number of classic objections from 
Evans -Pritchard, Durkheim and Lang. I then relate souls and animism to spirit beings 
and animatism, which were the subjects of the last chapter, and finally try to place 
the origin of the concept of soul at a given period of prehistory. 
The argument 
Dreams and death 
The essential Tylorian argument concerning the origin of the concept of soul 
runs as follows. I have based my version upon a certain passage in Tylor (1924, I: 
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428) but do not follow his train of thought exactly. I am concerned here to give what 
I believe to be the essence of the argument, not to expound Tylor as such. 
In dreams, relatives and others who have died may appear to the dreamer. 
This phenomenon gives the idea that the dead are in some way still active. Since the 
body is clearly inert or may have been disposed of or destroyed, there must be some 
other part of the dead person that survives. Further, in a dream a person may meet or 
see another person who is alive but elsewhere. Trances and hallucinations, however 
brought about, may produce the same effect as dreams, of seeing an image of 
someone who is elsewhere or who has died. Sometimes a waking person at a distance 
may think they meet or see a person who is in fact alive, perhaps sleeping, elsewhere. 
What people see has the appearance of the body, while the actual body is elsewhere 
or inert or may even no longer exist. All these phenomena give the idea that some 
part of the person, other than the body, is able to move around and act independently. 
Thus is produced the idea of what Tylor initially calls the phantom. 
When someone dies, it is as if something has left the body, namely some 
principle or entity which animated it, enabled it to feel, think and act. When people 
are laid low by disease, it is as if the connection between the body and that animating 
principle becomes more tenuous. Also, when someone is asleep, it is as if the 
animating principle is absent or at least more tenuously connected; because, while 
the person is asleep, although they breathe, they do not interact with their 
surroundings so fully as they do when awake. The animating principle Tylor initially 
calls the life. In my view, the life is not an abstraction but more or less identical with 
the breath, since in sleep breathing may be reduced and in death absent. This is 
discussed further in Appendix 8A in connection with Lang's objections. 
The next step is to identify life and phantom: this entity we call the soul. 
Tylor does not make the point explicit, but it would seem particularly easy to make 
the identification between the phantom of a living person seen by others and the life 
of that person while asleep. Indeed, he reports the case of St Augustine having 
dreamed that he visited a disciple while the disciple, apparently waking, received his 
visit (1924: I, 441). So people have the experience in dreams of visiting places, while 
the body remains inert in the sleeping place, apparently without life. 
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In a series of chapters on animism Tylor gives copious examples to illustrate 
the currency of the idea of soul, in forms more or less as described above, in a 
number of cultures. I offer just one as an instance of what he is talking about, from 
another authority. Among the Bukaua of New Guinea, it was believed that the soul 
leaves the body during sleep and during a fainting spell; when a person awakes, the 
soul has returned; death liberates the soul from the body (Lowie 1948: 59). 
The dream image seems to show the soul apart from the body, so it is what 
Lang calls a separable soul (Lang 1898: 57). The fact that a person who has died 
may be seen again in dreams gives the idea that the soul may survive the body (Tylor 
1924, I: 428 -429). 
Out -of -the -body experience 
In the twentieth century the attention of researchers was drawn to `out- of -the- 
body' experience and the related `near- death' experience. These have been the 
subject of a large number of studies since Tylor's time. Green (1968: 17) defines the 
out -of -the -body or 'ecsomatic' experience as `one in which the objects of perception 
are apparently organized in such a way that the observer seems to himself to be 
observing them from a point of view which is not coincident with his physical body'. 
More succinctly, Blackmore (1982: 9) defines it as `an experience in which one 
seems to perceive the world from a location outside the physical body'. 
Some examples from Blackmore (1982: 40, 48, 49) follow. In one, the 
subject, who had been in bed at night, became aware that he was bouncing against 
the ceiling, and could look down and see himself lying below. Another man suffered 
severe cramp in his legs at night, got out of bed and fell in pain to the floor. Next, he 
saw his wife and daughters trying to lift him up. The conscious part of him was 
looking at his corporeal self on the floor. In another case, a man was given an 
anaesthetic prior to an operation; he felt suddenly torn apart, then calmness followed. 
He saw himself lying on the operating table. He himself was freely floating and 
looking down from above; he could see the wound of the operation and the surgeon 
holding an instrument (cf others among numerous hospital cases, in Green 1968: 24, 
121, 123). 
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Sensations during an out -of -the -body experience are often heightened: 
colours are bright, exaggerated, and hearing may be acute (Green 1968: 72; 
Blackmore 1982: 68). The experience as a whole is often vivid, and the subject may 
feel a much greater degree of intellectual capability, freedom and strength than in 
everyday life. For many subjects the experience is both exhilarating and more real 
than ordinary life (Green 1968: 81 -87). 
In the near -death experience, a person who is seriously ill or undergoing 
surgery recovers later and recalls the sensation of being outside the body. Often 
during this experience the person looks down at his or her body from above. 
Sometimes, when in surgery, the body is seen lying on the operating table. 
Sometimes there is a sensation of leaving this world and travelling down a tunnel, at 
the end of which a bright light streams. Experients may see deceased relatives or 
angels or other religious figures coming to meet them. At some point they may be 
given to understand that they have to return (Blackmore 1982: 138, 147 -148). To 
some degree, what one experiences may be conditioned by the background of the 
subject. For example, Indian subjects saw a higher proportion of religious figures, 
while American subjects saw more visions of the dead (Blackmore 1982: 140). 
Near -death experiences often have a profound effect on the 
who have had them are often changed for life, becoming more religious, more 
disposed toward compassion and service (Blackmore 1982: 149, 150). 
Shiels (1978: 714 -727) maintains that beliefs in out -of -the -body experiences 
occur in a wide range of societies outside modern western culture, including tribal 
societies in Africa, South America and the Far East. A common belief is that the 
double or soul (sometimes one of several types of soul) leaves the body at death, and 
can leave the body also in sleep or dreams. In some cultures it is only shamans' souls 
that are believed to be able to leave the body during life. Strictly, what Shiels brings 
to notice is the cross -cultural belief in the travelling double, already documented by 
Tylor, rather than out -of -the -body experiences as classically described by Green and 
Blackmore. The latter, as noted above, include features such as looking down at 
one's own body, travelling through a tunnel, and the rest. Shiels does not document 
such details or correspondences. However, the experience of shamanic flight is 
clearly, for the subject, an out -of -the -body experience in a generic sense. Equally, the 
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idea of the travelling double clearly implies a belief that a person, or some part of a 
person, can leave the physical body. 
Out -of -the -body experiences are frequently preceded by the physical trauma 
of illness or injury, or by fear. Stressful circumstances reported include illness, war 
injuries, preoperative and postoperative situations, impending accidents and ongoing 
dangers such as falls (Green 1968: 25 -26). 
For the present, I leave aside the question of the reality of the out -of -the -body 
experience. All I am concerned with here is its probable bearing on the origin of the 
concept of soul. 
I have found no evidence in the literature to indicate that out -of -the -body 
experiences should be a recent development in human psychology. If those 
experiences are fairly frequent in modern times and occur in people widely separated 
geographically and culturally, as they do, then they appear to be a common property 
of human mentality. It seems legitimate to accept provisionally that ancient people 
were also subject to those experiences from time to time. 
One can imagine a hunter many millennia ago, severely wounded in the 
course of a hunt or traumatized by a fall from a rock ledge, perhaps close to death, 
becoming unconscious and experiencing sensations of leaving the body and being 
apart from it. Rescued and after recovery, one can imagine him relating the 
experience to his fellow tribesmen. They would testify that his body was present all 
the time, while he would aver that he had been absent. The tribesmen might not find 
the need for an explicit explanation there and then, but an inkling that he or a part of 
him was separable from his body might occur to them, even if the inkling remained 
unspoken. Stories would be told for generations of how he left his body, which might 
be said to have died in the meantime. At a later date, a religious innovator (Radin 
1938: 15ff) would connect this story to other stories about people's dreams, and tell a 
new story about a soul. 
For the subjects reported in the cited references the sensation of being out of 
one's body was impressive and unforgettable. It is hard to think of anything which 
could more forcefully induce or, after it had been induced, corroborate the idea that 
one has a soul or separable consciousness, than the experience of seeing one's body 
from the outside. Out -of -the -body experiences are less common than dreams: most 
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people dream; most people do not have out -of -the -body experiences. Even so, a first- 
hand story about an out -of -the -body experience could be seen as convincingly 
corroborating any ideas about the existence of soul which had already taken root in 
people's minds. Similarly, a first -hand story about a near -death experience would 
strongly encourage belief in personal survival. 
Evidence and objections 
Tylor's theory of the origin of the concept of soul has of course been widely 
criticized, along with his whole approach to anthropology and religion. I do not think 
he is correct that the idea of soul preceded or was the template for the idea of a spirit 
being, which I believe to be a more fundamental concept. However, I think he is 
right about the likely origin of the idea of soul. I shall proceed to show why. 
Evans -Pritchard argues that there is no evidence that the idea of soul arose in 
the manner that Tylor says it did, and that the best that could be done would be to 
show that primitives themselves cite dreams as evidence for the existence of souls. 
This has not been shown, and he is dubious whether it could be shown (Evans - 
Pritchard 1965: 25). 
It is certain, however, that the `primitives' of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries are not the primitives who first came up with the concept of soul (Lang 
1898: 62). Like ourselves in the West, recent traditional Africans, Australians and the 
rest stand at the end of a long lineage of societies possessing religion (cf Lowie 
1948: 125). They are no more the first societies with religion than we are. The 
reasons which recent native informants in those societies might cite for a belief in 
souls would be latter -day rationalizations and, for all we know, might bear little 
connection with the reasons or feelings which motivated the originators of the idea 
many millennia, perhaps tens of millennia, ago. Given this position, it is irrelevant 
whether or not recent tribal informants cite dreams as a reason for believing in souls. 
However, the belief in souls did arise, somehow and at some time. Tylor 
points out that the presence of modern household objects like scissors and matches in 
every village in England does not invalidate the proposition that there was a time 
when none of those things existed. Equally, there was a time when man was in a non- 
religious condition (1924, I: 425). 
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Savage philosophers 
Tylor has been accused of making philosophers of savages. He himself uses 
the phrase `the ancient savage philosophers' (1924, I: 428). He imagines how a 
primitive person might contemplate experiences, as described above, in waking life 
and in dreams, about death and sleep as witnessed in others, and might come to the 
conclusion that people have souls. 
It is claimed that this intellectualist approach attributes too much interest in 
reason and speculation to people living in societies which had to be concerned with 
the essentials of life, seeking food, shelter and reproductive success. Primitive man 
was not a philosopher manqué and was too busy dancing out his religion to think it 
out (Marett 1914: xxxi). Marett here considers theories about reasoning by primitive 
people to be too intellectualist to describe the thought processes of individuals at the 
beginnings of religion. However, it is fair to say that at this point Marett does not 
name Tylor, and here he was concerned not with the soul as such but with spirit 
beings in general, with animism, and with the phase of animatism which he regards 
as its necessary and much more primitive predecessor. 
Primitive people, it has been claimed, besides having no time to spend on talk 
and reflection, are afflicted by `intellectual laziness'. They, being only `weak beings, 
who have so much trouble maintaining life against all the forces which assail it, have 
no means for supporting any luxury in the way of speculation. They do not reflect 
except when they are driven to it' (Durkheim 1915: 58). 
In the first place, although Tylor uses words such as `dogma', `doctrine' and 
`theory' (1924, I: 426, 442) to describe the presumed initial conception of souls, I 
suspect he did not intend us to imagine the primaeval thinkers suddenly crying 
`Eureka' as the concept occurred to them, then sitting with a philosopher's frown by 
the campfire, codifying and elaborating their ideas, and teaching them to the youth of 
the tribe. He says the concept of the human soul was elaborated and extended to 
animals, disembodied spirits and eventually gods (1924, I: 426). But these 
elaborations need not, on the basis of anything Tylor says, have been conceived in 
the same generation or among the same population as those in which the idea of the 
human soul was conceived. That too may have been conceived several times in 
different places by divers human groups, and repeatedly invented by numerous 
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inventors and then forgotten, lost until the next time, unless an inventor did manage 
to discuss and pass on his or her idea. All that the Tylorian theory requires is that a 
vague idea should dawn in the minds of primordial people; that it should be spoken 
of not necessarily the first time round, but eventually, and elaborated perhaps 
generations later into a more detailed story of what the soul is and can do, and 
perhaps thousands of years later still into a comprehensive tradition involving other 
kinds of souls and spirits. 
The criticism of Tylor as being too intellectualist arises, I think, from a 
misapprehension of what his theory requires. Even if the vocabulary with which he 
phrased his argument may give rise to that misapprehension, it is rational not to be 
led astray into an absurdity which it is unlikely that a great scholar would have 
intended. Instead, we can respect his insights and try to use them judiciously to 
rethink what could actually have happened to bring about religion in prehistory. I add 
that here I am concerned only with the origin of the concept of soul, not with the 
later alleged elaborations to spirits and gods. 
In fact, as is well known from more recent ethnography, `savages' can be and 
often are philosophers (Malinowski 1948: 16 -17). They often have time - in some 
cases, more time than we in the West have - in which to talk about and reflect on 
their experiences. A few examples will suffice. In West African traditional societies, 
there are often old men retired from the occupations of the middle part of life, who 
have the leisure to think about and discuss the nature of their world. Further, such old 
men play a major part in transmitting ideas to the next generation (Horton 1993: 56). 
Hunter -gatherers and tribal agriculturalists in Australia, Africa and the Americas 
built up elaborate classifications of plants and animals on which they depended 
(Lévi- Strauss 1962: 35ff). Within their daily routine, clearly there was time to pass 
on these detailed conceptions to new generations. Far from barely subsisting in what 
must be one of the harshest and least promising environments in the world, the San 
of the Kalahari spent much of their time in camp, talking within and across family 
groups. The participants in discussions might be engaged in sedentary tasks, making 
things, or just lying around (Tanaka 1980: 101, 108). In the same study of the San, 
the average length of time spent by men out of the camp per day was found to be 
only 6.29 hours, by women 2.93 hours; some days they were not out of camp at all 
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(Tanaka 1980: 76). Among the !Kung, talking and relating experiences was the main 
source of entertainment, and people sat around for hours talking to one another 
(Marshall 1976: 351 -355; Konner 1976: 249). It is clear that a hunter- gatherer way of 
life does not by any means occupy so much time that people have no opportunity to 
think and talk. 
By the middle of the Upper Palaeolithic in Europe, human beings there had 
reached a level of hunting and gathering subsistence comparable with that of recent 
hunter -gatherer societies such as the Native Americans of the North West Coast 
(Hayden 1993). It is therefore plausible to postulate similar availability of time for 
reasoning and theorizing to individuals among those prehistoric people. It is 
therefore conceivable that they possessed the idea of soul. 
The objection to savage philosophers is dealt with in another way by Stringer 
(1999). In his analysis, Durkheim (1915) and Evans -Pritchard (1965: 25) interpreted 
Tylor as saying that primitive people made a deduction more or less like this: there 
are dreams which show dead people, there are trances in which people appear when 
they are far away, ..., therefore there is something of those people independent of 
the body -a soul. Evans -Pritchard clearly thought it unrealistic to expect primitive 
people to have made such a deduction. Durkheim said, `in order to thrust itself upon 
men with a kind of necessity, this idea would have had to be the only plausible 
hypothesis, or at least the simplest' (1915: 53, quoted by Stringer). However, 
following Lowie (1948), Stringer claims that Tylor was really listing facts about 
primitive and civilized people's concept of soul, demonstrating that it is a universal 
concept in all societies, and then putting forward a reasonable explanation of those 
data. That is, he was giving an explanation why people everywhere have the concept 
of soul. He was not presenting irrational beliefs as rational, but presenting a rational 
explanation of why people hold irrational beliefs. Tylor's theory based on the dream 
image and the life is one possible and very plausible explanation of the facts 
(Stringer 1999: 544). 
But what is Tylor's rational explanation of why people hold the `irrational' 
belief that there is a soul? It is that in early times people made the connection 
between the dream and trance image of an absent person and the life of the person. 
They came up with one concept, the soul, which unified the two earlier concepts. 
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They went through some reasoning process. Tylor was then indeed, as Stringer says, 
not presenting irrational beliefs as rational. But he was presenting a theory that 
primitive people arrived at the concept of soul by means of a process of reasoning, 
however vague or perhaps, by our standards, faulty. Very little to promote or rescue 
Tylor's theory is gained by the attempt to analyse it as purely a rational explanation 
of why people hold irrational beliefs. 
It is better, I think, to acknowledge that Tylor did require savages to be, to 
some degree, philosophers. Then we find from ethnography that hunter- gatherers do 
after all have the time to be, and often are, philosophers, and are perfectly capable of 
the ratiocination required to produce the idea of the soul. We can then extrapolate 
from the evidence of recent hunter -gatherer, `savage' societies to those of the past. 
We therefore look for the origin of the concept of the soul in the context of bygone 
hunter -gatherer societies of comparable complexity to those of the most primitive of 
recent times. 
I distance myself from the presupposition in the foregoing that the belief in 
the soul is an irrational belief. Whether it is irrational is a question left in abeyance 
for my purposes here. My concern is to account for its origin. 
Strangely, Stringer has claimed that Tylor's was not a `theory of origins', 
although, according to Stringer, all critical authorities have treated it as such, and he 
says this is the reason why they have misinterpreted, in the way of Durkheim and 
Evans- Pritchard, the nature of Tylor's argument (Stringer 1999: 543fß. He says 
categorically, ` Tylor is not interested in how religion originated' (Stringer 1999: 
548). However, if Tylor was trying to offer a plausible explanation of why people 
believe in a soul, then it seems to me that any such explanation is a theory of the 
origin of the idea of soul. Stringer says (1999: 545), `For Tylor, the theory is 
descriptive,' and yet he notes that Tylor hypothesizes `the sequence in which they 
[the religious concepts of soul, spirit being, ...] are supposed to have arisen one out 
of another' (Tylor 1866: 85). Notice that Tylor does not even say `one after the 
other' but `one out of another' (emphasis mine). According to Tylor's description, 
the idea of soul leads to the idea of spirit beings which either are or inhabit other 
creatures and objects (1871, II: 109 -111), and ultimately to the rest of religion - or, 
in my terms, to further religious elements. For he says, `although it [animism] may at 
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first sight seem to afford but a bare and meagre definition of religion, it will be found 
practically sufficient; for, where the root is, there the branches will generally be 
produced' (Tylor 1924, I: 426). It seems clear to me that Tylor had in mind to offer a 
theory of religious origins. 
Classical objections 
I deal with the objections of Lang and Durkheim in Appendix 8A. 
The numinousness of souls 
In Chapter 5, I proposed that the supernatural fear or numinous fear is 
associated with specific amygdalar activity. How does that come about in relation to 
souls, wraiths and ghosts? 
Marett says (1914: 23 -24), `The thrill of ghost -seeing may be real enough, 
but I fancy it is nothing to the horror of a human corpse instilled into man's heart by 
the instinct of self -preservation'. The dead body of one of our conspecifics is an 
unwelcome reminder of our own mortality. It is an affront, a threat, to our sense of 
self. It evokes a degree of stress which we may theorize induces activity in temporo- 
limbic structures corresponding to an uneasy numinous feeling. 
This horror of their own dead is not felt by chimpanzees, it would appear, but 
they do exhibit a certain interest in the strangeness of a corpse (Chapter 6). I suggest 
that the threat to our self is felt even if the corpse is that of an enemy whom we have 
killed. However, soldiers accustomed to battle and others who constantly deal with 
death, such as mortuary workers, may become inured to the sight of corpses. 
Familiarity should reduce stress, and with it the probability of numinous experience. 
Given the idea of a soul, the primordial person associates the horror or 
potency of the dead body with the wraith or soul. That this potency is assumed is 
indicated by the widespread use of parts of a dead body in apotropaic and other 
magical practices by tribal peoples. Belief in the soul's continued lingering with the 
body, even if the former is conceived as something which is separable, is well known 
from the ethnography of tribal peoples as well as from the practices of more 
developed eastern and western societies (Chapter 9; Paton 1921: passim). The facts 
that we take the trouble to bury or dispose of a corpse with funeral rites and that 
people visit cemeteries indicate that the body is not seen as just a husk left behind by 
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a soul which has flown. The focus of reverence for ancestors in Chinese civilization 
is as much the grave as well as a domestic shrine. The ghost or disembodied soul is 
therefore most likely to be encountered with the body. Even if the body is out of 
sight in a grave or has mouldered away, the location where it lies or has lain may still 
be the habitation of the ghost. 
The basic fear of the ghost, which, with Marett, I suggest is transferred from 
the corpse, is overlain in all societies by cultural ideas. These concern the nature of 
the soul and its longer -term fate: whether it survives at all or beyond the memory of 
the living who knew the deceased in life, whether it goes to an underworld, to the 
isles of the blest, to heaven, and so forth. Even so, I think the underlying fear is that 
the dead body is not completely inanimate: that the body may come back to life, but 
not life as we know it. It would be bearable if the person had not died after all but 
had only been unconscious, and could now resume his or her normal life. But the 
fear is lest a genuine corpse should be reanimated not to a normal state but in its new 
state of post -mortem strangeness. It is as if the former tenant is still there, no longer 
contained in the body in a normal manner, but by a more tenuous connection. The 
fear of the body is transferred to the ghost, and becomes a fear that the now - strange 
dead person, even as an insubstantial phantasm of its corpse, should appear to us and 
be active again.2 In some tribal societies, such as the Washo of California, great 
precautions were taken to avoid having the deceased return, even to the extent of 
burning their houses and possessions so that a ghost would not have anything to 
return to. All in all, once we have accepted a death, we want the dead to stay dead 
and not trouble us (Harris 1997: 8; Downs 1966; Boyce 1975: 124 -125; Frazer 1933; 
Paton 1921). 
Sleep and dreams are widely felt to have a mysterious quality in their own 
right (Bear et al. 2001: 614). The dream appearances of a person cannot but take on 
an extra mystery if that person is dead. The ghost therefore can scarcely fail to be an 
object of numinous sensation. 
' The raising of Lazarus, who after four days in the tomb had begun to stink and is thereby confirmed 
as really dead, is perhaps only bearable because it is Jesus that raises him (John 11: 14 -44). 
2 This fear can be recognized in a scene in the French film Les Diaboliques (1952). A colleague and 
the wife of the apparently murdered principal have deposited his body in the bath and covered it with 
water. Later, the wife walks into the bathroom and witnesses the corpse raise itself out of the water. 
She shrieks and runs away, and the audience experiences the thrill of numinous fear. 
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If the stress and thrill of being in the presence of a dead body, of having seen 
a dead person in a dream, or of being in a place where someone has died are 
sufficiently strong, then I suggest that limbic activation, already producing numinous 
sensations, may reach such a level as to provoke inter -hemispheric intercalation, 
following the theory of Persinger (Chapter 5). As the right- hemisphere sense of self 
becomes accessible to left -hemisphere awareness, a sense of presence will be felt. In 
the given circumstances, the presence will be interpreted as the ghost. At worst, an 
hallucination in which the subject actually sees an apparition will occur. If the 
apparition takes on a recognizable humanoid shape, it is probable that, since the 
subject is thinking about the deceased person, association data from the temporal 
cortex will clothe the apparition in the form of the deceased. 
Relation of soul to daemons and the rest of religion 
Marett believes that a preanimistic phase of religion preceded the phase of 
animism, which latter includes spirits generally and the souls of people and animals. 
I concur with him on the precedence of his preanimistic phase. 
He proposes (1914: 9), like Tylor, that the souls or spirits of the dead are the 
prototype of spirits of other objects, such as rivers, stomach -ache and so forth. The 
revenant of dream or hallucination, which he usually refers to as the `dream -image' 
or `trance -image', possesses exactly the ghostly quality to which spirits are asserted 
to conform, a type of what Tylor called `vaporous materiality'. He therefore regards 
the derivation of soul from dream or hallucinatory images of the dead, and then spirit 
(of non -human objects) from soul, as `one of the few certainties' which anthropology 
can claim. However, he recognizes that a further question arises: how `an animistic 
colour' could have become attached to other objects that are not connected with the 
dead: stones, rivers, trees and the like. 
Marett's (1914: 10) explanation requires that primordial people attribute 
personality to inanimate objects, those which inspire fear or awe, and leads to an 
account of preanimistic religion. What Marett describes under the heading of 
preanimistic religion, and also calls animatism, is, in his view and mine, a much 
more fundamental and primitive stage of thought - one might say pre- thought - than 
the idea of a soul which survives death. 
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Tylor does not distinguish animatism from animism proper, by which latter 
Marett means the attribution of not merely personality but also soul or spirit to a non- 
human object (1914: 14). Marett emphasizes the psychological primitiveness of 
animatism and the consequence that it must be chronologically prior to animism, but 
does not explicitly draw the conclusion that the concept of soul must be later than 
animatism. That conclusion would appear to be at variance with what he says (1914: 
9) about the derivation of the spirits of other objects from souls. 
The two can be reconciled, however. I suspect Marett could agree with the 
following summary. Animatism, the attribution of personality to non -human objects, 
was indeed prior, original and independent of the concept of soul. Later, people 
began to have a concept of soul based on the dream -image or trance -image, in the 
way explained by Tylor. Eventually, they came to apply some of the attributes of 
soul, for example, its ghostly appearance and its seeming ability to locate 
independently of its host object, to the spirit beings or daemons which they already 
associated with non -human objects such as trees, caves and rivers. In this manner, 
animatism was transformed into animism proper. 
There is a tendency for animism to supersede animatism. That is, in people's 
thinking about supernatural beings, the personality attributed to certain objects and 
phenomena becomes assimilated to the soul -like spirit believed to be associated with 
human beings and animals. Eventually, among a given people, animism may 
completely subsume a prior animatism. For example, animism has taken over from 
animatism in a case such as the following: when a Banks Islander sees little stones 
round a large stone, he says that there is a spirit inside it and it can promote fecundity 
among humans and animals (Marett 1914: 13, 18). 
When I refer to a tendency for animism to supersede animatism, I mean that, 
time and again in prehistory, once the concept of soul had gained currency in the 
intellectual or mythological repertoire of a people, at some point an individual made 
the leap from attributing souls to humans and animals to attributing soul -like spirits 
also to certain inanimate phenomena. Thereby he or she, perhaps when telling a 
story, would have an explanation of the naturalness of treating such phenomena as 
beings to which one can relate. A variety of ideas about souls and spirit beings may 
have been entertained by people in prehistory, but individuals telling their stories will 
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sometimes have extended the application of single explanations where possible, 
thereby imposing what Marett called `uniformity of doctrinal expression' (1914: 13. 
19, 27). Instance by instance, perhaps, animism will have taken over from animatism. 
For this reason, we should expect the number of instances of pure animatism among 
recent primitive peoples to be few. 
Schofield (1944: 60) is one of the few writers to distinguish animatism (an 
object `has a life of its own') from animism (an object is `inhabited by a spirit'), and 
says the former is a characteristic belief of ancient Semitic nomads. As is illustrated 
by his example of the Semites, animatism can coexist with animism. 
Tylor regards the concept of soul, and the principle of animism, that other 
creatures and objects may have souls, as the seed which gave rise to all religion 
(Tylor 1924, I: 426; Lowie 1948: 117). I do not follow him in this, as I believe that 
other factors were at work. One was animatism, as mentioned above. However, soul 
is clearly a foundational concept, without which religion could not have taken the 
forms which it now manifests in the most widespread world religions or in tribal 
religions as they are known to us. 
Dating the concept of soul 
From the foregoing section, I can explicitly claim that the idea of soul is later 
than the idea of spirit beings or daemons. A daemon is merely a more or less 
conscious personality attributed to a non -human object, place or natural process. The 
daemon does not inhabit the object. It is rather merely the personality of the object, 
or the object envisaged as having some sort of awareness and will. Soul is more than 
this: it is a self which inhabits and thereby animates a human or animal body, and is 
expected possibly to be independent of the body when the latter is alive, and possibly 
to survive the destruction of the body. 
The idea of soul is evidently much more developed than the basic idea of 
daemon, and must, I think, be the product of contemplation, however dim. The 
contemplation of dream and trance images and the observation of the difference 
between a live and a dead body, as described at the beginning of this chapter, is one 
way by which the idea could have come into being. In this respect, I think Tylor was 
probably correct, and that he has given us the origin of the idea of soul. 
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Lang observes that we do not know the nature of the mentality of our 
ancestors at a pre -religious stage. The question is whether they too were susceptible 
to dreams and hallucinations in which they might see phantoms of distant or dead 
people (Lang 1898: 60ff). 
Tylor suggests that susceptibility to hallucination and visions is more 
prevalent among modern primitives than among civilized people (1924, I: 446). 
Death, dreams and visions figure strongly in the life of tribal people (Lowie 1948: 
108). However, as Lang points out, we cannot presume that there were no `psychical 
differences between modern primitives and the datelessly distant founders of the 
belief in souls'. Yet we have no reason to believe that prehistoric people living at a 
similar level of material subsistence lacked the mental abilities and characteristics of 
recent tribal people. It makes sense to date the ` datelessly distant founders' to a time 
when hominins were sufficiently evolved and accomplished to have reached a 
material level equivalent to that of recent hunter -gatherers. Then it is reasonable to 
presume that, sharing a similar lifestyle, they may have shared a similar mentality. 
The Tylorian theory depends on people having some susceptibility to dreams and 
visions. Among the latter I would include out -of -the -body experiences. It is not 
necessary that they should have had dreams and visions with any great frequency, 
but only that those experiences should have occurred from time to time and on some 
occasions have been memorable. It further demands that people observe life and 
death and, to some dim extent, think about things. 
Contemplation of an order sufficient to generate the idea of soul one would 
hesitate to attribute to an australopithecine or to Homo erectus. I think probably we 
have to look to Homo sapiens as the first hominid to have this notion. It may 
therefore date from the early Upper Palaeolithic, conceivably the Middle 
Palaeolithic, when hunter -gatherer societies comparable with some of those of recent 
centuries had appeared (Brace and Montagu 1977). Further developments of animism 
as described by Tylor, including the conception that animals have souls, probably 
took place during the twenty or thirty millennia of the Upper Palaeolithic, long ages 
in which perhaps old men and women had the leisure round the evening camp fire to 
contemplate their condition, generate ideas to explain it and communicate their ideas 
to others. 
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CHAPTER 9 
ANOTHER WORLD: LIFE AFTER DEATH 
The purpose of this chapter and the next is to explore the possible origins of 
the idea that there is a world or mode of existence besides the everyday physical 
world. Examples of the other world are the abode of the dead, the underworld, the 
dreamtime, the world as encountered in ecstatic states, and in particular heaven, as an 
enraptured state entered upon after death. While Chapter 8 considered the point of 
view of the living in thinking about ghosts, this chapter considers the point of view 
of the prospective deceased. 
I think I have fairly fully elaborated the hypotheses of natural origins for the 
ideas of spirit beings and of souls. To do equal justice to the origin of the conception 
of heaven would require at least one full dissertation in itself While the others 
almost certainly originated in prehistory, this conception is one which, I suspect, 
straddles the boundary of prehistory and antiquity. More variables are involved, 
wider scholarship required, and a much fuller treatment deserved. My view is that the 
ultimate origin of the idea of heaven is to be found in a prehistoric shamanism, but 
that the processes of development are difficult to evidence adequately. This is largely 
because, unlike prehistory, antiquity has left a vast body of material from which a 
vast body of scholarship has been generated, too much to sift through in present 
circumstances. I am also aware that I have concentrated on accessible information 
mainly covering the ancient Middle East and primitive Eurasia and the Americas, to 
the neglect of Africa, China and other Far Eastern civilizations. However, as the 
afterlife is a major element of religion it should not be neglected, and a limited 
exploration and hypothesis is better than none. 
I shall begin by looking at ideas concerning the location and circumstances in 
which spirits of the dead have been believed to survive. In this chapter I feel free to 
use the words `spirit' and `soul' more or less interchangeably. 
The afterlife 
The idea that a person `goes to heaven' after death seems to be a late one, on 
the evolutionary timescale which I have been considering. It may even be a 
conception of historical antiquity: that is, of the last three millennia before the 
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common era. By `heaven' I mean a realm of happiness, even bliss, located variously 
in or above the sky or in a distant land on earth, usually the far west, into which souls 
enter after death. The conception of heaven seems to depend upon developments in 
astronomy and ethics, as well as on other factors. For the conception of a heaven as 
literally a celestial realm, it was necessary to have some ideas about the nature of the 
celestial bodies, sun, moon and stars. For the conception of heaven as a blissful state 
in which the just received their reward, it was necessary to have definite ideas about 
goodness and justice. However, it was not necessary that ideas about the nature of 
the heavenly bodies be astronomically correct, and the earliest evidence shows that 
no connection was seen to be required between living a good or innocuous life on 
earth and attaining a post -mortem reward. The state of bliss and rapture is part of the 
fully developed idea of heaven, as found in Christianity for example, but is, I think, 
distinct from some early conceptions even of a celestial afterlife. 
Discovery of what ancient people believed is complicated by human factors. 
Ancient writers do not necessarily transmit the conceptions held by ordinary people 
of their era, but rather their own speculations. People in different countries and at 
different levels of society may hold contemporaneously diverse ideas, some of which 
may be relics of very ancient beliefs, while others may be more recent. And human 
beings seem always to have had a contrary ability to maintain contrary ideas with 
equanimity, for example of the dead resting in the grave at the same time as enjoying 
felicity in heaven.' It is not always possible to determine from concrete dating 
evidence which beliefs were early and which late, because of the jumble of beliefs 
reported for any given people over a given era. In some measure, one is guided by 
internal evidence, namely, the degree of sophistication incorporated into a given 
conception. The latter procedure may seem to beg the question, but, as I shall try to 
show below, the attribution of temporal primitiveness to some conceptions is more 
plausible than that of others. 
It is plausible that there is a temporal and developmental sequence of ideas 
about the destination of the spirit after death: the grave, an underworld, and finally a 
heaven. 
As another example, Schilling (1989: 200) notes that in the Rig Veda the goddess of the dawn nurses 
a baby who is at one time hers alone and at another time both hers and her sister's. 
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The grave 
In the preceding chapter I delineated what form personal survival may be 
presumed to have taken in the minds of prehistoric people when the conception of 
personal survival first took form at all. The personality of a human being was 
believed to leave the body at death, literally when the body finally expired. The spirit 
thus released might appear to other people, particularly in dreams. The question then 
arises: what is the usual habitation of the disembodied spirit when it is not appearing 
to living people? 
I say `the question arises'. I do not mean primarily that the question arose for 
prehistoric people, although I am sure it did. I mean that it arises for us, in thinking 
what form their conceptions of life after death are likely to have taken. For historical 
antiquity, it is possible to determine the actual thinking of ancient people on the 
subject by examining the documentary evidence which they left behind. We can 
follow the developments in their thinking by comparing what was written at one 
period and place with what was written in another time and place, as is done in Old 
Testament scholarship. However, prehistoric people, by definition, did not leave 
documentary evidence. Even so, I think it is possible to reconstruct the likely ideas, 
given what is known from historical antiquity and from recent preliterate societies, 
and building on what has been determined so far about the probable conception of 
the soul or spirit. At this point one is obliged to cast Evans -Pritchard's denunciation 
of the `If I were a horse...' procedure to the winds. 
The question arises in this form: what is the most likely or natural idea of the 
location of the spirit of the deceased? Consider first an unlikely idea. It is plainly 
improbable that, given no prior related conceptions, prehistoric people should think 
that the dead person's spirit went to the stars. Why should prehistoric people 
associate a disembodied soul with lights in the sky, without having any developed 
ideas about what the celestial lights actually were? The idea of an astral afterlife is 
described as early as the third -millennium Pyramid Texts in Egypt (Lesko 1989: 35), 
but here we are dealing with a civilization with established means of transmitting 
sophisticated ideas. The pre- literate societies in Europe which constructed stone 
circles and similar monuments also evidently had astronomical interests and 
knowledge, and it is possible that they could have had the notion of an afterlife 
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among the stars. But, again, these are societies which evidently, from the effort they 
invested in giving physical expression to their perceived relations with the celestial 
bodies or lights, already had theories about what they were. I wish to consider the 
earliest and least demanding conception of the destiny of the spirit after death. 
The most likely conception is, I think, one requiring no further assumptions, 
knowledge or ideas about anything else: that the soul did not go away at all but 
stayed near the corpse. The spirit was believed to have come out of, or to be to some 
extent detached from, the corpse, since the latter was no longer breathing, but it need 
not have left the vicinity. Karsten (1935: 59) notes that `to a primitive mind' (and, I 
would add, to a civilized mind) there is still something of the soul left in the dead 
body: it is not entirely `lifeless'. The idea that the spirit remained near or associated 
with its dead body is consistent with the dependency of fear of the spirit on the 
strangeness of the corpse, as discussed in Chapter 8. Evidence from ancient cultures 
seems to show that, all over the world, this was indeed the most primitive idea of the 
location or fate of the spirit after death, when once the idea of spirit had been thought 
in the first place (Paton 1921: 35, 167, 172, 175, 205; Burland 1976: 44). 
In early Egyptian thought, the spirit was imagined as separating from the 
but as remaining associated with it. This association gave rise to the 
need for preservation of the body, so that the spirit, which depended upon it, might 
continue to exist. After death, to enable to the spirit to return and inhabit its body, a 
ceremony was conducted of ̀ making a man a ba'. If the body perished, the ba would 
also perish. The proper abode of the spirit was the body or mummy. The mummy 
was not expected to be revived by the ba, but was preserved to provide a habitation 
for it. At the same time, the ba was able to move around. Represented as a human - 
headed bird, it is sometimes pictured as hovering over the body. In one case it is 
shown perched nearby watching the proceedings at its own funeral (Paton 1921: 154- 
155, 163, 165 -167). One is reminded of the classic out -of -the -body experience that 
sometimes occurs during surgery. 
Paton (1921: 92 -94, 102 -103) proposes that, among some of the Indo- 
Europeans, the fate of the spirit was related to the mode of disposal of the body. If 
the corpse was exposed, then the spirit roamed widely or entered into animals such as 
birds or snakes. Notably, these are not herbivores but scavengers which would feed 
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on the flesh. In other words, it was consumption of the body that allowed the spirit, 
intimately associated with the body, to enter into such animals. If the body was 
buried, then the spirit remained in or near the body in the grave. If the body was 
displaced, the spirit would go with it. The reputed bones of Theseus were brought to 
Athens, presumably to secure his protective presence for the city. Having the body of 
an heroic Teuton king interred in the neighbourhood could bring good fortune to the 
living (cf Vernant 1989: 173; MacCulloch 1948: 159). 
A burial place or the location of a murder was where an encounter with a 
ghost was most to be expected, according to the ideas of such diverse people of 
antiquity as Greeks, Celts and Mesopotamians (Paton 1921: 7, 102, 205; MacCulloch 
1948: 158 -160). 
In the Egyptian Old Kingdom, some nobles had tombs constructed in which 
the body was laid in a chamber below ground, with a passage leading to a mastaba 
built on the surface. Inside the mastaba the shaft communicated with a small room 
containing an image of the deceased, separated by a false door from a chapel where 
offerings could be left. In some cases a gap was left in the false door to allow the 
spirit to pass in and out (Spencer 1982: 55 -63). Similarly, in both Greece and Italy 
there were prehistoric tombs in which a channel led from the grave to the surface, 
and libations of blood and other liquids were poured down the channel so as to reach 
the deceased.' In Greece, food was placed in and on graves. In Mesopotamia, it was 
the duty of descendants to pour out libations on graves. In China, where the cult of 
ancestors reached a level without parallel elsewhere, the grave has always been a site 
for offerings and prayers for the favour of the deceased. The cults of the Hebrew 
patriarchs were carried on at their presumed burial places. In Egypt, letters to the 
dead requesting favours were left at tombs (Paton 1921: 35, 40, 72 -73, 140, 160, 184, 
225, 238, 261; Lesko 1989: 49; Vernant 1989: 177). Even in the mid twentieth 
century, in a remote area of Siberia, Diószegi (1968: 80) observed graves furnished 
with low, wooden, gabled roofs, having rectangular openings in the gable end 
It was formerly held that similar installations for pouring libations into vessels in tombs existed at 
Ugarit. However, tombs there were located under dwellings. It has been shown that the conduits in 
question do not connect with the tombs but served for drainage, and in the case of one building for 
transferring olive oil from presses above (Pitard 1994). Pitard adds (1994: 36) that these discoveries 
do not resolve the issue whether offerings to the dead were made at Ugarit. 
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through which food had been placed over the grave. Clearly in these cases it was 
assumed that some remnant of the consciousness of the deceased inhabited the grave. 
The underworld 
An underworld or nether world is a dark cavern under the earth, to which the 
souls of the dead make their way and in which they remain endlessly as shades. The 
notion of a nether world appears to be an imaginative extrapolation from the 
individual grave or tomb. It is as if the ancients imagined that graves, being 
subterraneous, were connected, or that the spaces of soil and rock between them were 
traversable by the spirits, so that they could find their way down to lower hollows, 
and that the whole formed a vast underground cavern or tomb complex as a 
habitation for the shades (cf. Paton 1921: 102, 105, 216, 218; MacCulloch 1948: 80- 
81). 
The notion of an underworld already appears at the beginning of history with 
the Sumerians, who, according to Paton, had already `outgrown' the simpler idea that 
the dead inhabited their individual burial places. The conception of a nether world 
was passed on to the Semitic successors of the Sumerians in Mesopotamia, and from 
the Babylonians to the Canaanites and Hebrews. The Akkadian term for the nether 
world, Aralû, is equivalent to the more widely known Hebrew term Sheôl. The Arabs 
in antiquity did not have the idea of a nether world, which indicates that it did not 
form part of the early Semitic world -view. The distinction between grave and 
underworld is not always made. For the Babylonians, ghosts emerged from the grave 
or Aralu interchangeably, and people were eaten by worms in Aralu (Paton 1921: 
207, 215, 218, 243). 
The underworld, as documented in ancient sources from the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East and in the Indian Vedas was imagined as dark and dusty, and the 
shades who inhabited it were attenuated in form and reduced in capacities. While the 
shades retain some degree of consciousness, it seems to be imagined as almost 
emotionless, without acute suffering, except that the shades harbour resentment of 
those still living. The shades grope feebly about in the darkness (e.g., Isaiah 59: 10), 
and the words `twittering', `gibbering' and `whispering' are used in reference to their 
voiceless utterances. Generally, the future life below is pictured as dreary, miserable 
and valueless (Wright 2000: 29, 31, 42, 50, 85 -86, 113; Baillie 1934: 69 -83; Paton 
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1921: 5, 8 -9, 221, 238, 242, 245, 272; Cohn 1993: 75; Gnoli 1989: 125). Famously, 
Achilles tells Odysseus that he would rather be a labourer in the land of the living 
than reign over all the dead (Odyssey 11: 489 -491). In Israel the mainstream Judaic 
religion, which disapproved of worship of the dead, emphasised the powerlessness of 
the inhabitants of Sheol (Baillie 1934: 73; Paton 1921: 233 -234). 
It appears that at first the nether world was conceived as the common destiny 
of all. The mighty descended there along with those who had been weak and 
unfortunate in life. To some degree, within the limitations of these shadowy 
circumstances, social structures were thought to continue beyond death, at least 
among the Sumerians and Semites, and the Chinese. On the other hand, the Old 
Testament makes more of the communally miserable existence of the dead in Sheol 
than of distinctions between them (Wright 2000: 31, 42, 97, 113; Paton 1921: 20, 
215, 220 -221, 245; Cohn 1993: 75). 
Elysium 
Later speculation seems to have introduced the notion that not all the dead 
shared the same fate. In all but the latest books of the Old Testament, Sheol is the 
final destination of every human being. However, the prophets Enoch and Elijah are 
reported as being taken up by God, as were a few Babylonian heroes. There seems to 
have been a Sumerian paradise, the land of Dilmun, located on earth but reserved for 
gods and heroes. Similarly, in Greek and Teutonic myth there is an alternative 
destiny for heroes: in Elysium' or Valhalla, heroes enjoy the afterlife in the company 
of the gods. Pre -Zoroastrian Iranian myth has a similar paradise for the aristocratic 
warrior and priestly classes, but the rest are consigned to a subterranean kingdom. 
The Vedas also assert that nobles are taken up to enjoy the company of Varuna and 
the other gods, while commoners suffer the descent to the underworld. The joyous 
version of the hereafter may be a reward: not, however, for living blamelessly or 
doing good to others, but rather for being born noble and conducting oneself bravely 
(Paton 1921: 109 -112, 244; Cohn 1993: 76; Gnoli 1989: 125; Boyce 1975: 83 -84, 
110 -111; MacCulloch 1948: 124, 155, 160 -163). 
' Elysium is absent from the Iliad, and the Elysian Field first appears in Odyssey 4: 563 -564, where 
Proteus narrates that the Greek heroes were transported there without dying. 
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The origin of this idea of different fates according to one's social standing 
may lie in metaphysical speculation by religious specialists, but I suspect that the 
principal motivation for it may have been more prosaic. From all parts of the world, 
epics and much other ancient literature were produced by poets for the entertainment 
of the nobility in their societies, not for the common people (Cohn 1993: 75). Nobles 
and the powerful and wealthy were no doubt accustomed to flattery by subordinates 
and entertainers. Over hundreds of years, with increasing sophistication and the 
recollection of what had been said in previous generations, poets would be under 
pressure to exaggerate their flattery to an extreme degree in an effort to outdo their 
predecessors and satisfy their patron's vanity. Eventually the noble ruler would be 
compared to a divine being. In historical societies, the divinization of emperors in 
their lifetimes is observed from Rome to Kyoto. The future life of nobles in Greek 
and Teutonic myth seems not to be blissful and other -worldly in a mystical sense, but 
rather like an exaggeration of the more enjoyable aspects of wealthy life on earth, 
with feasting and good company. In Valhalla the warriors fight and maim each other 
daily but their wounds heal again in time for the feast (MacCulloch 1948: 162). 
There is not much of the numinous about this afterlife. 
Mixed afterlives from Egypt 
In Egypt, the king, as befitted a god, expected to pass at death into the 
company of heavenly beings. The abode of the blessed dead was Earu, the Field of 
Rushes, which is variously placed in the underworld, in a faraway country on earth 
or even in the sky. The Field of Rushes was evidently a counterpart of the fertile Nile 
Delta with its fields of reeds, where, in legend, the dismembered body of Osiris had 
been reassembled (Budge 1899: 211). This was perhaps a paradise suited to an 
agricultural society, and it was expected that the blessed would continue to live there 
like royalty (Wright 2000: 22). On the other hand, the widespread presence of 
ushabti figures in tombs indicates an expectation that manual labour would be 
required in the next world, work which the ushabti were intended to undertake 
instead (Lurker 1980: 125 -126). It seems that the Field of Rushes was at one time an 
earthly alternative for commoners, in contrast to the celestial realm reserved for 
Pharaoh and the gods, and perhaps only later was the former located in the sky 
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(Wright 2000: 24; Frankfort 1948: 110). However, Lesko (1989: 49) suggests that 
the sky was the original location of the Field of Rushes. 
The solar theology of the priests at Heliopolis emphasized the celestial nature 
of the blessed afterlife, whereby the blessed dead would traverse the sky by day in 
the solar boat, and pass in it by night through the underworld, to emerge in the east 
next morning. In this conception the underworld was the habitation of the less than 
blessed dead. The strictly incompatible Osirian theology, at one time centred on 
Abydos, emphasized rather the underworld itself, which was the realm of the dying 
god Osiris. On this doctrine, the dead were identified with and addressed as Osiris 
(Wright 2000: 19 -24; Paton 1921: 170, 173 -175; Cohn 1993: 28). During the earthly 
daytime, the inhabitants of the underworld, gods and former humans, were inert, 
pending the next traversal of the sun from west to east under the earth, which would 
revivify them (Spencer 1982: 154). 
In the third millennium BCE it appears that only Pharaoh was expected to 
attain to a blessed afterlife. As a god himself, he was worthy to be translated to 
heaven, which was a glorious realm, filled with the splendour of the sun god (Mercer 
1949: 326). In the course of the Middle Kingdom, a blessed immortality in one form 
or another, whether in the Field of Rushes or among the stars - or both - became 
accessible first to nobles and then to lesser people, so that by the first millennium it 
was the aspiration of all ordinary Egyptians (Paton 1921: 174; Wright 2000: 24). 
An ancient Egyptian possessed a variety of components of the self which 
survived death. According to Mercer (1949: 315 -316), the ka came into being along 
with the person. It was imperishable in heaven, and at death the individual's soul, ba, 
went to his ka. At the same time, the ba and ka were kept alive by offerings at the 
tomb. The ba was a bird -like form which could leave the tomb and visit heaven to be 
with its ka, but returned at night to inhabit the mummy (Spencer 1982: 58 -62; Lurker 
1980: 73). The ahu (akhu, khu) was a spiritualized body, identical with the ka in 
heaven (Mercer 1949: 322 -323). Frankfort (1948: 100 -101) tells us that the akhu 
were transfigured spirits, which departed to become stars. They passed to a realm 
beyond human understanding: hence there was reticence about detailing their nature. 
In the middle of the third millennium BCE, the solar theology forms the basis 
of the Pyramid Texts, but even these contain elements of the heterogeneous Osirian 
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theology, incorporated by the Heliopolitan priests because of the popularity of 
Osirian doctrines (Mercer 1949: 327 -328). For the next two thousand years, concepts 
from both were juxtaposed and only incompletely reconciled in mortuary literature 
and inscriptions. Throughout this period, the primitive surmise that the spirit of the 
dead remained in the tomb evidently continued side by side with more sophisticated 
doctrines. The immense funerary preparations conducted by the Egyptians of all eras 
testify to the importance of the corpse, whatever the ideal destiny of the soul or other 
surviving components. After death one went to the stars, the Field of Rushes, the 
underworld or stayed in the tomb, or all at once. Adherence to a diversity of contrary 
doctrines of no mean sophistication apparently did not disturb the Egyptians 
(Frankfort 1948: 19, 91; Wright 2000: 22 -24; Lesko 1989: 59). 
Given the duration of Egyptian civilization, it is not surprising that there 
should be developments and a variety and syncretism of ideas. The various souls, 
doubles and other components of the self appear to be speculative extrapolations of 
simpler conceptions of soul, perhaps first formulated in different religious centres 
and later combined on the principle that each might embody some aspect of what 
happened after death. It is to be expected that spells from incompatible doctrines 
should be juxtaposed in funerary inscriptions, since understandably the deceased 
would have wished to maximize his chance of backing the winning theology (Paton 
1921: 174; Lesko 1989: 49). 
In view of the complexity uncovered by specialist scholars and the vastness 
of the literature, there is little I can usefully say about the possible origins and dating 
of the various doctrines developed by the ancient Egyptians. In any case, the 
recorded eschatologies are clearly the product of sustained and communicated 
thought, in contrast to the primitive conception of mere continued `life' in the tomb. 
The latter owes more to an almost visceral feeling about the dead body (cf. Marett 
1914: 23 -24) than to any attempt at doctrine. 
Absence of heaven 
Among societies of the Middle East, the absence of a blessed afterlife can be 
traced. By `blessed afterlife' I mean a survival in a happy condition, without 
suffering or diminution of one's faculties. Survival in the grave and in an underworld 
are forms of afterlife but not a blessed condition. A blessed afterlife seems to take the 
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form of Elysium or heaven. Elysium, whatever name it may appear under, is a 
paradise reserved to an élite, and may be located on earth. The much more interesting 
heaven is a world or state of being whose inhabitants enjoy perpetual bliss. It may or 
may not be differentiated from the sky as such, but its location is generally 
somewhere in or above the sky or beyond the normally accessible universe. It is the 
abode of the gods or of God; and it may be accessible to all humans given some 
preconditions of right conduct or initiation. 
Wright (2000: 29 -31) states that the Sumerians had no idea of heaven being 
accessible to human beings. Heaven was only for the gods, and humans were 
destined for the underworld. The land of Dilmun is a sort of paradise, somewhere on 
earth, for superhuman heroes. Yet the lament even for a good king, Ur- Nammu, of 
the late third millennium, expects him to go down to the underworld, where he will 
no longer know his family. 
The Assyrian and Babylonian successors of the Sumerians perpetuated the 
belief that heaven was reserved for the gods and could not be attained by humans 
(Wright 2000: 42, 49 -50). The pre -exilic prophetic religion of the Israelites lacks 
expectation of a blessed life after death (Paton 1921: 275, 280, 286; Wright 2000: 
86). 
It seems probable that the Greeks of the pre -classical period shared the 
widespread belief in an underworld as the habitation of all the dead. Even the 
aristocratic Patroclus becomes an insubstantial shade and passes below to Hades 
(Iliad 23: 71 -76, 100 -104). While there are later literary legends about the translation 
of human beings to Olympus, for example the rapture of Ganymede by Zeus, in the 
Iliad there is no evidence of any general expectation of attaining to a blessed afterlife 
in the company of the gods (Wright 2000: 113). 
It is a matter of significance that there were literate societies in antiquity 
which lacked the conception of a blessed afterlife, even of the Elysian version, let 
alone of heaven. This fact should encourage attempts to trace the spread of the idea 
from one society to another, and to trace centres where it may have originated. 
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The sky 
At an early date in China the idea is found that the souls of the dead are 'in 
the sky'. It seems unlikely that this was a popular belief, given the importance of the 
grave in ancestor -worship. Confucian writings contain speculation that the soul 
leaves the body and `manifests itself on high as a shining light' (Paton 1921: 37 -38). 
In the ancient Middle East and indeed in Asiatic shamanism, the world was 
commonly imagined as having three levels: sky, earth and underworld. Excluding 
events likely to be witnessed only rarely such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, 
the sky is the scene of much the most impressive natural phenomena: daylight, the 
sun, the moon, a starfield, storms, lightning and thunder. It is perhaps not surprising 
that gods in general, if not the genii or gods of particular earthly locations, were 
believed to have their abode there. Sometimes in the ancient Middle East the stars 
were imagined as gods or at least as sentient beings. In the Old Testament several 
passages refer to the worship of the sun, moon and constellations by Israel, in which 
they appear to be identified with the `heavenly host' (Wright 2000: 46, 54, 58 -59, 
96). 
A hope of ascending to join the celestial beings was entertained in Egypt as 
early as the third millennium BCE, although it was limited to the Pharaoh. Later, in 
the Coffin Texts and the Book of the Dead, the deceased is conjured to identify 
himself or herself with a star or constellation (Wright 2000: 8 -10). 
While acknowledging an alternative hypothesis that the idea of paradise 
originated with the Sumerians, Wright (2000: 30, 51) points out that a comparable 
idea arose in Egyptian thought at least as early as in Mesopotamia, and concludes 
that the notion of deceased human beings being admitted to join the gods and stars in 
the sky, or `heaven', was an Egyptian invention. The belief in the celestial destiny of 
the soul known as akhu seems to be ancient and, unlike some versions of the 
afterlife, was not historically restricted to the Pharaoh (Frankfort 1948: 102). 
Another world 
Heaven 
By `heaven' I mean a place or state of ecstatic excitement, joy, rapture or 
bliss enjoyed by the blessed dead. It can be attained either by a disembodied soul or 
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by a resurrected body. A genuine heaven is, I think, more 'other -worldly' than the 
paradise of Valhalla and perhaps Elysium. There has to be an element of religious 
awe, toward the mystical end of the spectrum of Otto's numinous. At its most 
extreme in Christianity, the blessed in such a heaven experience the beatific vision. 
The Vedic paradise for the aristocratic class, while retaining its Elysian 
character, has some elements of the blissful state. On a supramundane scale its once - 
human inhabitants enjoy the mundane pleasures of making love and music and of 
feasting, this time in the company of the gods. However, we are told that, at death, 
the spirit makes its way to heaven, and is there reunited with its body, which is 
transformed into a glorious body. Varuna gathers the noble humans about him and 
they enjoy endless felicity. Heaven is blissful, full of radiance and filled with song 
(Paton 1921: 108; Cohn 1993: 76; Boyce 1975: 198). 
It seems to be with Zoroastrianism that heaven in the fullest sense first comes 
into prominence. Here, however, it is not a question of the soul of the departed 
making its way at death to heaven and enjoying eternal felicity. Rather, at the end of 
time, the Bounteous Immortals, gods brought into being by the Creator, Ahura 
Mazda, will finally vanquish Angra Mainyu and the forces of evil, against which the 
has Ahura 
will celebrate a final sacrifice, in which all the righteous will participate. The bodies 
of the righteous will be transformed into glorious bodies, and they will live for ever 
in peace and joy with their Creator and his Bounteous Immortals in an unchanging 
kingdom. Thus will the `making wonderful' be accomplished. After an encounter 
with the anthropomorphic pleasures enjoyed by the denizens of Valhalla and the 
incomplete pictures of life with the stars from Egypt, the Zoroastrian doctrine comes 
over as startlingly more grand. This is genuine heaven. There is an other -worldly, 
numinous, awe -inspiring quality about the prospect which unfolds.' Moreover, this 
heaven is not the preserve of aristocrats but is open to everyone who will have faith 
(Cohn 1993: 98 -99; Boyce 1993: 206, 251, 261). 
While a classical legend gives the date 258 years before Alexander the Great, 
Boyce places the prophet Zoroaster at between 1400 and 1000 BCE, and the location 
The vocabulary used by sympathetic scholars to describe the Zoroastrian doctrine may of course 
have something to do with this. 
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of his life's work as Central Asia, just before his people, the proto- Iranians, migrated 
into north -eastern Iran. From there Zoroastrian doctrine spread throughout Iran, and 
became more widely known throughout the Middle East and in the eastern 
Mediterranean with the expansion of the Persian Empire under Cyrus the Great in the 
sixth century BCE (Boyce 1975: 3, 190; Cohn 1993: 102). 
After 400 BCE, Plato expounds the doctrine that we possess an immortal 
soul, which at death is able to leave the body and engage blissfully in the unchanging 
world of forms or ideas (McDannell and Lang 1988: 16; Wright 2000: 100). The 
theory of ideas is due to Plato, but the conception of an immortal soul which can 
aspire to bliss after death seems to replicate Pythagorean teachings of the sixth 
century BCE. According to that doctrine, after death the soul reunites with a 
`universal soul' in heaven. Assigning the priority of these similar conceptions to 
either Greeks or Iranians is problematical (Wright 2000: 100, 108). 
While bliss is the ultimate destiny of the soul in the Platonic and Zoroastrian 
conceptions, it appears to me there is a fundamental difference. For Plato, the soul 
existed before birth in heaven and returns there immediately after death, glad to 
escape from the body, which is evil. In Zoroastrian doctrine the dead await 
resurrection of the body, which is good, to enter upon a glorious destiny at the end of 
the age.' This is in keeping with the novel view of history and eschatology 
introduced apparently by Zoroaster himself, of time tending toward a purpose and 
conclusion, in contrast to the conception of time as unchanging common to the 
ancient world (Boyce 1975: 233; Cohn 1993: 99). 
The once widespread view that ancient Near Eastern societies other than the 
Israelites regarded time as cyclic or repetitive is no longer tenable. The concept of 
world cycles was unknown to the Babylonians and may be due to the classical 
Greeks, specifically the Pythagoreans (Wyatt 2001: 304 -305, 325; Lambert 1976: 
172). For the Babylonians, Assyrians and other Near Eastern peoples, as well as 
Israel, it appears that history was conceived as a linear succession of events in which 
God or the gods took a hand in directing outcomes (Albrektson 1967; Drews 1975: 
39 -50). The novelty, if it is such, of the Zoroastrian conception is the emphasis on 
In Judaism and Christianity the attempt to combine instant immortality on the Hellenistic model with 
resurrection has always been problematic (cf. Paton 1921: 285 -288). 
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the end of time, and the relocation of great cosmic events, such as the combat in 
which good triumphs over evil, from the mythical past to the prophesied future. 
The soul which leaves the body after death according to the primitive 
worldwide conception is immortal in the trivial sense that it survives death. The 
novelty of the Platonic and Zoroastrian doctrines is that the soul is deemed to have a 
glorious destiny and not merely to be a ghost or shade. 
As discussed in Chapter 8, it is understandable that people should believe 
there is a spirit which leaves the body at death. As discussed in this chapter, it is 
understandable that people should think the spirit lingers near the body and inhabits 
the grave if the body is buried. It is even understandable that the spirit should be 
thought to inhabit an underworld, which is a sort of generalized grave complex. But 
why should anyone think (1) that the spirit goes to the sky, (2) that the spirit enters 
upon an enraptured state? 
The idea of an ascent to the sky has been connected with the practices of 
exposure and cremation. In particular, among the Indo- Iranians, only nobles were 
cremated, and heaven was reserved for them (Boyce 1975: 110 -113).1 In exposure, 
especially if the corpse is elevated off the ground on a trestle, the spirit may be 
thought to have access to the atmosphere and to be able to fly upward. In cremation, 
the spirit, as a vaporous entity itself, may ascend with the smoke.2 I think these are 
plausible sources of the belief in ascent to the sky. Certainly, neither exposure nor 
cremation would encourage a notion that the soul descends to an underworld. At the 
same time, whether or not given societies practised cremation or exposure, there may 
have been other phenomena which could give rise to the belief in ascent, as I shall 
suggest later. 
There remains the ecstatic, blissful state. Afterlife in the grave or underworld 
is the reverse of blissful or exciting. Consider the Egyptians, who Wright (2000: 51) 
thinks were the first to expect a celestial afterlife. Even the hope of dwelling in the 
Field of Rushes did not make them wish any less for a long natural life or perhaps 
fully dispel the view of death as a disaster. The enormous precautions of tombs, 
mummification, amulets and reduplicated spells commissioned to secure an 
I Yet in Homer heroes (not commoners) are burnt on a pyre but descend to the underworld. 
2 Cf Brihadáranyaka Upanishad V.x; Chándogya Upanishad V.x.3, 5 (Zaehner 1966: 77, 100). 
Chapter 9 183 
agreeable afterlife indicate anything but a 'sure and certain hope'. For me, there is a 
note of desperation in some appeals which plainly run counter to observation: for 
example, 'O king, you have not departed dead but have departed alive!' (Wright 
2000: 19). If one must die, the wish to participate in the apparently unchanging round 
of the stars, away from the cares of this world, is understandable. It appears to be 
wishful thinking carried to an extreme. Even Pharaoh must have wondered whether 
the flattery of the priests and courtiers, to the effect that he was a god and would 
blissfully join the sun in heaven, could possibly be true. 
Experience of a heavenly state in this life 
Flattery, wishful thinking and speculation seem insufficient to generate the 
idea of a heavenly afterlife. Once the idea of an enraptured state of being had come 
into circulation, then flattery would attribute the possibility of attaining it to those in 
authority on earth, and ethical speculation might allow it also to the righteous. But 
what could give rise in the first place to the idea that an enraptured state was 
possible? 
More than speculation and wishing, what would be convincing as a starting 
point is experience. I think it is in the experience of an enraptured state by certain 
individuals and then the testimony of those individuals to others that one should 
identify the origin of a general belief in its possibility. Here, by 'experience of an 
enraptured state' I mean experience in this life: experience which can be described to 
others and the means to attain which can sometimes be offered by an experient to 
others. The attribution of this state to a post -mortem existence is, I think, the result of 
speculation and wishful thinking. Once its attainability in this life has been 
conceived, because it is reported by some experients, then its attainability after death 
becomes also conceivable, given a preexistent belief that the personality survives 
death in some form anyway. 
The fulcrum of my argument has been anticipated by Baillie (1934). 
Baillie notes the inadequacy of Plato's philosophical arguments for the 
existence of an immortal soul (cf. Cross and Woozley 1964: 119 -120, 287 -288). As 
does Moore (1931: 25), he concludes that Socrates' and Plato's convictions 
regarding a blessed personal immortality arose not from rational excogitation but 
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from the emotional pull of direct experience. The philosophical concept of an 
immortal soul was owed to Socrates, but Plato elaborated the idea from non -rational 
faiths in which it was already implicit. Specifically, it was from the experiential 
phenomena of the Eleusinian mysteries that the concept derived. In those mysteries 
the initiates temporarily experienced a higher kind of life. Doctrinally, the experience 
was interpreted as participation in the universal renewal of life, as epitomized by the 
return of Persephone from the underworld to her mother Demeter. Experientially, it 
was a blinding revelation, awe - inspiring and unforgettable. For the uninitiated, the 
afterlife would be only the shadowy existence of the underworld. For initiates, there 
would be real, blissful life after death, since the experience of the mystery was 
interpreted as `a foretaste of what the individual was one day to enjoy as his own for 
ever'. The mysteries were accessible to everyone, including slaves. Unlike Elysium, 
therefore, the prospect of a blessed afterlife was open to all people in return only for 
purification and worship of Demeter (Baillie 1934: 83 -85, 102 -107, 112). 
In the Orphic sects, devotional interest was overlaid by a strong doctrinal 
system, elaborated by the Pythagoreans. In the mythology of this doctrine, Dionysus 
was dismembered by the Titans, whom Zeus subsequently destroyed by fire. Each 
human being contains one of his fragments, which is the person's soul. In contrast, 
the body consists of matter originating from the ashes of the Titans. Being divine, the 
soul is immortal and capable of ultimate union with the divinity. Of significance for 
my purpose is the ecstatic state attained on occasions by worshippers of Dionysus, in 
which the soul appeared to be liberated from the body. This again could be 
interpreted as a foretaste of the future life (Baillie 1934: 108 -110). 
In a later section I discuss the probable events and content of the Eleusinian 
mysteries. I concentrate on Eleusis rather than Orphism because in the former case 
the reticence of ancient commentators has kept down the accretion of distracting 
mythology and philosophy, and because the essence of the mystery was a unique, 
once -in -a- lifetime experience, regarding the nature of which a credible theory has 
been put forward in recent decades. 
Earlier I referred to the resurrection hoped for in Zoroastrianism. Baillie notes 
the earliest occurrences of the concept in Old Testament writing, specifically Isaiah 
26: 19 and Daniel 12, which he dates to the third and second centuries BCE. Of pre- 
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Christian Jewish writings besides these, only 1 Enoch prophesies a glorious afterlife. 
While noting that an independent origin is possible, he points up the probability that 
the Judaic conception found in these post -exilic writings had its origin in Persian 
thought encountered by the Jews toward the end of and after the Exile (Baillie 1934: 
129 -130). Above I observed that for pre -exilic Judaism personal survival was a 
dismal affair in the underworld. The conception of bodily resurrection, in contrast to 
the idea of survival of a separable soul, is neither widespread nor easy to account for. 
That the same conception should originate independently among two religious 
groups in the Middle East at the same period of antiquity seems on the face of it most 
unlikely. 
Cohn (1993: esp. 220 -228) argues that the resurrection found in the late 
Jewish prophets is owed to Zoroastrian influence. When the Persians conquered the 
Babylonians, the majority of the Jews exiled in Mesopotamia chose to remain there 
instead of returning to Palestine as the new conquerors allowed. While previous and 
subsequent overlords, the Egyptians, Babylonians, Greeks and Romans, were reviled 
and their religions abominated by the Jews of the first millennium BCE, this is not 
the case for the Persians. Acquaintance with and respect for Persian beliefs was 
possible for Jews serving Persian households and institutions and participating in the 
urban life of the empire. The Persian doctrine of the end of the age, when oppression 
and evil would be finally overthrown, appealed to the Jews, with their history of 
oppression by foreign peoples. Sympathetic to the Zoroastrian doctrine, the Jews 
adapted its eschatology to their own history and condition. 
Clear similarities are demonstrated between the Jewish conceptions of 
resurrection and afterlife and those of the Zoroastrianism of the Persian Empire. 
Additionally Cohn elucidates the similarities of the concepts of the Son of Man in 
Enoch and Daniel and those of the Essene and Christian messiah to the Zoroastrian 
doctrine of the saoshyanls, the future saviours who are born from the seed of 
Zoroaster. He is able to attribute most of Judaeo -Christian apocalyptic to a 
combination of Zoroastrian expectations with the ancient combat myth found in 
many cultures, as exemplified by the Babylonian story of Marduk destroying the sea 
monster Tiamat and the Greek story of Zeus destroying the Titans. In the Zoroastrian 
world view, the great combat is relocated from a past mythical era to the 
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ecshatological future. One observes that the outcome of the combat is 
correspondingly more grand. In the ancient story, the defeat of the monsters brought 
about the end of chaos and ushered in the present age of order and normality; in 
Zoroastrian and Judaeo -Christian prophecy, the defeat of evil will bring about the 
end of mere normality and inaugurate an unending era of bliss and glory. 
It seems probable that the blissful afterlife, alien to pre -exilic and much of 
post- exilic Judaism but promised by Pharisaic Judaism and elaborated and spread by 
Christianity, is in the end derived from Zoroastrian doctrine. The question arises: 
where did the Zoroastrians get their idea of a blissful afterlife? As with the Platonic 
or Pythagorean doctrine, the core and motivation of the belief must lie, I think, not in 
theory but in an other -worldly experience. In Chapter 10 I present an hypothesis 
about the nature of this experience. 
Of countries whose history is easily accessible to western scholars, the 
remaining location where an idea of a heavenly blissful afterlife has been 
encountered is Egypt. Its occurrence there seems to be independent of and probably 
earlier than its origin in Persia. For Egypt also I take Baillie's view that an 
experience of some striking kind must lie at the core of the belief. In Chapter 10 I 
present evidence about the nature of that putative experience. 
Chapter 9 187 
CHAPTER 10 
ANOTHER WORLD: HEAVEN 
Other -worldly experience 
Enraptured states 
At some stage of prehistory there was a time when there was no doctrine or 
tradition, and people or prehumans did not seek experiences for their religious 
significance, because there was no religion to give significance. Even so, there must 
still have occurred experiences of altered states of consciousness comparable to those 
of later times which have been regarded as religious. In remote prehistory people will 
have attained states of bliss, rapture or ecstasy in the absence of an interpretative 
framework to make sense of them. 
There are various means whereby an overwhelming enraptured or blissful 
state may be attained. In earlier chapters I discussed neural phenomena, including 
auras associated particularly with temporal lobe epilepsy, which in a minority of 
cases include states of intense bliss and which occur spontaneously in some 
individuals. Near -death experiences often incorporate blissful states, which manifest 
common elements whatever the cultural content of the experience: the subject 
encounters either Christ or Krishna, for example, but both figures appear radiant and 
welcoming. Experiences which resemble the above subjectively can be induced 
deliberately: by meditation, controlled breathing and other physiological techniques 
which generally restrict the flow of oxygen to the brain, or by ingestion of 
intoxicating material. For origins, then, there are five possibilities: spontaneous 
epileptic or quasi -epileptic episodes, near -death experiences, meditation, 
physiological techniques and intoxication. 
Neither blissful epileptic auras nor near -death experiences are common, but 
they do occur, and there is no reason to believe they did not occur in antiquity or 
prehistory. Those experiences would be uncontrolled: the epileptic variety 
spontaneous and the near -death variety occurring in unpredictable physiological 
trauma. 
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Meditation and breathing techniques, or a combination of the two. are the 
preferred methods of inducing a religious experience today in literate societies. But 
these are generally taught by an experienced practitioner. One does not meditate for 
the first time without having some idea what one is seeking. Either one has been told 
that some sort of experience is possible and something of what it should be like, or 
one has read about it, or one has experienced it spontaneously before. The same 
applies not just to contemplation but also to physical exercises such as overbreathing, 
shallow breathing, drumming, dancing or whirling. These activities in a religious 
context are alternative ways of seeking an experience about which one has prior 
knowledge or expectation (Harner 1973a: xii). One may whirl round without 
particular intention and end up in a mild altered state. Children do this, and an adult 
may have learned in childhood that a pleasant altered state can be induced (Weil 
1998: 19, 24 -25). However, the altered states induced by physical activity not 
specifically directed toward religious experience are likely to be of short duration 
and consist of either mere dizziness or, in a fortunate case, euphoria due to the 
release of endorphins. Sports players report such `highs' without religious 
connotation. In prehistory and early antiquity, without a prior theory as to why one 
would undertake the exercise - that is, an expectation of what experience one would 
be seeking and how the technique or activity might bring it about - I should think 
those practices would rarely be undertaken. No doubt, however, at some time in 
prehistory, someone must have been the first to `meditate', in some manner or other, 
without knowing what experience would supervene. 
Consider a population with no prior tradition of inducing altered states of 
consciousness. It seems clear that the most likely occasion of an unanticipated first 
experience of a striking and memorable altered state is offered by the accidental 
ingestion of psychoactive plant material. The reason why it is the most likely means 
is that the experience could be precipitated in anyone, with or without specific 
neurological predispositions and with no effort, simply by eating something found in 
the environment. 
Once that experience had been attained and repeated, practitioners would 
investigate other means of obtaining the ecstatic experience. This would be 
particularly the case if there were some change in circumstances which made the 
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original source of that experience inaccessible to a population, such as climate 
change, migration or captivity; the memory of it would remain. They would pursue 
those physiological avenues, such as altered breathing or rhythmic drumming, which 
had accompanied the experience when formerly induced by the intoxicant, or had 
been discovered inadvertently to produce similar results. It is reasonable to suppose 
that this is how the alternative techniques of ecstasy were developed, as Eliade 
proposes for India, where not only alternative techniques but also a whole religious 
philosophy grew up, ultimately based upon ecstatic experience but with vast 
elaborations unknown to the original practitioners (Eliade 1978: 212). 
Eliade (1964: 414) had earlier raised the question, in respect of India, whether 
(1) the schemes of its religious philosophy are derived from conceptualizing the 
ecstatic experiences of a few, or (2) the ecstatic experiences come from an effort 
toward `interiorization' of existing conceptual schemes. In his later (1978) view (1) 
is much more likely, and (1) makes far more sense to me. 
In the rest of this chapter I shall present evidence for the following 
propositions. 
Plants containing psychoactive chemicals grow in most parts of the world. In the 
majority of cases they have been used by tribal people to induce altered states, 
and such experiences invariably form part of their religious tradition. 
A variety of altered states can be produced by intoxicants, and among those are 
some which with repeated experiences could induce a subject to believe that 
there is another world. 
The conceptions of another world in certain classical historical religious 
traditions are derived from experiences resulting from the consumption of 
psychoactive plant material. I specifically discuss the Greek mysteries, the Indo- 
Iranian and Zoroastrian tradition, and Egyptian religion. 
Psychoactive plants 
By `psychoactive' I mean having the property of unilaterally altering the 
mood and perceptions of the subject. Various terms have been used in recent decades 
more or less as synonyms, perhaps the commonest being `hallucinogenic' (producing 
hallucinations), `psychotomimetic' (simulating psychosis), `entheogenic' (causing 
the divine to enter the subject). Each of these terms embodies a value judgement 
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about the experiences produced. The words 'entheogen' and `entheogenic', favoured 
by Wasson, Ruck and the Shulgins (e.g., Shulgin and Shulgin 1997: 41; cf. Forte 
1990: 1, 8) are particularly tendentious. Discussing the appropriateness or otherwise 
of these and other terms, Schultes and Hoffmann (1992: 12 -13) conclude that no 
word is universally suitable, ironically in this and other passages all the while using 
the satisfactory value -neutral term `psychoactive'. 
Even such common food substances as coffee and tea are regarded as mildly 
psychoactive, in that the caffeine they contain is a stimulant. Alcohol is 
psychoactive, inducing euphoria at first, followed by depression or sleepiness. The 
latter effect enables alcohol to be classed as a narcotic, like tobacco (Schultes and 
Hoffmann 1992: 10 -12). However, it is the more strongly psychoactive plants, those 
which produce striking and memorable alterations in perception and mood, and 
particularly those which are strictly hallucinogenic, that are of interest here. Tobacco 
as used by the natives of South and North America is included among these, because 
tribal people have traditionally consumed tobacco from species containing higher 
concentrations of toxic substances than commercial plantation tobacco, and in very 
large quantities (Von Gernet 1995; Wilbert 1972). From now on, I shall use the word 
`psychoactive' and a synonym `psychotropic' to refer only to substances having 
strongly mind- altering but not necessarily strictly hallucinogenic properties. 
Every continent except Antarctica has its complement of plants containing 
psychoactive chemicals. These are found principally among the lowest orders, the 
fungi, and the highest, the most recently evolved flowering plants (Schultes and 
Hoffmann 1992: 16 -19; Schultes 1972: 5 -6). The reason why the extracts of some 
plants are psychoactive is that they contain alkaloids which in their composition and 
structure resemble the body's own neurotransmitters. Some alkaloids such as 
morphine, derived from the opium poppy, were isolated long before 
neurotransmitters were discovered (Furst 1990: xx). Alkaloids are alkaline 
substances containing nitrogen, and may possibly be waste products of processes 
occurring in certain plants. Why only some plants produce them is unknown 
(Hoffmann 1978: 25; Schultes and Hoffmann 1992: 20 -22). The neurotransmission 
effects of these alkaloids presumably open pathways in the brain - that is, enhance or 
Chapter 10 191 
activate circuits of neuron populations - which would normally remain suppressed or 
inactive. 
While in drug- enforcement circles, especially in the United States, the word 
`narcotic' is used to cover all kinds of psychoactive material, the effects of the 
various plants vary, and they can be classified accordingly. Intoxicants include the 
familiar alcohol. Stimulants include coca and its cocaine derivatives, and 
amphetamines. Euphoriants include cannabis and its derivatives, such as marijuana 
and hashish. Narcotics tend to be euphoriants also but induce sleep and dreaming; 
they include opium and its derivatives such as morphine and heroin, as well as 
tobacco. True hallucinogens, producing visionary experiences, include a variety of 
Old and New World fungi such as the Mexican magic mushroom Psilocybe, cacti 
such as Peyote, and the seeds and tissue of a large number of leguminous and 
flowering plants, such as morning -glory seeds, the vine Banisteriopsis, Syrian rue, 
henbane, belladonna and many others. 
Here I list general effects of the types of drugs according to Huxley (1970). 
Intoxicants such as the alcohol of beer and wine produce euphoria, then incapacity 
and narcosis, the drunkenness well known in western culture. Stimulants such as 
amphetamines speed up the metabolism. Cocaine removes anxiety symptoms and 
increases vigour and wakefulness. Euphoriants such as cannabis create a feeling of 
well- being. Narcotics such as opium slow down physical activity and produce 
dreaming sleep, sometimes of fantastic scenes. 
Huxley states that the hallucinogens produce `inspired imagination'. Drugs 
used in religious contexts tend to be hallucinogens rather than narcotics. The South 
American ayahuasca or yagé, the concoction based on Banisteriopsis, generates 
surges of energy with terrifying and splendid visions, including sometimes the 
tearing apart of the subject by beasts of prey. The flowering Datura plant generates 
visions and a sense of power. The Amanita mushroom (fly agaric) produces `startling 
visions'. The Lophophora cactus (Peyote) produces visions of fantastic, colourful 
landscapes and architecture with giant figures. The Psilocybe mushroom induces 
depersonalization, detachment of the self, which enables the subject to feel able to 
pass through things and enter other bodies. While narcotics alleviate anxiety, 
hallucinogens do not, hence the `bad trip'. Hallucinogens separate the ego or sense of 
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self from the imagination, so that the experience seems to be imposed from outside 
and may include an attack on the self In traditional cultures, the practitioner is 
trained to expect and accept the attack, and thereby to become stronger. The beasts of 
prey which tear a shaman apart in his initiation often also put him back together 
(Harper 1973b: 160 -163; cf. Eliade 1964: 44, 56, 59, 486). 
The above sketch, condensed from Huxley, is of course inadequate to express 
the range of experiences which subjects undergo, but it is consistent with a wide 
literature, including medical summaries (e.g., Frude 1998: 186 -197). Psychoactive 
substances are rarely wholly narcotic or wholly stimulating or wholly hallucinogenic, 
and effects may differ at various stages during the period of psychoactivity. Also, the 
effects depend significantly upon set and setting. Set is the expectation, attitude and 
belief system of the subject; setting is the physical surroundings and conditions - 
light or darkness, open or enclosed space, for example - in which the experience 
takes place (Devereux 1997: 45). The important point for my purpose is that among 
the experiences induced by narcotics and hallucinogens are some which appear to 
extend the subject's perceptions, enlarge the boundaries of his or her world, or enable 
travel to another realm of being interpreted as `metaphysical realms', `upper world', 
`lower world', `spirit world'. In some South American tribal societies the common 
term for the visionary experience literally is `trip' (Harper 1973a: xii; Metzner 1999: 
15 -17). 
The hallucinogenic `tea' ayahuasca taken in the northern countries of South 
America has been said to produce similar experiences among both indigenous people 
and visitors from foreign cultures (Kensinger 1973: 12). Harner (1973b) describes 
five themes which commonly occur during the hallucinations: (1) release of the soul 
from the body, and a trip, often soaring into the air; (2) visions of snakes and jaguars; 
(3) visions of gods and demons; (4) seeing distant but real places and the people in 
them; (5) divination: for example, learning who committed a crime or bewitched a 
patient. Now that ` ayahuasca tourism' by western visitors exploiting the traditional 
practices of native peoples has developed (Metzner 1999: 38 -40), the statistical 
analysis of the experiences of large numbers of subjects would be an obvious area for 
research. The proposition that specific drugs may produce specific experiences is 
interesting. For example, if it could be shown that, say, eating a certain type of 
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mushroom gave rise to hallucinations of fairies, then this would be the likely origin 
of the notion of fairies. However, I have not found any such correlation in the 
literature. 
Psychoactive alkaloids have been isolated in the laboratory from many 
species traditionally used for mind -altering purposes. In most plants several distinct, 
but usually related, psychoactive substances are present. Equally, similar alkaloids 
may occur in plants of widely different types. Most of the mind -altering substances 
occurring in nature are found in plants, but some animals, including certain toads and 
caterpillars, contain hallucinogens. The toad Bufo marinus exudes a secretion 
containing the tryptamine alkaloid bufotenine, which is also found in beans of the 
tree Anadenanthera. These beans, containing further tryptamine alkaloids, are the 
source of a traditional hallucinatory snuff used by South American Indians (Schultes 
and Hoffmann 1992: 118; Emboden 1978: 395). 
Human beings in tribal societies have shown ingenuity in means of 
consuming psychoactive material. It has been burnt in bowls and the fumes inhaled; 
smoked in pipes; snorted dry or snuffed up a pipe; blown by one person through a 
pipe into another's nostrils; chewed and swallowed; chewed by one person and 
expelled for swallowing by another; mashed and mixed with water or milk, then 
drunk cold, or boiled and allowed to cool and the mixture drunk; rubbed on a part of 
the body for absorption through the skin, even on the inward aspect of the eyelid; 
inserted as a rectal suppository, either manually by the subject or blown up through a 
pipe by a partner; or recovered in the urine of a primary intoxicated subject and 
drunk by another. 
All over the world, plants containing psychoactive agents have been sought 
out by local people and employed in traditional religious or magical practices. The 
only peoples who have not been known to employ hallucinogens are the natives of 
Australia and New Zealand and the Eskimo, presumably owing to a scarcity of such 
plants in the regions they inhabit (Schultes and Hoffman 1992: 26). 
It has been asserted that human beings are physiologically attracted to 
dreamlike or intoxicated states. At the very least, a dreamlike state offers a unique 
combination of relaxation and excitement without the danger of injury, unless from 
toxic agents consumed to procure that state. Evidence that intoxication is desired is 
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given by the almost universal attraction of alcohol» Furst (1990: xix -xxi) cites 
psychopharmacological opinion that the desire for intoxication is an innate organic 
drive alongside those for personal survival and reproduction, and discusses the 
proposition that animals generally, including insects as well as mammals, are 
specially attracted to intoxicating plants. Writing originally in 1972, Weil (1998: 
passim, esp. 19, 21, 31) was the first to present the argument that the desire for 
altered states is an innate drive. He points out that sleeping, daydreaming, 
meditation, general anaesthesia, delirium and even being engrossed in entertainment 
as a spectator are all altered states of consciousness, different from normal waking 
attentiveness. People generally enjoy and wish to prolong and repeat at least some of 
those conditions. 
Shamanic and prehistoric use of psychoactives 
Eliade (1964) defines shamanism most concisely as `techniques of ecstasy' 
(1964: 4) and describes its world -view and phenomena as found in Central Asia and 
Siberia. Shamanism of fundamentally the same form has been identified in the 
Arctic, North and South America, Australasia and Oceania, southern Asia and 
ancient Europe. The only continent from which shamanism seemed to be absent was 
Africa; but `true' shamanism has been described from there also (La Barre 1972: 
268).2 In the same vein, Baldick (2000: 169) denies any dichotomy between African 
spirit- possession, in which the subject is under the control of a spirit (e.g, Nadel 
1946), and Asiatic shamanism in which the subject may either be possessed by or 
command spirits. Eliade (1964: 4, 496, 500 -502, 506) raises the question of Indian 
(Buddhist) and Middle Eastern influence in creating the Central Asian shamanic 
world -view. Yet while there may have been some transfer of `Lamaist' ideas 
(Alexeev 1990), the presence of essentially similar beliefs and practices throughout 
northern Eurasia and pre- Columbian America demonstrates that the core shamanic 
complex is aboriginal. 
Primitive elements of religion are not necessarily shamanic and the shamanic 
not necessarily primitive (Eliade 1964: 3 -12). Shamanism has certain universal 
However, eastern Asiatic people, not including Siberians, generally display allergic reactions, 
flushing and sweating, to alcohol. 
2 La Barre cites Nadel (1946), to which Eliade also refers (1964: 26, 27), but Eliade does not commit 
to the presence of true shamanism in Africa. 
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characteristics, among which the principal one is that a state of trance or ecstasy is 
valued as the primary religious experience (Eliade 1964: 107). In such a state the 
shaman is believed to be able to leave his or her body and make a journey to the sky, 
the underworld or distant places, and in those places observe and converse with other 
beings, human, animal and supernatural. Further, in that state, the shaman, in the role 
of medicine man or woman, is able to heal patients because the causes of illness 
become visible. Generally shamans demonstrate a predisposition to the vocation in 
youth, but are usually also trained by older shamans in the techniques of achieving 
ecstasy and of what can be accomplished in that state (Furst 1994: 4 -7). There has 
been some dispute in the literature about whether `trance' means the same thing in all 
contexts. Here, following Eliade, I use it to refer generically to altered states of 
consciousness whose subjective components and objective circumstances are well 
documented in numerous works (e.g., Furst 1990; 1994; and his references). 
It will be observed that the core elements of shamanism do not include 
worship of gods, sacrifice, offerings or elaborate theology. Sacrifice is present in 
some forms of shamanism, for example in Central Asia (Alexeev 1990), but is not a 
core element (Hultkrantz 1978: 33, 37). What ritual there is serves induction of 
trance, not worship or celebration. It does involve an ontology of spirit beings, both 
souls of the dead and non -human supernaturals or daemons, including demons. It 
also, crucially for the present chapter, involves the existence of other worlds, other 
places or planes of existence, which can be reached by `leaving the body' - that is, in 
an altered state. 
It has been argued that a basic shamanism is the aboriginal religious complex 
or Ur- Religion of the whole of prehistoric Eurasia (La Barre 1972: 268 -273, 278; 
1970a: 387 -432; cf. Eliade 1964: 502 -504; Baldick 2000: 143) and that this formed 
part of a generalized Palaeolithic Ur- Kultur (Kluckhohn 1959: 271). Features of the 
cave art of Upper Palaeolithic western Europe, some of it dating as long as 31,000 
years ago and continuing until about 13,000 years ago (Chauvet et al. 2001: 9 -11, 
122 -123), are widely but not universally regarded as evidence of shamanic practices 
(Dickson 1990 and his references; Baldick 2000: 156). 
La Barre (1972: 270 -273, 278) proposes that this hunting and shamanistic 
cultural complex was carried by the proto- Amerindians at a Mesolithic stage of 
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material culture when they migrated from Siberia into Alaska toward the end of the 
last glaciation about 14,000 years ago, and spread by them over the western 
hemisphere. Hultkrantz (1978: 53) confirms the continuity of specific elements of 
shamanism from Eurasia to the Americas: the séance focused on a spirit lodge or 
shaking tent, the ecstatic journey and the great spirit who is master or mistress of the 
animals. La Barre (1970b; 1972) further argues that the proto- Amerindians, 
accustomed to the use of hallucinogens for religious purposes, were primed to seek 
out psychoactive plants in their new environment. This aspect of their originally 
homogeneous culture accounts for the wider and more intense religious use of 
hallucinogens, among pre -agriculturalists, in the Americas than in the Old World. 
As late as the early 1970s, Harrier (1973a: xiv) was able to write that 
academic literature on shamanism largely overlooked the use of hallucinogens by 
shamans. This omission has been rectified since, as later collections (e.g., Seaman 
and Day 1994; Browman and Schwarz 1979) demonstrate. It is always possible that 
shamans in prehistory used such means as drumming, dancing, or hardship and 
solitude to achieve trance states before they discovered and used psychoactive plants. 
Wilbert (1994: 47 -48) acknowledges this, but does not believe it, with regard to 
South American native societies. In his classic work, Eliade (1964: 223, 400 -401, 
477) denied that shamans traditionally had used psychotropic agents to bring about 
the trance state, and claimed that those who did in recent times represented 
degeneration from archaic practice. He was taken to task for this by Wasson (1968: 
326 -334), who shows that Eliade's pronouncements are assertion, not 
demonstration.' Shortly before his death, Eliade conceded that the use of 
psychoactive plant material was indeed archaic and that shamanic techniques were 
equally valid whether or not assisted by chemical agents (Furst 1994: 23). 
Shamanism is discussed further in Chapter 11. 
With the invention of agriculture, the rise of settled communities and the 
specialization of roles in more complex societies, shamanism disappeared in much of 
the Old World, surviving among hunter -gatherers and among the nomadic 
pastoralists of northern Asia. In pre -Columbian America, shamanism survived more 
Also, Eliade derives Central Asian words of the form pank for `mushroom' and `intoxication' from 
Persian bang, meaning `cannabis'. Wasson shows that this derivation is untenable. 
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widely along with the continuing hunter -gatherer culture, but was discarded by the 
agriculturalists of south -western North America and the city -dwelling cultures of 
Central America and the Andes. These cultural changes in the Americas provide an 
illustration of the processes which are believed to have occurred earlier in the Old 
World (La Barre 1970b; 1972; Hultkrantz 1978: 52). 
In the Neolithic and early Bronze Age, much of Eurasia was a zone of 
`smoking cultures', like recent North America. In archaeological sites from Siberia 
and Armenia to western Europe, and dating from the third to the first millennium 
BCE, bowls have been found, made of pottery and later of bronze, sometimes 
perforated, which appear to be braziers for burning plant material. At some sites a 
residue of hemp or opium has been detected in the base of these vessels. In the Altai 
mountains, burial mounds have been excavated, each containing a tent -like structure 
over a brazier containing stones and hemp seeds, the psychoactive leaves and stems 
presumably having been destroyed by the fire. This is reminiscent of a practice of the 
Scythians documented by Herodotus'. The opium poppy was being actively 
cultivated in central Europe in the Neolithic (Sherratt 1995; Devereux 1997: 31 -45; 
Rudgeley 1999: 139). 
Sherratt (1995) proposes that the original means of consuming psychoactive 
plant material was by smoking, and rather by inhaling smoke from a brazier in a 
confined space than through a pipe. He argues that when wine and beer became 
common in the Near East and Mediterranean in antiquity, the liquid mode of 
consuming the new intoxicants was applied to the old ones, and the practice spread 
northwards. On Cyprus in the second millennium BCE, opium was cultivated 
commercially, prepared as a liquid mixture with olive oil, and exported in 
characteristic jars shaped like poppy seed capsules to the Levant and Egypt. Temples 
excavated in Turkmenistan and Tadjikistan, dating to the second millennium BCE, 
contained repositories for ash, presumed to be from sacred fires, and vats and 
strainers for liquids. Pollen traces of cannabis, opium poppy and Ephedra - the latter 
a mild euphoriant and stimulant (Wasson 1968: 126, 133, 141 -142) - have been 
found in these. It seems that these plants, formerly smoked, had come to be prepared 
by grinding and infusion and consumed in liquid form. 
Herodotus, Histories IV: 75. 
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In the ancient civilizations of the Middle East and Mediterranean, alcohol, 
mostly in the form of wine, became a popular, more palatable and less cumbersome 
replacement for stronger psychoactives. However, wine in classical Greece and the 
Roman Empire could be extremely potent. Ruck (1978c: 89 -93) notes a passage in 
Pliny' mentioning a wine which required dilution with eight parts of water to be 
drunk safely. Ruck explains that its alcohol content could not be greater than 14 per 
cent, since above that proportion alcohol is fatal to the yeast which produces it. The 
ancients were unacquainted with distillation. The extra intoxication, therefore, must 
have been produced by other substances. Among these, myrrh was sometimes added 
as a soporific. At a drinking party the symposiarch was in charge of mixing and 
dilution. One surmises that he was elected for his skill in combining wines, water and 
other substances to produce enjoyable varieties of intoxication without killing the 
guests. Ruck's evidence is consistent with Sherratt's proposal about the transition 
from inhaled psychoactives to wine and other alcoholic beverages. Wine did not 
simply replace the substances already known; instead it was used in combination 
with such of them as could practically be added. 
In Mesolithic North America, it may be that highly toxic plant hallucinogens 
sought out by the earliest populations gave way to less toxic but still hallucinogenic 
species discovered later (La Barre 1974). Much later, when European liquor was 
introduced to North America, some native tribes adopted it for religious use, 
including shamanic healing (Trenk 2001: 73 -81). Similarly, in Old World 
agricultural and city -dwelling societies, the hallucinogens characteristic of ecstatic 
shamanism seem to have been replaced by narcotics and euphoriants and then by 
alcohol, so that the ecstatic form of drug - induced experience became less common or 
only a memory. If this had not been so, then the experiences arising from the 
rediscovery of hallucinogens or minority continuance of rituals involving them 
would have been less striking than they evidently were (see below on `A Blissful 
Afterlife'). 
The origin of the idea of other worlds 
I am arguing not merely that psychoactive chemical agents have been used in 
tribal societies from the earliest times, which is now commonly acknowledged, but 
Pliny the Elder, Natural History 14: 53. 
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that they were the original means, and for long the only means, of attaining a trance 
state. 
It is one thing to note that shamans in recent times have used techniques other 
than the ingestion of psychotropic material. But those practitioners stand at the end 
of a long tradition of shamanism, in the course of which numerous alternative 
practices for seeking altered states have been developed. If we consider a time before 
there was any shamanism, what is the most likely means of inducing a `trance' state? 
One possibility is that early humans or prehumans engaged in rhythmic or whirling 
movements until they became giddy and then ecstatic: they `danced out' their 
religion, as Marett (1914: xxxi) put it. But what religion were they dancing out 
before there was any religion? While for some of us dancing readily leads to 
giddiness, one surmises that it would take a long time and sustained effort to become 
actually ecstatic unless the subject were already intoxicated. The same applies to 
drumming. As for the vision quest with its physical extremes and sensory 
deprivation, what would induce a practitioner to go on a quest before there was any 
religious theory as to what a quest was for? For those physical procedures not using 
chemicals, the subject's intention and expectation - what in the drugs context is 
called set - are necessary to bring about the success of the procedure. But before 
there was any tradition there was no expectation. 
The most likely means of inducing altered states before there was any theory 
or tradition to justify seeking them was the accidental ingestion of psychoactive plant 
material. An effect would not be instantaneous, except perhaps in the case of coca, 
but it would come about more or less inevitably and effortlessly. I hypothesize that it 
was these experiences for individuals that produced the notion that such states are 
possible, interesting and desirable, and the broader notion that there is more to the 
world than meets the eye in normal waking consciousness. 
Such episodes of altered consciousness experienced by isolated individuals 
would be repeated many times all over the inhabited world where psychoactive 
material was available, for tens of thousands of years, long before there were any 
practices that we would recognize as shamanism. Homo erectus and even his 
predecessors must from time to time have eaten psychoactive material and gone out 
of their tiny minds. With their small brains, comprising less association cortex to run 
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riot than ours, one suspects that the altered states attained were less profound, less 
full of imagery. But they may still have been on occasion overwhelming, depending 
on dosage. However that may be, only when people could talk and compare their 
experiences was there the possibility of forming a rudimentary theory as to what they 
had experienced, and this represented the beginning of tradition. Tradition therefore 
probably did not come about until the advent of Homo sapiens. 
For clarity, here is an explicit statement of my position. In prehistory people 
did not first seek out psychoactive agents in the environment so as to bring about 
trance states which they already knew about in their tradition and wished to attain 
with greater ease. On the contrary, it was the inadvertent ingestion of psychoactive 
plant material that first produced trance states; the repetition of these at first 
unintentional experiences was the origin of the awareness that trance states could be 
attained and were desirable, and antedated any other means of securing them. 
Furthermore, it is the drug -induced experience of apparently reaching distant 
places or other levels of existence in which one typically encounters strange scenes 
and objects, and agents interpreted as spirit beings, that gives rise to the idea that 
there are other worlds besides the everyday waking world. Before these experiences, 
I propose, humans and prehumans did not have any idea that there could be another 
world. It was only when they experienced these apparent encounters that the limits of 
the unitary normal world seemed to be extended. At first there would be no 
differentiation between the normal and other worlds. But only a little reflection 
would be required to notice that the unusual modes of being and their unusual 
denizens were only encountered in the ecstatic state; they could therefore be 
imagined to belong to another world. The other world could be interpreted as a kind 
of place, distant but real, perhaps even physically present, and accessible by means 
of what would later be described as a shamanic journey. 
The other worlds of shamanism, the heavens (but not yet genuine heaven) and 
hells above and below the everyday middle earth (Eliade 1964), with their flights and 
bliss, monsters and terror, can be recognized as visions induced by hallucinogens 
(Ripinsky -Naxon 1993: 176 -177). An attempt to determine more precisely how the 
transculturally similar geographies and spirit -being inhabitants of shamanic other 
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worlds can be derived from hallucinatory experience would form a worthwhile 
research project. 
Access to other worlds, therefore, was apparently given by an ecstatic state 
and ultimately by the substances ingested to produce it. The experiences were strange 
and fascinating - that is, they incorporated numinous feelings mediated by certain 
neural processes. Those neural processes were activated by the alkaloids contained in 
the plant material. Not unnaturally, plants which enabled numinous experiences 
came to be regarded as themselves numinous or sacred. 
A blissful afterlife 
It is with the trance -valuing shamanic form of religion that the idea of another 
world first arose, through the experiences detailed above. However, the other worlds 
which appear in shamanic contexts are not always blissful, and not yet a heavenly or 
resurrected blissful afterlife. How the latter conceptions may have come into being 
can perhaps be illustrated by examination of three cultural developments which 
include blissful states to be experienced in this life and hoped for after death: in 
Greece, in Iran and India, and in Egypt. 
The Eleusinian Mysteries 
For this section I have relied on Mylonas (1961: 224 -285) and Kerenyi 
(1967). 
The Mysteries at Eleusis may have begun in or after the late second 
millennium BCE, and continued to be celebrated until the late fourth century CE. At 
first the Mysteries seem to have been an agrarian cult in the possession of local 
families at Eleusis, fourteen miles from Athens, but when Eleusis was incorporated 
into the Athenian state, they were promoted as a state cult. From that time there were 
two celebrations: the Lesser Mysteries at Agrai in Athens in February, and the 
Greater Mysteries, partly at Athens but culminating at Eleusis, in September - 
October. The Mysteries were open to men, women and children, including slaves. At 
first only Athenians were eligible, then all Greeks, then, in Imperial times, all 
Romans. Unlike the Orphic religion, the Eleusinian cult had little or no doctrine and 
made no lifestyle demands on its adherents. The only requirement was that they 
should know Greek, so that they could understand the ceremonial utterances, and not 
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be ritually unclean, for example by having committed murder. A person attended the 
Mysteries only once in his or her life (Nilsson 1925: 211, 241, 293; Guthrie 1935: 
154, 161). 
Parker (1996: 25, 97 -99, 188) stresses the insufficiency of evidence for great 
antiquity or ancient independence of the Eleusinian Mysteries from Athens. In the 
sixth century BCE a number of religious reforms were undertaken there, including 
the incorporation of the Eleusinian cult and major building work at its sanctuary. The 
cult of a `mother' goddess was conducted at Agrai and linked with that of the 
`mother' Demeter at Eleusis by 460 BCE. 
The central myth relating to the Mysteries is that of the goddess Demeter and 
her daughter Persephone (Kore). Persephone, gathering flowers, was abducted by 
Plouton, the god of the underworld. Demeter searched for her daughter and became 
distraught, and refused to allow crops to grow. When the other gods became alarmed 
that human beings would perish and therefore cease to make offerings, an 
arrangement was made whereby Kore would be restored to her mother for part of the 
year but have to spend the rest of the year in the underworld with her new husband. 
The myth is related in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter, which was committed to 
writing some time in the seventh century. 
When a candidate had experienced the Lesser Mysteries, he or she was an 
initiate called mystes. In the following year the mystai were eligible to attend the 
Greater Mysteries. After various celebrations at Athens, including the sacrifice of a 
pig, the usual animal in purificatory sacrifices (Nilsson 1925: 86), the mystai set off 
in festive procession to Eleusis. There could be thousands of candidates. They were 
led by priestesses carrying the hiera (`sacred things'), which had earlier been brought 
from Eleusis to Athens and stored temporarily in the temple there called Eleusinion. 
The hiera were contained in sealed containers, kistai, and what they were is 
unknown. Arriving at Eleusis in the evening, the mystai with their sponsors, 
mystagogoi, crossed a pedestrian bridge over a stream to the side where lay the 
sacred enclosure, a large area containing a number of temples and other features, 
including a cave called Ploutonion, presented as an entrance to the underworld. The 
next day, the sixth day of the festival, was one of rest and fasting. 
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On the evening of the sixth day, there seems to have been a pageant in which 
the mystai participated, recreating the frantic search of Demeter for her daughter. 
Some authorities envisage the candidates and their sponsors running about the sacred 
enclosure, visiting the Ploutonion and the temples, reliving the events and sharing the 
distress of Demeter recounted in the Homeric Hymn. Afterwards, the climax of the 
Mysteries, the telete (`completion'), awaited them when they entered the largest 
temple, the Telesterion. Inside this rectangular structure, tiers of steps lined the walls, 
and there was a large level area in the middle. Pillars supported the ceiling, and in the 
central area there was a shrine called the Anáktoron. The hall was lit by torches, and 
lighting effects may have formed part of the proceedings. There seems to have been a 
ceremonial dance by priestesses or by women initiates, carrying on their heads either 
large vessels bearing lights, or chalices called kernoi containing the kykeon. 
The kykeon was a concoction of water, barley and mint. At some point before 
or after entering, the mystai drank this potion In Kerenyi's (1967: 65 -66, 177) view, 
it was before the initiates were admitted to the sanctuary, since in the synthema, the 
sentence which they had to give as a password, the phrase occurs `I have drunk the 
kykeon' .I There is a possibility, less often mentioned in the literature, that earlier, to 
break their fast, they were given a cake, pelanos, made of barley (Ruck 1978b: 55). 
Mylonas (1961: 260) says the pelanos was an offering to Demeter, but this does not 
preclude its being shared by the initiates. 
In the Telesterion the mystai then had an overwhelming experience, which 
remained with them for the rest of their lives. The initiate was awed by sounds and 
music and dazzled by sights and colours (Guthrie 1935: 154). Things were enacted 
(dromena), things were spoken (legomena), and things were shown (deiknymena). It 
is likely that, during the first two, the hall was darkened, and that there was music, 
and dancing by the priestesses. Finally, a deep gong was sounded and the chief 
priest, the Hierophant (`he who shows the sacred things') threw open the doors of the 
Anáktoron, and in the midst of a bright light the hiera were exposed. At this point the 
mystai became epoptai (`they who have seen'). 
The synthema occurs in the context of the imitative Mysteries at Alexandria, and Mylonas rejects it 
for the original Eleusis (Kerenyi 1967: 206 -207). 
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Mylonas thinks the `sacred things' were possibly agricultural relics from 
Mycenean times, which he says would have impressed the later audiences, but Ruck 
dismisses this suggestion on the ground that agricultural implements of earlier and 
later times were indistinguishable (1978c: 84). Also, if they were small enough to fit 
in the kistai, they would have been too small to be seen recognizably in the 
Telesterion unless the initiates filed past individually. Hippolytus claimed, albeit 
derisively, that they were an ear of barley.' Other derisive and hcstile identifications 
by ancient commentators have included a phallus, a vulva, or both of these together, 
or the enactment of a hieros gamos in the semi -darkness. 
There seems to be a discrepancy between events as described so far and the 
awe -inspiring nature of the Greater Mysteries as recorded by the ancients. Athenian 
citizens, accustomed to dramatic productions including effects such as the deus ex 
machina, are unlikely to have been overwhelmed merely by a show. The Telesterion 
offered less than ideal space or visibility (Kerenyi 1967: 26 -27, 111, 113), and 
Mylonas points out that no staging equipment or record of expenditure for equipment 
has been found. 
A number of classical descriptions are quoted or cited by Kerenyi (1967) and 
repeated in Wasson et al. (1978). I give some here. According to Plutarch, `... 
persons being initiated into the mysteries throng together at the outset amid tumult 
and shouting ... but when the holy rites are being performed and disclosed the people 
are immediately attentive in awe and silence.... He who has succeeded in getting 
inside and has seen a great light adopts another bearing of silence and 
amazement....'2 Plutarch again, on the journey of the soul after death foreshadowed 
by the Mysteries, says: `At first [there were] wanderings and toilsome running round 
and through the darkness uncertain paths and blind alleys. Then, just before the end, 
[there were] all kinds of terrors, with shuddering, shivering, sweating and 
amazement. After this, a wonderful light met [the soul]; pure landscapes and 
meadows, containing voices and [choric] dances and the solemnities of sacred 
instructions and holy visions, received [the soul]'.3 Cicero says the Mysteries were 
Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 5.8.39. 
2 Plutarch, Progress in Virtue 81e. 
3 Stobaeus, Anthologium LII.49 (ed. Hense, vol. V, p.1089). The section claims (LII.48) to be citing 
Themistius, but it is accepted that this text is derived from Plutarch, On the Soul. The correct reference 
is given only by Kerenyi (1967: 204), but the translation comes from Ruck (1978b). I have modified 
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the best thing that Athens had brought to mankind, and that they gave a reason not 
only to live with happiness but also with the hope of a better death.' Plato describes 
in terms of the Mysteries the soul before its imprisonment in the body. The soul was 
then like an initiate, in a state of perfection, seeing perfect, simple, calm and happy 
appearances - which I take to be the pure forms.2 One who is newly initiated is better 
able than the rest to apprehend beauty in this world as a likeness of the genuine 
beauty of the forms. 
In 171 CE, invading barbarians set fire to the temples at Eleusis, and the 
profanation troubled Aelius Aristides, who was probably an initiate (Behr 1968: 
110). According to Wasson (1978: 17 -18), Aristides has these things to say about the 
telete: `new, astonishing, inaccessible to rational cognition', `most awesome and 
most luminous', `miraculous tidings', `ineffable visions', `where has there been such 
rivalry between seeing and hearing ?'.3 
Guthrie (1935: 155) suggests that the initiates were promised Elysium, and 
that this hope filled them with bliss and joy. Mylonas reports earlier opinion that the 
fasting, `mystic food', and the passion play of Demeter and Kore could induce in the 
worshipper a sense of mystic union with the divinity. So the Mysteries assume the 
form of an audience -participation Oberammergau. 
After all this, Mylonas confesses: `I cannot help feeling that there is much 
more to the cult of Eleusis that has remained a secret'. The secret of the Mysteries 
was sustained successfully throughout antiquity, over more than a millennium. The 
laws of Athens made it a crime to reveal what happened in the Telesterion, but even 
when Athens was only a subordinate city within the Roman Empire the secret was 
kept (Kerenyi 1967: 112; Ruck 1978b: 55 -57). That the Mysteries were so 
overwhelming as to conjure such reticence demands explanation. It will be observed 
it, rendering word for word wherever possible. Without embellishments, the passage is, if anything, 
more striking. The term akousmata (`things heard', translated as `sounds' by Ruck) was used of 
instruction in the Pythagorean schools. 
' Cicero, On the Laws 2.14.36. 
2 Plato, Phaedrus 249e-251c. Ruck seems to take the appearances (phasmata) to be of spirit beings. 
3 No reference is given for these quotations, and the only reference in Wasson et al. 1978 to any work 
of Aristides is to his Panathenaic Oration, 373. The latter simply makes clear that Eleusis was the 
largest festival of its kind and was attended by multitudes. Following the trail left by Kerényi (1967: 
203), who cites `ineffable' visions from Aristides Oration XXII, 257, I found the second, third, fourth 
and fifth of Wasson's quotations in Oration XXII, 256 -257 (Aristides Vol. 2, ed. Keil, Berlin 1898, 
p.28). 
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that the principal unknowns are: (1) what exactly happened in the Telesterion, (2) 
what were the hiera, (3) what was in the kykeon and pelanos? I shall deal mainly 
with the last, which I think is the key to the whole mystery. 
The kykeon and pelanos 
Aristides' rhetorical question `where has there been such rivalry between 
seeing and hearing ?' seems to indicate synaesthesia. Wasson relates how, during his 
intoxication with Psilocybe mushrooms at a shamanic séance in Mexico, sights 
seemed to take on rhythm, and the shaman's singing had colour and shape. He tells 
us `ecstasy is not fun' (Wasson 1978: 18). Trembling in the limbs, shivering and 
sweating were symptoms which the initiates experienced while waiting in the 
Telesterion. Even if there was a pageant and enactment, these symptoms are not 
effects of watching or participating. But they could have been physiological reactions 
to the toxins contained in any of various hallucinogenic plants. Ruck points out that 
every year for hundreds of years Eleusis was able to induce a memorable experience 
for thousands of initiates. There is no record of anyone coming away saying it was 
not all it was cracked up to be. The dependability of the effects seems to demand not 
merely a good show but a reliable chemical agency (Ruck 1978a: 37; 1978c: 80). 
Valencic (1994: 326) says that either Kerényi or the writer Graves was the 
first to propose that there was an hallucinogen in the kykeon. Graves favoured either 
the fly agaric or Panaeolus, another mushroom related to the Mexican Psilocybe. 
Recall that the kykeon was an infusion of barley and mint in water. The mint blechon 
or glechon is generally identified as Mentha pulegium, pennyroyal, used in perfumes. 
Kerenyi (1967: 178 -179, 214) suggests that the barley was fermented, and that the 
mint was psychoactive. He cites a personal communication from Hoffmann to the 
effect that an aromatic oil made from wild pennyroyal, if ingested in large doses, can 
produce delirium and spasms. Ruck (1978c: 100; 1986: 162 -163) says the mint has 
only slight psychoactive properties. However, mint can counteract the nausea 
induced by certain fungal preparations (Valencic 1994: 328). 
It is the central thesis of Wasson, Hoffinann and Ruck (1978) that a fungal 
growth on the barley component of the kykeon was the hallucinogen responsible. 
This growth is ergot, which, if consumed in flour made from infected grain, gives 
rise to ergot poisoning or ergotism. Ergotism can manifest in hallucinations and 
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convulsions. Of great interest is the fact that the most powerful hallucinogen known, 
LSD, is a synthetic variant of the psychoactive ergoline alkaloids. The ergot 
hypothesis is discussed in Appendix 10A. 
Inside the Telesterion 
Assuming an hallucinogen was employed, whatever its identity, I offer a 
scenario of what happened inside the Telesterion and what the hiera were, based on 
Kerenyi (1967) and Ruck (1978a; 1978b; 1978c) but with some additions. 
Inside the Telesterion were tiers of steps around the walls, on which people 
could stand or sit. Owing to numbers, probably many stood in the space in the 
middle, which was filled with evenly spaced pillars. The space was lit by flaming 
torches. Not quite in the centre stood the closed Anáktoron, possibly with a great fire 
burning inside it. Earlier, the initiates had drunk the required draught of kykeon and 
perhaps had been given the putative cakes made from the harvest of the Rarian Plain. 
The mood of expectancy was heightened by music, chanting and perhaps by the 
release of perfumes. Ruck is surely correct that the functionaries of Eleusis were 
aware of the importance of set and setting. 
At some point the kistai were brought out, and opened so that the initiates 
could see and handle the sacred objects, which Ruck identifies as cakes, balls of salt, 
pomegranates, poppies, fig branches, a serpent and a thyrsos (a hollow stem used for 
gathering berries).' On the other hand, rather than this collection, the hiera may just 
have been stalks and ears of barley, as stated by Hippolytus (see above), easily 
recognizable even from a distance but rendered mysterious by the circumstances. 
As the hallucinogen began to take effect, the initiates would have begun to 
experience synaesthesia; the music and voices would have seemed to come from 
various directions; colours would have been heightened; vertiginous sensations and 
depersonalization may have ensued. Possibly the torches were put out, and in the 
darkness sensory deprivation would have give rise to free hallucination. At the 
' This list of objects Ruck, following Kerenyi, gets from Clement of Alexandria, Exhortation to the 
Greeks 2.19. However, I find that Clement additionally lists marjoram, a lamp, a sword, and a 
woman's `comb', which he says is a euphemism for private parts. It all seems rather a lot to fit into a 
kist. Like some other Church Fathers, Clement was familiar with the `Eleusinian' Mysteries at 
Alexandria, which, instituted in the Ptolemaic period, were an imitation of the Attic Eleusinian 
Mysteries. They included erotic tableaux and were not kept secret (Kerenyi 1967: 115-120). But even 
Kerenyi applies some of Clement's testimony to the original Eleusis, which I find surprising. 
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climax, there was a sound of subterranean gongs, and the Hierophant intoned: `The 
lady Brimo has given birth to the lord Brimos!' 1 The Anáktoron was thrown open, 
and in the light of a great fire the initiates witnessed Kore with her son. She had 
come back from the dead. Given their immersion in the story of Demeter's loss and 
distress, the type of all human bereavement, one can imagine that the hearts of the 
initiates leaped with a surge of joy. The priestesses going about, perhaps not having 
partaken themselves of the hallucinogen and still dancing with headdresses bearing 
lights (Kerenyi 1967: 182 -185), may have seemed like supernatural beings. 
Blessed life after death 
The above scenario confirms but extends mainstream scholars' view that the 
Greater Mysteries involved a kind of passion play. But this is Oberammergau on 
acid. That is why it made such a powerful and lasting impression on the ancients. 
They experienced it only once in a lifetime. Wasson and Ruck avow a personal 
feeling of brotherhood with others at Eleusis, in Mexico and elsewhere throughout 
the ages `who have experienced the superior hallucinogens'. Putting aside the ego 
trip in favour of the ergot trip, I think one is bound to agree that a sense of 
fellowship, reverence and fidelity to the Mysteries would be a natural consequence of 
such powerful experiences. That is why the secret remained unrevealed. 
Most importantly, as Ruck phrases it, `Huddled in the darkness in the 
initiation hall, they saw something that validated the continuity of existence beyond 
the grave'. Baillie (1934: 103) tells us that the Hellenistic belief in a blessed 
immortality arose not from thought but from what for the classical Greeks was a new 
kind of religious experience, as exemplified by the Eleusinian Mysteries. The 
evidence of the initiates' own senses convinced them that they were changed, saved 
and assured of a blessed life after death (Guthrie 1935: 154; Kerenyi 1967: 13 -16). 
In the case of Plato we have someone on whom the experience of the 
Mysteries made a great impression. His mystical faith was as strong as that of any 
uneducated slave who just accepted that he had seen the goddesses appear from the 
Anáktoron. He combined a towering analytical intellect with receptiveness to non- 
rational experience. This combination motivated him to makes sense of and 
This scene is from Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 5.8.40 -41. 
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rationalize the faith, developing doctrines concerning the soul and immortality which 
have influenced all later western thought. The western conception of a blessed 
afterlife is owed not only to Judaeo -Christian (ultimately Zoroastrian) apocalyptic 
but also to the poetry of Plato's dialogues (Guthrie 1935: 238, 244). 
Zoroastrianism 
In ancient India and Iran, it appears that a tradition existed of priests 
ceremonially drinking a concoction, mixed from juice pressed from a plant, which 
raised them above the everyday world. This is the famous soma of the Rig Veda and 
haoma (the plant) and parahaoma (the potion) of the Avesta. In hymns of Book IX 
of the Rig Veda, soma itself is elevated to the status of a god. The Vedic translator 
Renou felt that soma was the heart and soul of the canon (Wasson 1968: 60). It has 
long been accepted among Vedic and Iranian scholars that soma and parahaoma 
were the same potion, and since the late eighteenth century it has been suspected that 
they contained psychoactive agents. As the tradition is attested in the oldest literature 
of both India and Iran, it appears to date from a time before the proto -Indo- Iranians 
went their separate ways, even to the period when they inhabited Central Asia. 
Effects of soma and haoma 
Ingalls (1971: 191) says `the soma experience was always an extraordinary 
event, exciting, immediate and transcending the logic of space and time'. The 
parahaoma produced exhilaration and heightened powers, inspiration and possession 
by divine power. Unlike alcohol and indeed contrasting with most other intoxicants, 
it gave no harmful side effects (Boyce 1975: 158). 
Here are some illustrative verses from the Rig Veda, taken from O'Flaherty's 
(1981) anthology: 
Accompanied by the gods, the eagle brought the exhilarating and intoxicating 
drink from the distance. ... ecstatic with Soma, the wise one left the fools. 
(IV. 26.6 -7) 
The white goblet ... the clear juice offered by the priests - now let the 
generous Indra raise it to drink until ecstatic with Soma; let the hero raise it to drink 
until ecstatic with Soma. 
(IV.27.5) 
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The whole universe is set in your essence within the ocean, within the heart, 
in the life -span. 
(IV.58.11) 
I have tasted the sweet drink of life, knowing that it inspires good thoughts 
and joyous expansiveness to the extreme, that all the gods and mortals seek it 
together. 
We have drunk the Soma; we have become immortal; we have gone to the 
light; we have found the gods. 
The glorious drops that I have drunk set me free in wide space.... 
...Soma has climbed up in us, expanding. We have come to the place where 
they stretch out life- spans. 
The drop that we have drunk has entered our hearts, an immortal inside 
mortals. 
Uniting in agreement with the fathers, o drop of Soma, you have extended 
yourself through sky and earth. 
(VIII.48.1,3,5, 6,11 -13) 
Be kind and merciful to us, Soma; be good to our heart, without confusing 
our powers in your whirlwind 
King Soma, do not enrage us; do not term us; do not wound our heart with 
dazzling light. 
(VIII.79.7 -8) 
Soma, who bring supreme ecstasy, be sweet for Indra to drink. 
(IX 74.9) 
Where the inextinguishable light shines, the world where the sun was placed, 
in that immortal unfading world, o Purifier, place me. O drop of Soma, flow for 
Indra. 
Where ... heaven is enclosed ... there make me immortal. O drop of Soma, 
flow for Indra. 
Where they move as they will, in the triple dome, in the third heaven of 
heaven, where the worlds are made of light, there make me immortal. O drop of 
Soma, flow for Indra. 
Where there are desires and longings, at the sun's zenith, where the dead are 
fed and satisfied, there make me immortal. O drop of Soma, flow for Indra. 
Where there are joys and pleasures, gladness and delight, where the desires 
of desires are fulfilled, there make me immortal. O drop of Soma, flow for Indra. 
(IX 113 . 4,6-11) 
Like impetuous winds, the drinks have lifted me up. Have I not drunk Soma? 
The drinks have lifted me up, like swift horses bolting with a chariot. Have I 
not drunk Soma? 
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The two world halves cannot be set against a single wing of mine. Have I not 
drunk Soma? 
In my vastness I surpassed the sky and this vast earth. Have I not drunk 
Soma? 
One of my wings is in the sky; I have trailed the other below. Have I not 
drunk Soma? 
I am huge, huge! Flying to the cloud Have I not drunk Soma? 
(X119.2 -3, 7- 8,11 -12) 
In some cases, the poet speaks as Indra or as a priest impersonating Indra; in 
others, it appears that the poet speaks just as a priest. But the descriptions of altered 
vision, flight and bliss read more like memory than imagination. 
Identity of the plants 
Soma and parahaoma are like the kykeon of Eleusis. One has to distinguish 
between the potion and the plant ingredients. The potion was a mixture with perhaps 
one principal psychoactive ingredient, although other plants may have been added. In 
the Rig Veda and the Avesta, we are told that plant material was crushed with stones 
to make its juice flow, and this was mixed with milk, water or both (Boyce 1975: 
159 -160). 
In both India and Iran during the first millennium BCE, substitutes came to 
be used in place of the original soma plants. The substitutes, in Iran Ephedra, and in 
India millet and a variety of other plants meeting specific criteria laid down by 
priests, are only mildly or not at all intoxicating, and no intoxication was expected 
(Wasson 1968: 96 -100; Flattery and Schwartz 1989: 14). 
The principal constituent of soma and parahaoma is usually identified as 
either the fly agaric mushroom or Syrian rue. There is a continuing controversy on 
this matter. The properties of these plant substances and the controversy are 
discussed in Appendix 10B. 
Zoroaster 
Fascinating though the controversy is regarding the identity of soma and 
haoma, it is not controversial to affirm that Iranian religion at the time of Zoroaster 
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included the consumption by priests of an intoxicating substance which induced 
uplifting and visionary altered states. 
It is generally assumed that Zoroaster was a real person, despite the early 
dating to 1000 BCE or before (Boyce 1975: 190). As with Moses, dated to a 
comparable era, there were accretions of minor myths about him. I shall carry on as 
if Zoroaster were a single person, but even if the reforms attributed to him were 
inaugurated by several people over a few generations the argument is not affected. 
Zoroastrian teachings are incorporated in hymns known as the Gathas, in an early 
form of the Iranian language still similar to the Sanskrit of the Rig Veda. 
Zoroaster was a priest trained in the `pagan' Iranian religion of his time, 
which had an Indo- European pantheon of sky gods and others, again resembling the 
pantheon of the Rig Veda. Zoroaster refers to himself as an `initiate'; he was a 
prophet in a tradition of those whose utterances came from meditation accompanying 
the rituals which they conducted. There were contemporary prophets who had their 
own conflicting inspirations, and his message was better received among strangers 
than among his own immediate folk (Boyce 1975: 8, 11, 12, 184, 189). 
The view that Zoroaster condemned the consumption of haoma is mistaken. It 
is supported by only one Gathic verse, which should be interpreted as condemning 
some debilitating, rather than exhilarating, intoxicant. The continued observance by 
Zoroastrians of the haoma rite along with other features of the older religion 
indicates the prophet's approval (Boyce 1975: 216 -218). 
Unlike contemporary Near Eastern and Mediterranean cultures, the semi - 
nomadic proto -Indo- Iranians had no fixed temples containing images. In 
consequence their divinities were not limited by attachment to particular locations; 
they could be imagined as possessing universal authority over their spheres of being 
(Boyce 1975: 22 -23). Even before Zoroaster, therefore, the proto- Iranians were 
primed for a religion with concepts of cosmic grandeur. 
According to legend, one morning at dawn Zoroaster waded into a river to 
fetch water for the haoma ceremony, and experienced a vision. A shining being 
appeared, who led him to the blazing presence of the Bounteous Immortals and of the 
high god Ahura Mazda. Enlightenment came upon him. It was in this encounter with 
the high god that Zoroaster realized his calling (Boyce 1975: 184 -185). The grandeur 
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of his innovative expectation that the present age will come to an end, and of the 
`making wonderful' at the end of time, I have alluded to earlier. His theology 
ascribes to the Lord Mazda a more exalted state than is known for any other divinity 
in antiquity before the exaltation of Yahweh in post- exilic Judaism (Cohn 1993: 81; 
Boyce 1975: 198). 
In the theophany we recognize an enraptured state resembling those recorded 
for St Paul and Muhammad. As discussed in Chapter 5, it would appear to some 
workers that epileptiform neural activity must be responsible for such a vision. In 
Zoroaster's case, there is no need to posit a disposition to epilepsy, because as a 
priest he was in the habit of drinking parahaoma, which might be expected to induce 
exhilaration and visions. According to the legend, the great vision occurred before 
the ceremony at which parahaoma would have been drunk by the priests. However, 
it seems likely that this vision was the most striking of many which the prophet must 
have experienced in the course of his priestly duties. One suspects that the founder of 
what is known to us as Zoroastrianism had over many years numerous spiritual 
experiences under the influence of parahaoma, which both generated and confirmed, 
in a virtuous circle, the expanded conceptions of divinity which he elaborated 
intellectually. More than his brother priests, I theorize, Zoroaster had the intellect and 
the determination to be able to develop a new theology out of his own existential 
spiritual encounters. In this respect the prophet resembles later founders such as 
Plato, St Paul and the prophet of Islam. 
Egypt 
If Egypt is the third major area west of China where the conception of heaven 
arose, and is independent of India, Iran and Greece, then it should be expected that 
an historical process generating the conception occurred there analogous to the one 
which I have argued for the other centres. That is, (1) there should be a tradition of 
ritually ingesting psychoactive material to produce altered states of consciousness in 
which the subject feels translated to another plane of existence; then (2) there should 
be some religious innovator or innovators who make explicit a doctrine which 
represents that new plane as another world to be entered upon after death. 
Of these, there is evidence of (1), but, so far as I know, there is no figure in 
Egyptian history who corresponds to a Zoroaster or Plato. One would wish to 
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identify someone like Akhenaten, but Akhenaten is associated with a quite different 
innovation and is much too late. It is not surprising that a non -Egyptologist does not 
know of a suitable figure, and it may be that there are some. However, even if no 
specific individuals can be identified, there should not be a presumption that there 
were no such thinkers. The inventors of this doctrine are most probably to be found 
among the inventors of other religious doctrines: the numerous but mostly 
anonymous members of the Egyptian priesthoods. 
The water lily and the mandrake 
For this section the substance is due to Emboden (1989, 1982, 1981, 1979). 
The Egyptians were no strangers to narcotics. I have referred above to 
Sherratt's (1995) evidence for the widespread use of opium in the ancient world, 
including Egypt. Of numerous scent -bearing plants available in Egypt, only certain 
ones are depicted regularly and in combination, so that the attribution of their 
popularity merely to scent is unconvincing. The opium poppy is widely illustrated in 
Egyptian paintings with its capsules incised to extract their juice. Two other, less 
well known, plants containing psychoactive substances are depicted in association 
with poppy capsules or in scenes of mourning or healing. These are mandrake and 
the blue water lily. Emboden argues that the association of these three indicates 
similarity of function. 
In some works on Egypt, the water lily is described as a `lotus' (e.g., James 
1979: 214 -215). The genuine lotus Nelumbo nucifera was introduced to Egypt about 
700 BCE, whereas the water lily is native. There are two principal species, the white 
lily, Nymphaea ampia, and the blue lily Nymphaea caerulea. I These are water -borne 
plants. The flower of the blue lily opens at dawn and closes at noon, and after three 
days' bloom the closed flower is drawn below the water, where it will generate its 
seed. By this time the flower contains insects which have pollinated it but have died 
from the poisonous nectar. This nectar is alleged to be psychoactive. 
The alleged psychoactive properties of mandrake and the blue water lily are 
discussed in Appendix 10C. Some illustrations are given at the end of this chapter. 
The blue lily has a white variety Nymphaea caerulea albiflora. 
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Emboden draws attention to the abundant depictions of Egyptian royal 
personages holding blue water lilies, or wearing chaplets or garlands of the flowers, 
or offering flowers to another person. The flowers were apparently dipped in wine to 
allow the psychoactive nectar to be drunk. There are depictions of people holding 
open flowers to their faces or to the faces of others, so that they may enjoy the scent 
or drink from the flowers. Some scenes appear to show the plants being offered for 
healing, as when the ailing Tutankhamun receives flowers and buds from his wife 
Ankhesenamun. There are a number of illustrations showing blue water lilies and 
mandrakes in bunches together. 
In tombs jars have been found which are generally interpreted as containers 
of perfumes or unguents (e.g., James 1979: 215). On two grounds, Emboden argues 
that the contents were not unguents but elixirs made from the blue lily or opium. 
Firstly, he thinks the necks of these jars are too narrow for easy pouring of salves, 
which would be more viscous than potable liquids. Secondly, the jars were emptied 
of their contents by robbers in cases where jewellery and other rich artifacts were 
ignored. The latter indicates that the contents were regarded as the most valuable 
commodities in the tomb: possibly that they were believed to be an elixir known as 
didi which could bestow life after death. If this elixir was placed in the tomb for the 
future of the deceased, then it is probable that it would also have been consumed by 
the living. One suspects that a substance would be regarded as an elixir of life only 
because it had profound effects on the living. 
The ceremonial practices of the Egyptian priesthoods were conducted for the 
benefit of an intellectual class and unknown to the majority of the population. Even 
the complex mythology is unlikely to have been of much interest to ordinary people. 
Until the end of the Old Kingdom, when the exclusive power of royalty collapsed, 
knowledge of the spells for attainment of a blessed life after death was available only 
to the ruling class (James 1979: 132 -133, 163). 
Emboden hypothesizes that some of the Egyptian priesthoods retained 
knowledge of prehistoric shamanic traditions, including the use of psychoactive 
plants. Possible shamanic survivals in Egyptian religion, as identified by various 
authorities, are discussed by Ripinsky -Naxon (1993: 37 -42). They include the 
wearing of ritual animal masks by priests and the Osirian legend as reminiscent of 
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the shaman's death, dismemberment and rebirth at initiation. The Pharaoh, as high 
priest (James 1979: 139), and other members of the royal family would have been 
privy to ancient tradition, and participated in esoteric practices. They used the water 
lily, opium and mandrake to induce trance for shamanic healing, in which either 
healer or patient or both are aided by being in an altered state. More broadly, the 
altered states of consciousness which they experienced removed the cares of this 
world and were interpreted as giving a presentiment of a blissful life to come. 
The genesis of a doctrine 
An apparent objection arises. If the shamanic experience of ecstasy was once 
so widespread and near -universal in Eurasia, and indeed Africa, as it was until 
recently in the Americas, and that experience is the core of the idea of a blissful 
afterlife, why is it that the idea of heaven or of a blissful afterlife did not arise 
automatically all over the world in prehistory? Why is it that, in complete contrast to 
such universality, it can apparently be dated and localized to particular historical 
cultures, such as certain phases of the Egyptians, Indo- Iranians and Greeks? 
The answer, I think, is that the experience is necessary but not sufficient. The 
ecstatic experience is a present one; it does not of itself promise its repetition and 
eternal continuance after death. To get from an indubitable, present, this -life 
enraptured experience to a hoped -for belief in an enraptured afterlife requires 
doctrine, however rudimentary. A new doctrine capable of dissemination requires a 
metaphysician or a prophet to conceive it in a leap of speculation. Perhaps we can 
identify two such: Plato and Zoroaster. The belief in a blissful afterlife was the 
product not of the experience alone but of thought applied to it: it has corne about 
when experience has met speculation. 
I suggest that, once doctrine is in place and people grow up learning about it, 
being taught to believe, an individual verificatory experience of another world 
becomes unnecessary. Those who have not had the experience can listen to the tales 
of those who have, and the tale contains an interpretation of the trip. So in the 
religions of later antiquity, the Middle Ages and modern times, the belief in 
immortality and heaven continues to be widespread, with or without individual 
verification. 
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Blue water lily 
(from web) 
Nakht and his wife with blue water lily 
held to the face, and bunch of blue 
water lilies on right  
(from web 'Tour Egypt') 
Tutankhamun (right) holds a vessel 
filled with upright (lily) flowers and the 
queen pours water onto them 
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Tutankhamun as Nefertem, reborn, like 
sun god at creation, from blue water lily 
(from Edwards 1976) 
Faience 'perfume' vessel with 
representation of lilies, from Nubia 
(from James 1979) 
Consort Meriton (right) offers 
Semenkhkara, leaning on stick 
(crutch ?), a bud of the blue water lily 
and two mandrake fruits, holding more 
flowers in her left hand (for healing ?) 
(from Emboden 1981) 
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CHAPTER 11 
RELIGIOUS SPECIALISTS: SHAMANS 
In putting forward a theory of the origin of the idea of heaven, I have already 
named two major religious innovators of antiquity: Zoroaster and Plato. They were 
responsible for doctrines which expanded the religious horizons of their own and 
subsequent generations. Some others, including legendary figures, are Pythagoras, 
Moses, the Israelite prophets, and poets such as Virgil. Doubtless in antiquity there 
were many other innovators, most now unidentifiable. 
In modern western society there are religious specialists known as priests, 
rabbis, imams, monks, ministers, mystics, witches, clairvoyants and so on. They 
study and seek to experience their field of expertise to a level much above that of 
most other members of society. Religion as a subject of study has always been a 
minority interest. In both traditional and new -age religions, new developments come 
from those who are specialists or have particular `spiritual' predilections. 
In tribal societies too, religion may be the concern of everyone, especially 
elders, but is usually the particular concern of someone, whom we call the witch 
doctor, medicine man or shaman. Such a person is the religious specialist, and it is 
from him or her that new developments and understandings come. I propose that it 
was so also in prehistory: that there have always been religious specialists, those who 
are interested and have a motivation to excogitate a conception of man's place in 
nature. 
Vast literatures exist describing the doctrines of traditional religions and the 
myths of ancient ones; and publications, including websites, abound on the 
commonplaces and smug, arbitrary dogmas of new -age religion. Much has been 
written about souls, gods and spirits, the stories of their adventures and the other- 
worldly realms in which the adventures sometimes take place. None of these 
supernatural entities or realms is accessible to normal, publicly sharable perception, 
examination or analysis. As a result, theories about their significance or reality can 
be argued about endlessly. However, the people who tell us about supernatural 
entities and realms are accessible to analysis. Study of people, rather than the stories 
they spin, may produce genuinely illuminating knowledge (La Barre 1970a: 161). 
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Role of the religious specialist 
One wants to know why and how certain people are able to become religious 
specialists and tell us about the supernatural. As I am concerned with origins, I shall 
concentrate on recent tribal societies whose mode of life is most like that of our 
ancestors (Chapter 1), and try to extrapolate from them to the prehistoric human and 
prehuman condition. A realistic analysis of this matter has long ago been offered by 
Paul Radin (1938). Radin's theory is reprised in his later work (1953). I shall use his 
insights to assemble a naturalistic rather than romantic view of the role of the 
religious specialist, covering these points: 
Types of people in any society 
Doctrine elaborated by specialists 
Social motivation of specialists 
Specialists' techniques to convince others 
Milieu of belief in which specialists function 
Afterwards, I shall try to analyse the nature and inner motivation of religious 
specialists as they might have applied in prehistory. 
Thinkers and practical people 
In all societies, ancient and prehistoric as well as modern, we can assume that 
there have been both thinkers and practical people. In the religious sphere, there are 
those who are interested in or even dominated by religion and issues of the 
supernatural; there are also those who get on with everyday life, usually accepting 
that there is a supernatural dimension but not giving it much attention. The latter may 
be called the laity. Religious thinkers have been a minority, but have often assumed a 
degree of importance in their societies. Radin identifies three types: the strongly 
religious, the intermittently religious and the indifferently religious, the latter two 
composing the laity. Among the intermittently religious are those who are weakly 
religious at any time, who accept a supernatural dimension in their everyday life 
without being fascinated by it, and those who are strongly religious only at times of 
crisis, who rarely bother with the supernatural but invoke its aid when security is 
threatened. The strongly religious person is typically a religious specialist: in a broad 
sense a shaman or a priest. Such a person in his or her generation is typically both the 
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custodian of society's traditions regarding the supernatural and the source of any 
new ideas about it, a religious formulator. 
Radin dismisses the widely criticized view of Levy -Bruhl that primitive 
people manifest a prelogical mentality or a mystical participation in the world. As 
indeed we might expect from the fact that human beings, even at a tribal level of 
organization, have been extraordinarily successful organisms on our planet compared 
with other mammals, there are practical people in low -technology societies just as 
among us. People have not survived in the jungles of South America or on the 
savannahs of Africa by being visionaries, even if some of them are, but by 
understanding the practical opportunities and limitations of their environment and 
successfully exploiting it for food and shelter. But there are different types of 
thinkers. 
There is a danger that ethnographers mistake the theories of a religious 
formulator for the views of people at large. Not unnaturally, on enquiring about the 
traditions practised by a tribe or its beliefs, the ethnographer will be directed to the 
guardian of tradition, the religious thinker, who may also be a formulator of new 
ideas. Radin cites the discovery of a clearly delineated concept of a supreme being 
among the Wintun people of California. The concept was in fact due to a single 
highly gifted religious thinker. The generality of people had only `the vaguest notion' 
of a supreme being, and no coherent theory of spirits: the soul of an ordinary person 
when deceased was variously described as appearing in the form of a whirlwind and 
as requiring acorn meal to be offered to it. 
Doctrines 
The variety and inconsistency of stories about the supernatural reported from 
tribal people are largely due to the fact that there are two sources of ideas: the 
religious thinker and the laity. One may add that religious thinkers of different 
generations may have promoted somewhat conflicting ideas, yet the ideas of an older 
thinker may be recollected and transmitted alongside the developing theories of a 
new thinker, adding to the confusion. 
Radin contrasts the formulations of the religious thinker with what he calls 
the folkloristic background, the ideas and practices of non -specialists regarding the 
Chapter 11 221 
supernatural. The folkloristic background consists of stories and vague conceptions 
about supernatural beings and a body of magical ideas and activities concerned with 
coercing aspects of nature or the associated supernatural beings. With Frazer, Radin 
is certain that magic preceded religion (1938: 59 -61); but, as the question is largely a 
matter of definition, I shall not discuss this issue. 
Some peoples have highly developed `theologies' or theories about the 
supernatural; others do not. The creative theorizing of the shaman can bring about a 
new relation between people and the supernatural, when his or her theories are 
accepted and become the theology of the people, whether or not fully understood. In 
some cases religious thinkers are able to dominate the people and to have their 
theories accepted. In other cases this does not happen. It is the economics of 
subsistence that determines whether the thinker succeeds. 
The Kiwai of New Guinea, who practised agriculture in fertile land and 
enjoyed a secure and adequate food supply, had no elaborate theory of spirits. This is 
because there was no opportunity for medicine men to seize power by exploiting the 
people's insecurity. Instead, one could say that among them `the folkloristic 
background reigns supreme', with magical rites predominant and little attention 
being paid to the precise nature of the spirits. The laity had no interest in knowing 
any more about spirits than necessary for subsistence, so the religious specialists 
contented themselves with being experts on the folkloristic background. 
Among the San of southern Africa, a hunter -gatherer society among whom 
subsistence was low -level but straightforward, again there was no wide acceptance of 
elaborate theory. According to Radin, in most of the `very simple' societies like this 
one, the beliefs of the layman `play havoc with all the schematizations and 
clarifications of the medicine man and thinker'. As a result, for example, the San 
rain -being is inconsistently represented: sometimes as an animal, but not always the 
same one, or as a `nondescript animal -like being' which lives in a waterhole, or an 
imaginary animal -like being which accompanies protected real animals; or she is not 
delineated at all. 
In contrast, the Eskimo, whose fishing- hunting way of life was precarious and 
pursued in an extremely adverse climate, had a very complex theory of supernatural 
beings and of taboos. In this case the shamans were able to exploit the economic 
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insecurity of the people and controlled the whole life of society by means of their 
professed specialist knowledge and power over the supernatural realm. Their religion 
was dominated by fear of demons and the dead. 
Social motivation 
According to Radin, the forms assumed by religion in primal societies depend 
upon economic and social structure. The determinant is not methods of food 
production as such - agriculture versus hunting and gathering, for example - but 
whether the mode of subsistence allows the development of a caste or class of 
religious specialists, and, if it does, then whether it is profitable for them to elaborate 
ideas about the supernatural. 
The observation that the type of religion is related to the nature of its society 
is not of course unique. According to Coon (1972: 286), societies which emphasize 
rank and wealth have myths about family ancestors; societies which do not have 
sharp rank or wealth divisions have myths about a creator or common ancestor. 
However, Radin's observation is not to be equated with the Durkheimian view that 
religion serves a function in society. It is not that a stratified society is served by a 
complex priestly religion. Rather, the secession from subsistence -orientated everyday 
life of a caste of religious specialists allows them the leisure to excogitate theories 
about the supernatural. Eventually, in more and more highly stratified societies, they 
become priests and use their theories to maintain their advantage and perpetuate their 
caste. 
In Melanesia and many parts of North and South America, where agriculture 
was practised but castes not strongly developed, there was `no trace' of deities as 
opposed to mere spirits. This is presumably because the religious formulators had not 
had the leisure to invent further ideas about spirits and turn them into gods. In the 
`simple' fishing- hunting cultures of North America - that is, excluding the complex 
hunter -gatherers of the North West Coast - the religions all share a relative absence 
of speculation regarding the supernatural. 
Across the world, Radin correlates the existence of class distinction in society 
with refinement of the notion of spirits into a hierarchy or pantheon. Gods are 
perhaps a sort of high -caste spirit. 
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In this study I have not set out to explain how gods, as opposed to mere 
daemons (Chapter 7), could have been thought of However, gods of large -scale 
natural phenomena such as mountains and rivers appear to be analogous to local 
daemons, but associated with extensive as opposed to small places. Gods which 
preside over human activities, such as marriage, childbirth, war and counsel, as 
found in Greek and Roman civilization, seem likely to be pure inventions of leisured 
religious formulators. Following La Barre (1972: 267), I propose that the universal 
deities which came to prominence in the thought of the late first millennium BCE 
could not have been conceived before the consolidation of the empires of the 
Persians, Hellenistic Greeks and Romans, incorporating wide geographical areas and 
diverse peoples. The grandeur of these conceptions of divinity owed much to the 
enlarged appreciation of the scale of the world which became available even to 
ordinary people during that era. 
Belief in a supreme being often existed in fishing- hunting tribal societies, 
such as the Ainu, Andamanese, Fuegians, the Semang of Malaysia and many North 
American tribes. They pursued a mode of survival which must have resembled, more 
than do any other recent lifeways, that of coastal -dwelling Mesolithic or Palaeolithic 
peoples. This has indicated to some the fascinating possibility of a primordial 
monotheism in remote antiquity (Lang 1898; Schmidt 1931). However, Radin 
maintains that only the shamans held this belief; ordinary people knew little or 
nothing of a supreme being. The supreme being's functions as creator and ethical 
judge were inventions of the shaman class as `an incipient intellectual aristocracy'. 
Their professed relation with the supreme being helped to set them apart and create 
for them a `semi- sanctity' which consolidated their advantage. More wide -ranging 
evidence against the theory of a primordial high god in Africa is given by 
Sharevskaya (1973: 38 -48).1 
The rigid class system of the Maori allowed religious specialists to develop a 
complex theology, knowledge of which did not, however, filter down to commoners. 
Since Radin, much ethnology has continued to be written without any statement about the identity or 
status of informants. In a somewhat revisionist article in favour of the high -god concept, Ogot (1972) 
tells us that `the Padhola's conception of God (Were) is that of a white, merciful and good Being'. But 
who were the Padhola informants? 
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Among the Mehinaku of Brazil, new 'spirits' and associated rituals have been 
instituted actually during the residency of ethnographers, leading to the inference that 
earlier cults have been similarly instituted by individuals in the past. Their culture 
allows individual religious experiences to generate innovations which become 
integrated into the religious complex of the tribe, provided that the innovations 
conform to an established norm. It is suggested that, while some innovators have had 
genuine personal visionary experiences, others have contrived them and merely 
invented rituals to gain status and influence (Ripinksy -Naxon 1993: 14 -15). 
Drawing upon Evans -Pritchard (1937) and Nadel (1935), Radin shows how in 
Africa chiefs and medicine men have promoted the belief in magic and witchcraft for 
their own economic advantage. 
For the Azande of the Sudan, misfortune and illness were attributed to 
witchcraft practised by malicious individuals. Suspects were tried using oracles in 
which the fate of a poisoned chicken indicated guilt or innocence. However, chiefs 
and the wealthy class were excluded from accusation. The chief's power was based 
upon his control of the oracles. 
In West Africa, the Nupe had female witches. The head of the best organized 
order of witches was also the leader of the women in the area, supervising the market 
and dealing with disputes among women. She was appointed by the chief. As a 
'good' witch, she was responsible for bringing to justice others who used their craft 
for evil purposes. Ostensibly the partnership of chief and leader of the witches 
operated to restrain the practice of evil witchcraft. However, Radin points out that the 
suppression of witchcraft is less significant than the degree to which it is allowed to 
flourish. In other words, playing along with the idea that witches operate, drawing 
attention to the supposed dangers and accusing supposed practitioners, brought the 
chief and the leader of the witches both prestige and the fearful respect of others. 
Further, if it was perceived that many witches had become active, causing 
fear among the people, matters were taken out of the hands of the chief and the local 
witches' leader. Instead, a secret male society assumed responsibility for dealing 
with the situation. Its members allegedly had supernatural knowledge imparted by 
spirits; they were not possessed by the spirits, but rather controlled the latter using 
special magic. The membership was selected by the head of this society, and he in 
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turn was appointed by the king. Usually at harvest time, when wealth was plentiful. 
the head of the secret society would tell the king that witchcraft was getting out of 
hand. The king would send members of the society into the villages to deal with it. 
Terrified of being accused, the women would neglect their duties and hide in the 
bush, or collect money to pay off society members. After a period of increasingly 
intolerable unrest, village chiefs would collect a large sum of money and present it to 
the king, asking him to recall the society. Subsequently, the head of the society 
received two thirds, and the king kept one third, of the collection. This royal 
protection racket needs no comment. Radin adds that the secret society was allowed 
to operate in the villages but not in the king's own town because the resulting unrest 
might have been turned against him (Nadel 1935: 434 -442). 
The persistence of magic in complex African societies which had long passed 
the hunting -gathering stage is explained by its economic usefulness to an upper class. 
It is advantageous to have the people believe in occult powers, because, by 
professing to have a special magic more powerful than common witchcraft, the 
ruling class enjoy prestige and wealth. According to Sharevskaya (1973: 64), with 
the development of chiefdom and stratified societies, the number of religious 
practitioners increases, including healers, seers predicting the future, and wizards 
making amulets. 
In some parts of Africa, most witches were female; but witch doctors, who 
combated witchcraft, were usually male. The male role in witchcraft was to suppress 
its practice and ensure that women did not get out of hand. Male secret societies were 
concerned with the maintenance of male prestige, the initiation of boys and the 
subjection of female witches (Parrinder 1954: 131 -132). Sharevskaya (1973: 63) 
notes that in Liberia, among the Kpelle and Mende peoples, adult men were members 
of secret societies, of which, besides conducting rituals, the chief purpose seemed to 
be to interfere in economic and family matters and subjugate women and the young. 
Altogether, it appears that maintenance by men of the pretence that witchcraft takes 
place gave a pretext for them to keep women subordinate by accusing them of it. 
Techniques of convincing 
In this section, I give evidence of trickery and imposture, whether intentional 
or self -deceiving, by religious specialists in recent primal societies. 
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Owing to economic insecurity regarding food, shelter and health among the 
Eskimo, fear was the predominant religious emotion. A pantheon of malign nature 
spirits was believed to lurk in the air, on land and in the sea, and to be joined by 
resentful souls of the dead. It was of course the angakok who had invented and 
delineated the personalities of these vicious beings, together with the magical spells 
and taboos by which they were to be kept at bay. By playing on and personifying the 
people's fears, the angakok secured his own position of authority in society (Radin 
1938: 51 -54). Evidently the benefits were sufficient to outweigh the disadvantage 
that the shaman himself became an object of fear and hatred. 
African rain - makers did not try to secure rain in the middle of a dry season, 
when it might appear to be needed most, but at times when rain might be expected 
anyway (Parrinder 1954: 81). An obituary of Modjadjiv, the last rain queen of the 
Bolobedu of South Africa, appeared in 2001.1 She would visit shrines and make a 
libation of beer on the ground, before performance of a rain dance. Latterly, 
implementation of the Mandela government's policies on water distribution had 
ensured full wells and watercourses. Her authority had waned, as had income from 
prophecies. 
During a séance, a shaman of the Siberian Chelkan people ran out into the 
yard, fighting an invisible hostile shaman. When he reappeared, he was covered in 
blood as evidence of his combat. Later, the intestines of a farm animal, prepared for 
sausage -making, were found at the scene (Alekseev 1990: 86). 
In respect of Asiatic Nanai shamans, Basilov (1990: 27) reports the likely use 
of assistants to find out particulars about deceased persons whose souls the shaman 
was supposed to contact for private information subsequently relayed to suspicious 
relatives. 
Lévi- Strauss (1963: 267 -270) relates autobiographical information obtained 
by Franz Boas from a shaman of the Canadian Kwakiutl people, who was skeptical 
about his own profession. In youth, this person was intrigued by the shamans and 
eventually was asked to join them. His training was `a curious mixture of 
pantomime, prestidigitation and empirical knowledge'. As well as learning about 
such practical matters as childbirth, he learned sacred songs, how to act out a nervous 
The Times, 30 June 2001, p.27. 
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fit, and how to organize spies who would covertly listen to people's conversations 
and pass on information about the ills of his patients. As in many such societies, 
illness was believed to result from intrusion of a foreign object into the body. For 
healing, he learned how to conceal a tuft of down in his mouth, then, while sucking 
at the patient's body, to bite his tongue or otherwise cause a little bleeding, so that he 
could produce the tuft with blood on it and show it to the patient and onlookers as the 
object supposedly extracted from the patient. This remarkable individual did not 
conceal his skepticism about other shamans, saying that one, in another tribe, was 
probably just a liar and fake and coveted the property of his patients. Stating that 
shamans only pretend to catch souls, he added that this other shaman represented to 
onlookers that a piece of tallow on his hand was a human soul. Lévi- Strauss 
acknowledges that shamans often cured their patients, and opines that the subject in 
question did not become a great shaman because he cured patients, but rather was 
able to cure because he was regarded as a great shaman. 
A similar procedure is described by Radin (1938: 147 -148) for a Zande witch 
doctor. Here the witch doctor concealed a sharp object under his fmgernail, and, by 
sleight of hand inserted it into a poultice which would be placed upon the patient's 
wound. Later the poultice was removed and the foreign object shown to the 
onlookers. An actual medicine was used to treat the patient, but its importance was 
kept secret by the witch doctors, because, as the informant said, `their treatment is 
very deceitful'. 
Harper (1968: 17, 23 -24) describes a healing procedure of the Jivaro of 
Ecuador, which I shall summarize. A shaman's spirit helpers are like darts which can 
enter people's bodies. Normally they are invisible to lay people, and visible only to 
shamans when under the influence of natemä (the local variety of the hallucinatory 
drink ayahuasca, as discussed in Chapter 10). Illness is caused when a malicious 
shaman sends a dart, tsentsak, into someone's body; but it can be sucked out by a 
rival shaman. When the curing shaman is ready to suck out the offending tsentsak, he 
prepares in his mouth two tsentsak, actually small physical objects. The (physical) 
tsentsak at his lips catches the (supernatural) tsentsak sucked out of the patient, and 
includes its essence in itself. The tsentsak at the back of the mouth guards against the 
sucked -out tsentsak getting into the shaman's own body. The shaman shows the 
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onlookers the first physical tsentsak, and lay people believe that this actually is the 
object sucked out of the patient. To the shamans, it merely contains (the supernatural 
essence of) the sucked -out tsentsak. On this interpretation, the shaman is not strictly 
deceiving the people. To explain to the onlookers that he had the objects inside his 
mouth all along would not be helpful: the physical object is the people's evidence 
that he has accomplished the cure. 
In the Jivaro scenario I think we can readily discern Radin's religious 
formulators at work. The shamans have devised a theory, which they themselves 
more or less believe, distinguishing an invisible essence from the physical object, in 
which the former can be incorporated. Production of the physical object is not 
needed for the shaman to know he has done his task; it is for the benefit of the laity. 
This is sophisticated theological thinking.' However, the shaman has to give 
evidence of his cure in order to be paid. In the end, production of the physical 
tsentsak is for his own benefit. 
The same procedure is described romantically2 by Sullivan (1994: 39), who 
tells us: `Truth -telling in shamanic medical practice requires that the shaman amaze 
the audience with a startling demonstration of the truth. To communicate truths of 
this kind, shamans must make available to the naked eye what they see with their 
clairvoyant penetration of the spirit domain.' Three straightforward misuses of the 
word `truth' need no further comment. 
In a Manchu folk epic, The Tale of the Nishan Shamaness, the father of a sick 
youth denounces fake shamans who cheat people of their food and are unable to state 
correctly the time of someone's death. However, he then goes to see the genuine and 
powerful shamaness of the title, who proves her competence, possessed by a spirit 
while inhaling incense and beating a tambourine (Baldick 2000: 146 -147). This item 
is of interest in showing folk recognition that some shamans are deceivers. 
Ripinsky -Naxon (1993: 21) says it is clear that some shamans have abused 
their positions for personal gain. In this connection, the Yakut of Siberia made a 
distinction between `great', `middling' and `mocking' or deceitful shamans. 
The similarity to the justification of images and gestures in Christianity as an aid for the weaker 
brethren is striking. 
2 Unless indeed he means to be ironical, as Radin (1938: 46) might say. 
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Summarizing information from Shirokogoroff, Baldick (2000: 136 -137) tells 
us that Tungus shamans developed methods of hypnosis by trial and error. They 
made sounds by rattling and rustling iron objects, trinkets, bells and mirrors on their 
costume; effective and ineffective shamans differed partly by their competence in 
this performance. Drumming and singing hypnotized the patient and treatment was 
effected by autosuggestion. The shaman induced hallucinations in the audience, and 
some believed he even flew through the air. When mass hallucination took place, 
those who did not succumb believed that their own senses were at fault, not that the 
others were mistaken. 
Milieu of belief 
In contrast to impersonal, abstract theories about society and religion, Radin's 
theory has the enormous merit of describing developments in terms of what people 
do and how people think, taking into account the fact that most people everywhere, 
given the chance, are keen to secure a personal advantage over their neighbours. 
In modern societies of the west and east, the majority of priests and their 
equivalents are probably not in their position for personal gain, but some are. Some 
enjoy the status. There are also practical advantages. In monastic orders and some 
priesthoods one is freed from the need to find and pay for accommodation, seek 
employment, do boring work, pay tax, buy food and do domestic chores. Even higher 
education may be paid for by one's religious order. The advantages of not having to 
manage one's own life on a trivial day -to -day basis are even acknowledged by 
some. 
In primitive and ancient societies, to be relieved, even partially, from the need 
to secure one's own subsistence must have seemed a huge advantage. However, in 
hunting -gathering tribal societies it appears that shamans generally have continued to 
hunt, and it is only with the separation of religious specialists into a priesthood, a 
leisured class, in a stratified society, that full -scale advantages accrue. 
Among recent primal societies also, there have certainly been shamans who 
were concerned for the welfare of their folk, not only in healing the sick but in the 
broadest sense. One such, an Amazonian Arakmbut shaman, seems to have been a 
Article by Br Kentigern in The White Rose, Old St Paul's Church Magazine, Edinburgh, Winter 
2003. 
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wise and remarkable individual (Gray 1997). Living among the Yakut, Sieroszewski 
was acquainted with a shaman who had `not only material gain in view but the 
alleviation of the griefs of his fellow men; ... vocation, ... faith and ... conviction' 
(Ripinsky -Naxon 1993: 21). 
An entire book could probably be constructed from ethnographic accounts of 
instances of trickery by practitioners of supernatural arts in primal societies. Another 
could probably be written working out, in one after another ethnographically 
documented situation, how economic advantage accrued there to a practitioner or 
member of a caste from the apparent practice of magic or the promotion of popular 
belief in it. The illustrations are from historical cultures, but the principles for 
credibility and persistence would have operated just as well in prehistory. 
Here, the point of drawing attention to these matters and supporting my 
assertion with a few specific illustrations above is not to cast all shamans and 
medicine men as charlatans. It is purely to show how practices concerned with the 
supernatural could be believed in and why they would persist, without recourse to 
any hypothesis requiring the reality of the supernatural. 
In the twenty -first century, in a democratic country which exports computer 
programmers to the United States, a population of hundreds of millions, including 
members of their government, have been enthralled by a religious leader's apparent 
supernatural ability to produce trinkets out of thin air.1 If such people can get rich in 
India today, a smarter than average hominin could have kept his tribe guessing a 
million years ago. 
However, even if potential religious specialists were adept at estimating and 
playing upon their fellows' credulity, they could not have persuaded non -religious 
people that supernatural entities existed if the laity had no prior conception of such 
things or propensity to believe. For example, before priestly religion in service of 
gods could be accepted, the idea of gods had to have some prior plausibility. If the 
ordinary people already believed in gods, then a priestly caste, once established, 
could induce people to believe in new gods or to believe the priestly caste's novel 
interpretations of old gods. Probably even a lone shaman not fully trusted by his 
fellow tribesmen would be able to induce people to take seriously his innovations 
See information on Sai Baba, on www.skepticweb.com. 
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and reinterpretations concerning the spirit world, as long as they already believed in 
a spirit world. For example, the religious innovators among the Mehinaku tribe of 
Brazil (see above) institute new rituals within an existing context of belief and rites. 
In prehistory, there had to be a prior substrate of supernaturalist ideas among 
the generality of people, so that the potential religious specialist had something to 
work on. Without a lay person's personal experience or the testimony of other laity 
concerning their numinous feelings, there would be no material for the religious 
specialist to interpret. This prior substrate is the primordial animatism and later 
animism whose possible origins are described in Chapters 7 and 8. Animatism and 
animism are general beliefs and propensities to believe, shared by all humans and not 
limited to potential religious specialists. This substrate can also be identified as the 
embryonic form of what in documented primal societies became Radin's folkloristic 
background. I speak of an embryonic or incipient form because the folkloristic 
background as described by Radin is already well developed, especially where it 
literally contains folklore, stories and myths. The embryonic form, animatism 
certainly, and animism possibly, antedated language and therefore genuine folklore. 
While Alekseev regards shamanism as unqualifiedly pernicious (see above), 
it would not have survived for thousands of years if its net effects had been 
detrimental to society. It has been proposed that a shaman, especially as healer, 
promotes the well -being of his or her tribespeople. Shamanic healing takes into 
account not only the patient's physiological symptoms but also relationships within 
the family and community. As a focal person in the community, the shaman is 
influential. His or her activities promote cohesion. One could add that a shaman, as 
thinker, offers a world view which gives a means of understanding the environment 
and makes sense of misfortunes. The shaman's professed efforts against evil spirits 
bring confidence to people in the uncertain and often hazardous economic 
circumstances of their struggle with nature (cf Basilov 1990: 29). Stress impedes 
recovery; depression weakens the immune system. By healing individuals, promoting 
good relationships, making sense of the world and fighting on their behalf, the 
shaman reduces stress and improves the confidence of everyone, with resulting 
physiological improvements in health and endurance (Money 1996). That the shaman 
is the one who promotes the belief in evil spirits in the first place is irrelevant. What 
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matters is that the people believe in his or her powers over the spirits. The 
uncertainty of survival is itself enough to produce stress; evil spirits serve as an 
explanation of vicissitudes which themselves are all too real. Personifying the causes 
of misfortune makes them amenable to combat. 
The religious specialist himself or herself had to possess some motivation to 
take on the role. While self - interest certainly figures strongly, it seems clear that 
many, probably most, religious specialists in primal societies have had a genuine 
calling, in that they feel themselves drawn to what they believe is a real supernatural 
dimension. Much of the rest of this chapter attempts to account for this perceived 
calling. 
Transition from shaman to priest 
In order to be able to say anything at all, I use some terms in a broad sense. 
The word `shaman', which figures prominently in this chapter and the previous one, 
strictly refers only to the traditional religious specialist in tribal societies of Siberia, 
Central Asia and arctic Europe. However, there is widespread agreement that it is an 
appropriate generic term to designate the religious specialist in tribal societies of 
North and South America, and even wider afield, in Indo- China, Oceania, 
Australasia and even, with reservations, Africa (Eliade 1964; La Barre 1970a: 268). 
Some of the characteristics of circumpolar and Asiatic shamanism are not shared by 
all the counterparts in other continents, but enough similarities exist. 
It has sometimes been said that in Africa possession by spirit beings, in which 
the subject loses control, is characteristic of trance; while in the classic shamanism of 
northern Asia, and perhaps the rest of the world, the shaman in trance is said to 
command the spirits and remain in control. Eliade dismisses possession as rare in 
shamanism, and Radin states that possession is found only in complex societies with 
developed cults, as in Africa. According to Hultkrantz (1978: 43 -47), a defining 
characteristic of classic shamanism is the concept of helping spirits. Citing Arbman, 
he presents what appears to some as possession in Asiatic shamanism as a role play, 
in which the shaman impersonates the helping spirit. Even if one helping spirit is 
inside the shaman, the rest are outside. Baldick (2000: 169) strongly disagrees that 
there is a difference between Africa and the rest of the world. He cites an African 
seeress who used incense to go into trance `like her Manchu counterpart', and the 
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initiation into a possession cult specifically of those who have been ill, as with the 
Asiatic shamanic illness (see below). 
Where societies are simple and unstratified, lacking chiefs or kings and with 
all members sharing an undifferentiated economic role, the only religious specialists 
are shamans (Radin 1938). As societies became more complex and stratified, perhaps 
with specialist economic roles appearing such as potters and smiths, shamans 
sometimes have survived as before, but in many contexts they took on the role of 
priest. Priests are religious specialists whose expertise lies in the area of knowing 
about deities rather than mere spirit beings, composing and preserving myths about 
them, and knowing how to divine their will and conciliate them using fixed rituals. 
They are typically approved by, and may even be equated with, the governing 
authority, and are organized in a group rather than operating as individuals. They 
conduct ceremonies but do not engage in the ecstatic performances characteristic of 
shamanism (Basilov 1990: 36 -38). 
Once a priesthood has been established in a secure economy, as in ancient 
Egypt, it becomes possible for priests in turn to diversify into ritualists, advisers, 
theologians and the rest. In many societies possessing an official priesthood, who act 
as a stabilizing force in society, other unofficial religious specialists have operated in 
parallel, carrying out cures and divinations or casting spells. However, in such a case 
they are usually disapproved of or suppressed and referred to as witches or sorcerers 
rather than shamans (James 1955: 13, 36; Basilov 1990: 33). It is not in the interest 
of a priestly caste to permit unofficial and unpredictable rival specialists to function 
in the community. 
Shamanism, rooted in hunting and gathering cultures with their egalitarian 
attitudes and focus on game animals, declined with the development of agriculture, 
as in Central America (Hultkrantz 1978: 51 -52). However, it is possible that a cadre 
of religious specialists might retain its function without loss of continuity. Through 
the cultural transition from hunting and gathering to agriculture, they may sometimes 
have made a parallel transition from shamans to priests. Just as the shaman was a 
botanical expert for the purpose of securing medicinal and psychoactive materials, he 
or she may have been the first expert on identifying and growing crops. It has been 
suggested that the earliest motivation of ancient people to identify cereal grasses may 
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have come from a more ancient prehistoric use of fungal growths, ergot, found on 
wild grasses, for the religious purpose of inducing altered states. In time, with the 
discovery of the food value of cereals, the shamans retained their expertise and 
exclusivity, now transferred to the new source of subsistence, and transformed 
themselves into the rain- makers, intermediaries of weather deities, and agricultural 
divine kings of ancient societies (Ripinsky -Naxon 1993: 185 -186). 
The transition from shamans to priests will not be pursued further here 
because, on the assumption that priests develop from shamans, the shaman represents 
the aboriginal religious specialist. The origin in prehistory of shamans, as the first 
type of religious specialist, before whom there were none at all, has the principal 
claim on this chapter. 
Nature and inner motivation of the shaman 
It has been disputed whether shamanism qualifies as a religion, but this is a 
matter of defmition and will not detain me any more than it does Hultkrantz (1978: 
29 -31). He summarizes that the central idea of shamanism is for a community to 
establish contact with a spirit world by means of a specialist intermediary. Four 
elements constitute the complex: (1) the ideological premise of a spirit world and the 
possibility of contact with it; (2) the shaman as agent for a community; (3) the 
shaman's ability or inspiration granted by helping spirits; (4) the ecstatic experiences 
of the shaman. Eliade (1964: passim) emphasizes the characteristics of the other 
world visited on the ecstatic journey and says comparatively little about the spirits 
encountered there and in this world. Hultkrantz emphasizes the host of spirits which 
are believed to exist, from among which the shaman recruits his or her helping 
spirits. More correctly, from an emic point of view, the helping spirits are said to 
recruit the shaman (Radin 1938: 135). 
Early in this chapter I discussed Radin's discrimination of degrees of 
religiosity among people, and noted that he identified three types. In fact, as shown 
in most of his work, the identification can be reduced to two: the religious specialist 
and the lay person. The middle type, the intermittently religious person, can be 
subsumed into the laity. Radin also identifies two types of personality, the `introvert' 
and the `extravert'. For an introvert religious ideas can assume great personal 
significance, while an extrovert is a practical, matter -of -fact person. By and large, lay 
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people are extroverts and religious specialists are introverts. In stratified, usually 
agricultural, societies the religious specialist may be an extrovert, because practical 
rewards in the form of power, prestige and economic security can be obtained from 
being a member of a priestly caste, and this motivation appeals to practical people. In 
simpler, unstratified societies there is less competition for the position of religious 
specialist, because the rewards are not so great. Therefore the introverts who have a 
personal calling or predisposition to attend to supernatural matters preponderate 
among the shamans and medicine men of those societies (Radin 1938: 105 -109). 
Mental abnormality 
Shamanic temperament 
Mostly on the evidence of Asiatic and American shamanism, it has been 
widely proposed that shamans manifest one form or another of mental illness or 
arrested psychological development (La Barre 1970a). They have been called 
neurotic, psychotic or epileptic. Even Joseph Campbell likened shamanism to 
`controlled schizophrenia' (Ripinsky -Naxon 1993: 102). Radin (1938: 108 and 
passim) states that the introvert religious specialist has a 'neurotic-epileptoid' 
disposition, but does not define what he means or distinguish the two terms of this 
description. 
Strictly, neurosis involves a persistent state of anxiety, which may take many 
forms. The neurotic maintains contact with reality and is rarely subject to delusions. 
In contrast, psychosis involves a loss of sense of reality, withdrawal and sometimes 
hallucinations; schizophrenia is the most widely acknowledged form of psychosis. 
Modern psychiatry has alternative classifications, and the terminology of neurosis 
and psychosis is no longer acceptable to all workers (Frude 1998). Neurosis and 
psychosis (for the sake of argument I stay with these terms) are psychological 
conditions manifesting in behaviour and without necessarily any marked 
physiological basis. In contrast, epilepsy is an unequivocally physiological condition, 
detectable by instruments such as EEG and often with a clear aetiology in brain 
abnormalities made visible by x -rays, scans or surgery. 
Eliade (1964: xi -xii) claims that it is a mistake to assimilate shamanism to 
any kind of mental illness, but then (e.g., 1964: 16, 20, 25 -26) cites ethnographic 
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examples which seem to show just the opposite of his claim. For example, a new 
Yakut shaman became frenzied, unconscious and wounded himself with knives; for 
Altaians, if a young man suffered epileptic attacks, he must have had a shaman 
among his ancestors; shamanic candidates among the Araucanians of Chile were 
sickly or morbidly sensitive and suffered from vertigo. 
A number of ethnologists in the early twentieth century hypothesized that 
people in far northern climates suffered from `arctic hysteria'. This putative 
condition results from prolonged hardship, uncertainty, relative solitude (and sensory 
deprivation) in an inhospitable environment, in which the monotonous days and long 
nights induce `cosmic oppression'. A particular example is Kayakangst, suffered by 
the lone hunter when travelling in his canoe. The strong form of this hypothesis 
further asserts that true shamanism originated among the people of the polar north 
who were subject to these conditions, and that the shamanism of more southerly 
peoples such as those of Central Asia is secondary and less intense. Generally, the 
strength and genuineness of shamanic practice correlates with the degree of 
neuropathy, and this in turn with proximity to the north pole (La Barre 1970a: 171- 
175; Eliade 1964: 24; Furst 1994: 9). 
Eliade (1964: 24 -31) points out that the presence of true shamanism in all 
climates of the world - with, one may add, no evidence of diffusion from north to 
south except in the Americas - is sufficient to dismiss the hypothesis that its origin 
lies in arctic hysteria. Furst (1994: 9) concludes: `From this alone it follows that this 
[arctic hysteria] and all attempts to explain the shamanic phenomenon as "mental 
illness" must be rejected'. This is a non sequitur. While the existence of shamanism 
elsewhere than in the far north eliminates arctic hysteria as the sole ground of 
shamanism, it does not eliminate the possibility that shamanism arises from other 
forms of mental instability. 
Basilov (1990: 3 -5) observes that nineteenth- century ethnologists dismissed 
shamans as deceivers; but by the early twentieth century the view prevailed that the 
shaman had a disordered mind. Phrases used by his earlier sources on Asiatic 
shamanism include: `neuropathic persons'; `many were almost hysterical, and some 
were literally half-insane'; `the most nervously unstable persons'; `a nervous, 
hysterical person, prone to seizures, occasionally an epileptic ... the shamanic séance 
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itself has much similarity to an hysterical attack'; `morbid neural organization, a 
tendency to ecstatic fits'; `shamanic illness accompanied by fits, fainting spells'; 'a 
cult of hysteria'; `socially organized neurosis'. 
Hultkrantz (1978: 50) refers to the labile nervous disposition of shamans 
generally, and says Tungus shamans are recruited from 'neuropathically disposed' 
families, the pathology manifesting as fits and hysterical attacks. He also cites 
hysterical phenomena, cramps, convulsions and imitative behaviour among Tungus 
men. Compulsive echolalia together with coprolalia and exhibitionism comprised the 
`olonism' observed among the Tungus by Shirokogoroff (1935: 245 -251; La Barre 
1970a: 172 -174). Some of these involuntary behaviours resemble automatisms 
associated with psychomotor epilepsy. 
According to Alekseev (1990: 60 -64), the shamanic gift takes the form of a 
neuropsychological illness, and a séance may involve falling down, convulsions and 
foaming at the mouth. On the shamanic journey, not only evil supernatural beings 
may be encountered but also nightmare landscapes may have to be traversed. When 
an Altaian shaman journeyed to the underworld to plead with khan Erlik', he 
encountered `a black stump, ... a black game that the old ones play, ... black tongs, 
endlessly opening and closing, ... a place that takes the power from great shamans 
and the head from poor shamans, ... black ravines, ... swarms of black gluttons, ... a 
boiling black lake, ... pale gluttons with greenish legs, the shore of a blue river, ... a 
stone palace and the residence of the khan'. In a Manchurian tale of a shamaness, 
`she comes to the bank of a river and a lame ferryman takes her across. ... She goes 
on to two gates, each guarded by two harmful spirits' (Baldick 2000: 146). 
Devereux (1961) declares that Ute shamans laboured under `at least 
borderline psychotic fantasies'. These included the belief that the shaman's powers 
might turn against him and he might plead with them in vain. He relates (1961; 1980: 
20 -21) the case of a Mohave shaman whom he had believed to be completely 
rational. Then one night, when drunk, the shaman `poured out frankly psychotic 
material', which he assented to when sober. A shaman of the Sedang Moi in Malaya 
had a psychotic episode in which he ran shouting through the village and had to be 
secured by several men while he tried to fight ghosts. Although shamans were 
King or god of the underworld. 
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expected to have contact with supernatural beings, local people testified that this 
behaviour was deranged. For Devereux, there are three explanations for these sudden 
outbursts: (1) spirit possession is real; (2) psychotic episodes can occur out of the 
blue without a preceding abnormal mental condition; or (3) the subjects had a 
preexistent psychosis. The last alternative is to be favoured. Much of the time, the 
subject may appear normal, and a culturally valued function can be carried out by a 
latent psychotic who has a sound understanding of his or her role. 
Radin (1938: 111 -129) cites original, in some cases first-hand, accounts of 
shamanic calling and initiation, to illustrate the mental state of the subjects. An 
Eskimo apprentice shaman chose for his way of suffering starvation and cold, which 
were regulated by his wife's father, a master shaman. However, note that the 
apprentice `chose' this way of suffering; it was not merely imposed. According to an 
Arunta informant, evil spirits deprive a prospective medicine man of his senses so 
that he `runs about like one crazy' and cannot rest day or night. He is `repeatedly 
beaten' by the spirits until he falls unconscious to the ground. Subsequently, he is ill 
and exhausted. For the Mentawei, a young person who is to become a seer is 
`summoned through sickness, dreams or temporary insanity', and malaria is the usual 
sickness. He promises to become a seer in return for being healed by the spirits. An 
Amazulu person who is going to become a diviner begins to be `delicate without 
having any real disease', particular about food, eating little, and complaining about 
pains in parts of his body. He `becomes a house of dreams'. He says: `I dreamt .... 
And on waking, one part of my body felt different from other parts; it was no longer 
alike all over.' For the Ashanti, the realization that a person is to become a priest 
comes upon him or her unawares in the course of ordinary life or during a religious 
ceremony, when the person hears a voice or falls down in a fit. 
These accounts describe different circumstances, and Radin points out that 
for some of the complex African and Tahitian societies (not cited above), admission 
to the cadre of religious specialist is controlled by the existing specialists, and those 
selected need not always be subject to unusual experiences. Because the rewards of 
office are greater, `normal' people are attracted to the priesthood. For the simpler 
societies, the ranks of the shamans are more nearly composed of self -selecting 
introverts. While there are apprenticeships in which the novice is trained by an 
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experienced shaman, the candidate is almost invariably of the 'neurotic- epileptoid' 
type. In the accounts given above, one can recognize in the feeling of strangeness in 
parts of the body a quasi -epileptic aural symptom, quite apart from the obvious 
symptoms of loss of consciousness, cramps (tonus ?) and fits. 
One issue which strikes the lay reader is that virtually none of the authorities 
define what they mean by such terms as ' neuropathie, `hysteric', 'neurotic', 
`psychotic', 'epileptic' and the rest. These are technical terms in psychology intended 
to have specific meanings. There may be a problem with translation, of course, but I 
suspect that different terms are used to describe the same phenomenon by different 
observers, and that they are all used with a more or less casual equivalence. 
Shamanic calling 
What is clear is that many ethnographers have noted the prevalence of a labile 
and abnormal temperament among shamans. The latter frequently manifest an 
abnormal temperament by the standards of their own community. They are not 
necessarily 'insane' by their community's standards, but it is their personal 
temperament that is unusual or abnormal, and not just their behaviour while 
shamanizing. Evidence that this is so is given by the manner in which shamans are 
selected. 
The experiences which manifest a shamanic calling take the form of any or 
all of the following: intense dreams and nightmares, prolonged sickness, desire for 
solitude, concentration on an inner life, maladjustment to the normal ways of society 
or to one's gender, a sense of strangeness, abrupt loss of consciousness, convulsions, 
visual and auditory hallucinations. Some of these manifestations have no connection 
with the supernatural: the failure to integrate socially in the common way, 
introversion as such and confusion of gender identity do not indicate the presence of 
numinous feelings. One suspects that some of those who merely have trouble finding 
a niche in a tribal society which has very few types of niche, perhaps only two, laity 
and shamans, choose the latter because in that niche eccentricity is tolerated. They 
are potential outsiders in an implicitly conformist society in which sociability is 
enforced (cf Devereux 1980:54 -57), but need not have a numinous inclination. 
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As an example, consider an Uzbek transvestite shaman who was well - 
adjusted and socially integrated, as described by Basilov (1978: 282 -288). This man 
was sick in his youth and was trained by a shamaness. Throughout adulthood he 
wore women's clothing, because, as he said, `I like it'. He liked to sit among the 
women and swear and gossip like them. Lively and smiling, he walked with a quick 
mincing gait. He was an accomplished musician, playing and singing at all village 
celebrations. He had had four wives in succession, who gave birth to two daughters 
and two sons; one of the latter was continuing his father's musical profession. In 
addition, the shaman performed the duties of divining and healing. 
Transculturally, the calling to become a shaman frequently takes the form of 
`shamanic illness'. The subject becomes anxious, moody, withdrawn or physically 
ill, and may suffer fainting episodes and mumble or sing while asleep. Sometimes the 
subject resists, but the illness continues until he or she accepts the call and seeks an 
apprenticeship with an established shaman (Ripinsky -Naxon 1993: 66, 71, 74, 79, 
87; Eliade 1964: 27 -28; Furst 1994: 6; Radin 1938: 111 -129, cited above). 
Sometimes a physical abnormality is taken to be a sign of shamanic destiny (Eliade 
1964: 31 -32; Ripinsky -Naxon 1993: 71 -72). For a child, I imagine that the awareness 
of looking different may give rise to a predisposing anxiety. Eliade (1964) gives 
detailed accounts of shamanic callings, including descriptions of the transcultural 
dismemberment theme, but these are emic accounts with little or no objective 
content. 
Tradition or temperament 
In a widely cited article, Basilov rejects a neuropsychological basis for 
`shamanic illness', and adduces evidence from Shirokogoroff (1935) and others. 
Shirokogoroff is cited by La Barre (1970a) in support of the opposite opinion. I shall 
summarize three points of Basilov's (1990: 5 -10) argument, and then offer a dialogue 
using Devereux's (1980) contentions in favour of the mental -illness hypothesis to 
counter the arguments of others. 
Firstly, Basilov shows that shamanic illness is not confined to adolescence 
but has been documented appearing at all ages from six to sixty, sometimes after 
marriage and children. So it cannot be a neurosis arising from the physiological 
changes of adolescence. I would add that in tribal communities young people know 
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what is expected of adulthood and look forward to it; the teenage Angst of western 
societies is unknown (Devereux 1980: 192 -194). 
Secondly, Basilov's positive contention is that shamanic illness is the result 
of autosuggestion. He cites evidence from the Ket and Evenk, two Asiatic peoples. 
Among them, if there had been no new shaman for some time, expectation would 
grow that a new shaman should soon appear. In a milieu of expectation, some who 
suspected that they were targeted would begin to manifest signs of shamanic illness. 
They would be taken ill, stop eating, become withdrawn. Some might even have 
hysterical attacks or convulsions; some would retire into the wilderness. The people 
might or might not be convinced, and even those suffering these symptoms might not 
be accepted as having a genuine call. As time passed and no shaman was identified, a 
wider circle would come to suspect that they were eligible, and more people would 
exhibit symptoms of shamanic illness. Eventually, when someone was identified and 
accepted, the symptoms of the others would quickly abate. Thus, shamanic illness is 
produced by autosuggestion when the community expects a new shaman. 
Thirdly, attacks of fainting and fits are essential components of shamanic 
ritual. But the shaman has these attacks in accordance with people's expectation. 
Frequently, even the ecstatic experience is consciously controlled throughout so that 
the audience witness what they hope for. It is programmed and achieved by 
autosuggestion (Basilov 1990: 10 -11). The professional shaman's everyday unusual 
behaviour, his or her actual shamanistic performances, and even the illness of the 
future shaman all conform to a stereotype. 
Devereux (1980: 14 -15, 20 -21) acknowledges that shamans' behaviour 
conforms to an institutional stereotype, but insists that it remains 'ego-dystonic' 
(harmful to the individual) and often 'culture-dystonic' (hostile or harmful to the 
community) as well. When it is believed by the community that a Ute shaman 
harbours an homunculus inside him, and the shaman believes this too, he merely 
shares the mistaken belief of the tribe. When a shaman actually experiences the sense 
of an homunculus inside him, then he is suffering from a pathological delusion, even 
if it is a culturally patterned one. 
Some types of abnormal behaviour have been regarded as an `ethnic 
psychosis'. Speaking in tongues in the ancient world was taken to be a divine 
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madness, but if observed today in a psychiatric ward would be treated as a clinical 
symptom. In an objective attempt to describe classical or other cultures, this and 
similar phenomena should be regarded as clinical symptoms of derangement 
(Devereux 1980: 47). The alternative to this objective diagnosis, as I have stressed 
before, is either to accept the ethnic view of the reality of the supernatural or to 
refuse to judge phenomena in a target culture. If we refuse to judge, then we refrain 
from trying to understand what is really, physiologically, happening to people in the 
target culture in a way we would never refrain from doing for our own culture. 
It has been argued that shamans cannot be deranged because they are useful, 
indeed pivotal figures, in their societies, as healers in the broadest sense. Astute 
shamans are tactful and insightful, and try to minimize conflict in the community as 
well as heal individuals. Their performances bind the community together. 
Ethnographers have repeatedly noted that shamans are typically more intelligent and 
learned than the average member of their societies and have much larger 
vocabularies. They are often the custodians of tribal lore. In South America shamans 
have extensive knowledge of medicinal plants. Sometimes shamans are physically 
stronger than the average tribesman and capable of prodigious feats. Even very 
elderly shamans in trance sometimes engage in prolonged dancing and leaping while 
wearing heavy costumes. These observations seem to argue against mental 
deficiency or sickliness (Eliade 1964: 29 -31; Furst 1994: 8, 13 -14; Siskind 1973: 37- 
38; Basilov 1990: 17 -19; Baldick 2000: 137). 
Devereux (1980: 24) points out that the claim that social usefulness, strength 
or intelligence demonstrates mental health is fallacious. Consider the mathematician 
Georg Cantor, who alternated between advanced scholarship and psychotic spells in 
a mental institution (Devereux 1961: 1089). His groundbreaking development of 
transfinite set theory does not prove that he was not psychotic. 
Eliade (1964: 27 -31) emphasizes that the shaman has not merely suffered the 
shamanic illness but has cured himself. From personal experience the shaman 
understands the mechanism of illness and this allows him to become a healer. The 
curer is his own first patient. The cure is effected by commencing to shamanize. His 
inner personal crisis (Ripinsky -Naxon 1993: 71) does not continue but is resolved 
(Furst 1994: 7). 
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Firstly, shamanic cures of other people are not by any means always 
effective. According to a study among the Altaians, recovery was rare. Yet people 
continued to make expensive sacrifices of livestock to clan spirits as part of the rites 
to bring healing. In some cases families were brought to ruin (Alekseev 1990: 67, 
107). 
Secondly, according to Devereux (1980: 17 -19), the shaman's cure is not 
`real'. Instead, he contends that the shaman provides a `corrective emotional 
experience' which repatterns psychological defences without insight into underlying 
conflict. In the case of the shaman's self -cure which terminates the initiatory illness, 
the individual's personal conflicts and desires are transformed into culturally 
conventional ethnic conflicts and ritualistic symptoms, without insight. The shaman 
is not cured but in remission. 
In the case of shamanic illness, Basilov says `the future shaman would know 
that the choice of the spirits would be upon him. ... He ... would resist, yet still be 
internally prepared for the inevitable.' But here I ask: why does one person and not 
another recognize himself or herself as a future shaman? I suggest that the self - 
selecting future shaman is likely to be someone who is of a labile, nervous 
temperament in the first place, one who will most easily be provoked to abnormal 
behaviour and exhibit it more strikingly than others, so fulfilling the people's 
expectation. 
One must now ask: why does the stereotype consist of those particular 
behaviours? Basilov (1990: 6 -7) says that the necessity of attacks and madness is 
suggested to the shaman by the people's traditions. `From remote antiquity' it was 
known that the person in possession of the spirits should exhibit fainting and 
inexplicable behaviour. But I would argue that the most probable reason why 
tradition specifies abnormal behaviour is that, indeed, `from remote antiquity' the 
memorable shamans have been people subject to abnormal behaviour - not just 
because tradition expected it of them but because they were personally disposed to 
abnormal behaviour. The stereotype was established by a succession of people with 
an abnormal temperament. 
I do not deny the cogency of Basilov's argument regarding tradition and 
expectation. However, as one must with a view to origins, I try to look behind the 
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tradition and expectation and see how they could have arisen at a period before there 
was any tradition. 
Cultural relativism 
According to Eliade (1964: 14), what is important is the shamanic technique 
and its theory as transmitted by initiation, not the personal or temperamental 'point 
of departure' for obtaining shamanic powers. This view does not represent an 
emphasis by Eliade on the function of shamanism in a society, but rather his positive 
valuation of shamanic practices as a technique of attaining what he clearly believes 
to be genuine ecstasy: that is, an altered state in which genuine knowledge of a wider 
reality than the everyday world becomes accessible. In accordance with the 
principles of this inquiry, of course I must reject this view. Further, in seeking the 
origins of shamanic activity, one must investigate the condition of those who practise 
it. At the time of its origins, there could not have been any shamanic initiation or 
transmission of technique, because at its origins there was no precedent. From this 
point of view, the condition of the individual subject in bringing about the 
phenomena becomes paramount. 
Like Eliade, Ripinsky -Naxon denies the importance of western categories of 
mental illness in determining the status of the shaman. Even so, he cites opinion that 
the only difference between shamanic trance and an epileptic seizure is that the 
shaman can enter the state at will (1993: 88; cf. Eliade 1964: 29; Basilov 1990: 10). 
Since epileptic seizures may manifest as purely motor phenomena without psychic 
auras, this is strictly not true. He says (1993: 68): `western cultures do not possess 
equivalent metaphors (existential wisdom as opposed to didactic knowledge) to pass 
diagnostic judgements on phenomena adaptive in cultural contexts'. This is of course 
an expression of cultural relativism, allowing only an emic approach to the study. In 
contrast, I believe, if we are to understand objectively why these phenomena come 
about, we must make judgements based upon wider information which can be 
brought to bear from outside target cultures. 
Devereux (1980: 14 -16, 20, 64) will not tolerate cultural relativism in 
assessing the shaman psychiatrically. In his view the shaman is a severe neurotic or a 
psychotic in temporary remission. Given the importance of reality acceptance in 
psychiatric diagnosis, the shaman's distorted sense of reality alone is enough to mark 
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him or her as at least borderline psychotic. Some potential hysterics become 
shamans; some remain `private' neurotics. 
It is part of Devereux's scheme that people have an idiosyncratic or personal 
unconscious and an ethnic unconscious. When people's conflicts are in the ethnic 
sphere - that is, it seems to me, they have trouble adjusting in society - they develop 
behaviours which society provides for those who cannot conform. Every culture 
provides a conventional mode of behaviour, sometimes ritualized, for those who are 
potentially unconventional. In nineteenth- century Europe, hysteria was the `ethnic 
type neurosis', the conventional mode of being mentally disturbed. People learned 
`the right way to be a hysteric', and when diagnosed played the part as expected. 
Individuals suffering from ethnic disorders shape their symptoms according to 
society's expectation of `how the insane behave'. In Malaya, running amok was the 
conventional mode of insanity; among the Vikings, the berserk rage (Devereux 1980: 
17, 35, 42, 44). In each society people know how they are expected to behave if they 
lose control - and it is different for different societies. Shamans therefore do not 
invent their symptoms, because a set of conventionalized symptoms are provided by 
their culture. But the fact that shamanic behaviour is conventionalized does not make 
it normal, any more than conventionalized hysterical behaviour in nineteenth -century 
Europe was normal. 
As a psychoanalyst, Devereux attributes mental disorder to mostly 
unconscious psychological conflicts, but it is not necessary to follow his aetiology all 
the way to retrieve insights from his analysis. The point is to note that one who 
chooses to become a religious specialist is of a less balanced or more disordered 
temperament, whatever the underlying causes, than the practical person in his 
community. 
Hallucinogens 
The underestimation by earlier workers of the role of hallucinogens in Old 
World shamanism may have facilitated the assumption that practitioners were 
mentally ill. Psychotomimetic drugs may induce some behaviours which could be 
misinterpreted as symptoms of psychopathology. 
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In the region of classic shamanism, Siberia, use of the fly agaric mushroom to 
induce ecstatic states has been documented for the Koryak, Kamchadal, Chukchi, 
Ostyak, Samoyed, Yukaghir, Yakut, Vogul and Ugrians (Hamer 1973a: xii -xiv; 
Wasson 1968: 233 -304). Harner relates a description by the explorer Jochelson of 
shamanic activity under its influence: great animation alternating with deep 
depression, rocking from side to side, talking quietly, then eyes dilating, convulsive 
gesticulation, conversation with invisible entities. It is easy to see how the 
intoxicated shaman could be construed as a psychotic. Certainly the experience of 
`another reality' and hence reduced acceptance of normal reality - an indication of 
psychosis - falls into this category. 
In Mexico and Central and South America, hallucinogens play a more 
explicit part in shamanic practice than elsewhere. Apprenticeship for Amazonian 
shamans often includes the ingestion of large quantities of tobacco and ayahuasca, 
which induces encounters with helping spirits. Apprentices experience what their 
masters have trained them to expect (Langdon 1979: 77 -78; Weiss 1973: 43; Furst 
1994: 17). Thus are they prepared for their future role, in which they will continue to 
use drugs for divination and healing. The behaviour of Native American shamans 
and laity while under the influence of ayahuasca, peyote or mushrooms seems to be 
relatively placid. Participants in ayahuasca rituals may sit round quietly having their 
own private visions between bouts of vomiting. While there may be chanting and 
dancing, the leaping and shrieks often described for Asiatic shamans are absent (cf 
Furst 1972: 181; Gray 1997; Reichel -Dolmatoff 1975; 1972; Harper 1973a). 
In all cases, however, the introvert's predisposition to the role of religious 
specialist is a personal characteristic rather than an effect of drugs, as the ingestion of 
drugs appears to be usually a consequence of selection for shamanic training rather 
than its cause. 
A psychodynamic theory 
In Appendix 11A, I summarize and criticize the Freudian psychodynamic 
theory of La Barre (1970a) explaining the religious inclinations of both layman and 
shaman. 
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Conclusion 
Altogether there are two hypotheses: the shaman as (1) master, deceiver and 
exploiter or as (2) victim, neurotic, psychotic or epileptic. Yet one person can 
embody characters from both (1) and (2). 
A variety of opinions at a more fundamental level than the anthropological 
can be discerned among the references I have used. Some, like Radin, Devereux, La 
Barre and Alekseev, have no doubt that the shaman is merely mentally ill or 
epileptic, has no insight into a wider reality, and wields a pernicious influence over 
the tribesmen who believe in his special powers. Others, such as Furst and Sullivan, 
and new -age followers of these real scholars, take what I call a romantic view. They 
believe in a wider reality as perceived by the shaman, and reject the claim of mental 
illness or mere epilepsy. For them the shaman has insight and is a positive influence 
in his or her community. Others again, among whom I would include Eliade and 
Ripinsky -Naxon, seem in some passages to accept the epileptic or even mental - 
illness hypothesis, but are prepared to believe that mastery of those conditions can 
bring insight and indeed allow the subject access to a wider reality than the normal. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that how one interprets the phenomena of 
shamanism depends largely on one's metaphysical position concerning the scope of 
reality. As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, I do not think that all metaphysical 
positions are equally rational. I side with Radin and Alekseev. I part company with 
Devereux and La Barre because I think their a priori psychoanalytic constructs are as 
`metaphysical', in a pejorative sense, as the shaman's spirits. 
I think the evidence for epilepsy at a clinical level (such as would lead to a 
positive diagnosis in the west) among Asiatic shamans is obvious. The widespread 
occurrence of feelings of strangeness, fainting and fits is undeniable. However, 
epilepsy at a clinical level is certainly not a universal prerequisite. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the numinous sense of presence - manifested in shamanism by the helping 
spirits - appears to be a subclinical epileptic or quasi -epileptic phenomenon. Even 
this is not a prerequisite for becoming a shaman. Individuals who have trouble 
finding a niche in the community may be drawn to shamanism because it is the only 
niche available for a mere eccentric. 
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One is drawn back to Radin's identification of the introvert in primitive 
societies in which most people are extrovert practical men and women. The reason 
for introversion, an interest in the inner life of dreams, may vary, but will often 
include the tendency to numinous feelings associated with unusual temporal -lobe 
neural activity. In Chapter 5, I set out the corroborated hypothesis that among human 
beings there is a continuum of degrees of susceptibility to epileptiform activity 
centred on the deep structures of the temporal lobes, ranging from virtually none at 
all to clinical temporal -lobe epilepsy with generalized seizures. I propose that 
Radin's introverts are, broadly, at the middle and sometimes high end of the scale, 
and his extroverts at the lower, mild end. His intermittently religious type falls 
somewhere toward the lower end but with some mild susceptibility. The great 
majority of people fall within the lower reaches of the scale. 
Those with marked susceptibility feel a calling to become religious 
specialists. This explains why shamans in simple societies have so often been 
reported as exhibiting what are fairly obvious clinical epileptic symptoms. But they 
are extreme cases. I stress that even defmitely subclinical transient and only 
occasional epileptiform activity may produce numinous feelings sufficient to induce 
a person to become a religious specialist. If `neuropathy' has been reported less for 
tribal religious specialists in Africa than in Eurasia, the reason is that African tribal 
societies are more organized than the hunting cultures of the northern hemisphere, so 
that `normal' people more commonly compete for the role. 
Consider the physiological explanation which I espouse, that numinous 
experience is quasi -epileptic. Then one can reinterpret the central contention of 
Eliade's (1964) and Furst's (1994) view of shamans that they `heal' themselves from 
their shamanic illness by learning to control their ecstatic predispositions. Take into 
account Basilov's (1990: 11, 29) point that as soon as a shaman lost control of his 
visions he would become a `neuropath'. One arrives at the conclusion that some 
shamans learn to control - to direct or transform? - their subjectively numinous and 
objectively epileptic experiences. If this interpretation is correct, the phenomenon is 
remarkable. It is worthy of study, at an individual level, to elucidate how shamans 
accomplish this neurological feat. 
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Too often one reads and writes: `The shaman does x'. What shaman? All 
there have ever been are individual shamans, who were human organisms each with 
its own peculiarities. They were not mere instances of a constant Platonic form of a 
shaman. Drawing freely on Eliade and other theorists, I have generalized the 
shamanic phenomenon in a quest to make sense of it in as few words as possible. I 
am only too aware not only that I have passed over differences in behaviours 
between societies but also that I have been guilty of diminishing the significance of 
the individuals who generated this phenomenon. 
Dating 
Shamans 
Basilov outlines his view of the origins of shamanism as follows. In 
prehistory, people came to believe in spirits. The idea that spirits controlled the 
environment had a debilitating effect on human confidence, so humans interposed a 
protection against spirits. They took to believing that certain people could control the 
spirits, and these were the first shamans (Basilov 1990: 29 -32). I am unconvinced 
that people in general felt a need for protection and invented shamans. I should think 
it more likely that prospective shamans invented the idea that they could control 
spirits and communicated it to the rest of the community. Earlier, people had come to 
believe in spirit beings and ghosts because of the animatist tendency and animist 
world -views described in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Alekseev (1990: 74, 77) alludes to a `preshamanic cult' of the Sayan -Altai 
people, and states that shamans first appeared among South Siberians in the first 
millennium CE. It is not clear whether he means that the cult in question preceded 
any shamanism or that it represented an interlude between an earlier, possibly 
primordial shamanism and the recent documented shamanic culture. In any case, the 
worldwide evidence that some form of shamanism preceded any other type of 
religion is convincing, if not overwhelming. 
Among the Jivaro of Ecuador, one in four men considered himself to be a 
shaman (Harner 1968: 17). In one Sharanahua village in Peru, three out of twenty - 
five men were shamans (Siskind 1973: 31). Of Chukchi men in eastern Siberia, again 
one man in four was a shaman, prompting Basilov (1990: 30) to raise the question 
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whether at one time everyone was a shaman. It is noteworthy that some Amazonian 
Indians, including the Jivaro, have community ceremonies in which all adult males 
drink ayahuasca (Reichel- Dolmatoff 1975; 1972; Harner 1968), and that the Chukchi 
are among the peoples alleged by early travellers to be addicted to the fly agaric 
(Wasson 1968: 233 -304). Availability of hallucinogens democratizes attainability of 
trance. Hultkrantz (1978: 34 -35), discussing evidence for and against a shamanism 
open to all, concludes with Eliade that an aboriginal shamanism limited to 
professionals is more likely. 
In prehistory, in any given geographical area, it is possible that there was a 
stage lasting hundreds of years when everyone shamanized, followed by a stage 
when only a few shamans did, or no one at all, for hundreds of years more, followed 
by repetitions of these stages. One would not be able to tell from archaeology. 
Recognizable shamanism is widely believed to have begun in or before the 
Upper Palaeolithic (Basilov 1990: 30; La Barre 1972: 270 -273). The cave paintings 
of western Europe are considered as evidence by many (Dickson 1990). The fact that 
many of the painted chambers are remote from the surface and difficult of access 
indicates that those who ventured there had a very strong motivation. They did not 
inhabit the deep chambers, and no food was to be obtained there. One is left probably 
with a magical, religious or ceremonial motivation. The animal depictions suggest 
hunting magic. To some workers the shapes resembling entoptic forms suggest 
altered states of consciousness, perhaps resulting from sensory deprivation 
occasioned by the darkness of the caves themselves (Balm 1998: 240 -242). However, 
Hodgson (2000: 867) reports phosphene -like motifs in the art of non -shamanic 
cultures. Such representations may sometimes be mere geometrical shapes which 
interested the painters. One does not have to suppose that Euclid was a shaman, even 
if some think that his predecessor Pythagoras inherited that calling. 
Given that in every society there are religious leaders and laity (Radin 1938), 
it is likely that the religious motivation was articulated by specialists who broadly 
conformed to the type of shamans. The advent of recognizable shamanism, at least in 
western Europe, can therefore be placed at around 30,000 years ago, the date of the 
oldest cave paintings (Chauvet et al. 2001: 9 -11, 122 -123; Conard and Uerpmann 
2000). Alleged evidence of earlier cult practice, such as the once famous Palaeolithic 
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bear cult dating from up to 75,000 years ago, has been reevaluated in the light of 
modern understanding of cave taphonomy and is generally dismissed (Kurtén 1976; 
M. Pacher, pers. comm.). 
Proto -shamans 
Before there were shamans, I suspect that there were proto- shamans among 
the humans and prehumans who preceded the Homo sapiens people of the Upper 
Palaeolithic. I am confident that shamanism did not spring into the world, with all its 
characteristics as observed in recent societies, fully formed. Long before any cult or 
organized beliefs existed, there will have been humans or prehumans whose 
behavioural repertoire did not yet exemplify, but did prefigure, some, and at first 
only some, of the characteristics of recognizable shamans. 
Our ancestors of the Lower Palaeolithic, who were Homo ergaster, Homo 
erectus and Homo heidelbergensis, must have possessed mental capabilities at the 
very least equivalent to those of chimpanzees. As the human brain increased in size 
over hundreds of thousands of years, it makes sense to suppose that the complexity 
of human mentality increased. The diversity of mental abilities and predilections 
from one individual to another should have increased similarly. 
Firstly, chimpanzees show signs of knowing which plants are beneficial in 
the event of various illnesses. In early Homo communities some individuals would 
have been more observant than others. Some may have acquired special expertise in 
the identification of plants for medicinal use. Some would have become more expert 
than others in ways of applying plant material to the skin to treat wounds and in 
mixing leaves, stems and roots from a variety of plants for medicinal ingestion. In a 
practical way, these first botanists would have been the first healers. One has only to 
read accounts of chimpanzee interactions in the wild and in zoo situations where 
communities have formed, as at Arnhem, to perceive that speech is not required for 
the sort of behaviour envisaged (Chapter 6). 
Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 7, Guthrie has shown that the tendency to 
look out for animate creatures, and especially conspecifics, in the environment is 
found in all but the lowest animals. Anthropomorphism should therefore date from 
the advent of the first Homo. It does not require speech. The numinous frisson 
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familiar to most of us today I have hypothesized to be the subjective aspect of quasi - 
epileptic microseizures in limbic structures deep in the temporal lobes (Chapter 5). 
Whether chimpanzees experience such frissons one does not know. The capacity to 
have such feelings, comparable to ours, may conceivably depend on attainment of a 
threshold brain size. I would guess that late Homo erectus, with an intracranial 
volume of around 900 cubic centimetres, two thirds of the mean for modern Homo 
sapiens, probably had a brain sufficiently similar to ours to be able to suffer temporo- 
limbic microseizures and thus experience such feelings as a sense of strangeness, 
déjà vu, vertigo and a sense of presence. Some individuals more than others will 
have been subject to these experiences. They could have manifested, among other 
things, as an abnormal sensitiveness to the possible presence of other creatures in the 
environment. This characteristic could even appear useful to a hunting and gathering 
community surrounded by wild beasts and hostile neighbours. 
All higher animals seek their own survival and advantage over their 
conspecifics. Chimpanzees appear to have a theory of mind. They look out for a 
chance to secure advantage, whether to get food or to mate, to outwit a higher - 
ranking male or female, or to become an alpha or dominant male or female who is in 
a position to enjoy the best share of food or to mate frequently. Early humans will 
have been no different. 
Imagine a community on the brink of animatism (Chapter 7), in which 
alertness to possible hostile presences and the occasional frisson of a sensed presence 
was precipitating the idea of elusive or invisible hostile beings. Individual early 
humans who appeared to be able to sense such beings may have secured an 
advantage over their fellows by emphasizing their special ability to detect the 
presences and ward them off. If the community had speech, the process of imposing 
upon their fellows would have been even easier. In later times, when there was 
language and not only animatism but also animism (Chapter 8), then recognizable 
shamanism could develop. 





In Chapter 1, I outlined the programme of this investigation, defining religion 
as behaviour connected with an apparent supernatural realm of being and proposing 
that religion is not one thing but a collection of elements, each of which could have a 
separate origin. In Chapter 2, the rationalist basis and guiding principles were set out. 
In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I made a case for identification of a neural basis of 
numinous feelings - the feeling that one is in the presence of a supernatural being or 
that something uncanny (supernatural) is happening. A major conclusion is the 
hypothesis that, broadly, religiosity or the propensity to have numinous experiences 
can be correlated with the degree of susceptibility to quasi- epileptic activity in the 
limbic system and temporal lobes, particularly the amygdala. There is a continuum of 
such susceptibility from virtually none at all to clinical temporal -lobe epilepsy. 
In Chapter 6, I tried to elucidate the baseline mentality from which our pre - 
religious ancestors set out on their unwitting development of supernatural belief. I 
then turned to five specific elements of religion: spirit beings or daemons; souls or 
ghosts; life after death leading to other worlds; other worlds leading to heaven; 
religious specialists or shamans. 
In Chapter 7, my spirit guides were Guthrie (1993) and Marrett (1914). Here I 
tried to show how an assumption that daemons exist results from the need for 
alertness to the presence of animate beings in our vicinity. In Chapter 8, Tylor (1871) 
was my psychopomp. Here the conception of a separable soul was attributed to the 
continued appearances of the dead in dreams and to out -of -the -body experiences. In 
Chapters 9 and 10, an entire host assisted, two of the pivotal angels being Baillie 
(1934) and La Barre (1972). They enabled me to argue that the idea of heaven is 
derived from the experience of expanded, transformed or different worlds under the 
influence of sensory deprivation, rhythmic activities or ingested substances which 
disturb normal processes of neurotransmission. In Chapter 11, my helping spirit was 
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Radin (1938). Here I argued that religious specialists generally seek to maintain 
advantage for themselves in the community by means of professional magical 
techniques and fear. Making use of the conclusions of Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I further 
argued that certain types of individual are drawn to the profession of the supernatural 
owing to an unusual propensity for numinous feelings, which are associated with 
high susceptibility to subclinical and indeed clinical epileptic activity in the brain. 
In this way the origin of five major elements of religion - arguably the five 
central and almost universal elements - is accounted for in naturalistic terms. For one 
who can accept the gist of the arguments presented here, I believe I have shown that 
there is no need for the objective existence of the supernatural to explain why human 
beings have come to believe that there are supernatural phenomena. 
I follow Radin's (1938: 145) view that a major reason for the persistence of 
belief is social: that the maintenance of supernaturalist beliefs is to the advantage of 
religious specialists. But the origin of the very idea that there is anything 
supernatural is not a social matter. Origins are to be sought in the psychological - 
ultimately neurological - propensities of the human mind. 
I do not seek to disparage prehistoric and ancient human beings for having 
developed `irrational' beliefs. In fact, the belief in daemons, souls, heaven and 
shamans is, I think, perfectly rational. These beliefs, regarded as theories, make sense 
of the phenomena. It is only in our age, when copious comparative information is 
available about a variety of cultures and when the objective mechanisms of the 
human brain are being successfully investigated, that a thesis such as the present one 
has become possible. 
Sequence 
Every known religion is made up of more than one religious element. Extant 
shamanism has at least four: the beliefs in souls and in daemons, the belief in another 
world, and the role of a religious specialist. On the perspective of the pre -religious 
behaviour of apes and of the vast timescale of prehistory, it becomes implausible that 
religion sprang into existence as a fully formed complex of several elements such as 
extant shamanism. 
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The elements of religion, having distinct origins, must have come into being 
in a definite sequence. For example, sacrifice, a religious element not discussed here, 
only makes sense in a context in which there are supernatural beings to be placated. 
Ancestral souls or divinities are not required: mere spirit beings or daemons, genii 
loci and personifications of nature, would be enough. Sacrifice therefore must 
postdate the origins of animatism, certainly, and possibly animism and theism. 
Throughout this document I use the words ` animatism' and `animism' as technical 
terms with distinct meanings. 
Animatism grows out of the animal tendency to alertness and personification. 
No archaeological evidence indicates its presence or absence. One can only infer or 
guess, and my guess is that members of the species Homo erectus and Homo 
heidelbergensis were sufficiently like us to have the notion that invisible beings 
lurked in their neighbourhood. Animatism therefore could have been in place a 
million years ago, and at any rate well before 100,000 years ago. 
In Chapter 8 I suggested that animism, the belief in souls, ghosts and 
ancestral spirits, probably required language for articulation, and therefore assigned 
its origin to Homo sapiens. The earliest `anatomically modern' Homo sapiens 
remains date from about 160,000 years ago in East Africa (Clark et al. 2003: 747). 
On grounds too extensive to discuss here, I suspect that their Eurasian 
contemporaries, the Neanderthals, also had speech. 
Burial is a sign that the corpse was valued. Paradoxically perhaps, it is 
probably also a sign that the living associated it with something which survived, a 
soul. This is very speculative of course, but burial can therefore be viewed as 
possible archaeological evidence of animism. The earliest burials are alleged to be 
from at least 90,000 years ago at Skhul and Qafzeh in Israel, where they have been 
dated by electron spin resonance (ESR) methods (Mellars 1996: 5, 380). These early 
dates have recently been challenged, with a proposed date around 35,000 years ago 
(Krantz 2001: 465). If accepted, this would return the Qafzeh and Skhul remains to 
the dates accepted (Coles and Higgs 1969: 358 -370) before ESR dating was applied 
in the 1980s. The next earliest dates for burial are from 75,000 years ago in France, 
and represent Neanderthals, not modern people. However, all the alleged 
Neanderthal burials themselves have been challenged as not being intentional burials 
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at all; but this is a matter of controversy (Mellars 1996: 375 -381). Indeed, there is 
ongoing controversy about the degree of distinctiveness of 'anatomically modern' 
Homo sapiens and the Neanderthals anatomically and culturally. At any rate, the 
burials of the Upper Palaeolithic are generally undisputed, so that one can presume 
that animism was in place by about 30,000 years ago. 
As discussed in Chapters 10 and 11, the cave paintings and movable figurines 
of western Europe are widely taken to be evidence of a religious dimension to the life 
of Upper Palaeolithic people. The existence of another world, inhabited by spirit 
animals, may be indicated by the paintings of game animals such as bison and horse. 
Some think that the other world was believed to be behind those rock walls on which 
naturally occurring animal -like contours appeared, inducing the people to paint 
outlines, features and hair to bring them to life (cf. Bahn 1998: 246). Whether this is 
so or not, we are not yet witnessing a belief in genuine heaven. That had to await 
social and intellectual as well as experiential developments after about 1000 BCE. 
The Palaeolithic cave paintings can be seen as indicative of a primitive but 
recognizable shamanism (Stringer and McKie 1996: 184 -185). Especially convincing 
are the therianthropic figures, the most famous of which is the 'dancing sorcerer' at 
Les Trois Frères, an apparent depiction of a man dressed in animal skins and wearing 
a horned mask (Bahn 1998: 237; Bahn and Vertut 1988: 142, 158, 186 -187). The 
evidence is not conclusive, but it is suggestive, that people impersonated animals for 
some ritual purpose. Schlesier (2001) reports opinion that fully developed 
shamanism existed in Siberia by 23,000 years ago, with the suggestion that 
perforated `Venus' figurines found at Mal'ta were objects attached to shamans' 
costumes. Perhaps in Palaeolithic times everyone shamanized; perhaps it was the 
profession only of Radin's early ' neurotic -epileptic'. Archaeology does not elucidate 
this question. The depiction at Les Trois Frères dates from 14,000 years ago, but at 
some sites the paintings and movable art are much earlier. So a recognizable 
shamanism can perhaps be dated to 30,000 years ago, along with animism. This 
combination makes sense, since fully developed shamanism involves the journey of 
the shaman's soul. Recognizable shamanism can only follow or be concomitant with 
animism; it cannot precede it. 
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The idea of another world is not necessary for a recognizable shamanism. 
since the shaman's soul can journey through this world. However, the differentiation 
of another world from this one becomes a possibility once a specialist psychic 
traveller is in place to describe and differentiate it. The idea of another world 
therefore can be expected to follow or be concomitant with a developed shamanism, 
but is unlikely to precede it. 
A proto- shaman, as discussed in Chapter 11, need merely be a specialist in 
the use of healing plants or appear to possess an enhanced awareness of spirit beings. 
Proto- shamanism could have been in place for hundreds of thousands of years, and I 
suspect it dates from the era of Homo erectus or Homo heidelbergensis, if not, in 
even more rudimentary form, from long before. 
Above I have given dates where possible, and some dates relate to 
archaeological evidence. The absence of evidence at earlier dates does not prove that 
a given religious element was not in place much earlier than I have suggested. For 
example, there could have been earlier cave art and burials than have so far been 
discovered. The evidence could have been obliterated by rock falls and other 
sedimentary processes or, less probably, given the extensive explorations of the 
twentieth century, the caves and other sites in which it lies may not yet have been 
found. 
Transcultural religious elements 
Prehistoric revelation 
In Chapters 1 and 11 I referred to the theory of a divine revelation in 
prehistory, as espoused by Lang and Schmidt and researched by the latter's Viennese 
Kulturkreis school. A primitive revelation would explain the prevalence of religious 
ideas in every known society, and especially account for similarities. However, the 
central tenet, the existence of belief in supreme beings or old high gods, appears to 
be limited to religious formulators. 
If there had been a primitive revelation, one might expect considerable cross - 
cultural resemblances between the geographically separate conceptions of supreme 
beings and the creation myths in which they often figure. But they are disparate. For 
example, the Uitoto of California had a sophisticated creation story involving 
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creation out of nothing. This story has a supreme being, but the created world itself is 
only a `phantasm' at first (Radin 1938: 164 -165), not the physical world of heaven 
and earth found in Genesis and related stories. The Uitoto myth is clearly a poetical 
speculation by a religious thinker from a culture completely foreign to Old World 
`revelation' or tradition. Rather than believe that creation myths as they have 
survived are degenerated and diversified from a single correct revealed story, it is 
much more plausible that religious thinkers in disparate cultures invented them as 
part of their efforts to make sense of their world. 
Diffusion of shamanic culture 
There is no complex of religious beliefs held universally. On the other hand, 
there are a variety of conceptions which are very widespread, both in the Old World 
and in the Americas (Hultkrantz 1978: 32, 53). These are apparently very ancient 
elements of shamanism, discussed further below. However, in each culture where 
some of these widespread conceptions are found, they exist side by side with others 
which are evidently local. For example, the creation story of the Yanomamo of 
Amazonia held that all people, including Europeans, were descended from the 
indigenous ancestors of the Yanomamo, and the foreigners represented a degenerate 
branch of the lineage (Ripinsky -Naxon 1993: 118). 
Among the transcultural conceptions found in shamanistic cultures and others 
are the tripartite world, with sky, middle earth and underworld, and the cosmic 
serpent. Such conceptions require explanation. An explanation may be found in a 
common inheritance from a Mesolithic or even Palaeolithic Ur- Kultur which 
included a strong shamanic component (La Barre 1972: 270 -273, 278). 
That these shared conceptions are archetypes held within the group mind, 
racial memory or in the human psyche is untenable on present understanding of how 
memory works. No biological means have been discovered whereby memories as 
such can be stored from generation to generation. Adaptations can be transmitted 
genetically; but adaptations, even in the form of instincts, are not memories or ideas. 
Instincts are unlearned, inherited propensities to behave in certain ways, not ideas 
that can be expressed in speech or art. It may be, however, that the human brain, 
given certain types of stimulus, for example from psychoactive substances, 
automatically produces fixed and potentially predictable ideas, owing to stimulation 
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of the same target complex of neural circuits. The apparent occurrence of snake and 
jaguar motifs cross -culturally, to both natives and westerners, during ayahuasca 
intoxication may be an example (Harner 1973b; Naranjo 1973; Ravenswood 1999); 
although it is not clear that these motifs really occur to westerners who have not been 
primed to expect them. 
So wide a geographical occurrence of similar conceptions would seem to 
make diffusion from a single source unlikely. Even so, one has to take into account 
the almost incredible conservatism of human beings in prehistoric times. Material 
culture changed little through the hundreds of thousands of years of the Lower and 
Middle Palaeolithic, and the conservatism of artistic culture in the Upper Palaeolithic 
of Europe is almost equally astonishing from a modern western point of view. The 
oldest cave paintings of south -west France appear on the scene at Chauvet, as if from 
a tradition evidently already fully formed, 31,000 years ago. Yet the most recent 
comparable paintings date to only 13,000 years ago at Niaux and El Castillo, with 
many others in between (Chauvet et al. 2001: 11, 122). All the achievements of 
humanity in the time since 13,000 years ago - agriculture, cities, writing, empires, 
mathematics, space travel - have come about in less time than elapsed between the 
eras of the earliest and latest Palaeolithic cave paintings. It appears that early 
Europeans conserved their artistic and perhaps religious culture almost unchanged 
for many generations, to a degree almost incomprehensible to us. 
It is therefore just possible - I hesitate to say `credible' - that some of the so- 
called `archetypal' religious ideas originated with the bands of Homo sapiens who 
drifted out of Africa some time before 50,000 years ago and spread over the rest of 
the Old World, replacing the indigenous but sparse Neanderthal populations in the 
Middle East and Europe and Homo erectus populations in the Far East. Such 
diffusion of ideas is possible if the Homo sapiens migration and replacement actually 
took place, a matter about which there is continuing controversy. The migration out 
of Africa is generally dated to 120,000 years ago or before (Stringer and McKie 
1996). However, the stone tool culture of the Middle East, where the ex- African 
Homo sapiens newcomers settled, remains Middle Palaeolithic (Mousterian) until 
about 45,000 years ago (Mellars 1996: 419). This is the same tool culture as in 
Europe, where the Neanderthals were the sole occupants. Evidence for the ancestors 
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of modern people coming out of Africa before this period exists not in the form of 
cultural remains but in the form of their fossil skeletons at Qafzeh and Skhul. 
Whether anatomically modern people from Africa arrived in the Middle East 
early or late, there is no clear evidence of their presence farther north, west or east 
before 45,000 years ago'. An Upper Palaeolithic stone tool culture is generally 
believed to be associated with anatomically modern people. Its earliest appearance is 
45,000 years ago in the Middle East, 43,000 years ago in the Altaian region, 33,000- 
27,000 years ago in Mongolia and 23,000 years ago in China (Brantingham et al. 
2001: 735 -736, 745), possibly indicating the migration of its practitioners. Along 
with the stone tool culture, new soft cultural traits, such as art forms, rituals or a 
system (or mere collection) of beliefs, could have been developed during the 
residence of Homo sapiens in the Middle East. When they spread more widely, the 
soft cultural propensities could have been carried with them to Europe, northern Asia 
and beyond. Such a diffusion would explain the relative homogeneity of the putative 
prehistoric shamanic Ur- Kultur across the Old World north of Africa, and might 
account for the differences in forms of `shamanism' which some workers detect 
between Africa and the rest of the Old World. 
Numinous experience 
A number of statements about the connections of dreaming, hallucinations, 
sensory deprivation, rhythmic dance and drumming and controlled breathing, 
psychoactive drugs, epilepsy, numinous experience and a sense of presence can be 
given with a fair degree of confidence (Table 12.1). In my view, the overlap and 
similarities of types of experience occuring in a variety of circumstances give the key 
to the whole phenomenon of the numinous - that is, of experience in which one is 
apparently encountering the supernatural. 
It is sometimes stated that Australia was colonized by 60,000 years ago, but the later date of 40,000 
years BP is supported by absolute dating (Jones 1989: 760, 773). 
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1. Normal human beings have several periods of rapid eye movement sleep with dreaming 
every night. 
2. If normal people are deprived of sleep for several days, they often begin to hallucinate. 
3. In experimental conditions of sensory deprivation (e.g., acoustic chamber, isolation 
tank), most humans are liable to enter altered states of consciousness, sometimes with 
out -of- the -body experiences or a sense of presence, the latter often malign. 
4. In isolated arctic, cold and seaborne situations, relative sensory deprivation is often 
sufficient to cause an altered state, often with a sense of presence, usually benign. 
5. In 'nightmares', particularly in sleep paralysis, any human may experience a sense of 
presence, usually malign, and often interpreted as supernatural (incubus etc.). 
6. Some humans have numinous experiences, such as fear and a sense of presence 
(usually malign), when exposed to fluctuating magnetic fields, either in an experimental 
setting, in the home or in allegedly haunted houses. 
7. Some humans experience apparent out -of- the -body travel sponanteously, particularly in 
bodily trauma (accidents, operations, near death, etc.). 
8. Drug- induced states, accessible to anyone, may include apparent out -of- the -body travel, 
apparently meeting spirit beings, seeing and hearing more than in a normal state, 
intense anxiety or the relief of anxiety, and even bliss and rapture: the experiences vary 
according to drug type and dose, set and setting. 
9. Shamans in trance may experience any of apparent out -of- the -body travel, seeing and 
hearing more than in a normal state, a sense of presence, apparently meeting spirit 
beings, apparently being possessed by a spirit being, and even bliss and rapture. 
10. Shamans in many cultures take hallucinatory or other psychoactive drugs or use 
rhythmic drumming, dancing, chanting or controlled breathing to induce or facilitate 
trance. 
11. In many cultures, potential shamans are identified as such by others and often by 
themselves because they are of a 'neurotic- epileptic' temperament: neurotic in that they 
may be maladjusted to ordinary social relations, epileptic in that they may be subject to 
psychic auras, absences or even grand mal seizures. 
12. Epileptic psychic auras sometimes but not necessarily followed by a clinical seizure may 
include such experiences as déjà vu and out -of- the -body travel. 
13. Epileptic clinical seizures may sometimes but rarely mediate bliss and rapture. 
Table 12.1 
In Chapter 3, I said that there is a numinous quality to dreams in themselves. 
If they are frightening, the fear that they bring is generally, I suggest, a numinous 
fear. If they are pleasant, they make us wish to prolong them or return to them. 
Remembered dreams often have a nostalgic or haunting quality. If one is deprived of 
dreaming by being deprived of sleep, then one begins to hallucinate. The process of 
hallucination, at least in this case - and possibly also in the case of intoxication or 
sensory deprivation - can be interpreted as an intrusion of a form of dreaming into 
waking life. When given the opportunity, as in sensory deprivation, when the sense 
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organs are no longer delivering enough data to define the boundaries of (external) 
reality, the mind -brain fills the void by generating its own experiences (cf La Barre 
1970a: 54 -57). 
Consider not merely enhanced sensory input or vague feelings, but positive 
and detailed hallucinatory experiences such as falling, flight, being approached by 
someone, encounters with distant people and other beings such as saints and spirit 
animals. The similarity with dreams is too great to be discounted. Whether it 
substitutes its own creations for perception, as in dreaming, or distorts perception, as 
in synaesthesia, or both in full -blown hallucination, the brain is generating numinous 
experience by abnormal reduced activity in some circuits or excessive activity in 
others. According to Devereux (1980: 207), dreams are the product of the mind when 
it withdraws from reality, and uninhibitedly acting out dreams would virtually be 
schizophrenic behaviour. This is an opinion which, with different terminology, goes 
back at least to Kant (La Barre 1970a: 67). The proposition that positive 
hallucination is an intrusion of dreaming into waking life deserves further attention, 
but I shall desist from this line of inquiry in the interest of finishing. 
Not all hallucination takes place when the senses are in abeyance. Many 
hallucinogens enhance sensory data, so that the experience of seeing, hearing and the 
rest is heightened and sometimes the senses merge into one another: for example, 
plain colours become luminous and one sees sounds and hears shapes. It is as if the 
normal processes of filtering for meaning and importance are reduced, permitting 
more sensory data to reach consciousness. The sensory data is not raw, because, by 
the time it reaches consciousness, it has already been interpreted; but more of it gets 
through. Filtering processes seem to develop gradually through learning from birth 
onwards.' 
One of the characteristics of the numinous is that it appears instinct with 
value. Out -of -the -body travel and near -death encounters are not dismissed by the 
subjects as dreams. They often become life -changing events. The same aura of 
significance surrounds mystical experience - people are not casual about having a 
Hyperactive children lack inhibition of a natural impulse to act on stimulus (Kewley 1999: 180 -183). 
From personal observation (N =2, only!) I derive the impression that some do not discriminate sensory 
data as effectively as normal children: their eyes dart constantly around the room; they cannot attend 
to only one thing because they are bombarded with sensory stimuli. 
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sense of oneness with the universe, and they may attribute value to both large and 
small things in life, because even the small things are part of the universe. In 
epileptic auras, sometimes everyday events assume intense significance. It is the 
temporal lobes and limbic system, the hippocampus and above all the amygdala, alert 
to what is important for survival, that assign significance. It is as if, in certain 
conditions, relevant nuclei of these structures are activated continuously, so that 
everything seems important. 
A parsimonious neural explanation of experience will, I think, expect similar 
subjective experience to be mediated by processes in the same or closely related 
neural circuits. So when one has waking hallucinations because of lack of sleep, the 
circuits mediating the hallucinations are from the set of those which typically are 
active during normal REM sleep. When enhanced perception in separate modalities 
or synaesthesia occurs, the same blocking circuits are ineffective as in a baby. When 
significance is attached to everything by the mystic, the near- death -experiencer and 
the epileptic, it is the same limbic circuits that are hyperactive in all three. 
The fact that apparently supernatural experiences can arise from epilepsy, 
given that epilepsy is associated with structural abnormalities in the brain, or from 
psychoactives, given that they distort the normal processes of neuotransmission 
which have evolved to serve us and other animals for survival in the waking state, is 
a prima facie indication that those experiences are non -veridical. 
Consider an epileptic person who spontaneously and involuntarily has begun 
to have trance experiences because he or she has a lesion in the brain resulting from a 
severe fall. Consider a western `psychonaut' who seeks trance by ingesting an 
hallucinogen. Consider a shaman who enters trance by rhythmic drumming and 
controlled breathing. If there are broad similarities of experience across the three 
states, then we can assume that broadly the same sets of neural circuits are 
correspondingly active or inactive. Then, if it is unlikely that the epileptic sufferer is 
having genuine supernatural experiences simply as a result of accidental brain injury, 
one has no greater reason to believe that the other people's similar experiences 
during intentionally induced states are genuinely supernatural. 
When the dreamer, the shaman, the mystic, the epileptic or the drug taker 
have similar experiences, similar things are going on in their brains. The simple and 
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admittedly simplistic conclusion is that in numinous experience certain parts of the 
brain are processing abnormally. Normal processing is associated with effective 
waking consciousness, such as obtains when one sits round the campfire enjoying 
food and conversation. Of course abnormal processing does not imply dysfunctional 
processing. A shaman who has the ability to enter trance may possess, even out of 
trance, sharpened perception of his or her surroundings, having access to subliminal 
visual and auditory cues, and consequently be able to trace the movements of a lost 
person, detect a liar or interpret the condition of a sick patient (Basilov 1990: 18 -21). 
One must distinguish between the general hypothesis that abnormal neural 
activity accounts for numinous experience, and specific hypotheses that a particular 
numinous experience is accounted for by a particular abnormal neural activity. An 
example of the latter is that the sense of presence is accounted for by right - 
hemisphere intrusions into the left hemisphere's sense of self. The latter hypothesis 
could be shown to be untenable if, for instance, radically commisurotomized 
patients, with no connection between the cerebral cortices above brainstem level,' 
still had a sense of presence. That would not, however, invalidate the more general 
hypothesis that a sense of presence was produced by some kind of abnormal activity. 
Nor of course would it invalidate the even more general hypothesis that abnormal 
neural activity of various kinds accounts for all kinds of numinous experience. 
The above paragraph may seem to contain rather many caveats, but I stress 
again that the technology for investigating brain activity and consequently the new 




What I have sought is to demonstrate that a plausible theory of religious 
origins is possible without recourse to the reality of the supernatural. This has been 
attempted before, but previous theories account for only some of the phenomena. By 
identifying separate elements of religion, it is possible to seek separate origins, and to 
bring to bear existing theories to account for individual elements. Older approaches 
I In fact, when the corpus callosum is resected, the commissures are still left intact in, I believe, all 
cases. 
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have to be updated to take into account new findings about the neural substrate of 
numinous experience. I have demonstrated that a theory is possible by constructing 
one. A viable theory would have the following characteristics. 
1. The explanation adequately accounts for the phenomena. 
2. The explanation is parsimonious. (i) It does not require the existence of the 
supernatural. (ii) It does not require the existence of any other types of 
entity not accepted by common sense and mainstream science, such as 
extraterrestrial aliens. 
3. The explanation is consistent with available evidence from relevant fields 
(neurology, archaeology, anthropology, primatology, etc). 
Clearly, because only some of the religious elements are accounted for, my 
explanation is incomplete. But, for the elements which are covered, I suggest the 
explanation given is adequate, and that points 2. and 3. are also fulfilled. 
Some parts of this theory are speculative. However, many others are testable 
or falsifiable in the Popperian sense (Chapter 2, and point 3. above), particularly the 
neurological aspects. Some proposals about the appearance of certain religious 
elements are falsifiable by archaeology. For example, if unequivocal human burials 
were found from half a million years ago, one would have to rethink the dating of the 
origin of animism, although the way in which it came about would not have to be 
rethought. If documents unequivocally describing a heavenly afterlife came to light, 
say in Europe, dating from 2000 BCE, one would have to rethink not only the dating 
of this concept, but also how it came about, since the concept would antecede the 
developments which I have proposed for its origin. Other proposals may be 
falsifiable by ethnology. Are there aspects of a primal conception of the soul, found 
universally, that are not accounted for by my neo- Tylorian case? If there are, can 
they be accounted for by some addition to the theory (one hopes, not too ad hoc)? Is 
there any phenomenon in the shamanic performance that indicates objectively 
verifiable paranormal powers? For instance, claims have been made that South 
American shamans knew of distant events before they happened (Kensinger 1973: 
12). Knowledge of distant events has of course also been attributed to Indian yogis 
(Yogananda 1950), along with bilocation and many other feats, some shared with 
Christian saints. 
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It is in the nature of science to have alternative theories or at least competitive 
hypotheses. While I think it is substantially correct, I do not claim that the theory 
offered here is the only one that could account for the origins of religion. It is simply 
what I am able to offer within present constraints. 
One may note with satisfaction the absence of system and of abstractions. 
This is no `unified field theory' of religion. I make no pretence of having identified a 
primordial complex of behaviour (such as the totemism beloved of the early 
twentieth century), universal stages of religion which societies historically go 
through, or connections with structures in society or psychological archetypes. On a 
common -sense basis, I merely identify the simplest form of religion as animatism, 
observe that some elements could not have preceded others which are presupposed, 
note that in societies with a variety of occupations a cadre of religious specialists 
could become separate from the rest, and use suggestive results from neurological 
research to account for some apparently supernatural visitations. 
Consequences 
Putting aside dishonesty, wishful thinking and the desire not to offend, I 
personally feel obliged to take seriously the conclusion that numinous experience, 
whether mystical or of the `debased' ghostly type, is not a genuine perception of 
reality. 
That certain experiences arise from unusual or even abnormal brain activity is 
not itself a guarantee that the experiences are non -veridical. While I have no desire to 
believe in ghosts and daemons, I would like to believe, with admirable scholars such 
as Eliade and Furst, that the entranced shaman and the Christian mystic have access 
to a wider and more exciting reality than we normally perceive. Sadly, there is no 
independent, publicly sharable and measurable evidence that the other worlds are 
real. It is much more plausible that they are sublime creations of our dreams. 
Whether value or significance attaches to numinous experience - even 
numinous experience arising from brain injury - is not decidable on the basis of 
anything I have covered. The question is beyond my present scope. 
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APPENDIX 3A 
Experiences of the sensed presence 
Case 3 
This second case from James (1902: 61) contains the commonly reported 
element of dread. 
Quite early in the night I was awakened ... I felt as if I had been aroused 
intentionally .... I then turned on my side to go to sleep again, and immediately felt a 
consciousness of a presence in the room, and singular to state, it was not the 
consciousness of a live person, but of a spiritual presence.... I felt also at the same 
time a strong feeling of superstitious dread, as if something strange and fearful were 
about to happen. 
Case 4 
David Hufford (1982) describes a great many cases of what he calls the Old 
Hag experience. Hufford is careful to analyse the phenomena and circumstances of 
each of his cases and to distinguish types of experience. Not all cases of the sensed 
presence are cases of the Old Hag, and, given Hufford's classification of primary and 
secondary features of the Old Hag, not all cases of that are cases of the sensed 
presence (see below and Hufford 1982: 25). However, it seems clear that full - 
featured cases of the Old Hag are cases of the sensed presence. The full- featured Old 
Hag or entity experience is, I should think, the most frightening type of apparently 
supernatural encounter. 
I give extracts from a few of Hufford's extended quotations. The first case 
here is of a female graduate student who had not heard of the experience happening 
to anyone else (Hufford 1982: 40 -42). 
Well, I woke up, or I thought I woke up. And I was conscious of the room 
anyway. I was looking around the room and I felt like there was a man next to me 
with his arm underneath my back .... And his head was on my shoulder. And I was 
so scared when I first was conscious of it .... I couldn't look around to see who it was 
.... And then he would just kind of move closer to me. And so I tried that about three 
times. And each time I did it, it felt like he'd grip my arm and sort of move a little 
closer .... I remembered really distinctly his smell. Like he smelled like someone's 
been working out in the fields or something. All sweaty and kind of dusty. 
And then I tried to scream .... But I couldn't get any kind of sound out. And 
then I don't remember what happened in between, but then he was on top of me, and 
I tried to look up to see who it was or something. ... I could get my head up but I 
couldn't move past my chest. Like it was pressing down on my chest. And so every 
time I would bend my head, I could just see this - it looked like a white mask Like a 
big white mask. And it kind of had a funny face on it. And it had black dots on it and 
a red kind of crooked mouth.... It was a really funny, ghastly looking kind of mask! 
... And I kept trying to pull up, and finally I just sort of felt sort of released, you 
know. And I ... could sit up, and I got the feeling there was nobody there. 
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... It gave me a bad feeling Like I felt bad the whole rest of the day. Sort of a 
scared feeling, because I was so scared. 
Case 5 
A woman in Toronto had the following experiences (Hufford 1982: 49). 
I too have heard the footsteps and the strangling scene but just as I was about 
to be strangled I came out of it. When we lived in Toronto I had the experience at 
least 3 times in one year. I could hear the footsteps coming down the hall and each 
time they came closer to my bedroom until finally the almost strangling After we 
moved to Quebec... the footsteps came up the stairs -I haven't had the strangling 
here but a form with a very bright light in front of it. I've been paralysed during this 
experience. ... It's a dreadful, frightening experience and I sometimes am almost 
afraid to go to sleep especially if I'm overtired as I know I'm more apt to experience 
it then. 
This person experienced the attacks less frequently after she began taking 
antidepressants. 
Case 6 
This case from Hufford (1982: 32 -37) is described in a long dialogue. The 
subject was a teenager at the time of the frightening experiences, which occurred on 
five consecutive nights at his grandparents' house on the east coast of Canada. I shall 
quote just some essential passages. 
One night everything was dark as usual, and I heard footsteps on the stairs. 
... I could look out and see the stairway, and I saw a figure coming up the stairs and 
turned at the top of the stairway. And it was almost all white and glowing. It had a 
hat on. It was dressed as an elderly lady. ... I watched this figure come right down 
the hall and came right into the room. ... I couldn't move or say anything ... When it 
got into the room it sat down on the floor and it looked to me like an elephant of all 
things! Just a blob, but white. ... I knew I wasn't dreaming I thought I was dreaming 
but I knew I wasn't dreaming! And I broke out into a sweat and was just forced onto 
the bed. ... closed my eyes, opened them again, it was still there. ... Practically got 
no sleep that night. 
... I was so petrified during the daytime that I asked my grandmother to sleep 
with me that night. ... And she came in and slept with me, and the same thing 
happened! ... the steps came up over the stairway and I knew that in a minute there 
was going to be something in the room again. And I looked out over her [his 
grandmother] and sure enough ... there was the white blob again. 
This happened several times after that until I ... went down to my aunt's 
house [to stay the rest of his holiday]. 
On questioning, the subject related: 
When the figure came into the room I closed my eyes in utter fear and the 
next time I looked up the figure seemed to sink onto the floor - because it was 
definitely standing right next to my bed for a ... couple of seconds .... (Twice) I saw it 
walk into the room. But what I would do after that was I would close my eyes after I 
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heard the footsteps coming and I would count them. ... And I knew when it would 
reach the top because it was a different sound. 
... I definitely didn't fall asleep. And each of the other times that it happened 
with my grandmother in the bed, I actually waited for this to happen. ... I knew it 
would happen the third night. And I knew it would happen the fourth night. And I 
knew it would happen the fifth night. 
Case 7 
A young man gave Hufford a detailed account, which I shall abridge, of a 
recurrent terrifying episode. 
I have had this experience probably around a dozen times .... But on 
occasion that I have slept on my back, that has been the only time that this has 
occurred 
... This is one thing, the fear, the terror that I would experience ... because of 
the presence of someone else in the room. And me just being afraid to move or budge 
whatsoever. And my eyes could move and no other part. But I was sometimes afraid 
even to move my eyes ... for fear of the person, object or whatever it is, either being 
there or ... just looking down at me where I couldn't see him, or the few times -I 
think only two or three times I actually saw the image of a person. 
When I did see it, it was a person ... it was very dark and shadowy ... Just 
like a silhouette. But it did have, like, a ... very transparent, like dark, cape ... that 
just hung down .... The face wasn't a clear face, but what it did have - and what 
scared me and made me not want to move - was two very dark eyes. You know, 
piercing eyes looking at me .... 
... It wasn't just like two dots. They were eyes, and it sent a chill up my spine 
- tingling ... shivering type of sensation.... I felt this hardness on my chest ... 
pressure was there. ... I would think I was breathless. 
On one occasion when his brother was also in the room at night, the brother 
observed that he was breathing heavily and had his eyes wide open and staring. 
When the brother spoke to him, the subject moved his head and the experience 
ceased; nothing was there. The subject continues: 
I did sense it coming into the room ... like footfalls .... Smoothly, gliding even 
though there were footfalls .... About the second or third time ... the person or object 
did actually come along side me, and I was afraid to look up at it. I was afraid to 
look into those eyes, you know. ... I did twice try to jump out [of bed] and I couldn't. 
... I'm six one, and it seemed that if I jumped out of bed it would still be 
above me - closer to seven feet. It was tall. And I was paralysed. 
... in college.... This was one of the times when I saw the person right at the 
foot of my bed ... right behind the foot of my bed There is a cupboard which can be 
open sometimes, and I can see darkness. And a couple of times 1 thought that was it 
... But it wasn't.... But I knew when it was there! ... I could see the shadow of the 
veil, and everything. 
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... I couldn't see any other features other than very plain, but very piercing, 
dark eyes. And it seemed like it had a hat or something, and long hair. ... Brown 
hair, not black ... Like everything else was dark except brown hair ... So this all 
made me think that I was actually seeing something instead of just a silhouette. 
The first time it happened I think I was just falling asleep. ... And I opened my 
eyes. And I looked around. And someone was there .... 
... It's like I opened my eyes and everything was OK And then, "No, it isn't," 
you know. "Everything is not OK! " ...Sometimes I just try and scare it away, but I 
couldn't, you know. And I tried psyching it out or something by just looking at it, but 
I couldn't because those things are staring back at me too hard! 
... I can recall a lot of dreams, you know .... But this is nothing like that. This 
is something where I opened my eyes and I saw it, .... I sensed its presence and I 
didn't loop but I knew it was there .... It was something that was real and if I could 
have been able to go over and tackle it or something-I wanted to do that, but I 
found myself unable. If I could reach out it would be tangible. 
This account conveys strikingly the daemonic dread or fear of the 
supernatural discussed by Otto. However, of interest is the fact that the subject 
wanted to scare away and even tackle his assailant. Here, as with the first case from 
James, we find that the experient senses the assailant is not all -powerful. There is 
none of the awe or abasement in the presence of the mighty which Otto associates 
with the mystical or religious experience proper. I think it is clear that we are dealing 
with a quite different kind of feeling. 
Case 8 
The accounts given by Budden are unfortunately not detailed and are not 
given in the first person, which means that they are difficult to assess. However, this 
and the following three cases (Budden 1994: 13 -20) more or less conform to the 
sensed presence. 
A woman had a history of paranormal events since childhood. When she 
moved to a flat in Brighton, she began at night to see an old man at the bottom of the 
bed, wearing a scarf and looking at her. Apparently an old man had lived there 
previously. In her house the electric kettle would go on and off by itself. Tape 
recordings would come out blank or with extra sounds on them which those present 
had not heard during the recording. The woman suffered from multiple allergies. 
Case 9 
A woman saw a female child sitting on the pillow beside her. The child's 
hands and feet were unclear and faded into the bedclothes. It had a pudding -basin 
haircut and staring all -black button eyes. The eyes looked evil and it exuded a sense 
of `unpredictable menace'. The experient referred to it as `the troll'. The apparition 
occurred several times. Her husband did not see it, but averred that if the unpleasant 
aspects of his wife's nature could be embodied, then the result would fit the 
description she gave him of the troll. The woman herself had often sat on the bed 
exactly where the troll usually appeared. 
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Case 10 
At Dulwich the subject slept on a futon on the floor. One night a dark figure 
shuffled into the room. It touched her on the forehead with one of its long, thin 
fmgers. She then had the sensation of falling over backwards, although she was 
already supine. 
Case 11 
The most striking case is of a thirteen -year -old girl who grew up within sight 
of Alexandra Palace in London. Sent to bed, she suddenly had a strong feeling of a 
presence in the room, which made her hide under the bedclothes. When she peered 
out, a blue light appeared on the reflector of an electric fire on the wall, then faded. 
Then `luminous raindrops' fell from a circle of light on the ceiling and formed into a 
large humanoid figure. The luminous blue giant hovered just below the ceiling, then 
tilted and rotated, as if it were under remote control, until it seemed to be looking 
through the curtains. A booming voice said in her head, `What is the power ?' She 
said after a while, `That's Ally Pally!' referring to the radio transmitter. After more 
speech, a circle of light appeared on the floor, with a dome above it. A city with 
people, cars and buildings appeared inside the dome, and she was fascinated by the 
people going about their business in this city. Some of these appearances, including 
the city, occurred on further occasions. The girl, like many of Budden's subjects, 
grew to adulthood suffering from multiple allergies. 
The city in the dome is reminiscent of a feature experienced by a patient of 
Ramachandran (1998: 108 -111). Following damage to her visual cortex, the patient 
had a scotoma or gap in the lower left of her visual field. This area, and only this 
area, would be filled at times with cartoon figures, admittedly stationary ones, 
forming a waking hallucination beyond her control. There is no suggestion that 
Budden's subject had brain damage; it is just the symptom that is similar, and 
perhaps the mechanism. 
Case 12 
In Evans' (1984) fascinating and comprehensive survey, among the cases 
which conform to a fairly simple type of the sensed presence is one in which a 
woman felt she had been possessed (Evans 1984: 132 -133). Before and after the 
encounter, she had `trances' and was often ill. At the moment of possession, she felt 
that `he insinuated himself from the left side of her body'. The direction may be 
significant (Chapter 5). 
Case 13 
At a haunted house in London a young man, who later became an admiral, 
had `a curious experience' in 1894 (MacKenzie 1982: 95). 
I woke up with the knowledge that someone was about, and I felt strangely 
afraid. The door opened and someone came in and stood by my bed I can see it very 
clearly in my mind's eye now, standing there for a short time, then turning towards 
the window at the back, whither it went and disappeared. A large dog appeared to 
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run across the room at that time .... It is a curious feeling, that of intense fear - so 
intense that one can 't even speak. 
Case 14 
In the same house a woman had the following experience, after hearing 
noises from below in the house (MacKenzie 1982: 96). 
Two o 'clock had just ceased to chime ... when I heard another sound which I 
first thought was a little breeze in the trees outside. ... I became aware that it was no 
breeze that I heard but the sound of skirts, as though some woman was moving 
swiftly along the passage outside my room. Right up to my door she came, then 
paused, as though she was listening outside. 
Promptly, and with shame I say it, under the bedclothes went my head! ... 
when I ventured to peep out again it was only for a second, an indescribable feeling 
of terror which I could not conquer impelled me to cover it up again. Five times I did 
this! At the fifth nervous peep, I distinctly saw a dim figure standing in the corner by 
the door. The head was veiled, I merely saw the outline of a woman's figure, dressed 
in pale grey, standing there in the dim moonlight. The next instance [sic] it had 
vanished without a sound. 
Case 15 
In Westphalia a person had this encounter (Green and McCreery 1975: 13). 
I was awakened from sleep by my left shoulder being shaken, it seemed to me 
quite roughly. I sat up in bed The room was dark but I could just see that somebody 
was standing at the foot of the bed ... I waited for the visitor to speak, and while I 
did so the figure became increasingly visible; it was a woman, hatless and with dark 
hair, and not anyone I recognized. Up to that time I still thought it was an ordinary 
person, but then the figure seemed to become gradually illuminated by an internal 
glow. It was not a glow as bright as when a hand is held round an electric bulb, and 
the illumination was yellow, rather like a luminous clock -dial. 
The features became quite clearly visible, the face seemed to be smiling, and I 
could see the outline of the arms. ... She moved slowly forward, her hand extended at 
arm's length as though with the intention of shaking my left shoulder again. To move 
forward, she came round the bed as a tangible person would have done. 
Suddenly, I became very frightened and tried to switch on the main light, 
which was operated by a cord hanging down the wall behind my head, while at the 
same time moving away to my right to avoid the approaching figure. ... I groped 
about desperately with my left hand behind my head but could not find the cord ... 
As soon as the light came on, the figure disappeared The bedroom door was, as 
usual, shut. 
Case 16 
Green and McCreery (1975: 127) report this fascinating case. 
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My wife and I were in bed; my eyes suddenly became aware of someone 
moving about the bedroom. I saw a person walking around the bedroom as though it 
was looking for something. I tried to shout and to jump out of bed, but no noise came 
from my voice and no response came from my legs or body. My eyes were still 
watching this person when suddenly it turned face towards me and I realized that I 
was face to face with my own double. It then walked towards me and climbed on to 
my physical body and quickly wormed itself into me. 
Case 17 
Another apparition of the subject's own self, a double, is related in Green and 
McCreery (1975: 76). 
I was prescribed a certain drug to be taken three times a day. ... On the third 
day I felt so dreadful that I wondered whether I would take any more. ... I was lying 
in bed, knowing I was there, quite comfortably, when I suddenly saw myself sitting on 
my bedside chair, dressed in a frock discarded quite a year before. I did not speak at 
all but myself in the chair told me that if I wished to recover I should stop taking the 
tablets at once. ... My chair self ... finally persuaded me to stop them immediately 
and tell the doctor, and then she disappeared. 
She stopped the tablets, the doctor agreed and prescribed something else; she 
recovered quickly. 
... the picture of myself sitting by my bed ... and talking to me is as vivid as it 
was then. I should mention that there was no question whatsoever of delirium at any 
time. 
Case 18 
In this case from Green and McCreery (1975: 70), the subject is not 
immediately afraid. 
One night ... I woke up, quite naturally, and saw a tall man standing close to 
the side of the bed. I was not still dreaming. I saw the large bay window, the street - 
lamp opposite, the furniture in the room, and the man. His face was long, 
melancholy, and slightly moustached. He wore a check overcoat and a trilby hat. The 
overcoat had a wide belt at the waist.... 
Suddenly, I was afraid, and I screamed and screamed, waking my husband in 
a fright. As I was comforted, the man vanished. ... I have dreamed ever since I can 
remember, and no one ever came so close to me with such clear, breathing reality. I 
have never forgotten exactly how the man looked at me. 
Case 19 
As well as the more frightening cases, some accounts raise an eyebrow, if not 
a smile. Budden (1994: 35) recounts a woman's apparently waking experience. 
... [she] saw three fairies with big oval sparkling wings, space helmets like 
goldfish bowls, computer buttons on their chests, silvery streamers hanging from 
their shoulders and lasers mounted on their pointed pixie hats. They arrived in a 
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spaceship the size of a small car with ski -runners underneath. They spoke to her 
about Jesus, whom they knew well, and left with a mince pie sticking to the end of 
their silvery green pointed arms. 
I would assume that the fairies were not really there. Budden tells us that the 
subject lived on top of three geological fault lines and had three large radio masts on 
local hills about 750 metres away. The significance of these circumstances are 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 5. 
Case 20 
Evans (1984: 181 -182) gives a baffling case, in which the subject, working at 
his garage in the small hours of the morning, saw a little old man with long white 
hair. He was wearing a one -piece metallic suit with a medallion. When he spoke, it 
seemed as if the sound came from all around and his words were, `From beyond all 
time, I am.' He stepped back, became a ball of light and floated away. The subject 
had earlier had an abduction experience, and the aliens whom he met then made 
similar portentous utterances. 
Case 21 
Not all episodes of the sensed presence involve fear, although my own brief 
survey suggests that that most do. I shall give a few cases which not only lack the 
element of dread but are instead associated with positive affect. 
The same informant as in the frightening Case 1 (Chapter 3) provided James 
(1902: 60) with an episode of a beneficent presence. 
There was not a mere consciousness of something there, but fused in the 
central happiness of it, a startling awareness of some ineffable good. Not vague 
either, not like the emotional effect of some poem, or scene, or blossom, or music, but 
the sure knowledge of the close presence of a sort of mighty person, and after it went, 
the memory persisted as the one perception of reality. Everything else might be a 
dream, but not that. 
The informant did not attribute the presence to God, although James thinks 
that would have been a natural assumption. 
Case 22 
Evans (1984: 71 -72, 167) cites this and the next three cases, which exemplify 
benign presences. 
A mountaineer six thousand metres up in the Himalaya suddenly came upon 
two friends from schooldays. Both had been killed in a motor accident more than ten 
years earlier. 
Case 23 
On a lone flight in 1932, the pilot on encountering difficulties experienced the 
helpful presence of several companions, including her deceased father and an old 
school friend who had died when she was fourteen. 
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Case 24 
Crossing the frozen mountains of South Georgia in the early twentieth 
century, after a perilous voyage from Antarctica, the explorer Shackleton and his 
companions felt that there was an extra man with them. 
Case 25 
Another mountaineer, Frank Smythe, climbing alone on Everest in 1933, was 
so certain that he had a companion that he offered him a piece of Kendal mint cake, 
but there was no one there. At times he felt that there was a companion above him 
with a rope, who would help if he got into difficulties. 
Case 26 
Beardsworth relates numerous accounts of presences, voices, touches, visions 
and other types of encounter with what the subject takes to be an external sentient 
being. Nearly all his cases are benign, and after relating two unpleasant experiences, 
he says (1977: 2) that encounters were comforting much more often. This and the 
next two cases are taken from his compendium (1977: 1, 121 -122). 
At the height of the panic, when I didn't know what to do, I was conscious of 
not a voice or a presence in recognizable form, but a live certainty as if there was an 
`I' present' outside me and yet directed at me personally. 
Case 27 
I was walking along a long, lonely country road by myself, worried sick and 
in near despair. Then came the experience. It lasted about twenty minutes -I sensed 
a presence, on my right, keeping level with me as I went along A mental message 
was conveyed in my mind; the sense of it being: `Don't worry; it will all turn out all 
right. ' 
Case 28 
Twice in Egypt I had a sense of overpowering evil ... Both times it was the 
seeing awareness of a malign presence so tangible that it was endowed with 
something like shape. The effect was to make my limbs rigid and induce profuse 
sweating. 
Case 29 
As an example of a baffling encounter, the following men -in -black visitation 
(Evans 1994: 144) is too good not to reproduce. 
IA young married couple] ... had men -in -black visitors, a strange couple, 
male and female, who wore old-fashioned clothes. The man sat on the sofa, pawing 
and fondling the woman, and asked if he was doing it right. They did not take the 
drinks set out for them. While the husband was out of the room, the man asked the 
wife if she had any nude photographs of herself Then, on the way out, the man stood 
up, but did not move. The woman seemed unable to walk round him. She said, 
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`Please move him, I can't move him myself' Then abruptly the man left, followed by 
the woman. 
The subjects thought the visitors might have been robots, for reasons which 
may be apparent. 
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APPENDIX 3B 
Psychical hypotheses of the sensed presence 
MacKenzie (1982: 28) cites five hypotheses debated by the Society for 
Psychical Research in 1956 concerning the nature of apparitions, which include cases 
of the sensed presence. 
1. The Gurney hypothesis: apparitions are hallucinations. However, this hypothesis 
adds that the hallucinations are caused in the percipient by telepathy from the 
appearer. I have not had access to the original material, and without it I fmd the 
intention unclear. The appearer has to exist in order to cause the hallucinations, 
but if the appearer exists then the sensations are not strictly hallucinatory, since 
their object exists. One suspects that the appearer is intended to be a living 
person, who projects telepathically so as to be sensed in some form by the 
percipient. 
2. The Tyrrell hypothesis: apparitions are idea -patterns produced by the percipient's 
subconscious, with or without the cooperative assistance of the appearer's 
subconscious. 
3. The Myers- Price -Johnson theory: apparitions are etheric images created currently 
or in the past by some mental act. If ̀ etheric' means `astral', then this theory 
accepts the reality of supernatural, in that the astral plane with its astral bodies 
are concepts unknown to generally accepted science. If `etheric' refers to the 
nineteenth -century physical concept of the ether as a universal substrate which 
permits matter to be located and forces to operate, then one has to take account of 
the discarding of that concept from physics since the early twentieth century. 
However, if one wishes to maintain this hypothesis, one can always imagine that 
there could be some other means of generating latent images in a physical 
medium, say, at a quantum level. These images would be latent in that only 
certain individuals in certain circumstances would see them, unlike normal 
physical images on screens or photographs which are visible to anyone given 
suitable lighting. On this hypothesis, it would seem that the images are actually 
there outside the percipient's own mind, but the object which they represent is 
not actually there. The images do not originate in the percipient's own mind. 
They are not the same as an image on a screen, because when looking at a screen, 
we do not assume that the people we see there are actually in the screen; we 
know we are looking at an image. In most cases, when a person sees an 
apparition, he or she assumes that the object is there and not that a projection of 
some kind of image is occurring. A closer analogy than a screen image would be 
a very convincing three -dimensional hologram such as we enjoy in Star Trek: 
Voyager. Such cases would be illusion, perhaps, rather than hallucination. 
4. The occultist theory: apparitions are the astral or etheric bodies of the appearers, 
with clothing and accessories created ad hoc. Presumably the appearer creates 
clothing so as to appear recognizably and with appropriate decency. 
5. The spiritualist theory: apparitions are the spirits of the departed. 
For my purpose, to find the origins of religious elements without recourse to 
the actuality of anything supernatural, I have to dispense immediately with 
hypotheses 4 and 5. I do not say that they are not correct, although I do not think they 
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are. I say only that, in the present context, it would be a distraction to consider 
hypotheses which demand that reality. 
The Myers- Price -Johnson theory requires that people be able, in some 
circumstances, to detect images latent in physical media such as walls and floors. 
These images were imprinted or projected there by mental acts of other people. For 
example, when one sees a ghost one is seeing an image, generally a moving, three - 
dimensional image, of someone who imprinted it, perhaps centuries earlier, in the 
physical objects in the given location. The theory therefore requires human abilities 
to imprint and to detect in ways unknown to physical science. To be sure, the 
mechanism is not in principle unknowable or uninvestigable, but it remains unknown 
a century after Myers. Accepting this theory, we would be accepting the reality of the 
paranormal, though not, I think, of the supernatural. 
The Tyrrell hypothesis that apparitions should be idea -patterns produced by 
the percipient's subconscious does not require the actuality of the supernatural or 
paranormal. However, as formulated above, the Tyrrell hypothesis allows for 
paranormal (e.g., telepathic), if not supernatural (e.g., astral), interaction between the 
percipient and the appearer. If we drop this paranormal addition and confine the 
creation of the apparition to activity of the percipient's own subconscious mind, we 
have a reasonable hypothesis for the rationalist to pursue. 
Similarly, the Gurney hypothesis that apparitions are hallucinations is one 
that can be pursued, provided that one rejects the paranormal additions regarding 
telepathy from the appearer. Without these additions, hypotheses 1 and 2 become 
practically identical. 
Myers (quoted in MacKenzie 1982: 16) offers an hypothesis which accounts 
for the `vague and meaningless' behaviour of ghosts and apparitions in general. Not 
uniquely of course, he proposes that phantasms of a living person are projected by 
that living person in the course of dreaming. The dreaming context explains the odd, 
dream -like behaviour, but on this hypothesis it is not the subject's dreaming that 
produces the odd behaviour: it is the dreaming of the other person who appears to the 
subject. Similarly, but more curiously, phantasms of the dead are produced by the 
dead person dreaming. The dead person still exists in some way, and can dream. In 
dreaming he or she projects the phantasm perceived by the subject. This explains the 
commonly reported lack of response by ghosts to the context or to the actions of the 
percipient. 
I do not know whether Myers' hypothesis has been elaborated by later 
psychical researchers, but in positing survival after death it certainly requires the 
reality of the supernatural. For this reason I do not take it further. 
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APPENDIX 3C 
A psychoanalytic hypothesis explaining nightmares 
While Hufford (1982) distinguishes the Old Hag from incubus and succubus 
encounters, the similarities are clear, in that in all cases an intruder approaches and 
oppresses the victim. The difference seems to be that incubus and succubus episodes 
have an explicit sexual content. The incubus is supposed to be a male entity which 
comes upon a female subject, while the succubus is a female entity which comes 
upon a male subject. On etymological grounds, we should expect the succubus to lie 
under the subject, but it seems still to oppress the victim from above. Evans (1984: 
296) notes that in the Old Hag there is no correlation between the gender of the 
subject and that of the entity. 
As a psychoanalyst, Jones (1931: 43 -44, 76) unequivocally assigns a 
universal sexual basis to all nightmare encounters with any sort of entity, humanoid 
or animal, whether incubus, succubus or what Hufford would call Old Hag. All 
nightmares are expressions of conflict arising from repressed sexual desire. The more 
intense the repression, the more intense the nightmare attack. The most strenuously 
repressed urges, which when reactivated therefore give rise to the worst nightmares, 
are the incestuous desires of infancy. 
For example, he cites a case from Bond (1753, in Jones 1931: 44 -45), in 
which a fifteen- year -old girl had a terrifying dream in which `a great heavy man 
came to her bedside and without further ceremony stretched himself upon her'. Jones 
says that what she both desired and dreaded came to pass in her imagination. 
On his view, the intense terror of nightmares arises from the conflict between 
the sexual desire producing dream imagery which would lead to its fulfilment and the 
repressing force of the consciousness, which resists that imagery. When the desire 
threatens to overpower the repressing force, the subject often awakes in a panic 
rather than dream the fulfilment of the unacceptable urge. However, Jones also 
explains dread in another way: the dream presents scenes which would fulfil the 
subject's suppressed urges but the true, desired, nature of what is being played out is 
concealed by cloaking the scenes in an element of dread; in this way what happens in 
the dream appears to the subject as undesired, when really the subject desires it. 
Jones (1931) is able to explain numerous kinds of experiences and beings, not 
only incubi and succubi but also werewolves and vampires, as products of 
suppressed sexual urges. He traces the `mare' component of `nightmare' to a word 
`mara', which in a range of similar forms occurs in several European languages; it 
denotes an incubus or succubus. However, the assimilation of the nightmare to ideas 
of horses is also explored, as horses are potent symbols of sexuality. 
The indiscriminate applicability of Jones's hypothesis should create some 
diffidence as to its validity. There is almost nothing of relevance that it does not 
purport to explain, and nothing would count as falsifying it (see Chapter 2). 
The psychoanalytic hypothesis maintains that incubus nightmares are a more 
or less disguised playing out of repressed infantile sexual desires on the part of the 
subject. However, in the last decades of the twentieth century, public awareness of 
child sexual abuse was much increased. One can now plausibly interpret incubus 
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experiences as a more or less disguised recollection or replay of actual events from 
the subject's childhood involving sexual threat or assault. When an hysterical patient 
expressed the notion that her father had attempted to have intercourse with her as a 
child, Freud perhaps too readily assumed that her belief was merely a wish resulting 
from her own infantile incestuous desires, in accordance with his theory (Munz 1973: 
87). In Chapter 3 I have speculated that one modern case recounted in a television 
documentary might have been not a replay but the actual occurrence of a gross 
homosexual assault. Consider the incubus case from Bond (1753, in Jones 1931) 
above, in which the father rushed into the bedroom from the next room after hearing 
the girl's screams and next morning the girl had `a copious eruption of the menses'. 
If this were reported today, social workers would take the girl into care. However, 
there is no suggestion in the accounts I have read that sexual abuse took place. Given 
the diversity of presence encounters - including not just the Old Hag and nightmares 
but also ghosts limited to their own haunted houses, and extraterrestrials - I do not 
think that many cases are amenable to being explained as recollections of abuse. 
I think some useful insights can be obtained from the psychoanalytic 
hypothesis. In effect, according to Jones, the subconscious generates imagery which 
is presented to the consciousness, the waking or dreaming consciousness, and some 
of that imagery is unacceptable to the consciousness. So there is conflict between the 
conscious and subconscious. It takes two to be in conflict, so there seem to be two 
components, almost two personalities, in one mind. From another aspect, we could 
say that involuntary brain processes produce imagery which is accessed by those 
processes associated with the conscious mind, the part of the mind which wills. 
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The human brain 
For this section I have used chiefly Bear et al. (2001), Carter (1998) and 
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The purpose of this section is not to offer an amateur lecture on neurology, but to 
summarize the general structure of the brain and locate those features which are 
particularly relevant to numinous experience and `neurotheology' (d'Aquili and 
Newberg 1999: 12, 15 -16). In this enormously complex organ, the relatively 
uniform- looking neocortex overlies a huge diversity of subcortical formations, 
ganglia and nuclei. There are many identifiable components, most of whose 
functions have been mapped, albeit in some cases only tentatively. I have listed only 
the most prominent structures within the brain; there are many more. Some structures 
listed will be discussed in more detail later because they play a leading role in 
theories about paranormal and religious experiences. Others are mentioned here only 
to set the scene within which the more interesting structures perform. 
Brain structures 
Cortex 
The largest structure of the human brain is the neocortex (or just `cortex'), 
which overlies the limbic system and the other components of the forebrain. In apes 
and monkeys the neocortex similarly dominates the rest of the brain in size. The 
evolutionarily older paleocortex consists of the olfactory cortices (Barton and 
Aggleton 2000: 484), which are located below the neocortex and forward of the 
thalamus (discussed below). In the brains of lower mammals, such as rats, the 
paleocortex is proportionately much larger than in primates. 
Each hemisphere of the neocortex has four structurally and functionally 
distinct regions or lobes, separated by deep folds or fissures. Often, the lobes are 
taken to include subcortical, limbic structures attached to the underside of the cortex. 
The frontal occupies the area above 
the midpoint of the length of the brain. Behind the frontal lobe and beneath the dome 
of the skull lies the parietal lobe, which extends almost to the rear of the cranial 
cavity. At the rear and below the parietal lies the occipital lobe. On the side of the 
cranial cavity, below the parietal, lies the temporal lobe. The temporal lobe is 
actually continuous posteriorly with the parietal and occipital lobes, but is separated 
from the frontal by the Sylvian fissure. Beneath the Sylvian fissure lies the insula, 
which is cortex continuous with the temporal, parietal and frontal lobes. The surface 
of the cortex is folded, so that its area is greater than it would be if it were smooth. In 
human beings the cortical surface is more folded than in any other creatures except 
elephants and cetaceans. 
A groove or concave fold is a sulcus; the convexity of a fold is a gyrus. 
Several gyri and sulci together which seem to form a functional unit are sometimes 
referred to as a lobule. Functional areas of the cortex, whether gyri, sulci, lobules or 
lobes, are sometimes referred to as cortices. 
Broadly, the occipital lobes and anterior regions of the parietal lobes are 
concerned with incoming signals, both from external sensory organs and from the 
interior of the body. Just behind the central sulcus, which separates frontal and 
parietal lobes, is the postcentral gyrus, which is the most anterior gyrus of the 
parietal lobe. It contains a representation of the body (known as the homunculus), on 
which sensations are mapped. The farther backward from the central sulcus one 
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looks on the parietal lobe, the less concerned with sensory input and the more 
concerned with associations is the area under examination. The occipital lobe is 
principally concerned with vision, containing primary and secondary visual cortex. 
Posterior regions of the frontal lobes are concerned with generating outgoing 
signals to control the body, principally of course movement. Facing the postcentral 
gyrus across the central sulcus is the precentral gyrus, the most posterior gyrus of the 
frontal lobe. This is primary motor cortex; it also contains a map of the body, from 
which signals are sent via the basal ganglia to actuate limbs. Anterior to the motor 
cortex is the supplementary motor area and premotor cortex. Anterior to those are the 
prefrontal areas. Broadly, the farther forward one looks on the frontal lobe from the 
central sulcus, the more removed from immediate motor functions and the more 
concerned with associations is the area under examination. 
Anterior regions of the frontal lobes, posterior regions of the parietal lobes 
and several regions of the temporal lobes all seem to be concerned with associations 
- that is, correlating information from different senses and from memory. Perhaps 
exclusively the temporal lobe is concerned with storing and retrieving memories, and 
perhaps exclusively the prefrontal areas are concerned with decision -making. 
Limbic system 
Hidden within the envelope of the four cortical lobes lies the limbic system, 
sometimes called a limbic lobe, which consists of a number of diverse structures 
(Chow 2001; Ramachandran 1999: 178, 228). Among these are the cingulate gyrus, 
which is the cortex on the inward side of each hemisphere, facing the other 
hemisphere. It is distinct from the external lobes. Below it is the corpus callosum, 
which connects the two hemispheres (see later). Below the corpus callosum and 
forward of the thalamus extends the septum. Nestling against the inward surface of 
the temporal lobe and attached to it are the temporo- limbic structures, the 
hippocampus and, anterior to the hippocampus, the amygdala. Behind the frontal 
lobes, centrally, below and between the cortices, is a collection of small disparate 
nuclei called the hypothalamus. There are extensive reciprocal connections between 
the hypothalamus and the amygdala and hippocampus of either hemisphere. 
The septum is thought to govern emotional responses. The hippocampus is 
required for storing memories. The amygdala attaches value and emotional content to 
experience and memory. The hypothalamus is also concerned with emotion, urges 
and appetites, and with autonomic functions and homeostasis, balancing the 
complementary arousal and quiescent systems of the body. 
The limbic system is often stated to be a primitive part of the brain (e.g., 
Newberg and D'Aquili 2001: 43) but the neocortex has not evolved at the expense of 
the limbic system. The limbic system has continued to evolve alongside the 
expanding cortex throughout the evolution of the primates (Barton and Aggleton 
2000: 480). Each limbic structure has coevolved with those parts of the cortex to 
which it has connections (cf Deacon 1997: 206). Some limbic structures are even 
`cortex -like' in that they have a neural configuration resembling that found in the 
cortex, while others are non -cortex -like. For example, the dense connections between 
the various nuclei of the amygdala are evidence of its integrity as a single functional 
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entity, yet the basal and lateral nuclei are cortex -like, while the central and medial 
nuclei and the anterior amygdalar area are non -cortex -like (Rolls 2000: 483, 492). 
Connections between hemispheres 
Below the cingulate gyrus, the two cortical hemispheres are connected by a 
broad bundle of two hundred million fibres, the corpus callosum. The hemispheres 
are also connected at a subcortical level by a number of much smaller commissures, 
including the anterior, hippocampal, habenular, posterior and collicular 
commissures. 
Basal ganglia 
In the centre of the brain is the thalamus, which has a left and right lobe. 
Outward of and below the thalamus lie on either side the basal ganglia. These are, 
next to the thalamus, the globus pallidus, and then the striatum, which consists of the 
putamen and its posterior extension the caudate nucleus. The subthalamic nucleus 
and the substantia nigra, which is actually a midbrain structure, are included as part 
of the basal ganglia. 
The thalamus serves as a central router of the brain, including reception of 
incoming sensory signals. The putamen is connected to frontal motor cortex and is 
involved in involuntary movement. The caudate nucleus is connected to prefrontal 
association cortex and alerts the latter to conditions which require attention. The 
striatum receives projections to the basal ganglia from the cortex. The globus 
pallidus sends projections to the thalamus from the basal ganglia. The subthalamus 
and substantia nigra are involved in motor control. 
Midbrain and hindbrain 
The structures so far listed are all part of the forebrain. The thalamus, at the 
centre of the forebrain, can be viewed as the summit of the brain stem. Behind and 
below it lies the midbrain, then the hindbrain, consisting of the pons, the twin -lobed 
cerebellum sprouting behind it, and the medulla. Below the pons the medulla merges 
into the spinal cord, passing through the foramen magnum out of the base of the 
skull. Finally, the spinal cord extends down the rest of the trunk. At the base of the 
medulla is the pyramidal decussation, where the thick bundles of ascending sensory 
and descending motor axons cross over, so that the left side of the body is sensed and 
actuated by the right hemisphere of the brain and vice versa. 
Besides the large, noticeable cerebellum, which processes fine control of 
balance and movement, the midbrain and hindbrain have smaller specialized 
formations and nuclei. For example, on the posterior aspect of the midbrain are the 
pairs of superior and inferior colliculi, involved in perception. Through the pons and 
medulla runs the reticular formation, concerned with regulating sleep and 
attentiveness. In the medulla are the pair of olivary bodies, involved in hearing, and 
the rapid nuclei, which manage mood and wakefulness. 
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Ventricles 
Extending up inside the brain, the spinal canal, containing cerebrospinal fluid. 
opens out to form the fourth ventricle at the level of the pons, the third ventricle 
centrally in the skull, and the lateral ventricles, one on either side, below the corpus 
callosum. 
Blood supply 
Blood supply to the brain is provided posteriorly by the twin vertebral arteries 
and anteriorly by the twin carotid arteries. The vertebral arteries merge into the 
single basilar artery inside the base of the skull, but the carotid arteries each serve the 
hemisphere on their own side. By injecting sodium amytal into one carotid artery, it 
is possible to anaesthetize the ipsilateral hemisphere while the other remains awake. 
This procedure is known as the Wada test. However, the carotid and basilar arteries 
are interconnected by anterior and posterior communicating arteries forming the 
circle of Willis, so that the period during which the contralateral hemisphere remains 
unaffected in the Wada test is limited to a few minutes (Beaton 1985: 112). 
Relevance 
All identified brain structures are shared by us with apes, monkeys and 
prosimians. There is nothing we possess that they do not, although of course size and 
proportions vary. Indeed, much of human knowledge about the function and 
formation of the brain has been derived from studies of other primates, especially 
rhesus monkeys (macaques). Rhesus monkeys, along with cats and rats, as the 
preferred experimental animals, have been injected with drugs which imitate, 
facilitate or inhibit natural neurotransmitters, have had selected nuclei lesioned with 
probes and toxins, have had their amygdalae sucked out, have had whole frontal or 
temporal lobes excised on one side or bilaterally, and even whole hemispheres 
removed, so that post- operative changes to their behaviour could be studied. 
The projections of nerve fibres from one part of the brain to others have been 
studied by staining. The activity in the live brain has been monitored for half a 
century by electroencephalographs (EEG). In recent decades it has become possible 
to image the live brain and its activity using computerized tomography (CT), single 
photon emission CT (SPECT), positron emission tomography (PET), magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) and functional MRI (fMRI). 
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Dissociative states and epileptiform EEG 
In a widely cited paper Mesulam (1981) describes twelve patients who 
suffered dissociative states. Dissociation is a disturbance of continuity of personality. 
Seven of these patients interpreted their condition as multiple personality and the 
other five as spirit possession. In all cases they had abnormal EEG resembling that 
found in temporal lobe epilepsy, but only some exhibited clinical symptoms such as 
absences or convulsions, and most had no family history of epilepsy. I shall 
summarize a few cases so that the reader knows what sort of conditions are under 
discussion, and then cover Mesulam's conclusions. 
A young woman had experienced absences since the age of twelve but no 
convulsions. She had a head injury at the age of one. She appeared to have three 
personalities: Edna, the patient herself, left -handed, dependable; Linda, a 
dominating, right- handed person who had tortured animals; Hanna, gullible and 
immature. The change from one to another was instantaneous. Edna and Linda 
communicated by written notes but Edna did not know otherwise what Linda did, 
whereas Linda was apparently `co- conscious', knowing about Edna but unable to 
interfere. EEG showed sharp waves bilaterally in the interior of the temporal lobes 
during drowsiness and theta waves over the left temporal during waking. Theta 
waves are slow and normally found during non -REM deep sleep. 
Another young woman experienced panic attacks, visual hallucinations and 
déjà vu. During periods of altered consciousness she would engage in rocking and 
lip- smacking. She had been treated in hospital for psychosis, rage and suicide 
attempts. She believed she was possessed - and not in a metaphorical sense - by the 
devil, whom she heard cackling inside her head, telling her to do things like throwing 
coffee into people's faces. An exorcism was performed, at the beginning of which 
she lost consciousness, but she felt relief afterwards. EEG showed spikes in the 
anterior temporal. A combination of drugs reduced the lip- smacking and decreased 
the frequency of the feeling of possession. 
Not all patients were women, but I shall summarize the information about one 
more. An older woman, diagnosed schizophrenic, had grand mal seizures for ten 
years until they came under control using anticonvulsant drugs. Auras included déjà 
vu, jamais -vu and depersonalization. EEG showed temporal -lobe spikes bilaterally. 
She had practised Judaism as well as varieties of Christianity. For a period of a year 
she had episodes during which she believed she was a messiah, `possessed by God'. 
On the basis of these and other studies, Mesulam suggests that multiple 
personality and possession cases may be behavioural manifestations of abnormal 
electrical activity in the temporal lobes, and points out the widely observed 
association of a range of behavioural changes, from mere hyperreligiosity to 
paranoid psychosis, with psychomotor epilepsy. In the temporal lobe, high -order 
sensory information is combined with emotional tone mediated by the amygdala and 
hippocampus, which have reciprocal projections with the hypothalamus and 
therefore have access to the internal state of the body. Spontaneous paroxysmal 
discharges in focal areas of the temporal lobe may disturb the normal process of 
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combining sensory and affective data. Subjectively the balance of thought, 
perception and emotion would be altered. 
When interictal behaviours such as hyperreligiosity, humourlessness and 
aggression come about as a result of chronic epilepsy, they become incorporated into 
the subject's behavioural repertoire, forming part of their personality. But, Mesulam 
suggests, in some cases the changes may be so great or sudden that they cannot be 
integrated. In such cases, dissociative states may appear, so that when the new 
behaviours are carried out they are assigned to new or alien personalities. Of the 
sample studied, in seven cases the temporal -lobe EEG abnormality was 
asymmetrical, and in five of those seven cases the predominant focus was located in 
the nondominant hemisphere, the right in right -handers and the left in left -handers. 
Mesulam hypothesizes that dissociation is more likely in cases where the focus of 
abnormal activity is in the nondominant hemisphere. 
Mesulam's hypothesis, that epileptiform activity in the temporal lobe is 
responsible for the phenomena experienced as multiple personality and possession, is 
plausible and certainly testable. For patients who report the dissociative symptoms it 
would be necessary to record EEG, both ictal and interictal. I am not aware that any 
such study on a large scale has been done or the results of smaller scale studies 
collated. 
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Schizophrenics as bicameral survivors 
Jaynes (1976: 404 -432) proposes that schizophrenic patients who hear 
hallucinated voices are people who manifest a condition corresponding to the 
putative bicameral mind of antiquity, or, perhaps more accurately, an intermediate 
condition, since they are generally conscious and the voices are mostly treated as 
unwelcome and intrusive. 
On Jaynes' theory, the hallucinated voices of the bicameral mind and of 
schizophrenic patients are an intrusion from the right- hemisphere linguistic function 
or homologue of the self, located in the temporo -parietal region. This would be 
consistent with evidence from EEG and brain scans of schizophrenic patients which 
has shown lowered activity in the dominant (left, linguistic) hemisphere with 
predicted reduced ability in verbal tasks (Frude 1998: 174 -175). Hypofunction of the 
left hemisphere should facilitate intrusions from the right (Persinger 1994: esp. 
1064). 
Even so, some authorities regard schizophrenia as a manifestation of deficit 
in frontal -lobe function. They view schizophrenia as a combination of disorders of 
willed action, self -monitoring and monitoring the intentions of others: a failure of a 
supervisory attentional system also found in patients with frontal -lobe lesions 
(Wilson et al. 1997: 246). In some schizophrenic patients PET scans have shown 
degrees of atrophy of the prefrontal cortex (Greenfield 1996: 170). Schizophrenia 
may be produced by raised levels of, or hypersensitivity to, the neurotransmitter 
dopamine, or, on another hypothesis, hypoactivity of certain types of glutamate 
receptors (Bear et al. 2001: 696 -699). Increased levels of dopamine have been 
detected in the left amygdala of schizophrenics, but this could be because the 
amygdala has extensive reciprocal connections with the prefrontal cortex, 
abnormalities of which are associated with schizophrenia (Aggleton and Saunders 
2000: 21). 
It would seem that the neurotransmitter hypotheses are not intrinsically 
incompatible with Jaynes' theory, in that alterations of neurotransmitter levels or 
sensitivity could be the mechanism facilitating inter- hemispheric communication. 
However, the frontal -lobe hypotheses do appear to be incompatible with Jaynes' 
theory, unless perhaps the frontal -lobe deficit removes inhibitory influences which 
keep anomalous inter -hemispheric communication at bay. 
A post -mortem study of some schizophrenic patients showed that the corpus 
callosum was unusually thin, while another study showed it to be enlarged (Frude 
1998: 174). The latter phenomenon has been interpreted as developmental 
compensation for defective interhemispheric communication. A further study showed 
schizophrenics exhibiting greater EEG `power' in the left temporal lobe than normal 
subjects, the right temporal lobe being equal to normals (Springer and Deutsch 1989: 
280). These observations seem inconsistent with the hypothesis of right- hemisphere 
intrusions as an explanation of schizophrenic symptoms. 
Jaynes himself (1976: 407 -408), however, points out that there are several 
types of condition referred to schizophrenia, and several theories regarding the 
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aetiology. What he is discussing is a specific type of unmedicated schizophrenia with 
the symptom of hallucinated voices. Given that most modern-day sufferers are likely 
to be have been on long -term medication since the symptoms first appeared, the 
underlying unmedicated neural phenomena are probably difficult to ascertain. 
Recall that the function of hallucinated voices in the bicameral era of Jaynes' 
theory was to give advice on which the person could act. Bicameral individuals 
depended on the advice and warnings of their voices to be able to conduct 
themselves successfully in everyday life (1976: 134, 141). The voices therefore 
would have had to give wise advice and timely warnings and conduce to the well 
being of the individual. On the last point, one would expect that the voices would 
have had to be encouraging rather than derogatory, and probably calming rather than 
inflammatory. One would not expect the voices to be advantageous to their hearer 
only occasionally; one would expect them to be advantageous more often than not. It 
is better to make a decision than be indecisive; but it is not enough on every occasion 
just to make any decision, right or wrong: most decisions have to be beneficial for 
the person to survive successfully. 
According to Jaynes' own testimony (1976: 88 -90, 95 -96, 418), the voices 
heard by schizophrenic patients are generally not merely warning or advisory but 
hypercritical. They `admonish, console, mock, command'; they `yell, whine, sneer'; 
a voice spoke `in its most reproachful tone'; a patient `heard accusations from God'. 
A particularly negative voice, which carries negativity about oneself to its logical 
conclusion, berated a patient, `Why are you sitting here making believe you are as 
good as anyone else when you're not ?' and then, `You're no good' and `You might as 
well drown yourself , advice which the patient tried to follow. The effectiveness at 
an everyday level of a person hearing hallucinated voices is cast into question by 
patients who say, `When I am making a cake she [the voice] gets too impatient with 
me', or `It is really very hard to keep conversations with others because I can't be 
sure if others are really talking or not and if I am really talking back'. 
I have not selected just a few examples from Jaynes' repertoire which happen 
to be negative. They are almost all like that. The voices are negative and sometimes 
provoke to suicide attempts. This is hardly the sort of advice that would lead a 
bicameral person to be successful in life. 
On the other hand, the comments of the hallucinated voices are exactly the 
sort of advice we would expect from a right hemisphere which subserves vigilance, 
doubt and depressive affect (Chapters 4 and 5). In conclusion, the viability of a 
bicameral mind in antiquity seems problematic, but the proposal that schizophrenic 
patients with hallucinated voices are suffering intrusions from the non -linguistic 
hemisphere has some plausibility. 
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Mystical states 
If all subjective experience is correlated with neural events, then mystical 
states of consciousness are not exempt. The fact of having a neural correlate does not 
invalidate mystical experience, since all experience has a neural correlate. In my 
view, what would appear to invalidate it - that is, render it suspect as a proposed 
apprehension of ultimate reality - is that it should be the outcome of merely aberrant 
brain processing. 
It has been alleged that mystical states can be correlated with certain neural 
processes, and that the sequence of events in the brain by which they are deliberately 
induced by a subject in the course of meditation can be traced. In a detailed paper 
(D'Aquili and Newberg 1993) and at greater length but with less specificity in two 
books (D'Aquili and Newberg 1999; Newberg and D'Aquili 2001), two workers 
offer their neuropsychological explanation. I shall use the 1993 paper as the main 
source when describing the mechanism, also described in Newberg and d'Aquili 
(2001: 116 -123), and the 2001 book when discussing implications. 
Absolute unitary being 
Sequences of neural events have been proposed for different types of 
meditation which should result in a sense of what D'Aquili and Newberg call 
absolute unitary being (AUB), a sense of being at one with the whole of creation. 
There are other attempts to account neurologically for such experiences, but an 
analysis of this detailed and plausible hypothesis will suffice for my purpose, which 
is to demonstrate that an attempt can be made. Whether it is satisfactory as an 
account is a secondary question, and I try to deal with that later. 
Presuppositions 
The hypothesis depends on the attribution of specific functions to certain 
structures in the brain. First, in the frontal lobe, the prefrontal cortex is the location 
of those circuits which seem essential to decision -making. In older philosophical 
terminology, one might say it is the seat of the will. Within the right parietal lobe, the 
posterior superior parietal lobule (R -PSPL) is concerned with the sense of space and 
position. Within the left parietal lobe, the posterior superior parietal lobule (L- 
PSPL) is concerned with the dichotomy of self and other, the distinction between 
oneself and the rest of space. In the books Newberg and d'Aquili (e.g., 2001: 4) refer 
to these as the orientation association areas (OAA). The inferior parietal lobule 
(IPL), in both hemispheres, is concerned with interpreting causality in the sequence 
of sensory input. In either hemisphere, in the temporal lobe, the inferior temporal 
lobule (ITL) is association cortex concerned with integrating visual data. It is the 
visual association area (VAA). It overlies the hippocampus, which is involved with 
memory, and the amygdala, which is also involved with emotion, particularly fear. In 
the centre of the base of the cranial cavity, the lateral hypothalamus is also, 
apparently, concerned with fear and with arousal and the `fight or flight' response to 
danger. In contrast, the medial hypothalamic nuclei appear to be an extension of the 
Appendix 5C 291 
parasympathetic nervous system up into the brain stem. Activity there subserves 
vegetative states and generates a subjective sense of quiescence. 
The hypothesis also depends on the effect of deafferentation on specific 
cortical areas. All structures in the brain, cortical and subcortical, receive incoming 
or afferent neural projections from other parts, which carry data to be processed by 
the target structure. The target structure has its own outgoing projections to other 
parts, which carry the signals that it has generated by processing its input. The 
processing may in some cases be accompanied by a component of subjective 
experience of some kind. The question arises: when input signals are cut off, what 
processing does the deafferented structure do, what output does it generate, and what 
is the concomitant subjective experience? 
Via negativa 
In passive meditation, the subject seeks to empty the mind of thoughts, not 
concentrating on anything. This method has been known in the West as the via 
negativa but is characteristic of eastern, particularly Buddhist, practice. The decision 
to empty the mind is an exercise of the right prefrontal cortex (R -PFC). This is the 
attention association area (AAA). The R -PFC inhibits input to certain other parts of 
the brain, notably the posterior superior parietal lobules (PSPL). In particular, input 
from the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) is blocked from reaching the PSPL. Especially 
in the left hemisphere, the IPL mediates language and concepts, so linguistic 
constructs and concepts are prevented from entering the PSPL. When the right PSPL 
is deafferented, it has no data to process, so instead of generating a sense of position 
in space, it generates a sense of pure space. The left PSPL also becomes 
deafferented. Without data to process, by which it would distinguish self and the rest, 
it is unable to distinguish self and other, and instead generates a sense of wholeness. 
Now, although the PSPLs have been deprived of incoming signals, they can still 
output signals. These cortical lobules project to the hippocampus and other limbic 
structures, which add an emotional component to the sensations of space and loss of 
self. The subject thus feels a oneness with the whole of creation. As the limbic 
structures have copious projections back to the prefrontal cortices, a reverberating 
loop is set up. Maximal stimulation within the hypothalamic nuclei causes spillover 
from one side to the other within the limbic system. The prefrontal cortices, right and 
left, at this time also stimulate one another via the corpus callo sum, which connects 
the left and right hemispheres at cortical level. This way, the experience, once set up, 
is self -sustaining. 
Via positiva 
In active meditation, the via positiva, the subject meditates on an object. This 
may perhaps apply to someone meditating on an icon, on the person of his or her 
guru, and in ancient times on statues of the gods (cf Cumont 1922: 121 -122). 
Concentration on an object is initially an activity of the AAA or right prefrontal 
cortex (R -PFC). The image is fixated in the right PSPL. The source of the image is 
the inferior temporal lobule (ITL), which either delivers memories of images or 
receives current images directly from the visual cortices, in either case adding to 
those the emotional or religious associations of the object from memory. Continuous 
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fixation stimulates the right hippocampus and amygdala, and in turn the lateral 
hypothalamus, and a mildly pleasant mood is the result. The hypothalamus stimulates 
the amygdala and hippocampus, which in turn stimulate the prefrontal cortex, so a 
reverberating loop is set up in the right hemisphere. Spillover in the hypothalamus 
stimulates the amygdala and hippocampus of the left hemisphere, which stimulate 
the left prefrontal cortex. That in turn inhibits the left IPL, and the left PSPL instantly 
becomes deafferented, so that the sense of a distinction between self and other 
ceases. However, the right PSPL is not deafferented but is concentrated on the object 
of meditation. As a result, the subject has a feeling of oneness with the object of 
meditation. In the hypothalamus, nuclei with conflicting functions (quiescence and 
arousal) are concurrently stimulated. Also, the inhibitory function of the right 
prefrontal cortex is stimulated (by the incoming signals) at the same time as (of its 
own accord) it is promoting the fixation. At this point, the inhibitory function 
succeeds, blocks the fixated image coming from the right ITL, and causes the right 
PSPL to be deafferented. Now the subject experiences the sense of pure space 
( deafferented R -PSPL) along with the abolition of self and other (deafferented L- 
PSPL). Thus the end point reached is the same as with the via negativa: the sense of 
absolute unitary being. 
Types of religious experience 
Stimulation by the cortex, via the amygdala and hippocampus, of the lateral 
hypothalamus may generate a feeling of exaltation accompanying the other, cortical, 
components of the experience, the sense of pure space together with abolition of self 
This sense of absolute unitary being is the height of religious experience, and is 
sought deliberately by practitioners of meditation. 
Discussing lesser mystical states, d'Aquili and Newberg refer to Otto. They 
distinguish as follows between his numen and his mysterium tremendum. 
In the case of the former, deafferentation of the inferior temporal lobe, 
concerned with memory, may allow internal intrinsic memories to rise into 
consciousness. These are not memories of experiences but are intrinsic to the circuits 
of the brain: they may correspond to Jungian archetypes. These archetypes, suffused 
with religious feeling, presumably become numina for the subject. 
In the case of the mysterium tremendum, the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) is 
deafferented. The IPL generates the sense of causality. This area of the cortex, 
without sensory input to work on, will generate a sense of pure causation: a 
subjective sense of causality as a being in its own right. This, accompanied by limbic 
discharges generating emotion, particularly fear, produces a sense of the `First 
Cause', `God', the Mysterium Tremendum et Fascinans. 
Religious experiences come about spontaneously as well as in response to 
practices with such experiences as their goal. In these cases, d'Aquili and Newberg 
(1993) propose that the sequence of events begins with activity in the limbic system 
and works from there upward to the cortex, but they do not detail what such a 
sequence would be, although the matter is discussed in Newberg and d'Aquili (2001: 
42 -46). 
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Critique and conclusions 
Reductionism 
D'Aquili and Newberg explicitly caution against a reductionist view which 
would interpret a person's `objective' experience of God as no more than 
neurochemical flux. They allude to the complex sequences of neural events which 
are required for the everyday perception of objects in the physical world, and suggest 
that everyday consciousness is not necessarily superior to mystical states in its claim 
for the reality of what is perceived or experienced. 
I would argue that a veridical perception is one in which the subjectively 
perceived or experienced object actually exists. There may be no way to determine 
whether the alleged object exists except by means of a perception, but the principle is 
that the alleged object has to be there and not be just something generated entirely in 
the mind of the percipient (Chapter 2). 
Now, the subjective experience of absolute unitary being, as described by 
d'Aquili and Newberg, arises purely internally. It is not a perception of anything 
external to the subject. By their account, the sensations of pure space and the 
obliteration of the self -other dichotomy arise in areas of cortex when those areas are 
deafferented: that is, they are receiving no input. If they are receiving no input, then 
by defmition, as far as those cortices are involved, the subject is not perceiving 
anything. One would draw the conclusion that the experiences are illusory, in that 
they arise only because those cortical areas continue to process in the absence of 
data. 
Those cortices can be assumed to have evolved their present functions 
because it was advantageous for an organism to determine its position in space and 
the limits of its own body. These determinations, based on sensory input, are the 
functions which those cortices perform in the life of the organism. For them to be 
deafferented is an abnormal condition. They continue to carry out processing, but in 
the absence of data they cannot be expected to produce accurate determinations of 
position in space or limits of the body. The determinations which they do produce in 
these circumstances are aberrations, because they are not functioning in the way they 
have evolved to do. These determinations are like the output of a computer program 
with inadequate validation procedures when it processes inputs outside the valid 
range: garbage in, garbage out. 
It therefore seems, on a prima facie basis, that the discussed hypothesis does 
lead to a reductionist and negative conclusion about mystical states. The conclusion 
is that those states do not mediate apprehension of ultimate reality or indeed of 
anything at all, but instead are illusory experiences produced by abnormal neural 
processes. They are a by- product of a specific set of survival- orientated mechanisms 
of the human brain, which some human beings have discovered can be made to 
function unnaturally to produce a sort of extreme `pleasure'. The position is 
analogous to the way that we use sexual organs, which evolved for reproduction, for 
pleasurable purposes unrelated to procreation. 
Appendix 5C 294 
Plausibility of a theory 
More fundamentally, the suppositions on which the hypothesis of d'Aquili 
and Newberg depends are considerable. They stretch one's confidence in the 
neurological data to the limit. Although there is general agreement in the literature 
that the cortical areas and limbic structures referred to have more or less the 
functions attributed to them, the attributions are not clear cut. 
Moreover, the presumed activity of cortical areas when deafferented is not 
known; it is part of the hypothesis. Why should it be that the deafferented PSPLs still 
generate output? Why should they not quiesce in the absence of incoming stimuli? 
Where do they get the energy to generate their own activity, when they are not 
receiving energy from a stimulus? One could argue perhaps that they are receiving 
energy from the prefrontal cortices (PFCs), in the course of inhibition by the latter of 
input from the inferior parietal lobules. So there is input, but the input from the PFCs 
has no content, or at any rate no `valid' content of the type expected from the IPLs 
that can be successfully processed. 
In an experiment which recorded electroencephalographs of subjects during 
meditation, one subject experienced the mystical sense of absolute unitary being. 
From this person, high amplitude alpha waves were recorded, and a large amount of 
theta frequencies. There were intermittent discrete bursts of strong theta waves over 
the prefrontal and parietal areas, indicating synchronous activity of large populations 
of neurons in those cortical areas. In later studies of meditating and praying subjects, 
SPECT scans showed increased blood flow in the OAA (Newberg and d'Aquili 
2001: 3, 6). D'Aquili and Newberg regard these data as supporting their hypothesis, 
because one would expect to see high activity in the prefrontal cortices and the 
spontaneous activity of the deafferented parietal areas. 
Other workers (e.g., Ramachandran 1999; Persinger and Makarec 1992: esp. 
221, 223) propose that mystical and religious awe are associated not with the 
superior parietal areas but with the temporal lobes, both cortex and amygdala. This 
view is based on the occurrence of feelings of intense meaningfulness, cosmic 
awareness and the like in some cases of temporal -lobe epilepsy. Not all such patients 
have cosmic experiences, but some do, like Dostoyevsky. In a television programme 
based on Ramachandran's 1999 book, a temporal -lobe epileptic patient describes the 
feelings of being godlike himself and of being chosen by God, which occur during 
his ictal states'. Ramachandran makes the hypothesis that the limbic system, as we 
have discussed before, attaches meaning and value to otherwise neutral experience. 
The attachment of value to experience is a survival mechanism, since some things 
are important - for example, avoiding predators, fording food, finding healing plants 
- and require the individual to attend to them. When the amygdala is hyperactive, 
meaning is attached not just to things that are important for the individual's survival 
or personal interests but to the entire content of experience. This would give rise to a 
cosmic sense of the significance and value of all things, in particular of the individual 
himself or herself Ramachandran is careful to state that the explanation of religious 
feelings in terms of abnormal activation of temporal -lobe structures has no 
implications for the value of those feelings. However, in my view this is a sop. It is 
' Phantoms in the Brain, Rosetta Pictures, Channel 4 Television 2000. 
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evident that this hypothesis holds out no more hope that such feelings are a veridical 
perception of anything than the hypothesis of d'Aquili and Newberg. 
While I do not feel bound to accept that the hypothesis of d'Aquili and 
Newberg accounts for the mystical sense of absolute unitary being, I think it is 
probably correct within the limits of current theory and scanning technology. At the 
very least, it is a precursor of the kind of account that will eventually be given and 
accepted for such mystical experiences. The hypothesis is testable in principle, and 
can be expected at some stage to become testable in practice. In principle, if not yet 
in terms of practical possibility, the sequences of neural events during all kinds of 
mental activity, including meditation, are traceable. With functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), which can trace activity from microsecond to 
microsecond in the living brain, the technological means available are beginning to 
approach the degree of accuracy that will be needed. 
Criticism of the authors' metaphysical conclusions 
D'Aquili died in 1999, and the 2001 book is mainly Newberg's work. 
The theory and the evidence are plausible. It is a major achievement to have 
found what the neural correlate of mystical experience is, if indeed the correlate has 
been identified correctly, however incompletely. Even so, there are many confusions 
in the philosophical implications which the authors attempt to draw. 
Newberg says (2001: 7), `Gene and I suspected that we'd uncovered solid 
evidence that the mystical experiences of our subjects ... were not the result of 
emotional mistakes or simple wishful thinking but were associated with observable 
neurological events, which, while unusual, are not outside the range of normal brain 
function. In other words, mystical experience is biologically, observably and 
scientifically real'. This alleged newly discovered reality of mystical states is restated 
in several places (e.g., Newberg and d'Aquili 2001: 126). 
No one would deny that mystical experience takes place. It is unarguably a 
real experience. Like all experience, it has a neural correlate. If we can observe the 
neural correlate, then we can confirm the expectation that some unusual brain 
activity takes place during mystical experience. But observation of the neural 
correlate does not make the experience any more or less real than we knew it to be in 
the first place. 
The most important question is: what is mystical experience an experience 
of? I have dealt with that question above, and suggested that, if mystical experience 
is mediated by the neural events described in the theory, then, on the face of it, it is 
not an experience of anything. 
Newberg and d'Aquili (2001: 9) refer to `the brain's capacity to make 
spiritual experience real' and `evidence of a neurobiological experience that has 
evolved to allow us humans to extend material existence and achieve and connect 
with a deeper, more spiritual part of ourselves perceived of [sic] as an absolute, 
universal reality that connects us to all that is'. I do not see anything in the neural 
events described that makes spiritual experience any more or less real. Nor do I see 
how these events `extend material existence', whatever that means. Newberg says 
that the spiritual part of ourselves is perceived as an absolute universal reality. Now, 
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universal reality is presumably what is designated by the phrase `all that is', so he 
has told us that universal reality connects us to universal reality. This is clearly rather 
unsophisticated metaphysics. 
There is a great deal of rambling about ritual, myth and other material, which 
I shall charitably pass over. There are also sentences such as (Newberg and d'Aquili 
2001: 164) `A Christian might call this truth [mystical experience] Jesus', which 
exemplify a straightforward misuse of the word `truth' (see Chapter 2). It is also a 
category mistake: it is just nonsense to equate a truth, an experience and a person. 
As part of the process of bringing about the mystical or religious feeling, 
Newberg (2001: 88 -91) tells us that the amygdala is involved, in apprehending 
unusual signals and generating mild fear. Ritual gestures are unusual and alert those 
brain structures involved in anticipating danger, principally the amygdala. The close 
connection of the amygdala with the olfactory paleocortex means that incense has a 
fairly direct effect. However, in his analysis of the effects of ritual, and clearly 
alluding to Roman Catholic and Anglican practice, Newberg betrays an unfamiliarity 
with both liturgy and theology. Apparently, `a priest swinging an incense dispenser 
[censer, thurible ?] pauses to make a benedictive [sic] bow'. Bowing is not a sign of 
benediction. There is a reference to `the sacrament of the Eucharist, which fulfils 
[sic] Christ's promise of union and eternal life'. If the sacrament fulfilled, rather than 
merely symbolized participation in, the promise of eternal life, then some of us 
would already be immortal. 
More seriously, there is throughout a failure to distinguish between (1) the 
word `God', (2) the concept of God, (3) the subjective experience of (apparently) 
apprehending God and (4) God as an putative actually existent being. 
Newberg declares (2001: 159 -161): `God is unknowable; he is not an actual 
being but being itself, the absolute undifferentiated oneness that is the ground of all 
existence. ... If we cling to the comforting images of a personal, knowable God, a 
God who exists entirely apart from the rest of creation as a distinct individual being - 
we diminish the ultimate realness of God, and reduce his divinity. ... God cannot be 
set apart from this ultimate oneness as an identifiable personalized being - to do so 
would be to conceive of a God who is less than absolutely real.' There is confusion 
here between oneness or unity, and reality. No metaphysical argument is presented to 
show that what is real must be part of the oneness experienced by a mystic. There is 
no obvious reason why things might not exist which do not feature in the oneness 
apparently apprehended by a mystic. Who is to say that the experienced oneness 
really includes all there is? 
The argument against God being separate from the universal oneness hangs 
on Newberg's interpretation of the mystical experience and its proposed neural 
substrate. Note that in the via negativa and via positiva the end point is allegedly the 
same: the mystic has the sense of absolute unitary being, of union with all that is. In 
the via positiva, the western mystic concentrates on a symbol which leads to a sense 
of union with God, the unio mystica, and this later may dissolve into absolute unitary 
being. In the via negativa, the Buddhist mystic seeks oneness, absolute unitary being, 
immediately, bypassing the supposedly intermediate stage of joining with the object 
of meditation experienced by the western mystic. In the process of the via positiva, 
the mystic, on reaching the unio mystica with God, may then `fall short' according to 
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Newberg, and not reach the stage of absolute unitary being. This is quite a 
presumption. A value judgement is clearly being made here. Who is to say that the 
unio mystica, the sense of oneness with God, is less real than the sense of absolute 
unitary being? On a straightforward interpretation of the theory, in neither case is the 
mystic experiencing anything outside himself or herself. Consequently, neither 
experience has any more objective validity than the other. Newberg also says that the 
state of absolute unitary being may result for the western mystic as he or she tires of 
concentration, the relaxation rendering the right orientation area (R -PSPL) 
deafferented (Newberg 2001: 122). 
The most startling statement is `God cannot exist as a concept or as reality 
anyplace else but in your mind' (Newberg and d'Aquili 2001: 33). This is 
presumably explicated by the statement which soon follows: `Whatever the ultimate 
nature or spiritual experience might be - whether it is in fact a perception of an 
actual spiritual reality, or merely an interpretation of sheer neurological function - all 
that is meaningful in human spirituality happens in the mind.' So what this amounts 
to is that we experience God the same way as we experience anything else, by means 
of neural processes. However, the bald ontological statement quoted in the first 
sentence of this paragraph is either a gross misphrasing of the explication or, taken at 
its face value, is completely unsustainable on any argument given by the authors. 
What is more, if we say `God exists only in the mind', this is polite shorthand for 
`We have an idea of God but God does not exist'. 
The question of the existence of God is beyond resolution by neurology. All 
that can be said is that a neurological explanation of the subjective experience of 
union with God or indeed absolute unitary being may cast light on whether an 
external source of the experience is involved, which might then possibly be identified 
with the deity. On the theory of d'Aquili and Newberg it is plain that no external 
source is required to generate the experience. 
Reductionism reconsidered 
It is probable that, at some stage in the next few decades, the exact neural 
process which corresponds to the sense of, say, absolute unitary being, will be 
discovered. 
It may be that that process does not involve deafferentation but rather a 
general heightened activity across various structures incorporating both sensory input 
and memories, or perhaps memories alone, but integrated so that a number of 
structures are concurrently processing all knowledge available to the brain. Maybe 
this is enough to produce the mystical experience. But, further, it may be that by this 
or some other process the brain reaches a level of arousal in which it is able to 
become attuned to states of being normally inaccessible. Perhaps the brain becomes 
attuned at a quantum level to apprehend pure spacetime or the universe at large. In 
such cases where the brain is processing information, from its memories or from 
becoming attuned to new external stimuli, the experience is veridical, in that the 
brain is apprehending something which does exist. Here I know I am in a grave 
danger of producing verbiage rather than worthwhile speculation. 
However, it may be that the central factor of the hypothesis of d'Aquili and 
Newberg does apply, namely, deafferentation of the PSPLs. I have argued above that 
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the deafferentation hypothesis leads to the conclusion that the mystical experience is 
not a veridical perception of anything. Is there any way to maintain the validity of the 
mystical experience even on this account of its neural correlate? 
I offer a proposal that, in the absence of input, the PSPLs are functioning 
indeed abnormally, but not aberrantly. So the sensation of pure space from the right 
PSPL and the sense of obliteration of self and other from the left PSPL are accurate 
representations of a state of being. Normally the PSPLs mediate our perception of 
objects located in space and separate from ourselves. In the absence of separate 
objects, only pure space and union with the rest of the world are left, and these are 
actual states of being, in fact ultimate states of being which we now apprehend in 
their own right without the confusion caused by perceiving separate objects. We are 
not perceiving, because we are not processing sensory input, but we are 
apprehending something real. In this sense, every perception involves apprehension 
as its fmal conscious stage, when we locate the object in space and in relation to 
ourselves. Here, without objects, the something real that we apprehend is the ground 
of being or pure existence. We apprehend it in so far as a human being can do so, 
using the same brain components as those by which we apprehend objects in 
existence. 
Alternatively, one could perhaps maintain that deafferentation - or any other 
neural process which may eventually be discovered to account for the subjective 
mystical experience - is the way in which the human brain can become aware of the 
possibility of absolute unitary being. It may be that during the experience one is 
indeed not perceiving anything external or even apprehending anything real, but that 
one becomes aware of the possibility of such a state or being and becomes aware of 
some of the characteristics that it might have. Whether such a state or being actually 
obtains or exists is another matter, and probably not even determinable by scientific 
inquiry in the physical universe. 




From the 1930s until the early 1980s it was generally believed that the 
ancestral stock of human beings split from that of the apes in the Miocene period, 
some time before 15 million years ago. The lesser apes, comprising gibbons and 
siamangs, are classified as a Linnaean family called the Hylobatidae. The great apes, 
comprising orang -utans, chimpanzees, bonobos (also called pygmy chimpanzees) 
and gorillas, along with their ancestors and extinct collaterals, used to be classified in 
the Pongidae; while humans and their ancestors and extinct collaterals formed the 
Hominidae. Recently, however, in view of the genetic closeness of the African apes 
to humans, and their genetic distance from orang -utans, it has become conventional 
to classify gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos and humans in the family Hominidae, 
while the orang -utan is left in the Pongidae. Within the Hominidae the subfamily 
Homininae is then reserved for humans, their ancestors and extinct collaterals (Ward 
2003; Wood and Collard 1999; Andrews 1995). A creature assigned to the 
Homininae is referred to informally as a hominin (occasionally the word is 
`hominine'). Older publications used the term `hominid' to refer to the same class of 
creatures. 
Biochemical evidence 
In the last thirty years, molecular biology has brought about a reassessment of 
the similarities and relationships between humans and African apes, and has 
produced estimates of the date at which the ancestors of humans and apes diverged. 
The resulting recent estimates make more sense of the fossil record than the very 
early date which would have included Ramapithecus. 
Similarities of humans and African apes 
In the cell nucleus, gorillas and chimpanzees have 24 pairs of chromosomes 
while humans have only 23 pairs. Gibbons have 22 pairs. To put this variation in 
perspective, some plants have hundreds of chromosomes. One of the human 
chromosomes appears to result from amalgamation of two of the chimpanzee 
chromosomes (Weiss and Mann 1978: 287; Gribbin and Cherfas 2001: 53, 131). 
The principal haemoglobin of chimpanzees and humans is identical (Stringer 
and McKie 1996: 11 -12; Diamond 1991: 19). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
study of another blood protein, albumin, gave rise to what was then a controversial 
new date for the divergence of hominins and apes. On the basis of quantitative 
differences between albumins taken from humans, African apes and Old World 
monkeys, assuming a reference date for the divergence between apes and Old World 
monkeys at 30 million years ago, itself an uncontentious date among 
palaeontologists, and assuming that the albumin molecule had changed since then at 
a constant rate, the point of divergence between African apes and humans should be 
about 5 million years ago. Vincent Sarich, one of the original researchers, stated in 
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1970, `I now feel that the body of protein evidence on the Homo -Pan [human - 
chimpanzee] relationship is sufficiently extensive so that one no longer has the 
option of considering a fossil older than about eight million years as a hominid 
[hominin] no matter what it looks like' (quoted in Poirier 1981: 390). 
Further biochemical research using a variety of proteins repeatedly confirmed 
a late date for the divergence of the hominids, so that by 1989 a standard textbook 
suggested a time between 10 million and 6 million years ago (Klein 1989: 399). 
Genetic distance and dating 
Comparison of sequences of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) in the cell 
nucleus, which constitutes the genes that determine the specific identity of the 
organism, has resulted in a clear quantitative statement of genetic distances among 
the various apes and ourselves. After the split of any species from another, the DNA 
of each species has been accumulating mutations at the same rate up to the present 
day. If a single date independently arrived at can be used to calibrate the rate of 
mutation, it becomes possible to determine the date at which each lineage split from 
the rest. 
One summary states that common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and pygmy 
chimpanzees (Pan paniscus) share 99.3% of their DNA, so they differ by 0.7 %. 
Humans differ from both species of chimpanzee equally, by 1.6 %. Gorillas differ 
from the chimpanzees and from us equally by 2.3 %. Orang -utans differ from us and 
from the African apes by 3.6 %. Old World monkeys differ from us by 7.3% 
(Diamond 1991: 16 -20). For reference, humans share about 50% of their DNA with 
dogs. 
The divergence of Old World monkeys from the ancestors of the apes and 
ourselves is dated on palaeontological evidence at between 25 and 30 million years 
ago. Palaeontology also indicates that the orang -utan lineage became distinct from 
the African ape lineage between 12 million and 16 million years ago. This time is 
about half way between the divergence of Old World monkeys and the present. 
Similarly, the genetic distance from us of orang-utans (3.6 %) is about half that of the 
Old World monkeys (7.3 %). Given the palaeontological dates above, genetic 
distance indicates that the date for divergence of gorillas should be between 7 million 
and 10 million years ago. The date for divergence of hominins and chimpanzees 
should be between 5 million and 8 million years ago, and for the divergence of the 
two species of chimpanzee between 2 million and 3 million years ago (Diamond 
1991: 16 -20; Goodman et al. 1990: 261, 264; Caccone and Powell 1989: 931, 932, 
939). Comparisons of mitochondrial DNA make the lower figures more likely, and 
have suggested a date as late as 4.5 million years for the separation of hominins and 
chimpanzees. On the same basis, the common and pygmy chimpanzees became 
distinct as recently as 1.5 million years ago (Sarich 1984: 45 -46). 
It has not been universally agreed that humans and chimpanzees are more 
closely related than either are to gorillas. Marks (1994: 59, 66 -69) describes the 
inadequacy of some of the molecular data and shortcomings in the methodology used 
to derive results. He draws attention to some molecular evidence favouring a closer 
relationship between gorillas and chimpanzees (as would be suggested by their 
physiology compared with ours) and suggests that there may well have been a three- 
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way split between chimpanzees, gorillas and humans. Similarly, Rogers (1994: 81) 
states that the dichotomous trees produced by molecular studies may be misleading, 
and that a trichotomy may better describe the separation of the three genera. On the 
other hand, Goodman et al. (1994: 3, 7, 17 -19, 21), reviewing in detail a range of 
studies, make a strong case for the closeness of humans and chimpanzees, that is, for 
the existence of a human -chimpanzee clade. Ruvolo (1994: 89 -95, 102) also 
convincingly argues that chimpanzees and humans are most closely related. 
According to her, the sole data set favouring a chimpanzee- gorilla clade is based on 
repeating DNA sequences of involucrin, a skin -protein gene. Repeating sequences 
are more subject to mutations which may result in homoplasy: that is, in the course 
of evolution, equivalent sequences from distinct species may come to resemble one 
another more closely than they did in earlier generations, giving a false impression of 
relatedness. There are no comparable processes for non -repeating sequences which 
would give rise to a degree of homoplasy that would explain the genetic similarity 
between chimpanzees and humans. The trichotomous explanation, she says, is not 
tenable, because, although there are significant studies which favour the chimpanzee- 
human alignment and some which favour the chimpanzee- gorilla alignment, there is 
very little support for a human- gorilla alignment. If there had been a trichotomy, the 
three possibilities should be more equally supported by the evidence. 
Waddell and Penny (1996: 53, 56 -60) examine data from a number of genetic 
studies and conclude that the existence of a chimpanzee -human lineage after 
separation from the gorilla is consistently favoured. Discussing dates of Sivapithecus 
fossils (as ancestral to the orang -utan) for calibration, they favour a split between 
humans and chimpanzees about 6.5 million years ago. 
It appears, then, that chimpanzees are genetically closer to us than are 
gorillas, although that was unknown until the 1980s. It is clear that we have no closer 
relationship to bonobos (pygmy chimpanzees) than to common chimpanzees, 
although it was possible to hold that view in the 1980s. Dental comparisons bear out 
the genetic evidence, showing that the pygmy chimpanzee and common chimpanzee 
have different but equally derived features (Kinzey 1984: 84). 
It is reasonable therefore to conclude that our closest relatives among the 
apes, therefore, are the two species of chimpanzee, and the latest common ancestor 
lived not much more than 4.5 million to 5 million years ago. 
Australopithecines, upright hominids after 5 -6 million years ago 
Numerous remains have been found in eastern and southern Africa, from the 
period from 4.5 million years ago to less than 2 million years ago, of creatures which 
were like chimpanzees in size, some larger, and had ape -sized brains, but which 
walked upright. They are known collectively as the australopithecines. While 
`australopithecine' was originally intended as a subfamily designation within the 
zoological family Hominidae, the word is commonly used nowadays to refer to a 
collectivity of forms, dated between 4.5 million and 1 million years ago and assigned 
to several genera, which more or less resemble the fossils assigned to the first 
identified genus of these hominins, Australopithecus. 
An upright stance is evidenced by the morphology of limb bones and 
especially of the pelvis. Pelves of australopithecines are broad and short like those of 
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humans, not long and narrow like those of apes. Also, the foramen magnum, where 
the spinal cord emerges from the skull, lies in a central position on the skull base, as 
it does in humans and slightly more forward than in apes. 
Early australopithecines, from before 3 million years ago, were small, about 1 
metre tall. Small, lightly built forms with a variety of skeletal characteristics continue 
in the fossil record until after 2 million years ago, and are known as the gracile 
australopithecines. Among them were forms which most likely became ancestral to 
human beings. But there were also larger forms, described as the robust 
australopithecines. These are usually assigned now to a separate genus, 
Paranthropus. On the basis of dental and jaw development, the latter seem to have 
become adapted to a diet of tough vegetation and roots. They disappear from the 
fossil record about 1 million years ago. 
Skeletal characteristics of the australopithecines 
Major differences between the australopithecines and the great apes are seen 
in the jaws and teeth. The dental arcade in most of the australopithecines is usually 
rounded or parabolic, as in the human condition, rather than U- shaped, with the 
premolars and molars forming parallel rows as in the great apes, but in some early 
cases show an intermediate conformation. The canine teeth do not project beyond the 
other teeth so as to interlock between upper and lower jaws, as in the great apes. 
However, in the earliest australopithecines it appears that the canines were larger 
than in the later species, producing an intermediate condition. In all the 
australopithecines, the incisors are smaller than in the chimpanzee, let alone gorilla 
or orang -utan. The molar teeth, however, are much enlarged, and the premolars, in 
Australopithecus africanus and even more so in Paranthropus, have become 
enlarged and molarized: that is, they have broad grinding surfaces as if they are extra 
molars. In this respect the australopithecines, especially Paranthropus, are ultra - 
human in comparison with apes (Le Gros Clark 56 -62; Klein 1989: 146). 
The change in proportions between front and cheek teeth would appear to 
indicate a shift in habitual diet from food such as fruit and shoots, which required to 
be bitten off and pierced, to food which required to be chewed. 
The most completely preserved skeleton of any australopithecine is still that 
of AL -288, discovered in 1974 at Hadar in Ethiopia, often called `Lucy'. This 
specimen, dated to 3.2 million years ago, has generally been discussed under the 
designation Australopithecus afarensis, but has also been referred to a separate genus 
and called Praeanthropus africanus (Wood and Collard 1999). While AL -288 was 
clearly an australopithecine and therefore not an ape, early study of the skull showed 
numerous relatively apelike features, including subnasal prognathism greater than 
that of later hominins and canine teeth much larger in males than females, as well as 
the small cranial capacity. 
The postcranial skeleton exhibits long arms relative to legs, curved foot and 
hand phalanges and long toes, and the funnel- shaped rib cage, narrow at the top, all 
of which resemble the condition of the African apes and indicate an aptitude for tree 
climbing. At the same time, AL -288 was clearly a biped, as shown by the forward 
and downwardly directed position of the foramen magnum on the base of the skull, 
from which the spinal cord emerges, foot structure with a human -like arch, the 
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orientation of femur and tibia, and the short, broad, and therefore humanlike pelvis, 
which completely contrasts with those of apes. 
For all their apelike retentions such as the ability to brachiate, the 
australopithecines were unequivocally hominins and not apes. Tobias (1998: 283- 
285, 302 -303) summarizes their hominine features: upright posture and bipedalism, 
abandonment of knuckle- walking, human -like small canine teeth, human -like hands, 
long thumbs and precision grip, and some features of the brain as shown by 
endocasts. 
Earliest australopithecines 
Further fossils assigned to Australopithecus afarensis have been recovered 
from Laetoli in Tanzania from levels between two volcanic layers dated at 3.76 and 
3.46 million years ago. Footprints found on a former lake shore within those levels 
imply that the bipeds who made them, though small and not human, possessed a 
striding humanlike gait (Klein 1989: 142 -145). 
Recent studies of later species dating between 3 million and 2 million years 
ago, Australopithecus africanus, Paranthropus robustus and Paranthropus boisei, 
have shown signs that they also retained a tree -climbing adaptation, while being 
bipedal on the ground. The Australopithecus africanus skeleton STS 14 has a short 
broad pelvis which signalizes the bipedalism of this species. Australopithecus foot 
bones from Sterkfontein indicate bipedalism but also show a divergent big toe. 
Paranthropus foot bones indicate that these hominids were better adapted than 
Australopithecus afarensis to bipedalism while on the ground, and yet remained 
efficient climbers. This combination of faculties for both arboreal and terrestrial 
locomotion is not seen in living primates (Andrews 1999: 556; Johanson and Edgar 
1996: 136 -137; Wood and Collard 1999: 68). 
In 2001 a skull was announced from Kenya which dates to 3.5 million years 
ago. It has a large, projecting maxilla, a small endocranial capacity and, whereas 
Australopithecus afarensis has midfacial projection like later gracile 
australopithecines, this skull, as reconstructed, has a flat face. In this respect it 
resembles the robust australopithecines but also the much later KNM -ER 1470 
(Homo rudolfensis) skull, as well as modern humans. On the ground of the 
resemblance to 1470 and modern humans, the specimen has been assigned to a new 
genus as Kenyanthropus platyops and declared to be a human ancestor (Leakey et al. 
2001). 
At two locations in Kenya remains of a species earlier than Australopithecus 
afarensis or Kenyanthropus have been recovered. They are dated to between 4.2 
million and 3.9 million years ago and have been assigned to Australopithecus 
anamensis. While resembling other australopithecines they have canines larger than 
in afarensis, and the leg bones combine human -like features with some apelike 
muscle insertions (Leakey et al. 1995, 1997, 1998). 
Until recently the earliest known australopithecine was Ardipithecus ramidus, 
remains of which from Aramis in Ethiopia have been dated to 4.39 million years ago. 
Cranial parts exhibit a chimpanzee -like morphology, yet have humanlike features 
such as a shortened cranial base and reduced mastoid, and the postcrania likewise 
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evince a combination of humanlike and apelike characteristics. It has been described 
as the most apelike hominin ancestor known. Other fragmentary specimens from 
Baringo and Kanapoi in Kenya, discovered decades earlier, may be referable to this 
species (White et al. 1995a, 1995b). This species has been mooted as a possible 
ancestor for all later australopithecines (Johanson and Edgar 1996: 37 -38; Stringer 
and McKie 1993: 14). 
A solitary mandible from Tabarin in Kenya dates between 4 and 5 million 
years ago. It has been designated Australopithecus praegens. An even older mandible 
from Lothagam in Kenya dates to 5.5 million years ago; its intermediate condition 
leaves its affinity to ape or hominin undetermined (Wolpoff 1980: 124; Johanson and 
Edgar 1996: 39). 
In late 2000 twelve fossils, consisting of fragmentary arm and thigh bones 
and teeth, were recovered from levels dated between 6.2 million and 5.6 million 
years ago. The shape of the upper part of the thigh bone is said to indicate bipedality. 
This, together with the small, thick -enamelled teeth, has allowed the discoverers to 
assign the specimens as hominin, with the designation Orrorin tugenensis (Senut et 
al. 2001; Aiello and Collard 2001). 
Brains of the australopithecines 
The australopithecines were upright walkers, but they did not share the other 
major sign of humanity: a large brain. In modern humans, measurement of the 
volume of the cranial cavity gives a mean figure of 1300- 1400cc; the documented 
range extends from below 900cc to 2200cc. 
Mean endocranial capacity of common chimpanzees is given as 385- 390cc, 
pygmy chimpanzees 350cc, and gorillas a little over 450cc (Wolpoff 1980: 142; 
Zihlman 1984: 180). The endocranial capacity of Australopithecus afarensis is given 
as 380 -450cc (Klein 1989: 140). That of a number of specimens of Australopithecus 
africanus falls within the range 428- 485cc, and of Paranthropus within 500 -530cc 
(Kennedy 1980: 221). The putative earliest species of Homo, Homo habilis, is said to 
have an endocranial capacity of 510- 750cc, with a mean of 630cc; this range 
includes the KNM -ER 1470 skull with much the largest capacity at 750cc, a 
specimen later assigned to Homo rudolfensis (Klein 1989: 156). 
Holloway believes that the early hominin brain, despite its small size, had 
already undergone changes in the human direction. Specifically, there had been an 
expansion of parietal association cortex at the expense of visual cortex, the 
development of a human -like third inferior frontal convolution, also known as 
Broca's area, which is involved in vocal utterance, and pronounced asymmetry of the 
left and right cortex, indicating handedness (Holloway 1996: 90 -95). The latter two 
interpretations are based on the 1470 specimen, which is the only calvarium of the 
period sufficiently well preserved to allow determination of the relevant features. 
Subsistence of the australopithecines 
Until quite recently, it was commonly thought that human ancestors even at 
the stage of the australopithecines practised large -scale hunting of medium and large 
herbivores on the African savanna, and indeed that big game hunting was one of the 
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factors which made us human (e.g. Ardrey 1966). Bands of early hominins were 
imagined systematically hunting and killing prey, large ungulates such as antelope 
and waterbuck, and lugging the carcasses back to a home base to be shared out with 
the family. However, as a result of more detailed analyses of the archaeological 
evidence since the 1960s, this `hunting hypothesis' now has few adherents. A site 
such as Swartkrans in South Africa, where one might have envisioned a home base, a 
living floor bearing stone tools, fossil remains of hominins and of the antelope kills 
which they brought home, is now seen to contain random collections of debris 
washed into what was once a cave. The hominin remains, no less than those of 
antelope, are the relics of predation by leopards (Tattersall 1995: 199 -200). 
It appears that australopithecines and early species of Homo following them 
obtained meat principally by scavenging the remains of kills made by carnivores 
such as hyenas and leopards. This conclusion is warranted by the presence at some 
archaeological sites of animal bones bearing cut marks evidently made by stone 
tools, and the presence also on those bones of marks of carnivore teeth showing that 
the bone was pierced or gnawed. Now, if this were the whole evidence, it could be 
argued that carnivores scavenged the remains of kills made earlier by hominins, and 
indeed it has been so argued (Bunn and Kroll 1986). The question is whether the 
hominins or carnivores had first access to the carcasses. 
On a prima facie view, it does seem improbable that australopithecines, who 
stood three to four feet tall, would be able successfully to compete with leopards, 
which, although they are solitary hunters, could grasp an australopithecine's head in 
their powerful jaws by sinking their canines into its skull, as one evidently did 
(Tattersall 1995: 200), or with hyenas, which hunt in aggressive packs and 
sometimes even chase leopards away from their kills. Until they were able to use 
fire, hominins would have been at some disadvantage against those powerful fanged 
predators. 
In a series of papers, Binford (e.g., 1989: 282 -290, 297 -382) has shown that 
the hypothesis of hunting of medium and large animals by early hominins is not 
sustained by the evidence. To deal with the question of first access, one example will 
suffice here. On the ` Zinjanthropus floor' at Olduvai Gorge in Tanzania, Oldowan 
stone tools lay where they were discarded by the early hominin users. They were 
distributed in certain concentrations forming well defined patterns. Also scattered on 
this floor were fragments of cut -marked bone, the flesh from which was presumably 
eaten by the hominins. Now, the bones were distributed in the same concentrations as 
the tools. Experiments in which fleshy bones were left out on the savanna for modern 
hyenas to scavenge have shown that hyenas will carry away and gnaw the bones, and 
randomly scatter them some distance from where they were originally deposited. The 
fact that the bones on the Zinjanthropus floor were still distributed in the same 
patterns as the tools indicates that the bones, left there by hominins, were not 
subsequently touched by hyenas. The hyena teeth marks were therefore imprinted 
before the hominins had access to the bones (Binford 1989: 353 -355). 
As discussed later, chimpanzees at the present day hunt and kill monkeys and 
other small mammals, but they do not kill large or medium ungulates. One can 
conclude that australopithecines probably hunted small animals, but only scavenged 
the remains of larger kills made by savanna carnivores. 
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Undisputed Homo 
Fossiliferous layers from both East and Southern Africa from the period 1.75 
million to 1.5 million years ago have delivered crania and postcranial bones, 
including an almost complete skeleton, which have been assigned to a species Homo 
ergaster. In both size and morphology, those remains are distinct from 
australopithecines in the direction of Homo erectus and Homo sapiens. Despite the 
early date, cranial capacity is 850 and 880cc in the two measurable specimens, 
overlapping the capacities of Homo erectus a million years later. Yet the rib cage of 
the WT15000 skeleton is proportionately narrower at the top than in later Homo, 
recalling the apelike, funnel- shaped condition found in the gracile australopithecines 
(Tattersall 1995: 187 -189, 194; Johanson and Edgar 1996: 72 -73, 180 -186; Stringer 
and McKie 1996: 28 -30; Klein 1989: 201 -202). Homo ergaster is the earliest 
undisputed species of the human genus. 
Appendix 6A RDC, 30/06/03 307 
APPENDIX 6B 
Chimpanzee mentality 
Here I discuss evidence for the degree of social intelligence and awareness 
which chimpanzees may have. Comparisons are made with human faculties in the 
same field. 
I am not going to discuss laboratory experiments designed to elucidate 
chimpanzees' problem solving, numerical and linguistic abilities. This is because, 
while the latter show some of the potential of chimpanzees, they do not represent the 
naturally occurring behaviour of chimpanzees, let alone the behaviour which may 
have characterized our remote ancestors. 
Sense of self 
While gorillas and gibbons do not recognize themselves in mirrors, 
chimpanzees and orang -utans do. In a laboratory experiment, the subject is 
anaesthetized and a coloured mark made on the forehead. When the subject comes to, 
the animal is observed and does not touch the forehead, showing no awareness of the 
mark. Then a mirror is introduced; the subject is able to see the mark, and touches 
the forehead (McGrew 1992: 58). 
Chimpanzees can relate the movements of an image in a mirror or on a 
television screen to their own body movements. This form of self -recognition is not 
found in Old World monkeys or in elephants, although some workers regard the 
experiments on the latter as inconclusive (Rogers 1997: 29). Discussing these 
investigations, Van Hooff (1994: 268, 270) suggests that chimpanzees have a mental 
representation of some of their own characteristics. Self- recognition appears to me to 
require that the subject have a sense of self or identity. 
Juvenile chimpanzees have been observed to imitate adults. In the large 
captive colony at Arnhem in the Netherlands, an adult female had a deformity which 
led her to walk in a hunched up fashion. A number of juveniles followed her in single 
file round the enclosure, imitating her posture. When an adult male suffered a hand 
injury in a dominance fight, and favoured that hand when moving around, juveniles 
were observed to copy his movements (de Waal 1982: 80, 135). 
Chimpanzees brandish sticks and branches during aggressive displays, as if 
they know that these props enhance the impression which their display makes on 
others. They are also known to put objects on themselves as adornment (Van Hooff 
1994: 269; Köhler 1927: 91 -95). I add that Köhler's apes were in captivity, and that 
he did not attribute the propensity for self -adornment to awareness of appearance but 
to a heightened sense of the body, which he asserts humans also enjoy when decked 
in finery. 
Deception and awareness of the perspective of others 
Chimpanzees are able to control their own behaviour so as to conceal 
knowledge from others. They, and also baboons, show high levels of tactical 
deception, whereas other monkeys show little or no sign of this behaviour. At the 
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Gombe Stream Reserve in Tanzania, a chimpanzee observed the human provisioner 
placing a cache of bananas. When another, more dominant, chimpanzee came along, 
the first averted his gaze from the cache and waited until the second departed, so as 
to enjoy the bananas undisturbed. On another occasion, the same happened, but this 
time the second chimpanzee, on leaving the immediate area, stayed behind a tree and 
peeped out. When the first approached the cache, the second was able to intervene 
and secure bananas for himself (Byrne and Whiten 1992: 609, 614). 
Male chimpanzees generally invite females to mate by holding their body 
upright with legs apart so as to expose their erect penis. A subordinate male was 
doing this when a dominant male appeared. The subordinate immediately covered his 
penis with his hand (Van Hooff 1994: 269). 
Chimpanzees were able to discern that a human who watched food items 
being hidden (`the knower') would know where they were, while a human who had 
his eyes covered during the hiding process (`the guesser') would not know any better 
than the chimpanzees themselves (Van Hooff 1994: 270). 
Reviewing the evidence, Quiatt and Reynolds (1993: 160 -161) conclude that 
chimpanzees manipulate, monitor and regulate their own and others' behaviour. A 
deceiver projects a representation of himself and his intentions, monitors the 
deceived chimpanzees' responses and alters his behaviour accordingly. Deception is 
cogent evidence of intentional behaviour. 
Dominance and its emotional concomitants 
Chimpanzee adult males expend a great deal of effort, and take the risk of 
injury, for the sake of status in their community. There is a dominance hierarchy, in 
which the females also figure, but one male becomes the alpha male, and generally 
remains in that position for months or years. The dominant male is `greeted' by the 
others in that they approach him with submissive postures not adopted for other 
males. 
The alpha male receives respect and support from the community, especially 
the females, in return for keeping order. Dominant males give protection when one 
community member is threatened by another: for example, at Gombe when the 
cannibalistic Passion and her family were threatening a mother and baby, the 
dominant male intervened to protect the victims (Goodall 1986: 143). Whereas 
females and juveniles tend to favour their friends and offspring, adult males are 
impartial. For example, one female took away the baby of another; the mother 
followed, yelping and whimpering; when the alpha male saw this, he came over and 
displayed aggressively in front of the kidnapper, who immediately returned the baby 
to its mother. De Waal (1982: 149, 171ff, 196 -197) gives numerous examples of 
such intervention by dominant males. 
By keeping order, the alpha male will be supported by the females in any 
conflicts with other males, will be able to mate more frequently than other males, and 
will retain the respect of the rest of the community, receiving their submissive 
`greetings'. There is no doubt that males seek positions of dominance. 
De Waal (1982: 204) draws a parallel with human societies. In tribal 
communities with chiefs, the chief generally receives many gifts, but traditionally 
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does not exploit the others by keeping all the wealth to himself. (That privilege 
perhaps awaits the development of kingship with bodyguards.) The chief is expected 
to return favours by giving feasts and supporting the needy. 
As a male matures, dominance over the other males is achieved by repeatedly 
challenging an existing alpha male. A challenge takes the form of displaying, with 
hair on end, a loud crescendo of pant- hoots, charging and sometimes buffeting the 
challenged male. The process of replacement in one case at Arnhem took nine weeks. 
In this period, the challenger may form a coalition with another male against the 
alpha male, and will seek the support of females (de Waal 1982: 86 -139, 188). 
During the period of uncertainty, the alpha male who is being challenged may 
lose confidence. When they are afraid, chimpanzees bare their teeth in a `grin of 
fear'. After one challenge, the alpha male involuntarily showed the grin of fear but 
immediately covered his mouth with his hand; a moment later, the same grin 
appeared again and he pressed his lips together with his fingers, as if attempting to 
conceal his fear from the others (de Waal 1982: 106, 133). 
During a conflict chimpanzees avoid looking each other in the eyes, but do 
look each other in the eyes during reconciliation. After a conflict, a male may seek 
reassurance from another by reaching out a hand; the other male may allow him to 
touch his scrotum, evidently a sign of trust (de Waal 1982: 113, 138; Goodall 1986: 
61, 180; cf Genesis 24: 2, 9; 47: 29). 
Chimpanzees' behaviour towards one another is characterized by an 
expectation of reciprocity. De Waal suggests there are two rules: `one good turn 
deserves another' and `an eye for an eye'. For example, a dominant female supported 
an adult male in chasing a second adult male. When the second adult male later 
displayed aggressively at her, she turned for support to the adult male whom she had 
helped. He did nothing to protect her. She immediately turned on him, chased him 
across the enclosure and bit him. It was as if he had not fulfilled an obligation (de 
Waal 1982: 207). However, unprovoked aggression, with the infliction of physical 
injuries on conspecifics, takes place not only in captivity, where chimpanzees are 
thrown together without the possibility of escape from their community, but also in 
the wild, where, if anything, the violence reaches greater extremes, both within and 
between communities (Goodall 1986 passim). This unprovoked aggression testifies 
against a sense of fairness or justice. One might argue that a seed of morality is 
present, but it has yet to germinate. 
States of mind 
Those who observe individual chimpanzees and their interactions over long 
periods become familiar with their behaviour and temperament and are able to detect 
moods and mood shifts. On that basis, they can justify stating that chimpanzees feel 
apprehension, fear, distress, annoyance, anger, rage, enjoyment, sexual excitement, 
social excitement, joie de vivre, boredom, joy, sorrow (Goodall 1986: 58, 118). 
Chimpanzees appear to possess `triadic awareness': that is, the ability to 
assess relationships not only between oneself and another but between two others. 
On the ground of the complexity of their behaviour, de Waal attributes rationality to 
chimpanzees, but asserts that this does not entail consciousness, giving cogent 
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examples from humans, as follows. Human beings may wish to influence and indeed 
take power over other people and develop ways of doing so, without being aware that 
power is their goal. Small children may find techniques of dominating a household 
without being aware of what they are doing (de Waal 1982: 118, 182, 193 -194). I 
think what he means here by `consciousness' is what I might call reflection or self - 
awareness, and what has been called conscious attentiveness in contrast to mere 
conscious sensibility (Noble and Davidson 1996: 14). 
Chimpanzee intelligence, notwithstanding tool -using activities, is exhibited 
chiefly in the social sphere. Relationships in primate society are complex; conflicts 
often occur and are of long duration. Reynolds (1986: 57 -58) notes that `the price of 
thinking is worry', and reports studies which show different levels of stress hormone 
in individual primates in different social (dominance) positions. Situations frequently 
arise in which an individual has to cope with conflicting personal interests. For 
example, a macaque mother may wish to be groomed by another female, but takes 
the risk that the other female, if allowed close, may snatch her baby. A dominant 
male cannot afford to be too violent, otherwise he may be deposed. Chimpanzees, 
gorillas and monkeys such as macaques appear to live worried lives. It is suggested 
that one of the reasons why individuals leave their natal group may be to escape 
irresoluble social problems. 
It appears that chimpanzees must experience what in humans would be called 
states of mind, such as anticipation, confidence, loss of confidence, fear, distress, 
concern about how others perceive them, an appreciation of how things appear to 
others. In that sense, they are aware. I do not think there is evidence that they reflect 
on their feelings. Most of the time, I suggest, human beings do not reflect either (cf. 
Jaynes 1976). 
Some authorities would take issue with the assertion that chimpanzees have 
states of mind, on the ground that such an assertion is anthropomorphic. They prefer 
that allegedly more parsimonious explanations should be sought, not requiring 
chimpanzee awareness. In this debate I side with de Waal (1991: 297, 301), who 
argues that the most parsimonious explanation of the behavioural similarities 
between humans and chimpanzees is that they share similar psychological processes. 
He suggests that skeptics about chimpanzee awareness could be challenged to prove 
the absence of intentionality, self -awareness and planning, and cites Asquith (1984: 
138), who says, `Anthropomorphism can be said to occur only if it is presupposed 
that self -awareness and purposeful behaviour are uniquely human'. If we do not 
presuppose anything but observe the behaviours of the two species and note 
convincing similarities, we are not engaging in anthropomorphism if we conclude 
that the underlying psychological processes are probably also similar. 
There has been much discussion in the literature on whether chimpanzees 
exhibit culture or 'proto-culture' or are in this respect aligned with other animals as 
lacking culture, which is held by some to be strictly a preserve of Homo sapiens. I do 
not propose to review, let alone engage in, this discussion, as I believe it is largely a 
matter of definition. Here I am not setting out to show how clever chimpanzees are 
or how similar to humans. For my purpose, even if chimpanzees manifested very 
little behaviour that was human -like, it would still be necessary to be clear about how 
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they behave. What matters is what chimpanzees (here, as surrogates of our ancestors) 
actually do, not how we classify, regard or interpret what they do. 
To be sure, any observation inevitably contains interpretation. In the case of 
chimpanzee studies, one is struck by the personal and (without prejudice) 
anthropomorphic tone of Goodall in reporting her observations (1971, 1986) and of 
de Waal (1982), in contrast with the quantitative, tabulated analyses of behaviour 
given by some other scientists, for example Ghiglieri (1984). However, it is the 
descriptions of observed events, given throughout by de Waal and by Goodall in the 
above -cited publications, and indeed also given by Ghiglieri (1984: 110 -115) in the 
form of transcribed field notes, that are the primary data; the tables, analyses and 
conclusions about chimpanzee way of life drawn from them are a second -order 
representation of the information. 
Goodall's and de Waal's style personalizes the chimpanzees, recounting their 
activities as if describing conscious beings with intentions, in a manner alien to 
purely quantitative studies. Are they giving us less information or more by doing so? 
In no way do I seek to devalue quantitative analyses. However, it seems to me that to 
ignore the possible presence of intentions, feelings, awareness and mental states, 
which can only be inferred from the objective behaviour, is to omit a dimension of 
chimpanzee life which, if it exists, is much more significant than any purely 
quantitative information. And I concur with de Waal that the best explanation of 
similarities between human and chimpanzee behaviour is similarity (but not of 
course identity) of the underlying psychology. 
According to Hillyard and Bloom (1982), the neurological activity of humans 
and other primates, and indeed some lower animals and birds, shows many 
resemblances, from alpha rhythm during relaxation to the cycles of slow -wave and 
rapid- eye- movement sleep. For example, they note parallels between the changes in 
EEG of squirrel monkeys when exposed to a novel stimulus and those of human 
beings when they report paying conscious attention to a stimulus. Association areas 
of the cortex, which are believed to be the seat of the most complex mental acts, 
seem to have similar functions in all higher primates. They conclude that processes 
resembling consciousness may take place in other animals besides humans. 
Therefore I believe it is reasonable to proceed on the assumption that a mental 
dimension of chimpanzee life does exist and is highly significant. 
Chimpanzees are not humans; they are similar but not the same. However, 
rather than see chimpanzees as mentally more developed and closer to humans than 
one might have thought, the evidence inclines me to wonder whether humans, 
especially in the sphere of dominance and status, are mentally less developed and 
closer to chimpanzees than one might have thought. If the behaviour which 
chimpanzees manifest is insufficient to count as evidence of mental states, then it 
may be that, regarded critically, the behaviour of human beings much of the time 
would also be insufficient. In that case, we ought to be led, in the manner of 
Descartes, to doubt the existence of other minds in humans. It might be instructive to 
try to specify what behaviour would count as evidence of mental states, but one 
suspects that certain authorities would deliberately draw up any such specification in 
such a way as to exclude non -humans. 
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Some authorities propose that culture, symbolic behaviour, language, self - 
awareness and perhaps even the idea of other minds did not develop gradually during 
the evolution of the genus Homo, but only came about late and very suddenly, all 
these phenomena appearing together within a few millennia not much before 35,000 
years ago. This abrupt appearance of symbolic behaviour and the rest coincided with 
the emergence of anatomically modern Homo sapiens, and is referred to as the 
`human revolution' (cf Stringer and McKie 1993; Mellars 1996). According to that 
conception, the onus of proof is on those who would assert that earlier species of 
Homo, let alone australopithecines or apes, possessed self -awareness, personality and 
symbolic behaviour - in short, possessed mind - to provide evidence of those 
intangibles. I think this view is mistaken. It appears to me that, if a discontinuity in 
evolution is to be asserted, then the onus of proof is on those who wish to assert the 
discontinuity, not on those who presume continuity. In this case, we are dealing with 
an assertion of discontinuity in the evolution of mind. 
Given the complexity of chimpanzee behaviour, and its resemblance to 
human behaviour in ways where both differ from the behaviour of monkeys and 
other apes, chimpanzees appear to represent on a scale of mental development a 
position some way between monkeys and humans. To that degree, their existence is 
evidence for a continuum of behavioural and mental complexity between lower 
animals and ourselves, rather than for a discontinuity. I believe the continuum has 
indeed existed, or, more correctly, has been enacted or traversed, by our ancestors the 
australopithecines and earlier Homo. To be sure, if we could look back from a 
timeless vantage on the development of mentality through prehistory, we might 
observe that there had been a discontinuity, a `great leap forward', somewhere 
between chimpanzees or australopithecines on the one hand and modern humans on 
the other. But it may be possible to argue for a discontinuity between chimpanzees 
and other apes, in that chimpanzees express a combination of behaviours and inferred 
capacities which is not shared with any other animal except ourselves. Included in 
this combination are such behaviours and capacities as sense of self, cooperative 
hunting, inter- community (inter- tribal) aggression, learned tool making, and social 
interactions which take account of others' perspectives and are conducted on the 
basis of expectations of reciprocity. One might argue that they have crossed a 
threshold which separates them, together with ourselves, from the rest of the animal 
kingdom. 
Rather than think in terms of thresholds and revolutions, I think it is more 
profitable to examine what the creatures under discussion, whether chimpanzees or 
ourselves, actually do, and infer as best we can from that and from archaeological 
evidence, what our ancestors may have done. And in this exercise, on the principle of 
parsimonious explanation, continuity of mentality should be assumed. 
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APPENDIX 7A 
Some objections to the animatist hypothesis 
Bird -David: Socially biased cognitive skills 
An objection to Guthrie's analysis is raised by Bird -David (1999: S71). 
According to Guthrie's account, animism (animatism) results from a mistake of over - 
interpretation of what we perceive in our surroundings (Guthrie 1993: 54). Bird - 
David asks why, if they `retrospectively recognize their animistic interpretations as 
mistakes', primitive people `culturally endorse and elaborate those mistakes'. In 
other words, they build religions around the concept of putative gods, the idea of 
whose existence is derived from the mistaken perception of humans in their 
surroundings, even while knowing that these perceptions are mistaken. She suggests 
that such a theory downgrades the cognitive abilities of primitive people. 
I am of course concerned with religious origins rather than with the 
maintenance of religious belief among recent primitives. I reiterate that the religions 
of recent tribal people should not be seen as unaltered relics of the original religious 
categories; primitives are not primordials. It is not the cognitive skills of the present - 
day Nayakas that are being impugned, if anyone's are, but those of the primordial 
hominids who first had the idea of a daemon. It is not the case that each generation 
reinvents the idea of a daemon: in a tribal society each generation inherits the beliefs 
of the predecessor generation. But at some point, not recently but in remote 
prehistory, the belief in question had its beginnings, in a rudimentary, uncodified, 
unelaborated form and, in this case, probably even unexpressed in language. 
The answer to Bird- David's objection is, I think, as follows. Firstly, 
primordial people did not retrospectively recognize their animistic interpretations as 
mistakes. The only mistake that was recognized on occasions was that of having 
expected a human being as a participant in a scene when on investigation they 
discovered that humans were not present after all. Further, I suggest that the 
primordial humans or prehumans who were led to a belief in non -human personal 
beings indeed recognized on individual occasions that their initial perceptions of 
human presences were mistaken, but did not always accept that there were no 
personal beings of any kind in the vicinity. On some occasions, for some individuals, 
the experience of sensing a personal presence may have been so intense that, even if 
on investigation no trace of a human were found in the vicinity, the individual may 
have continued to believe that something sentient was present, but concealed or 
invisible. Such a putative sentient, human -like but non -human personal being is what 
we may call a numen or spirit being. 
Today, a rationalist would fmd that the hypothesis of non -human personal 
beings associated with inanimate phenomena is superfluous, because, according to 
rationalism, all the phenomena which we observe around us can be explained in 
terms which do not require the existence of such beings. In such a sense we may 
retrospectively recognize that the idea of personal non -human beings is a mistake. 
For primordial people, humans or prehumans, the idea of non -human personal beings 
would not have been seen as a mistake. On occasions, the apparent perception of 
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human beings in a vicinity may have been discovered and recognized to be a 
mistake, but the apparent perception of some kind of personal being would not be 
discovered to be a mistake. For primordial people, as it would be for us in the 
absence of wider knowledge, the `hypothesis' of non -human personal beings did not 
appear to be a mistake but was perfectly reasonable, and around it they could build 
other religious categories. The cognitive abilities of primordial people, let alone 
recent primitives, are not in the least impugned by Guthrie's theory. 
Bird -David (1999: S78) raises another objection, saying that the 
acknowledged common tendency to `animate' (animatize) is engendered by socially 
biased cognitive skills, not by `mental confusion', a reason she attributes to Tylor, or 
by `wrong perceptual guesses', a reason she attributes to Guthrie. 
However, according to Guthrie, it is precisely the socially biased cognitive 
skills that bring about what we can see as wrong perceptual guesses. Socially biased 
cognitive skills equate to the propensity to see and attempt to deal with things, 
animate and inanimate, as if they have personality. Bird -David wants to say that 
human beings have socially biased cognitive skills because humans live in societies, 
as do chimpanzees, and much of our cerebration is concerned with social dealings 
among our own kind. But the socially biased cognitive skills cause us not only to 
deal with other humans as humans but also sometimes to deal with non -humans as 
humans. Thus is animatism engendered. Dealing with non -humans as if they were 
humans is, by rationalist standards applied in hindsight, a mistake. When we do that 
- for example, when we treat a stone or a waterfall as if it had a personality - then 
we make a wrong perceptual guess, precisely because we have not perceived clearly 
that the stone or waterfall does not have a personality. However, in the face of the 
unknown, acting as if something is animate, as if we should relate to it, when we are 
unable to tell for sure whether we should do so or not, is the outcome `of normal 
perceptual uncertainty and of good perceptual strategy' (Guthrie 1993: 54). 
Thus there is no incompatibility between Guthrie's theory and Bird- David's 
contention that animatism is engendered by socially biased cognitive skills. 
Karsten: No preanimist stage 
More serious objections to what he called the preaninhist theory are raised by 
Karsten (1935). 
In the first place, he takes issue with the proposition that, preceding animism, 
there was a primal stage of religious development during which a vague conception 
of impersonal supernatural or magical forces held sway. Those forces, or aspects of 
one force, are denoted by the words `mana' and `tabu' (Marett 1914: xxviii, 73 -121). 
In Marett's exposition, mana is the supernatural in its positive aspect, not in the 
sense of `good magic' but a supernatural, weird force viewed neutrally or with 
philosophic interest as a phenomenon; taboo (tabu) is the supernatural viewed in its 
negative aspect as something to be avoided or against which protection is required. 
While `mana' and `tabu' are Polynesian words, similar concepts of forces such as 
they are supposed to denote seem to be widespread, and occur under local names in 
various parts of the world: for example, in North America, the concepts wakan and 
orenda are said to correspond to mana. 
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Karsten adduces numerous ethnographic examples to show that the 
impersonal supernatural force or mana is not something which exists in its own right 
or subsists in inanimate objects. On the contrary, in all cited cases it is believed to 
emanate from or be wielded by living human beings or dead ancestors. In other 
words, it is essentially a magical power derived from the supernatural status of 
sorcerers or the souls of the departed. As such, the concept of mana or tabu 
presumably cannot precede that of soul. 
In answer, first, it is conceivable that there could have been a concept of an 
impersonal force prior to the development of the concept of soul, and that, once the 
idea of soul had come into currency, then the supposed force came to be explained as 
something which proceeded from powerful souls. However, there is no evidence for 
this, and I see no reason to argue for it. In the present inquiry I do not seek to deal 
further with mana or tabu. 
Second, Karsten himself states (1935: 30) that two separate notions are 
involved in the preanimist theory of his time, and are frequently confounded by other 
workers. One is the notion of an impersonal power, mana, and the other is 
animatism. It is only animatism, or the animatist theory, that I argue for here. 
However, Karsten also argues against animatism itself, as follows. 
It is a universal belief among savages that unwelcome natural phenomena 
such as thunder and eclipses are caused by powerful evil spirits, `often conceived as 
disembodied human souls'. In the case of the Kafirs running out to threaten the 
thunderstorm, he cites Kidd as saying that some natives believe thunder is caused by 
`some old ancestor', while others believe it is caused by `hostile spirits'. From his 
own fieldwork, he informs us that the Jibaro ( Jivaro) of South America believe that 
during a storm dead warriors are running through the air. It was the custom of the 
Jibaro to frighten away their supernatural enemies in the storm by brandishing their 
lances. He cites authorities to show that the Fuegians and the Chaco Indians believed 
that rain, snow and hail were sent by evil spirits (Karsten 1935: 35 -37, 133). In 
South America all high hills were regarded with awe by the Indians, who believed 
they were inhabited by spirits. The spirits were `by nature the souls of departed 
Indians, notably those of medicine men'. Among the Sami of northern Scandinavia, 
the spirits of the dead took up residence in the mountains. The worship of caves is to 
be understood because caves once served as human dwellings, the dead were often 
buried in them, and so the spirits which haunted them were those of departed men, 
according to some South American Indians. Water spirits inhabiting lakes and 
streams are of the same type as those of mountains and rocks: they are souls of dead 
people. All Finno- Ugrian peoples believed that the malevolent spirits of lakes and 
streams were the souls of people who had drowned in them (Karsten 1935: 126 -129). 
In sum, Karsten's view is that animatism is not to be found at all in primitive 
societies, whereas animism is universal. He traces the worship of inanimate nature, 
plants and animals to the presence of the souls of dead humans in those objects 
(1935: 61 -160). 
To counterargue, firstly, on close scrutiny of many of the instances which he 
cites, Karsten does not explicitly show or even state that they were cases of animism, 
in the strong sense of once -human or once -animal souls inhabiting inanimate objects. 
For example, the hostile spirits which the Kafirs believed to be present in the 
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thunderstorm are not claimed to be necessarily the souls of the dead. Karsten's 
source of information, Kidd, states that the Kafirs were `hazy' on the point that 
thunder is caused by `some old ancestor'. Kidd gives a number of explanations of 
thunder offered by various tribes, including hostile spirits, brown birds which spit 
fire at the earth, an enormous bird flapping its wings, and white birds which make 
lightning. In Mashonaland, apparently, thunder was attributed to a fat baby, which 
descended to earth and was instantly taken up again. None of these phenomena are 
stated to have any relation to dead people (Kidd 1904: 119 -122). 
Karsten further states, `As of the Greeks, so of the lower cultures in general, 
the wind demons seem, in most cases, to be conceived as spirits of the dead' (1935: 
135, emphasis mine). Among the Finno -Ugrians the heavenly bodies were thought to 
be animated, but `there is no direct relation between this cult and the cult of the dead' 
(1935: 139). In various cultures, man -made objects are sometimes treated as 
animated: among North and South American Indians, pots were believed to have 
souls; Karsten says, `in many, perhaps most cases, they are simply human souls 
which may have taken up their abode in these objects' (1935: 141, emphasis mine). 
However, the only evidence adduced is that the spirits of such objects appear in 
human form. Instances of equivocal ethnographical evidence such as these can be 
found throughout the text. Suffice it to say that the evidence for animism rather than 
animatism in all cases is not conclusive. 
Secondly, the presence of undoubtedly animistic ideas about inanimate 
objects in numerous societies can be explained by a tendency, acknowledged by 
Marett, for animism to supersede animatism, as people assimilate a variety of ideas 
to a single explanation. Once people had the concept of soul, it would not be 
surprising if they began to attribute souls to other objects already personified. Once 
ancestor worship had taken root, it is possible that the spirits of non -human objects 
were interpreted to be the souls of dead people which had transmigrated into those 
objects. It is easier to believe that this development of animatism to animism took 
place than to believe that, until the concept of the human soul had been accepted, 
people did not personify inanimate objects at all. 
Thirdly and most importantly, Karsten himself plainly describes cases of 
animatism in man and the higher animals. The first example is one of the best 
descriptions of animatist behaviour I have found, and I quote: `A horse in the dark 
shies away from the threatening form of a tree stump beside the road, although in 
daylight he would not notice it at all. In his [the horse's!] imagination it becomes a 
strange living being with power perhaps to injure him; the instinct of self - 
preservation, therefore, prompts him to be on his guard against the unknown.' High 
mountains with dark abysses, gloomy caves, old hollow trees and so forth, all these 
awaken in man `a sense of something supernatural and divine'. `The sense of the 
supernatural can be traced even in the higher animals. ... The fear and awe which 
domestic animals display during thunderstorms or earthquakes is evidently closely 
akin to religious sentiment as it appears in man' (Karsten 1935: 27). Presumably we 
are not meant to suppose that horses and other domestic animals have a concept of 
soul, or that they believe frightening natural phenomena are produced by the souls of 
their dead ancestors. 
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He goes on explicitly to discuss the tendency of animals and man to personify 
natural phenomena, as follows. The savage projects upon natural objects the 
consciousness of himself as a subject with will and emotions. The idea of a boundary 
between animate and inanimate does not, in any case, play a part in the savage 
assessment of the world. The savage is limited to the sentient world of himself and 
other living beings, with whom he enters into relations. So when a striking object 
comes to his attention, it occurs to him that this may be `some living yet strange 
being' (1935: 28 -29). To my mind, this is an account of animatism, not animism. 
Karsten explicitly accepts Tylor's explanation of the origin of the concept of 
soul (1935: 57). The concept of soul is not shared with the higher animals and 
therefore must have originated at some time in human prehistory. In contrast, given 
the continuity of the human animatizing response with that of the higher animals, it 
would be strange if there were not, in human prehistory, an animatist stage preceding 
the era when the concept of soul originated. 
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APPENDIX 8A 
Classical objections to Tylor's dream theory 
Lang's objections 
Lang criticizes Tylor's theory on two grounds. 
The first objection is a logical one. According to Tylor (1924, I: 285), it 
appears to primitive savages that all objects are animated, the subjects of personal 
life and will. In that case, how could they seek to distinguish between a living and a 
dead body, and conclude that the living body possessed a soul and the dead one not? 
For if everything, including stones and lumps of wood, is animated, then a corpse 
must be animated just as much as any other object (Lang 1898: 58). 
Recall that Tylor seeks to account for the origin of animism. So at the time 
when the idea of soul first occurred to primordial people, they were not yet animists. 
They did not yet believe that animals, stones and other objects had souls. That came 
later, after the conception of the human soul. So the objection evaporates. 
The other objection is that the primordial thinker is made to derive what Lang 
calls a less abstract concept, the soul, from a more abstract concept, the life. He says, 
`Early man excogitated (by the [Tylor's] hypothesis) the abstract idiom of Life 
before he first envisaged it as breath or shadow. He then decided that mere breath or 
shadow was not only identical with the more abstract conception of life, but could 
also take on forms as real and full- bodied as, to him, are the hallucinations of dreams 
or waking visions' (Lang 1898: 59). 
Lang's idea of `Life' is too abstract, and Tylor does not demand it. All that is 
necessary is that the plain observation be present occasionally to the minds of early 
people that a dead body is no longer active, does not move by itself, and in particular 
does not breathe. That is why the breath may be identified with the life. It is not that 
there comes to be a connection between two preexistent concepts, the breath and the 
life, but that there is no distinction: there is one concept. The life which the 
primordial person could conceive is simply the movement of the body, in particular 
the breathing. Once that stops, he or she observes that the body will not move again 
by itself. So it dawns on the primordial observer that the soul is the life (cf Tylor 
1924, I: 433). He or she does not deduce anything; the idea just occurs to the person. 
When respiration stops, the life has gone. Substitute `breathing' or `movement' for 
`life' in Tylor's argument, and we have something more akin to the primordial idea 
which I think he intends by `life'. 
It is commonplace to recognize that many words for soul denote breath (e.g. 
spiritus, psyche, ruah, ...). Paton (1921: 2, 19, 69 -71, 154, 200 -202) gives a list of 
these words from numerous cultures of divers language families. 
Of course a sleeping body and the body of someone in a trance continue to 
breathe, so one might object: why would early people think that the soul leaves the 
body during sleep or trance, if the soul is the life and the life is the breathing, which 
obviously continues in the body? In answer, perhaps they noticed that breathing is 
shallower during sleep, and certainly the body is less active than when awake, so 
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they thought that the life was less completely present. Inactivity may not always be 
observed of a body when the owner is in trance or hallucinating - sometimes quite 
the reverse - but that could be understood as a struggle of the soul to leave the body. 
One can easily imagine how an untutored primordial man or woman could be moved 
to these ideas. 
In any case, it is unrealistic to imagine the primordial thinker reasoning, 
making deductions and being perplexed by contrary conclusions. What we must 
envisage is merely the occurrence of ideas which more or less made sense to 
someone trying to understand his or her world. People, and animals for that matter, 
constantly seek to interpret their environment. It is entirely comprehensible that early 
people would seek to make sense of what was happening in death, sleep or trance. 
Moreover, people at all times, including the present, have been able to assent to 
completely incompatible ideas and beliefs without a qualm (Persinger 1987). It is a 
little too much to ask of the ancient savage philosophers at the first glimmering dawn 
of metaphysical speculation that they should excogitate the law of non -contradiction 
and immediately apply it to all their thinking, as well as conceive the `doctrine' of 
souls. 
Durkheim's objections 
Besides questioning the likelihood of savage philosophers (Chapter 8), 
Durkheim produces further objections to both animism and what he calls naturism. 
Animism here is the Tylorian theory that the concept of spirit being is an extension 
of the concept of soul. `Naturism' here refers to the theory that the phenomena of 
nature are worshipped without having soul -like spirit beings assigned to them. It is 
more or less what, following Marett, I call animatism (Chapter 7). 
Durkheim's principal objection to animism runs as follows (1915: 69 -70). 
According to the animist theory, the soul is constructed out of the vague images 
which occur to people in dreams and hallucinations. Spirit beings (daemons) and 
gods are then constructed out of the concept of soul. Therefore the forms under 
which religious powers have been represented, the symbols by which they are 
thought of - gods and spirit beings - have no denotation beyond the dreams, the 
nightmares, the illusions of private minds. But historically religion has been the fount 
from which law, morals and science have sprung, and religion provides the energy 
which people must have to live. It is inadmissible that religion should be made up of 
a tissue of illusions. Durkheim concludes, `It ought to be a principle of the science of 
religion that religion expresses nothing which does not exist in nature; for there are 
sciences only of natural phenomena.' 
Firstly, we cannot say a priori that the belief in souls and spirit beings is 
illusory. All that the Tylorian need say is that we have in dreams and the like the 
origin of man's concept of the soul. We cannot say that we do not have souls, thus 
that the belief is illusory, just because the phenomena which led our ancestors to 
conceive the concept of soul may have been dreams, trances and other states of 
consciousness whose content we may now regard as illusion. 
Secondly, Durkheim confounds a belief in souls and spirit beings with 
religion as a whole. This might seem to be a problem with the original Tylorian 
theory, according to which religion is based upon the belief in spiritual beings and 
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belief in spiritual beings is a minimum definition of religion (Tylor 1924, I: 424, 
426). However, on my approach, belief in the soul and in spirit beings are only two 
of many religious elements. A religion is generally made up of other components or 
elements besides these. Some of the other elements within a religion may be equally 
`illusory' but others again may correspond to some reality. 
It is possible that belief in souls and spirit beings should be erroneous and 
illusory, while the religion as a whole is still a force for good or to the advantage of 
the population which possesses it. In a given society, some other element or group of 
elements within the religion may be delivering law, morals and science, and the 
`energy' which people need to live. It is possible that such another element may be 
independent of the belief in souls or spirit beings. For example, divination from the 
flight pattern of birds or from entrails, with a view to determining a safe or profitable 
course of action, does not require the existence of spirit beings or the human soul. 
The same applies to myth, which could be concerned with ancestors who perform 
edifying moral actions, yet without those ancestors or anyone else being required to 
have souls. The moral and social aspects of a religion may not have much connection 
with spirit beings. The Golden Rule, `Do under others as you would have them do 
unto you', is found in several religions or philosophies and does not seem to depend 
on a belief in spirit beings but rather on the experience of reflective individuals living 
in society. 
Thirdly, even if the elements or aspects of a religion which deliver the 
advantage are dependent on the belief in spirits or souls, even if the elements of 
belief in souls and spirit beings are themselves the ones that deliver the advantage, 
that is not necessarily a problem for the Tylorian theory. The moral values promoted 
by a religion may be supposed to be handed down by prophets inspired by a god, so 
that there is a dependency of morality on the concept of spirit or god. But it is 
perfectly possible for an advantage and for good to proceed from an illusion. Those 
who do not subscribe to a given modern religion may still concede that advantage 
accrues to those who accept it. Historically, it has been an advantage in certain 
centuries in certain countries of Europe to be Protestant rather than Roman Catholic; 
and the reverse also applies. A Catholic can concede this while not agreeing with 
points of Protestant doctrine - that is, while taking those points of doctrine to be false 
or illusory - and vice versa. It is an advantage to be Moslem in Saudi Arabia, where 
public practice of Christian worship is currently not allowed. On a more personal 
level, a dramatic film entitled Brighton Rock (1948) illustrates a point about the 
worth of an illusion. At the conclusion, the bereaved heroine hears a recording made 
by her deceitful boyfriend just before his violent death. When making the recording, 
he says `You think I love you' and then proceeds, as he thinks, to disillusion her with 
contemptuous words. But the recording is faulty, and when she listens to it she hears 
`You think I love you - I love you -I love you ....' Owing to this fault, she is able to 
continue believing a comforting falsehood, and the illusion sustains her in her 
bereavement. 
Further objections are presented, which I cover below. They have been, I 
think, fully rebutted by Lowie (1948), and I expand on his rebuttals. 
Durkheim points out that under certain conditions the soul is supposed to be 
independent of the body, yet it cannot be radically separated from it, because it 
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animates the body. The notion of the dualism of soul and body does not exclude a 
deeper unity and interpenetration of the two beings. Tylor's concept of the soul or 
double is too simple to account for this duality and unity (Durkheim 1915: 56). 
It is clear to me that Tylor is not trying to account for sophisticated ideas of 
duality combined with unity. He is trying to account for the origin of the basic 
concept of soul, which we fmd in societies throughout the world, in some cases 
overlaid with or combined with more complex notions. We should not expect 
primordial people to have worked out a consistent ontology for an area of thought 
which has taxed metaphysicians for more than two thousand years. Whether the idea 
of soul is combined with contradictory notions among various given groups of 
primitive people is irrelevant (cf Lowie 1948: 110). 
Dreams in which people see other people or places at a distance would be 
more easily accounted for by the idea that one had long- distance vision while 
sleeping, rather than demanding the idea of the soul (Durkheim 1915: 56). 
Firstly, dreams are only one type of phenomenon alleged to give rise to the 
concept of soul. Secondly, it is not at all obvious that the notion of telescopic vision 
is less complex than the idea of soul. Thirdly, telescopic vision would not account for 
dreams in which the dreamer seems to be visited at home by other people known to 
be far away or dead. Fourthly, the point is not to think of alternative theories 
whereby the primordial person could explain dream life, but to identify phenomena 
which might have motivated him or her to conceive the notion of soul, and dreams 
are one such phenomenon (cf Lowie 1948: 111). 
Dreams often relate to past experiences. Even if the soul or double can travel 
in space, no savage would theorize that it could travel in time. It would be much 
easier for early man to regard such dreams as what they are: vivid recollections 
(Durkheim 1915: 56 -57). 
Firstly, dreams indeed sometimes replay past events. When dreams show 
scenes from the past, there is no reason to expect that a primitive person would 
suppose that they are any more than recollections, as Durkheim says, even if a dead 
person appears in them. But if there is a dream in which someone known to be dead 
appears and acts as if the scene is the present day, or participates in new activities 
which he or she did not carry out when alive, or says something to the dreamer about 
some issue of present -day concern, then this is clearly not a memory and would not 
be interpreted as such. This sort of dream might suggest that the dead are still around, 
and able to be encountered and interact with the living in dreams. 
Secondly, Tylor's theory is a theory for us in our attempt to understand 
prehistory. He is concerned to draw attention to phenomena which might suggest the 
idea of soul. He is not delineating a theory which primordial people themselves might 
have constructed to account consistently for all dreams (Lowie 1948: 112), about the 
past, the present or the future. Theories are our domain. From the primordial person 
we expect only this: that what he or she experienced should have suggested a vague 
notion. 
If a primordial person dreamed at night about another member of the tribe 
having certain adventures, then he or she could check the next morning with that 
other person and fmd out whether they dreamed the same things. In most instances 
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there would be discrepancies, therefore no reality would be attached to the 
adventures of dream life (Durkheim 1915: 57). 
Firstly, people seen in a dream may not always be available the next day to be 
interviewed. Secondly, the details of dreams can be hard to remember. Even if a 
person interviewed a friend about dream experiences, it is unlikely that the friend 
would always recollect his or her own dream, if there had been one at all, or recollect 
it sufficiently clearly to be able to deny the adventures which the questioner might 
allege. The friend's response would depend on suggestibility and on his or her social 
status and consequent freedom or otherwise to disagree with the questioner (Lowie 
1948: 110). It is not by any means certain that a negative response would frequently 
be given. If a negative response were given on a particular occasion, then the 
questioner might accept that his or her dream that time had been an illusion. But if on 
another occasion the friend concurred, or without being certain acknowledged that 
some joint adventure might have occurred, the questioner would be able to assume 
that the dream was significant. 
There is no reason to believe that primordial people would feel the need of an 
explanation of dreams. Plenty of phenomena pass us by every day without our 
feeling the need to have an explanation of them all (Durkheim 1915: 57). 
Firstly, primitive people do not evaluate all dreams alike, as Durkheim (1915: 
59) himself points out. The Dieri, an Australian tribe, sharply distinguish ordinary 
dreams from those in which deceased relatives or friends appear. Dreams figure 
importantly in the lives of tribal people (Lowie 1948: 108; Hallowell 1960: 378). 
They may be assigned great significance and be told to friends and relatives even if 
they are not interpreted as having anything to do with adventures of a soul or out -of- 
the -body experiences (Stewart 1969). Dreams matter and interpretations are sought. 
Secondly, the point, again, is not that primitive people sought an explanation 
of dreams. Recent tribal people seek to interpret their dreams, that is, to find out 
what they may signify. Tylor does not claim that they seek explanations, that is, 
theories about what is going on when they dream. All that is claimed is that the 
experience of adventures in dreams suggested to early people that there was a part of 
a person which was active while the body remained inactive. 
Of course Durkheim's principal concern is not with the origins of religion but 
with its function in society, and he seeks to dismiss Tylor and his like as offering 
accounts which are trivial in comparison with his own analysis of religion as a 
formative force in society. His own functionalist theory of religion, of religion as it 
operates within societies, forming an intrinsic part of society and representing society 
to its members - as opposed to a theory of religious origins - is equally not my 
concern here. It is not clear to me how, on Durkheim's theory of what religion is, 
what I regard as elements of religion would actually originate. To take a particular 
case, it is not clear how the concept of invisible spirit beings would come into 
existence, or why it should come into existence. For me, if we are seeking origins, an 
account has to be given in terms of what individual people in prehistory could have 
done or thought. Tylor has done this better than most. 
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APPENDIX 10A 
Identity of an Eleusinian psychotropic agent 
Ergot 
My principal sources for the following are Hoffmann (1978: 25 -35) and Ruck 
(1978a: 47). 
In the Middle Ages there were epidemics of hallucinations, convulsions and 
deaths, sometimes attributed to witchcraft, which have since been diagnosed as due 
to ergotism, poisoning by flour contaminated with ergot. The Salem witchcraft 
episode has been plausibly linked with an outbreak of ergotism. The last major 
outbreak was in France in the early 1950s. Ergot is the sclerotium of a fungus 
Claviceps which is parasitic on cereal grasses such as rye, barley, wheat, millet, and 
`wild rye grass' (Paspalum distichum), also known as tares. The dark brownish 
(`purple') sclerotium adheres to the grain -bearing ear or the stalk just below it, 
looking almost like an extra ear, and, if the grain is not harvested, eventually falls 
off. Where it lands on the ground, mushrooms may sprout, which are the fruiting 
bodies of the fungus. Different varieties of ergot grow on different grasses, and 
different varieties on the same grass. Wild rye grass is said to be particularly prone to 
infestation by ergot. 
The effects of ergot are due to the psychoactive alkaloids present in varying 
concentrations. These include ergine (lysergic acide amide), ergonovine (lysergic 
acid propanolamide), and others of the ergotamine and ergotaxine groups. Lysergic 
acid amide is the nucleus common to most ergot and some other alkaloids. The 
morning -glory seeds used to prepare the strongly hallucinatory ololiuqui of the 
Aztecs, still used in Mexico (Schultes 1990: 17 -22), contain ergine and ergonovine, 
as well as lysergic acid hydroxyethylamide. In 1943 Hoffmann synthesized LSD, 
lysergic acid diethylamide, another ergine derivative. LSD is the most powerful 
hallucinogen known. The main alkaloid in the magic mushrooms traditionally used 
by the Mazatec of Mexico for divination is psilocybin ( Schultes 1990: 10). For a 
given quantity, Hoffman says ergonovine is five times as potent as psilocybin, and 
LSD is twenty times as potent as ergonovine. In ergot of barley and wheat, the main 
alkaloids are variants of ergotaxine and ergotamine, but ergonovine is also present. 
Only the last is soluble in water. However, in ergot of wild rye grass (tares), the main 
alkaloids are ergine and lysergic acid hydroxyethylamide, which are both water - 
soluble. 
In the Homeric Hymn, Demeter plants barley in the Rarian Plain adjacent to 
Eleusis. The barley used to prepare the kykeon for the Mysteries would presumably 
have been harvested there. Ancient Greek herbalists would have recognized the 
varieties of cereals and the ergot which grew on them. If ergot -contaminated barley 
were used to prepare the kykeon, the water -soluble ergonovine would have been 
ingested in the potion. If the priests had also used the wild rye grass also to be found 
in the Rarian Plain and even more probably infested with ergot, they would have 
added ergine and lsyergic acid hydroxyelthylamide to the concoction. The ergot 
could have been powdered in any case. Hoffmann has no doubt that herbalist priests 
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attached to the sanctuary of Eleusis would have learned over the centuries which 
varieties and combinations generated the most potent effects. Ruck points out that the 
priests may have cultivated fields there specifically to grow ergot -contaminated 
cereals, given that large quantities must have been required for the thousands who 
attended the Mysteries every year (1978c: 117 -118). The composition of the kykeon 
was probably the ultimate secret, known only to the Hierophant and his assistants. 
In 415 BCE there was a scandal at Athens when the Mysteries were profaned. 
The famous military commander Alcibiades and others had been conducting some 
part of the ceremony in their own homes in the course of drunken revels. Ruck's 
hypothesis is that herbalists other than those of Eleusis may have become aware of 
developments in production of the ingredients for the kykeon, and made use of this 
knowledge to create their own for the drinking pleasure of wealthy citizens. This 
would explain the fact that the Eleusinian authorities were not involved in the 
profanation: evidently it was possible to conduct it without possessing genuine 
`sacred objects' from Eleusis. This also indicates that the hiera were not specific 
objects such as Mylonas's putative relics from Mycenean times (Ruck 1978a: 37; 
1978b: 53; 1978c: 79). 
In addition to the kykeon, Ruck reports mention in some Christian writers of 
a cake, pelanos, which was served to initiates, possibly to break the fast of the sixth 
day before the telete. The cake was made of barley and wheat, and was broken into 
pieces and served to all participants (1978b: 55). If this information is correct, then 
of course the cake provided an additional opportunity to administer a dose of any and 
all the ergot alkaloids, water -soluble or not. However, pelanos and kykeon together 
begin to resemble Christian bread and wine rather suspiciously. 
Problems of the ergot hypothesis 
Valencic (1994) raises some difficulties, as follows. Two forms of ergot are 
involved: ergot of barley, Claviceps purpurea, and ergot of paspalum (wild rye 
grass), Claviceps paspali. 
In the former, the water -soluble alkaloid is ergonovine. This is used today 
obstretrically as a uterotonic. As women participated in the Mysteries, there is a 
question about the possibility of miscarriage. Self -experiments with ergonovine by 
modern researchers, including Hoffmann, produced variable effects. These were 
doses of the pure chemical, not aqueous infusions from ergot. Small doses gave 
visual distortion accompanied by leg cramps and lassitude, salivation and vertigo. At 
the largest doses, hallucinatory effects were comparable to those of low doses of 
psilocybin, but the somatic effects were inhibitingly painful. The natural ergot 
alkaloids are narcotic as well as hallucinogenic, and the experimenters were 
additionally reduced to a dreamy state. These do not sound like Eleusinian 
experiences of ecstasy, and there is no ancient report of unpleasant side effects. 
Instead of ergot of barley, ergot of wild grass, containing the water -soluble 
ololiuqui alkaloids, could have been the active ingredient of the kykeon. However, to 
my knowledge, no self -experiments have been published. Valencic observes that if 
cattle graze on pastures of wild grass infected with Claviceps paspali they contract a 
neurological disorder manifested in tremors and failure of coordination. Claviceps 
paspali contains five tremorgenic substances. If these are not water -soluble, then it is 
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just possible that a kykeon could have been made from ergot of wild rye without 
inducing unpleasant or dangerous tremors in the initiates (Valencic 1994: 329 -334). 
However, there would have been a risk that some particles of ergot might remain in 
the potion unless it were strained very thoroughly. The putative pelanos cake, if 
made with flour containing dry powdered ergot and therefore potentially all the 
tremorgenic substances, was presumably not made from Claviceps paspali. Even so, 
there remains the testimony of Plutarch apud Stobaeus, quoted in Chapter 10, of 
shuddering and shivering. Perhaps the herbalists of Eleusis had perfected the 
quantities and combination of ergot ingredients so as to reduce the risk of tremors, 
but were unable to eliminate the latter completely without compromising a sufficient 
psychoactive effect. 
Valencic argues that the question will remain open until someone conducts 
what he calls the `acid test' of experiments which duplicate the infusion process and 
human ingestion of the resulting potion, rather than administration of synthetic pure 
ergoline alkaloids. On the basis of pure ergonovine experiences, the case for ergot 
does not look convincing. If ergot is not the source of the mystical experience of 
Eleusis, another psychoactive plant must be sought. Some have suggested opium in 
combination with ergoline alkaloids. Representations of Demeter showing poppy 
flowers and seed capsules are well known (Kerenyi 1967: 75; Ripinsky -Naxon 1993: 
159). However, opium is said to inhibit the effects of LSD, and might therefore be an 
antagonist of other ergoline alkaloids. Opium on its own is an unlikely candidate 
because opium dreams do not resemble the vivid waking hallucinations which one 
envisages for Eleusis. The possibility of a psilocybian mushroom is reopened 
(Valencic 1994: 333 -335). 
Bulbous plants at Agrai 
Ruck notes that Greek mythology has several stories of maidens being carried 
off while gathering flowers (e.g., Eurydice, Creusa, Helen), and suggests that this 
may be a metaphor for being overcome by psychoactives. The abduction of Kore 
happened in the course of gathering some bulbous plant, according to Aristophanes.1 
In the course of the Lesser Mysteries, a bulbous plant was `hunted' at Agrai. 
It is not known whether all initiands took part or merely assisted in the hunt. The 
bulb was not cultivated but found wild, being an antithesis of the cultivated grain. It 
might therefore metaphorically abduct the maiden but not send her back. Certain 
depictions on urns connected with Eleusis seem to show mushrooms, the stalks being 
too thick to be the stems of higher plants. Many depictions have conventionally been 
interpreted by classical scholars as phalluses, but some quite clearly are mushrooms 
(Ruck 1978c: 87, 105, 115, 121 -122; 1986: 165). 
If the bulbous plant at Agrai was hallucinogenic, mushroom or not, could it 
have become a secret ingredient of the kykeon or pelanos at Eleusis later in the year? 
Given that the original cult at Eleusis was a local and family affair, one is inclined to 
wonder whether, with hardly anyone to initiate each year, an initiation ceremony 
could take place on anything like the scale of later events, or even at all. Is it possible 
that mystical initiation was a component of the cult only after the Athenians took it 
over and connected it with an originally unconnected cult at Agrai involving a hunt 
Aristophanes, Clouds 187 -192. The word bolbous is sometimes translated `truffles', i.e. fungi. 
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for mushrooms? For all I know, these questions may have been answered, but in the 
present context I am obliged to desist from the hunt. 
Appendix l0A 327 
APPENDIX 10B 
Identity of a soma and haoma psychotropic agent 
The major contenders for the original and principal active ingredient are the 
fly agaric mushroom, Amanita muscaria, found in forests of temperate and arctic 
latitudes, and Syrian rue, Peganum harmala, a weed common in the Middle East. 
Fly agaric 
The fly agaric has been the principal psychoactive plant used by shamans and 
tribespeople in Siberia and Central Asia, and also in North America. Among them it 
produced stupor, euphoria, invigoration, frenzy, inspiration, dreams and splendid, 
wonderful and extraordinary images (Wasson 1968: 156, 159, 239, 244 -245, 256- 
257, 260, 262, 282). 
From the apparent references to the soma drink or plant in the Rig Veda, the 
points in favour of the fly agaric are held to be these. (1) No mention is made of 
leaves, branches or flowers, as one would expect for a higher plant but not for a 
fungus. (2) Soma grew only in the mountains. The fly agaric grows in woodland at 
the base of birch and conifers, not on the plains. This explains why in post -Vedic 
times other plants were substituted, as the real soma became harder to obtain and 
eventually unavailable. (3) The pressed juice was a tawny colour, as is the extract of 
fly agaric. (4) Soma shone like the sun and was radiant. This is said to be an allusion 
to the bright red cap of the fly agaric, which also can be seen from a distance in 
moonlight. (5) Soma abandons its envelope. This is said to be an allusion to the white 
envelope which encloses the mushroom when it first grows, until the red cap bursts 
through, whereupon the envelope falls back, also revealing the stem or stipe. (6) In 
soma rituals urine is referred to. In Siberia the urine of one who has eaten fly agaric 
is also psychoactive; it is consumed by other people, who then also become 
intoxicated. Of all the hallucinogens, this characteristic applies only to the fly agaric 
(Wasson 1968). 
The raw fly agaric contains muscimole and ibotenic acid. Drying induces the 
ibotenic acid to convert to muscimole, increasing the psychoactivity of the fly agaric. 
It has been shown that muscimole is not metabolized and is indeed present in the 
urine of a subject (Schultes and Hofmann 1992: 85). 
In post -Vedic times substitutes were used in the rituals, which were no longer 
expected to produce ecstatic states. Wasson (1968: 96 -100) argues that substitutes 
were employed because the genuine soma plant could not be obtained except by 
trade from the northern highland areas. 
In a review of Wasson's 1968 book, the Sanskritist Ingalls (1971) accepts the 
identification of soma with fly agaric. He regards previous candidates, including 
Ephedra, Sarcostemma, rhubarb, hops and cannabis, as failing to meet the Vedic 
descriptions. However, among other points, he does not accept the alleged urine- 
drinking reference. One of Wasson's crucial verses is Rig Veda VIII.4.10, in which 
Indra is addressed: `Drink soma as much as you want, pissing it out day by day'. 
Ingalls says this refers to Indra drinking it so much he simply urinates it every day: 
there is no suggestion that anyone will drink the urine. Another striking verse is 
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IX.74.4, which Renou, the translator favoured by Wasson, renders as `The lords 
[storm gods] with full bladders piss the soma quick with movement'. Ingalls 
translates it as `The fructifying men piss it down as it is sent'. He imagines this hymn 
as describing the ritual preparation of soma. The priests have pounded the fly agarics 
and pressed the juice, and now they pour it through `the god -inviting skin', the 
woollen filter, into a trough containing water and milk. The `pissing' is a metaphor 
of pouring. Another Sanskritist, O'Flaherty, contributes a chapter in support of 
Wasson's theory in his 1968 book. However, in her later translation of selections 
from the Rig Veda (1981), she renders the relevant passage as `The swollen men piss 
the soma set in motion ", but interprets `the swollen men' as storm gods in the guise 
of rain clouds. 
Kuiper's (1970) review doubts the value of the Rig Veda as evidence for pre - 
Indian practice, as it was primarily sacred tradition and composed on the Indian 
plain, not in the earlier homeland. Wasson, regarding post -Vedic Indian literature as 
irrelevant on the ground that it already contains ritualistic interpretation and 
mystification, believes that the hymn writers of the Rig Veda knew nothing of later 
philosophizing but were describing actual experiences (Wasson 1970: 291 -292). In 
the same vein, Ingalls (1971: 191) says: `It seems to me to add not a little to our 
understanding of Vedic literature to know that an hallucinogen lies at the base of the 
second [soma] cycle of Vedic hymns'. 
For me, the problem with the fly agaric hypothesis is the nature of the 
experiences produced. Wasson (1968: 74 -75) describes his own experiment with it, 
along with colleagues in Japan. Taking it fresh, they enjoyed no effects at all, with 
the exception of one Japanese researcher who toasted his fly agaric over a fire before 
eating it. He had a striking mystical experience. Other experimenters have also 
encountered wide variability, and some think the fly agaric experience inadequate to 
account for the Vedic descriptions (Devereux 1997: 77 -78). Present -day 
`psychonauts' experiment with drugs and some write up their experiences on the 
Internet. Checking through these, I again found mixed results. Most reported 
virtually no consequences at all, although they were allowing the fly agaric to dry out 
in preparation, as has always been done by Asiatic shamans. One said Amanita 
intensified the mood, whether upbeat or depressive. One person has eaten several fly 
agaric daily, attaining no more than a certain euphoria and certainly no mystical 
experience; for him and his family it is a general tonic. One subject, on the other 
hand, described the most powerful illumination of his life, with an out -of -the -body 
experience and controllable flight. 
It is to be expected that effects will vary. Factors must include the soil 
conditions in which a plant has grown, the quantity and density of the substance 
consumed and the subject's physiology and neurological predispositions, let alone set 
and setting. A shaman in training is taught what to expect by an established 
practitioner, and usually interprets his or her experiences accordingly (Sullivan 1994: 
31 -32). In western recreational use, I suspect the attitude of `I want an experience' 
may militate against achievement of the objective. Even so, for an hallucinogen as 
striking as soma seems to have been, one would expect pharmacological effects to be 
1 On first encountering this verse in translation as `The swollen men piss the flowing soma', I 
imagined a line of stoned -out sadhus with tightly closed eyes and ecstatic grins urinating copiously 
into bowls, which their acolytes wait eagerly to take up. 
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powerful enough in their own right to cause something to happen for the subject, 
whatever the preexisting mood. 
Harm el 
Syrian rue or harmel, Peganum harmala, is proposed by Flattery and 
Schwartz (1989), who take their prime evidence from the Avesta, rather than the Rig 
Veda. They argue that the Vedic descriptions are unreliable. 
Harmel is readily available all over the Middle East as a weed which springs 
up in the waste alongside human occupation sites. It is thought to have been spread 
round the Mediterranean by Moslem migrations, but is not known to have occurred 
in India until some time before 1030 CE (Flattery and Schwartz 1989: 35 -42), two 
thousand years after the Vedic era. This would seem to preclude its use as soma. 
However, Flattery and Schwartz (1989: 7 -9) argue that one need not accept the 
hymns of the Rig Veda as genuine accounts of ecstatic experiences. On their 
hypothesis, the hymns no longer represent soma as intended to cause intoxication in 
the priests themselves, as it is represented in Iranian tradition, but as an offering to 
Indra. This is a purely Indian development, but already appearing in the oldest Indian 
texts, which therefore do not represent tradition from the proto -Indo- Iranian era. As 
this conclusion is incompatible with Ingalls' analysis outlined above, I find it 
problematical. 
The strongest argument for harmel is that it contains the ß- carboline alkaloids 
harmine and harmaline, which are among the psychoactives in the South American 
ayahuasca or yagé drink. Given the reliability of yagé in producing mind -altering 
effects, on a prima facie basis this would make harmel a very plausible candidate. 
Among the recorded effects of yagé have been euphoria, flight, visions of sublime 
beauty, vivid colours, gorgeous scenery, stark terror, encounters with wild animals 
and nature spirits, and `phantasmagoria' (Harper 1968; 1973b; Naranjo 1973; 
Reichel -Dolmatoff 1972: 86 -96). 
On the other hand, yagé is not made from rue but mainly from the vine 
Banisteriopsis caapi, which contains harmine, harmaline and d- tetrahydroharmine. It 
is usual, however, for the South American Indians to add a variety of other plants to 
the brew, using different additives to alter the psychoactive effects for different 
occasions. Particularly noted are Banisteriopsis rusbyana and Psychotria viridis, 
which do not contain harmala alkaloids but large amounts of N,N- 
dimethyltryptamine and other tropane alkaloids. The activity of the tropane alkaloids 
is inhibited by enzymes in the body, but those enzymes are in turn inhibited by ß- 
carboline alkaloids. The combination therefore results in much more powerful 
hallucinatory effects than any of the plants would have on their own (Schultes 1990: 
38 -39; Callaway 1999). Devereux (1997: 76) reports opinion that harmaline is a 
minor constituent of yagé and the observation that there is no evidence of additives 
to haoma in ancient Iran. 
Other views 
Some workers such as Ripinsky -Naxon (1993: 165, 248) continue to support 
the fly agaric hypothesis. Sherratt (1995: 30) supports the harmel hypothesis in the 
sense that harmel may have been one of several constituents of soma. 
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Sherratt (1995: 29 -30) and Rudgley (1998) draw attention to recently 
excavated fortified oasis sites in Turkmenistan. At one site, Gonur South, dating 
from the early second millennium BCE, there is a structure believed to be a fire 
temple, which has an inner shrine in which ceramic bowls and strainers have been 
found. Some bowls contained remains of cannabis and Ephedra. A site dating from 
the middle second millennium has a shrine with mixing and straining equipment, but 
no plant remains. Finally, a late second millennium site, Togoluk 2, also has a shrine, 
in which were bowls containing the remains of Ephedra and poppies. This region is 
within the presumed early- second -millennium homeland of the proto -Indo- Iranians, 
and fire rituals were the characteristic inheritance of the Iranians and Indians. 
Rudgley concludes that combinations of Ephedra, opium and cannabis were the 
original soma or haoma, and emphasizes that this hypothesis is the only one 
supported by archaeological evidence. The only problem I see with this hypothesis is 
the nature of the experiences, because, if the evidence of the Rig Veda and the 
Avesta is accurate, then an hallucinogen seems to be indicated rather than a soporific 
or euphoriant. 
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APPENDIX 10C 
Identity of an Egyptian psychoactive agent 
Mandrake (Mandragora) has been venerated in many countries because of 
the humanoid shape which the roots sometimes assume. As with other solanaceous 
plants including henbane and belladonna, the whole plant, but especially the seeds 
and roots, contains the tropane alkaloids atropine, hyoscyamine and scopolamine, of 
which the last is the most active. Scopolamine is also the main psychoactive 
constituent of a concoction made from the leaves and stems of Brugmansia by 
Andean natives for healing and other shamanic practices. Scopolamine intoxication 
has been said to include visual distortions, a violent phase with convulsions, 
hallucinations of sight, taste and smell, followed by narcosis during which 
hallucinations may continue (Schultes and Hoffman 1992: 73, 86 -90, 129). 
Three alkaloids have been found in the white water lily: apomorphine, 
nuciferine and nornuciferine (Schultes and Hoffman 1992: 66 -67). Emboden 
discusses at length the use of the white lily among the Maya in Central America, as 
indicated by archaeological remains, including depictions. There, in the view of 
Dobkin de Rios (1974) and Emboden (1981), priests consumed the white lily to 
achieve altered states of consciousness. Dobkin de Rios (1974: 151) theorizes that 
the cosmology, in particular their emphasis on time, of the Maya owes much to 
trance experiences in which the subject's sense of time and space was altered. 
In a recent television programme', an attempt was made to verify whether the 
blue lily has psychoactive properties. The flowers were soaked in water and the 
water and petals consumed. Subjects reported feeling carefree and `cheeky'. A report 
on the Internet of a more recent experience describes sedation, emotions in abeyance, 
and absence of the sensory overload which the subject associates with other drugs. 
Another describes no effect for the first two hours, then placidity and giggliness, 
some visual distortion, then twelve hours' sleep, followed by another whole day of 
serenity, dreaming and an affectionate attitude to other people, summarized as `two 
days of bliss'. In these cases the subjects not only had drunk a boiled tea made from 
the flowers and rhizomes but also smoked some material. There was no nausea. 
Without accurate details of quantities and methods, the descriptions are not of 
clinical value, but the quality of the experiences seems consistent: tranquillity, 
goodwill, euphoria. While the lily appears not to be an hallucinogen, one suspects 
that the blissful effect if prepared along with an hallucinogenic extract of mandrake 
would be striking. 
Sacred Weeds, Channel Four Television 1998, hosted by A. Sherratt. 
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APPENDIX 11A 
A psychodynamic theory of religiosity 
A comprehensive account in Freudian psychodynamic terms of the religious 
attitude in general and of the calling of the religious specialist is given by La Barre 
(1970a: esp. 17 -19, 93 -115), taking into account previous work (e.g., Róheim 1930). 
His approach is of merit in that it deals with the genesis of ideas in individuals. I 
think insights are to be gained from La Barre, but find some areas problematical. In 
summarizing below I do not wilfully seek to distort. First, I summarize the alleged 
ontogenetic origins for all humans of religious ideas. Later I come to religious 
specialists in particular. 
People in general 
Before birth, no demands are made on the foetus. When it is born, it utters a 
cry of rage because it has been deprived of the oceanic security of the womb. The 
baby makes demands, which are met by the mother. What it wants it receives. At 
some point, the baby is potty trained. It learns that things which the body does can be 
bad and that control of the body has to be learned. `Sphincter morality' is the 
beginning of ethics. 
At some point, the father intrusively comes on the scene. The child is 
disturbed to fmd that it is not the only recipient of the mother's affection and 
attention. Even apart from Oedipal feelings, the child's relation to the father is 
ambiguous. The mother loves and gives unconditionally, but the father makes 
demands. The child wishes to be loved and accepted by the father, but finds he (the 
discussion is mostly about boys) has to meet expectations to gain approval. The 
father rewards the righteous and punishes the wicked. The father is the first power 
the child has encountered which does not respond to wishes by granting them. The 
automatic granting of wishes by the mother has encouraged a sense that wishful 
thinking produces desired results. The child has a sense of being able to command all 
he wishes. This sense manifests in adult supernatural dealings as magic. The father's 
immovability is a body blow to the infantile sense of omnipotence. In addition, the 
boy child discovers that the father has a penis and so does he; he also discovers that 
there are girls, who do not have penises. This means `in naïve male terms' that girls 
once had penises but have had them taken away as a punishment for being bad, and 
they are therefore to be despised. From the girl's point of view, on the other hand, the 
absence of a penis represents `cosmic unfairness'. The boy child now has a 
`castration' fear, that his penis (not his testicles, curiously) may be removed, 
presumably by the father. The child has to reconcile himself to the negation of his 
own omnipotence and to the existence of an omnipotent being outside himself in the 
person of the father. He cannot command the father as he can the mother; but he can 
plead and earn rewards. This sense manifests in adult supernatural dealings as 
religion. 
As the child grows to adulthood, he learns with dismay that even his father is 
not omnipotent. The failure of the father and of other men to demonstrate perfect 
fatherhood by being omnipotent does not cause the child to give up the sense that 
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there ought to be a perfect omnipotent father. Instead he projects his wish into the 
supernatural realm, where the result is God. In early childhood, the father has himself 
been a mysterium tremendum et fascinosum' .1 
On this theory, a full `psychosexual' adjustment to adulthood results in what I 
would call a rationalist approach to the world. Growing up, the adult accepts that 
neither he nor the father is omnipotent, and does not yearn for a return to a blissful 
foetal or baby state. Instead, he accepts the world as an external Other which is 
unresponsive to wishes or pleading, because it is indifferent and impersonal, but 
which can be manipulated by the application of objective knowledge about it. He 
looks forward to learning about the world through common sense and science. An 
imperfect adjustment, arrested at the oral stage of only personal awareness, is 
manifested by the magical attitude, which retains the infantile conception of personal 
omnipotence. The person thinks that symbolic actions unconnected with their object 
but laden with wishing can make things happen. Another imperfect adjustment, 
reflecting arrested development at the phallic stage, which includes more developed 
social awareness, is the religious attitude. This retains the conception of the father's 
omnipotence, but stripped from the father and projected onto a deity. The person 
thinks that praying and good deeds can bring rewards. 
The religious specialist 
As for the religious specialist, his or her attitudes to the supernatural represent 
in a heightened form those of the average person who has not made the adjustment to 
fully functioning adulthood. If the male child does not accept his own non - 
omnipotence or the non -omnipotence of the father, then he is locked into a `phallic 
paranoid' stance. The boundary between god and self is fluid. The same individual 
may be a prophet speaking for his god, indeed `the priest of his father's godhood', or 
the god himself. The paranoid becomes the vatic personality. In society, the vatic 
personality takes the form of magician or priest: which form is assumed depends on 
cultural context and the individual's stage of psychosexual development. The male 
vatic personality evinces a degree of femininity: he cajoles the father like a girl or is 
passive instead of expressing himself in a direct, manly way. The feminine qualities 
of the shaman and priest are manifested in the ethnographically widespread 
phenomenon of shamanic (and priestly) transvestism. 
When a practitioner commands spirits, he is a shaman; when he is possessed 
by them and only does what they command, he is a prophet: in either case, the spirits 
or god are really himself. When he submits to a personified god outside himself and 
beyond his command, the practitioner is a priest. In all cases, the practitioner has 
abandoned the growth to manly independence in favour of a paranoid means of 
coping with imagined omnipotence. The magician operates at a stage in which other 
people have not yet been discriminated: he manipulates `a vaguely impersonal 
mana'. The priest despises and fears the magician because he has outgrown that 
stage but could regress to it. The priest operates at a stage in which other persons 
La Barre (1970a) throughout uses the word fascinosum, not Otto's fascinans. According to Lewis 
and Short, fascinosus, occurring classically only as a comparative fascinosior, means `having a large 
membrum virile'. This is from fascinum, which means either `witchcraft' or membrum virile, from the 
amulet of that shape hung round a child's neck to protect against witchcraft. This is a strange error 
from the erudite La Barre, unless indeed he means to be ironical. 
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have been discerned, in particular a personal Other whom he strives to obey and 
placate. 
`God' is not a semantic but a phatic term: it does denote or connote anything 
but expresses the speaker's oedipal constitution, how he feels about the world. 
Arguments about the nature of God are `an irrational hurling of individual oedipal 
convictions at one another'. The god- concept is a relic from infantile narcissism. 
Problems and insights of the psychoanalytic approach 
I am sure many critiques have been written of this and accounts like it. Mine 
may be brief and naïve but should be clear.2 
The sense of omnipotence in babyhood is credible, because a baby is only 
beginning to recognize the boundaries of the self and is having its wishes gratified on 
demand. The father as immovable and representing the source of only conditional 
rewards is more problematical. 
Firstly, social fatherhood is not universal, pace La Barre (1970a: 12). In 
western societies one -parent families usually contain only the mother, and, with the 
dispersal of the extended family and the preponderance of women schoolteachers 
(disapproved of by La Barre (1970a: 103)), a child may scarcely meet a man until his 
teens. Of course a strict woman could probably represent the social father, and could 
even give rise to castration fear. Indeed, Devereux (1980: 231) states that, in an 
increasingly matriarchal society like the United States when he wrote in the mid - 
twentieth century, the `genuine phantasmatic castrator' is the `phallic mother'. 
Presumably her motivation for the threat is penis envy rather than omnipotence, and 
her possession of the latter ought anyway to be incomplete in a boy's view if he 
knows she lacks a penis. 
Secondly, I doubt whether in modern societies, outside abusive families, 
many little girls or boys have ever witnessed the `primal scene' or have seen, known 
or cared much about each others' or their parents' penises or lack of them. 
Thirdly, certainly Freud and even La Barre in 1970 wrote before the balance 
had quite tipped in favour of the feminization and infantilization of western society, a 
process which has taken place in the last decades of the twentieth century and is 
ongoing (cf Devereux 1980: 230 -234). I suspect that modern fathers, `in touch with 
their feminine side', make few demands of behaviour or performance from their sons 
and are likely to be indulgent as mothers. Fathers and men in general are in the 
twenty -first century much less likely to be authority figures in a child's life than they 
have been in any of the previous five thousand years. The interpersonal landscape of 
childhood must have been changed considerably by child- centred approaches to 
parenting and education. If the development of the individual, and particularly his 
religious development, is much the same with or without a `father' or authority figure 
in early childhood - in the person of either a strict man or a strict woman - then this 
theory, predicating so much on the authority figure, has difficulty. 
An obvious research project would be to determine whether the most basic 
religious conceptions of people born since about 1980, many of whom must be the 
2 Admittedly, since I do not `command' dynamic psychiatry, I ought not to say anything (La Barre 
1970a: 49). 
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product of a child- centred upbringing, are different from those of people who 
reached adulthood before about 1990, who antedate many of those developments. 
One would examine the incidence of ideas of God as a father figure, mother figure or 
something else, of the belief that one can make things happen by magic, and so forth. 
Of course there are other variables, but some relevant results might be delivered. 
La Barre's theory is copiously stated for boys, but sketchily for girls. It is not 
at all clear how a girl is supposed to become religious, since the father does not 
figure as so great a threat to her as to a boy, yet religiosity is at least as prevalent 
among women as among men, and ethnographical literature is replete with accounts 
of witches and shamanesses. 
The claim that the idea of God is generated from the image of the father 
seems to account for the stern God of the Old Testament and some varieties of 
Christianity and Islam. I refer to the stern Biblical God as perceived by modern 
westerners, since Old Testament scholars have long observed that Yahweh has some 
androgynous features (Robertson Smith 1927: 517). Perhaps even the high gods 
alleged for primal societies by Lang and Schmidt could be explained this way, 
although their usually otiose position renders them unimportant for everyday life, 
whereas one would expect a father deity to figure strongly. However, the claim does 
not account at all for the polytheism of antiquity, with its often absurd and rogue 
gods who are not authority figures, or the belief in a multiplicity of frequently 
nameless and indefinite spirits and an absence of genuine gods found in simple tribal 
societies. No doubt one can contrive some adjustment. La Barre does refer frequently 
to Zeus and other mythical figures, but in lyrical phrases which do nothing to resolve 
this question. 
A further problem is that, if the projections which become our gods are the 
product of our wish to fmd omnipotence and gratification, there is some reason to 
expect them to be benign. While deities are often addressed as if they are benign, 
there tends to be a degree of `godly fear' in the supplicant, and I should think from 
the literature on shamanism and ancient religions the majority of supernatural beings 
are probably imagined as malign or capricious. One could say that a capricious or 
malign projection accounts for the fact that, as often as not, the deity does not grant 
our wishes. Certainly, while a god may be projection, it is not the product of wishful 
thinking (Guthrie 1993: 13 -14, 74 -75). 
La Barre (1970a: 48 -50) states that there are two objections to the psychiatric 
(psychoanalytic) study of religion: the methodological (treating cultures like 
individuals: for example, as being capable of disorientation) and the emotional (the 
student's refusal to accept the infantile origin of his own religious outlook), and both 
can be dismissed. I would add a third objection: the ambiguous scientific status of 
psychoanalytic theory. This question was raised in Chapter 2, with some references. 
The psychoanalytic theory can account for any conceivable human behaviour. Since 
it appears that no logically possible occurrence need count as showing that the theory 
is false - interpretations can always be contrived to save the theory - it ought not to 
be counted as science. 
One can assent to the depiction of the shaman, prophet or priest as deluded 
when commanding spirits, relaying the commands of a god or supplicating a 
supposedly external deity. They are deluded because the supernatural beings are 
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creations of the subjects' own imagination. However, it is not necessary to accept the 
claim that the supernatural beings are imagined because the subjects are retarded in 
their psychosexual development. First, the theory itself is problematical, for the 
reasons given above. Second, other theories to be described below can account for 
certain individuals' vocation or predilection for the supernatural, and these theories 
require no distinctions of gender. 
There are two separate questions. (1) Is the florid behaviour of some shamans 
and certain religious behaviour of people generally symptomatic of mental disorder? 
The answer is probably yes. (2) Do these disorders result from arrested psychosexual 
development? The answer is probably no. 
It is possible to make use of observations and insights regarding abnormal 
behaviour, interpreted as symptomatic of psychological disorders, without 
subscribing to the psychosexual theory of the basis of such disorders. The theory of 
stages of infant psychosexual development, with reference to oral, anal and phallic 
stages, along with many other original Freudian doctrines, has been discarded by 
some modern practitioners of dynamic psychiatry (Malan 1995: 205 -206). More 
generally, it is probably useful to follow modern practice of distinguishing between 
disorders which are demonstrably organic or physiological in origin and those which 
are non -organic or functional, manifesting only in behaviour and adjustment 
(Greenfield 1996: 163; Frude 1998: 13 -14). For example, obsessive -compulsive 
behaviour is an organic disorder associated with dysfunction of the caudate nucleus, 
striatum and frontal lobe, and can be treated successfully with drugs (Carter 1998: 
59 -63; Frude 1998: 63 -64). 
La Barre is, I think, correct in saying that a magical or religious 
(supernaturalist) approach to the world is learned adaptively but used inappropriately 
(1970a: 117). The supernaturalist approach treats the world at large as being 
composed primarily of persons, entities which can be asked, cajoled, bullied and 
deceived. In early childhood, adapting to a world of humans who look after us, we 
learn how to deal with other people. Some of us do not grow much beyond this stage: 
we fail to recognize that the majority of the universe is inanimate and indifferent to 
our needs and wants. We continue, inappropriately now, to try to command or 
entreat, as if the universe consists of or is ruled over by persons, instead of trying to 
learn the impersonal laws by which it actually operates. In Chapter 7 I propound 
Guthrie's (1993) theory that human beings, and indeed all animals, are adapted 
biologically by natural selection to treat the world as animate. We can therefore say 
that in early childhood our biologically innate personalist approach to the world 
(Guthrie) is confirmed psychologically by its success in dealing with immediate 
family in infancy (La Barre). But, if not relinquished in adulthood, it leads to 
mistakes in interpretation of the world at large, resulting in animatism (Chapter 7). 
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